Nandi Resistance to British Rule

1890–1906

A.T. Matson

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by A. T. MATSON

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PREFACE

At a meeting of the Nandi District Council in 1950, Senior Chief Elijah arap Chepkwony and his colleagues asked that the history of the tribe should be recorded. They were concerned that this should be done before those elders died who remembered the days when Nandi warriors were the scourge of present-day Western Kenya and the people resisted the imposition of foreign rule. Although I had been in the district for only a few months at the time, I was anxious to discover how a small tribe like the Nandi had managed to oppose the government for so long, when their numerically stronger neighbours had accepted British rule after little more than a token struggle.

I accordingly volunteered to collect all the information I could from official records and published works. These researches quickened my interest in the history of the tribe, and prompted me to extend the scope of the enquiry by recording reminiscences of the few surviving members of the Kablelach age-set and other elders. My official duties took me into the remotest parts of the district and gave me many opportunities, when walking with the elders by day or talking with them in camp during the evenings, to record, sift and check the information which they readily gave me. As the years passed by the intention to collect written sources and traditional accounts developed into a resolve to write a history of the Nandi, as an acknowledgement of the fourteen happy years I was privileged to spend among them.

The book was originally planned to deal only with the Nandi. But as the work progressed it became obvious this treatment was too limited, and that regard would have to be paid not only to events in neighbouring districts but also to what was happening at the time in the Uganda and East Africa Protectorates and the world outside. The inclusion of material concerning other Kalenjin tribes as well as the Kavirondo and Masai was, moreover, necessary since there were no detailed histories of these peoples to which the reader could be referred for comparative information.[1]

The study began as a comprehensive history of the Nandi tribe and district from earliest times to the end of the 1905-06 expedition, when the people gave up their long and valiant struggle for independence and shortly afterwards became the loyal and valued friends of their former adversaries. It was found, however, that such a course required a great deal of compression and the exclusion of a considerable amount of relevant material. It was decided, therefore, to attempt in the first place to give a circumstantial account of Nandi resistance to British rule, and to describe the administrative and military methods that were adopted by district officers and the government to contain and overcome that resistance. The importance of detail in relating the events of the pacification period has been stressed by Dame Margery Perham, who observed that a more balanced view of the imposition of British rule would only be possible after a close study of tribal reactions to administrative policies, and the analysis of the impulses behind the incidents of resistance.[2] An effort has been made to provide such a study and also to rationalise the thoughts and feelings of the Nandi on the events described. The latter, and much more difficult task has been undertaken in the light of discussions with Nandi elders on particular incidents, and of deductions formed as a result of my lengthy association with the people. Further studies are planned to complete the story of the first decade of Nandi resistance to British rule and to give an outline of the traditional history of the tribe.

A work which has had a gestation period of nearly twenty years necessarily owes much to a multitude of people who have provided me with information and favoured me with their comments and criticism on various topics. I would ask all those who have helped in this way to accept this anonymous acknowledgement as a mark of my sincere gratitude for the assistance they generously gave me. I cannot, however, allow this occasion to pass without expressing my special thanks to Mrs. M. A. Haines, Mrs. M. Hemphill, Mrs. E. Huxley and Mrs. K. Stahl, Professors D. A. Low and R. A. Manners, Doctors T. H. R. Cashmore, A. H. Jacobs, J. M. Lonsdale, G. H. Mungeam, M. P. K. Sorrenson, J. E. G. Sutton and G. S. Were, Lord Claud Hamilton. Lt.-Col. H. Moyse-Bartlett, Messrs. G. Bennett, L. Branney, C. E. Hobley, Taita arap Towett, J. M. Weatherby, and the late J. J. Drought, W. R. Foran, M. F. Hill, F. D. Hislop and Col. R. Meinertzhagen. My task has been made immeasurably easier by the friendly and expert help of Mr.

B. Cheeseman and Mr. D. H. Simpson and their assistants at the Colonial Office and Royal Commonwealth Society libraries respectively, and by the courteous efficiency of the staff of the British Museum, Church Missionary Society, Colonial Record Project, the Institutes of Commonwealth Studies at London and Oxford, Public Record Office, Rhodes House, Royal Geographical Society and St. Joseph's College, Mill Hill. In East Africa my researches were encouraged by the Kenya Government, and greatly facilitated by the understanding shown by the custodians of the Kenya and Uganda National Archives.

I am especially grateful to the late Mr. H. B. Thomas for his wise counsels and scholarly criticism, and deeply conscious of the debt I owe to my wife whose encouragement and understanding have spurred me on to bring the labour of years to fruition.

Finally, I should like to thank all my Kalenjin friends, who gave me cheerful and unstinting assistance in my enquiries. and in particular ex-Chief Kiprop arap Titi, with whom I walked and talked for countless hours discussing a subject about which he and his fellow-tribesmen showed unflagging interest. I would ask arap Titi to accept this book as token of my personal regard for him and the Nandi, and in the hope they will feel that *Chepkendi* has kept faith with his friends, and that some of the traditions which they generously shared with me have been faithfully preserved for future generations of the Nandi.

References

1. See p. 37 and bibliographical index for recent and forthcoming works on these tribes.
2. Harlow, Chilver and Smith (eds.), *History of East Africa*, II, pp. xx, xxi.

NOTE ON SPELLING AND ABBREVIATIONS

In order to avoid confusion between quoted passages and the text, tribal names are generally written in the form commonly used at the turn of the century. The correct name is given in brackets after the first entry in every case, for example Lumbwa (Kipsigis). The use of the misnomer, "Kavirondo", calls for special comment. It has been retained for the reason given above; and also because the district was officially designated Kavirondo in the 1890's and because it is often impossible to determine when the word is applied to the tribes in the district whether it refers to the Abaluyia, the Luo or to both peoples. The well-known but now discredited terms, "Nilo-Hamites", "Nilotes", etc., have also been retained, because the various alternatives suggested by ethnologists and linguists have yet to be generally accepted. Place names are usually those in current use but earlier variants are sometimes given in brackets, for example Kavirondo Gulf (Ugowe Bay). Titles, ranks and initials are given when a person is first mentioned but not otherwise, unless their omission would lead to confusion.

The following abbreviations are used in the references and occasionally in the text:

BRA	Buganda Residency Archives.
BLI	Bombay (Baluchi) Light Infantry.
CEUR	Chief Engineer, Uganda Railway.
Cmd.	Command (Parliamentary) Paper.
CMS	Church Missionary Society.
CO	Colonial Office.
COCP	Colonial Office Confidential Print.
Com.	Commissioner.
EAP	East Africa Protectorate.
ESA	Entebbe Secretariat Archives.
FO	Foreign Office.
FOCP	Foreign Office Confidential Print.
GEA	German East Africa.
IBEA	Imperial British East Africa Company.
IO	India Office.
JEAUNHS	Journal, East Africa and Uganda Natural History Society.
JRAI	Journal, Royal Anthropological Institute.
JRGS	Journal (and Proceedings), Royal Geographical Society.
KNA	Kenya National Archives.
KWN	Kenya Weekly News.
NCB	Nandi Station Cash Book.

pte.	Private letter.
pers. com.	Personal communication.
RSD	Ravine Station Diary.
TNR	Tanganyika Notes and Records.
tele.	Telegram.
Treas	The British Treasury.
UJ	Uganda Journal.
UR	Uganda Rifles.
URy	Uganda Railway.
URC	Uganda Railway Committee, London.
WO	War Office.
WOID	War Office Intelligence Division.
WP	Whitehouse Papers, Uganda Railway.
ZG	Zanzibar Gazette.

References to despatches are usually from Foreign Office confidential prints (FOCP), copies of which are to be found in the Entebbe Secretariat Archives. FO2 and other Public Record Office files are cited when they contain papers and minutes which were not printed. Much of the factual information not attributed to other sources has been taken from C. W. Hobley's personal diary covering the period between 1 October 1894 and 27 April 1897.

1

INTRODUCTORY

Origins

The genesis of the Nandi and the Nilo-Hamitic peoples, with whom they share affinities in matters of tradition, language and culture, is obscure. Apart from the fact that most members of the group lived at one time in territory to the north of their present habitats, accounts of the formation, dispersal and migrations of the several tribes are largely founded on conjecture. As is commonly the case among nomadic pastoralists, without a centralised authority in the form of a ruling dynasty or priestly caste, little light is shed on this problem by tribal legends or genealogies.* It is, however, unlikely that the cradleland of the Nilo-Hamites was farther south than the present Ethiopian boundary; and it is possible that the group was formed in the country between the River Omo and the Pibor tributaries of the Sobat. As the physical type, language and culture of the Nilo-Hamites are basically Nilotic, it can be inferred that Nilotes provided the main element of the mixture. The Hamitic progenitors responsible for introducing the characteristics that distinguish Nilo-Hamites from true Nilotes were possibly Galla or Sidama. No reliable estimate can be given for the period during which the mingling of the Nilotic and Hamitic strains occurred, and it is uncertain whether the three well-defined groups of present-day Nilo-Hamites were formed at the same time, or ever lived together as one people. If the latter was the case, it seems the constituent groups must have separated a long time ago, probably from a dispersal area north of Lake Rudolf and east of the Nile, that is to say in south-west Ethiopia or south-east Sudan. The northern migrants (Bari-Lotuko group) moved west and north-west towards and across the Nile; the southern Nilo-Hamites (the Kalenjin and Masai) migrated to the south; and the central group (the Karamojong-Turkana cluster) probably remained in the dispersal area for some time, before they, too, moved south into country through which their southern kinsmen had previously passed.* It is not known when the several groups left the main body, but it is probable that the migrations were made by successive waves over a long period of time. Before any of the southern or central Nilo-Hamites passed south of Lake Rudolf, certain of the agricultural areas of present-day Kenya and Uganda were occupied by Bantu peoples, and some of the forests and plains were inhabited by Dorobo hunters and pastoral Nilo-Hamites. The latter might have been the product of an earlier cross between Nilotic and Hamitic progenitors, or merely earlier emigrants from the Nilo-Hamitic cradleland.

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* There are genealogies of rain-makers and laibons in the Northern and Southern groups respectively.

The southern Nilo-Hamites

This group consists of the various Kalenjin and Masai tribes, and possibly the precursor pastoralists mentioned above. The peoples forming the Tatoga cluster in Tanganyika either fall within the Kalenjin division, or are descended from Nilo-Hamites who left the cradleland before the Kalenjin migrations. At the present time, the southern group occupies a solid block of country stretching from beyond Lake Eyassi in the south to the Karamoja-Turkana plains in the north. It is not certain whether the constituent tribes ever lived together as a group, though similarities of tradition, physical type, language and culture make this hypothesis more tenable in their case than in that of the Nilo-Hamites as a whole.†

The irruption of the southern group into and beyond the country around Lake Rudolf apparently took place in two main streams, probably at different periods of time and by different routes. The migrant waves passed either to the east of the lake by way of Mts. Kulal and Nyira, the Angata Mbarta and Suguta, or to the west on the line of the Moroto, Nepak (Kamalinga) and Kadam (Debasien) massifs. Most of the Masai sections began their journey after the main Kalenjin migration, and either pushed through some of the latter in a southerly or south-easterly direction, or passed to the east of areas under Kalenjin occupation.

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* "Kalenjin", a useful term coined in the last decade for the "Nandi-speakers"; it means "I say to you", i.e. we understand one another since we are one people.

† For example, circumcision and clitoridectomy are practised by all the tribes in the Southern group, but not by the Northern and Central Nilo-Hamites.

The Kalenjin contingents concentrated in the country bounded on the west by Mt. Elgon and on the east by the Suk and Cherangani Hills. It is debatable whether the first settlements were made on Elgon or the eastern hills, but it seems there was a considerable amount of wandering within the concentration area before some of the sections settled permanently, and others moved away to their present locations. The sojourn around Elgon must have lasted some time, and it was presumably during this period that the previously nomadic pastoralists modified their way of life in order to meet the requirements of a more settled mode of existence. Kalenjin traditions agree that at this time all the sections were members of one tribe; this seems a valid claim, since the similarity in language and culture throughout the group is most marked, and divergences from this norm can generally be explained by events that occurred after the sections had left the concentration area. The migration sequence among the various sections is not clear, but there is some evidence that the Tatoga and Suk (Pokot) moved away before the others and were the first to become tribal entities, occupying separate territories and speaking distinctive dialects. While the Kalenjin were living in the concentration area, they met the forest-dwelling Dorobo (Oggiek), and possibly the Nilo-Hamitic precursors who grazed the plains to the south. Groups of Bantu were still living on the western foothills of Elgon when the Kalenjin arrived, but others had already left the mountain and no conflicts with previous inhabitants are recorded in Kalenjin legends.* It is unlikely that the Bantu occupied the cold, forested upper slopes or the high plateau pastures, as these areas, which were the chosen habitat of the Kalenjin, were not suited to the agricultural pursuits of the Bantu.

Nandi migrations

The more adventurous Kalenjin sections, who migrated from the concentration area to their present locations in North Nyanza, Nandi and Kipsigis, travelled south by two major routes. The western contingents passed through the uninhabited North Nyanza forest to the Maseno Hills, and then proceeded to the northern margin of the Kavirondo Gulf, where they settled around the Kamoin salt lick.* During the course of this migration the Wangoma (Ngomomek) remained on the Kavujai Hills, and other sections stayed at other resting-places on the route. Some of the latter subsequently continued their travels, while others were annihilated or absorbed by the Bantu Kavirondo (Baluyia).† The main body left the Gulf littoral and ascended the Kakamega escarpment, where the section that eventually became the Nyangori (Terik) pushed on farther north, accompanied by the founders of the Nandi *pororosiek* of Kapsile and Kabianga. The section that later became the Nandi returned to the plains in the area round Njoiywai, and then climbed the escarpment to settle at Chemngal and Chebilat. These settlements were established by an Elgony (Kony) named Kakipoch, after whom the oldest Nandi *pororiet* is eponymously named. A few of the more enterprising spirits went south from the Njoiywai settlement and formed the Lumbwa (Kipsigis).

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* The Baganda are said to have left before 1,000 A.D.

The eastern contingents passed down the Kerio Valley, wandered about between the Kamasia Hills and Lake Baringo, and as far east as Rumuruti, before taking possession of the uninhabited Rift Valley grazing plains around Lake Nakuru. Here they later encountered the Segelai Masai, who pushed the Kalenjin back to the Kamasia Hills and Elgeyo.‡ After recruiting their forces, the Kalenjin returned to the Rift Valley and either drove the Segelai to the east, or pushed through them towards Mau in the Molo-Londiani area. Here the migrants split up: the main body moved south into Lumbwa, while the remainder turned west and joined their kinsmen at Chebilat. It is not certain whether the eastern migrants left the concentration area before or after their western colleagues, but traditions agree that when the former reached their destinations, after long and extensive wanderings, they found other Kalenjin groups already settled in Nandi and Lumbwa. Most of the ensuing migration waves followed the western route, where there was no opposition to be feared, rather than the eastern which necessitated crossing Masai occupied country in the Rift and Nyando Valleys.

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* Near the Kisumu aerodrome.

† Several Bantu Kavirondo clans are of Kalenjin origin. The Nyangori, whom the first Luo immigrants found in Kadimu *c.* 1500, presumably left the main group before it reached the Kavirondo Gulf.

‡ Those who remained behind in the first migration formed the Kamasia (Tugen), and those who stayed on the hills after the Segelai victory became the Lembus section of the Kamasia.

Kalenjin legends agree that the migrations were caused either by natural calamities resulting in famine, or the desire to seek better grazing and a more congenial habitat, and not by pressure from other peoples pushing down from the north. No date can be given with any certainty for the first settlements on the Nandi Plateau. Huntingford has suggested tentatively that Kakipoch arrived at Chebilat about the beginning of the seventeenth century, but the traditions of other tribes point to a much earlier date for the Nandi and Lumbwa migrations.* Both tribes were occupying part of their present locations before there was any considerable influx of Bantu into North Nyanza, before the Masai grazed the Rift Valley plains or the Uasin Gishu Plateau, before the Kisii (Gusii) completed their southern migration or the first Luo settlers arrived at Kadimu. As most of these events had taken place by the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Nandi and Lumbwa had presumably completed their first migrations a century or two before that date.

Topography

Nandi constitutes one of the western limits of the central East African Plateau, and extends from Mau (the western wall of the Rift Valley) to the Nyanza Plains, which form the littoral of the Kavirondo Gulf and Lake Victoria. The Nandi also occupied areas below the south escarpment in the middle and lower Nyando Valley, and on the North Nyanza Plain at the foot of the west escarpment. The southern and western limits of the Nandi Plateau are well defined by granite escarpments rising steeply from the plains below. The south escarpment, which towers 2,000 feet above the floor of the Nyando Valley (*c.* 4,000 feet), extends eastwards from the south-west corner of Nandi until it merges with the Tindiret and Mau ranges. Its western counterpart, which rises about 1,200 feet above the North Nyanza Plain, stretches in an unbroken line from the Yala Valley to Broderick

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* Huntingford's date is based on the questionable assumption that the cyclical age-set system, consisting of seven sets spanning 105 years, has remained constant. On this premise, and the tradition that the warriors with Kakipoch were from the Maina age-set, the Chebilat settlement might have begun in 1491, 1386 or 1281.

Falls, and then continues northwards to join the Elgon massif (14,000 feet). South and west of the gap which the River Yala has cut through the latter escarpment, Nandi territory lies at roughly the same altitude as the adjoining Nyanza areas of Tiriki, Nyangori and Kajulu. The cliff-like walls of the escarpments present a forbidding aspect to the inhabitants of the Kavirondo Plains, but provide the Nandi with a commanding position overlooking the almost featureless countryside below. This gave the Nandi considerable military advantages over their neighbours, since raiding parties could only find easy means of access to the Plateau from the extreme south-west. Elsewhere, the escarpments could only be scaled by means of steep, narrow watercourses, and the summit of the west escarpment was further protected by a wide belt of dense forest. The average elevation of the Plateau is around 6,000 feet, the general slope of the land being from north-east (Lessos 7,446 feet) to the Kibos Valley (*c.* 5,500 feet) in the south-west. In the south, the country slopes from east to west from the headwaters of the Nyando on Mau (*c.* 8,000 feet) to the Kavirondo Gulf (3,756 feet). In the north-west, a smaller, less precipitous escarpment extends from Osorongai (7,206 feet) to Kapkoimur, below which the land falls away to the Kipkarren-Turbo Valley (*c.* 5,700 feet).

The country contained within the walls of the escarpments forms two distinct topographical regions: the flat Uasin Gishu Plateau, which reaches its southern limits in North, Central and East Nandi; and the land south of the Yala headwaters, which is more undulating and terminates, in broken country with rocky outcrops and numerous caves, at the edge of the south escarpment. The hills which occur throughout the Plateau region provided the Nandi with well-spaced outposts from which the surrounding countryside could be surveyed. The whole country is well watered by springs and by tributaries of the three rivers which flow from the Plateau into Lake Victoria. The Kipkarren-Nzoia runs through flat country in the north as a free flowing river fed by numerous streams. The northern affluents of the Yala meander through the swampy country of East and Central Nandi, but the southern branches flow more rapidly in their middle and lower courses. The fast running tributaries of the Nyando, which drain Tindiret, Nandi Hills and South Nandi, are contained within steep valleys, some of which have been eroded into gorge-like formations.

The broken terrain of these areas has been formed by streams forcing their way at right angles through the east-west line of the granite escarpment. Most of the country is well drained, but extensive swamps occur in Central and East Nandi* and there are smaller areas of impeded drainage on the upper reaches of all three river systems.

Climate

The climate of Nandi is governed in the main by conditions on the Mau to the east, the direction from which the prevailing wind blows. It is also affected to some extent by the weather of the Lake Victoria basin, which causes spectacular electric disturbances, heavy rain and destructive hailstorms. The Plateau normally enjoys an ample, well distributed rainfall, with a wet season extending from March to October. Precipitation is heaviest in the forested area immediately behind the south escarpment and decreases in the north and south-west. The peak periods occur at the onset of the rains, and from July to September when the heaviest falls are recorded. Amounts vary from nearly 50 inches in the north to a little over 60 inches in the central region and well over 70 inches in the wettest parts. Rainfall below the escarpments is less prolonged and more scattered than on the Plateau, and conforms to the long and short rains pattern characteristic of the Nyanza basin. Scotch mists occur seasonally throughout the country and locally in swampy areas. Occasionally, thick persistent mists are brought up by air currents from the hot Kano Plains. Heavy dews are common, but the humidity never induces the lethargy experienced near the shores of the Indian Ocean or Lake Victoria. This is due to the strong east winds, which persist for much of the year and are particularly trying in the dry season. Day temperatures seldom reach oppressively high levels even during the hottest months; at night and during the rains, the thermometer falls rapidly, often to below 40 degrees Fahrenheit and very occasionally low enough to produce a slight hoar-frost.†

It is difficult to assess how the Nandi character has been affected by the climate, which is one of the healthiest in East Africa. One experienced observer noted in 1902, however, that "the native features of their country may have had some effect in rendering the Nandi sullen, morose and suspicious".[1] Although the incidence of respiratory and bowel affections was high, the altitude and climate of the Plateau shielded its inhabitants from many of the dangerous tropical diseases that afflicted their neighbours and adversaries.[2] This relative freedom from debilitating conditions and crippling epidemics strengthened tribal morale, and gave the Nandi a sense of positive wellbeing that was an essential attribute for a martial people.

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* For example, the Ngonyek swamp covers *c.* 3,000 acres.

† Kapsabet temperatures: mean 75.5 deg., with absolute maximum of 90.2 and minimum of 39.0 deg.

Flora and fauna

Altitude, soil and climatic conditions were conducive to the maintenance of a varied and abundant flora throughout Nandi. Most of the country was suitable for the type of agriculture practised by the tribe, and good grazing was available in all seasons. The extensive rain forests, which were to be found all over Nandi except for certain areas in the north and east, consisted of large timber trees with a thick, often impenetrable, undergrowth of creepers and bush.[3] Most of the forests contained deep depressions and extensive glades, which were of considerable value to the Nandi during Masai raids, and punitive expeditions. The flora of the country varies according to the topographical regions. The country in the northern region is open grassland with occasional patches of forest in the west and central areas, but with hardly any trees on the eastern plain and swamplands. Vegetational types in the southern region vary from dense forests, thorn tree thickets, secondary bush and grassy parkland to the sparser vegetation found near the south escarpment. Below the escarpments, the trees are more scattered and stunted, and the less nutritious grasses provide a thinner ground cover.

The forests, swamps and grasslands provided food and shelter for a large variety of game, including elephants, the larger carnivores and several species of antelopes. Many of these animals were hunted by Nandi warriors in order to supplement their diet, to protect their crops and to safeguard their stock.* Hunting excursions broke the monotony of tribal life and called for the exercise of bravery, fortitude, discipline and endurance. They enabled the warriors to maintain their physical fitness, and to practise themselves in the exercise of aptitudes similar to those employed in raiding expeditions. Their courage and skill in attacking lions won for the Nandi the admiration of several experienced sportsmen.* Success in this dangerous sport also secured the approbation of the tribe, and entitled a lion-killer to adopt the not uncommon sobriquet of *Barngetuny*.

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* Place names confirm the variety and distribution of animals.

Accounts of early travellers contain few descriptions of the country's beauty, fertility or potentialities, but the attractions of Nandi scenery and climate were quickly appreciated after Sclater's Road was constructed in 1896. The Uganda Commissioner commented that "Nandi is really a first rate district . . . and the best bit of country I have yet seen".[4] The district station was used as a sanatorium for officials who were recuperating from illnesses contracted in less healthy areas of the Protectorate. When Sir Harry Johnston travelled through part of the district in 1899, he described the country in characteristically lyrical terms:

> a climate as healthy as that of the temperate parts of South Africa, of Southern Australia, of New Zealand; a land abundantly watered by running streams, with grassy downs, splendid forests of conifers, a fertile soil, and a country, which, though exactly under the equator, is singularly like the landscape of southern England; a land that is never too hot in the daytime, though sometimes there is a frost at night . . .; on the whole one of the fairest countries for beauty on the habitable earth.[5]

The people

Most Nandi are of medium height, although they appear to be taller because of their upright carriage and military bearing. They are slightly built and seldom carry surplus fat.† Trunk and limbs show no pronounced muscular development, and the Nandi have neither the physical strength for heavy manual labour nor the stamina for sustained work. On the other hand, they are agile, athletic and able to travel long distances without fatigue; when marching, hunting and raiding, they exhibit considerable powers of endurance and great reserves of strength.

The Nandi are independent, frank, truthful and ready to acknowledge their mistakes. They do not suffer from an inferiority complex in their relations with one another or with foreigners. In manner, they are polite, dignified and slow to anger; in demeanour, quiet and undemonstrative. The last quality can be deceptive, as it masks the deep affection which characterises their marital and family relationships. Although the Nandi acknowledge their fear of the supernatural powers possessed by sorcerers, and their distress if the spirits of the dead seem antagonistically inclined towards them, they are less affected by unseen enemies in their environment than tribes with animistic philosophies. This relative freedom from superstitious influences stems from the simple religion which their ancestors probably fashioned when they were nomadic pastoralists. The Nandi are never afraid to be alone or to make long journeys without a companion, and have no fear of the dark. The last trait gave them significant advantages over their Kavirondo neighbours in military matters. Their pastoral background, a tendency towards fatalism, and the discipline instilled by tribal practices account for the personal courage and endurance which are possessed to a high degree by almost all Nandi. These attributes manifested themselves not only in hunting and warfare, but also in fortitude when in pain, a patient uncomplaining attitude towards privation or adversity, and a sense of humour in difficult situations. These sterling qualities were marred by idleness, an aversion to work and a disregard for the dignity of labour. Although some manual work was performed traditionally by men, these operations were viewed with distaste as undignified tasks unworthy of the protectors of the tribe.

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* e.g. Roosevelt, Foran, Hoey, Pitman, Kearton.

† Average height 5 feet 7 inches; average weight 130-140 lb.

In his relations with other members of the tribe, a Nandi is generous and hospitable to neighbours and strangers. Mutual goodwill, upon which the maintenance of community life depends, is demonstrated by co-operative effort in several routine practices, and by the help that is readily given to those in trouble. The community is brought together by festivals and social gatherings, and well-conducted beer drinks provide a means of social intercourse under genial conditions for men who have ceased to be warriors. The Nandi do not consider themselves tied to a particular locality but remain nomads in spirit. They will move away from a neighbourhood, where misfortune has occurred or influences prejudicial to their comfort are at work, and when a locality becomes "overcrowded". In contrast to the Kavirondo, the Nandi are not given to personal, family or group feuding; they prefer to settle differences decisively as they arise, seldom bear malice and have a distaste for recrimination.* Petty thieving is dealt with promptly, and in persistent cases severely, as an anti-social activity. A different ethical standard is followed, however, regarding thieving from other tribes, which is considered a laudatory practice, especially when the seizure of livestock is concerned.

As the Nandi had no hereditary chiefs or office bearers, the successful conduct of tribal affairs depended on their ability to assess character and to satisfy themselves about the personal qualities of their chosen leaders. Hero-worship attitudes had not been developed, owing to the absence of clan or culture leaders; and genealogical knowledge seldom extended beyond a man's grandfather, so that families could not acquire a privileged status on that account.† Recognition was accorded to leaders because of their personal attributes, and not on traditional or hereditary grounds or the material prosperity of a candidate for office.‡ In hunting and warfare, the warriors exhibited unquestioning loyalty to their leaders and a willingness to be led by men who earned their respect. The discipline essential to secure success in these undertakings brought forth the best in the Nandi character. Their organising ability showed to advantage in manly pursuits, but in more mundane matters the Nandi were indifferent organisers, inclined to procrastinate, impatient of direction and reluctant to act in co-operation with their fellows.

The Nandi as a people are conservative and insular: new ideas are accepted only after long consideration and divergences from customary practices are frowned upon, so that the imitative faculty has largely remained dormant.§ They considered their traditional form of existence rendered them self-sufficient within the framework of their environment, and accorded them a degree of satisfaction which made them indisposed to accept radical change. This contented frame of mind, together with their exceptional tribal unity and military prowess, engendered an intense pride in being Nandi and strengthened their reluctance to associate with their neighbours. Language differences also created a barrier to communication, and inter-marriage was unthinkable with people whose views on circumcision differed from their own, and whose fighting qualities they despised.

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* Clans were not localised as in Kavirondo.

† The laibons were an exception; see p. 28.

‡ The same yardstick is applied to Europeans; a few early officials earned the esteem of the Nandi, but most of them failed to impress the discriminating tribesmen.

§ Contrast the Baganda, Kikuyu and, to a lesser degree, the Kavirondo and Kamba.

There were some individuals whose conduct was at variance with the code of behaviour accepted by the people as a whole. Minor and temporary deviations from the tribal canon were dealt with promptly by the offender's neighbours. Unrepentant wrongdoers were ostracised, and those who committed grave offences that were abhorrent to the moral standards of the tribe were killed or outlawed.

Although the Nandi character is less complex than that of many other East African tribes, it contains some contradictions which can only be appreciated after long and sympathetic study. It is not surprising, therefore, that most of the early officials failed to understand the Nandi or to establish friendly relations with them.* The Nandi refused to acknowledge they were in any sense inferior to the newcomers, showed no disposition to change their way of life, and were prepared to fight to retain their independence when this was threatened by interference with their traditional practices. Such an attitude of mind was anathema to government officers, who masked their lack of understanding of the Nandi character by applying opprobrious epithets to the tribe. Many of these epithets were exaggerated or unwarranted, while others were merely descriptive of the people's desire to live their own lives in their own way.†

Much of the above applies to the women of the tribe. Pride of race influenced relationships between the sexes, as Nandi women not only honoured their menfolk as defenders of the country, but also spurred them on to seek glory in war and the chase. By inciting the fighting men and according their approbation to participants in successful raiding enterprises, the women helped to sustain the aggressive spirit of the tribe. By cheerfully accepting hardships to themselves and their children in times of conflict and by their endurance in adversity, they made it possible for the fighting men to engage the enemy without undue anxiety about the fate of their families. This freedom of action was an important factor during the long struggle with the Masai, and when the country was invaded by punitive expeditions. Although women take little part in public discussion or the management of affairs, their influence on their husbands is considerable. Nandi women are as independent-minded as their menfolk and able to express their opinions with much force and conviction. They are fitting partners in every respect for the men of a warrior tribe.

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* See p. 222 for a fuller discussion of this.

† "Bloodthirsty", "treacherous", "truculent", "rebellious", "arrogant", "turbulent", "contumacious", "intransigent", "obdurate", etc. cf. Orchardson, *The Kipsigis*, Chapter 6.

Population

The Nandi were a very small tribe compared with the hundreds of thousands of Bantu and Nilotic inhabitants of the Nyanza Plains.* Statistics compiled in later years suggest that the population of Nandi in 1890 totalled between 20,000 and 30,000 people. Families were much smaller than among neighbouring tribes and only averaged two or three children to every union.† Polygyny was not uncommon, but Nandi women were less fertile than the Kavirondo. In view of the smallness of the tribe, it is astonishing that the Nandi were able to impose their will on their infinitely more numerous neighbours. Furthermore, it is understandable that government officials found it irksome that their task of pacification and development was held up for a decade by 30,000 people, whose fighting strength could never have exceeded 8,000 spearmen.

Tribal organisation

When the first settlements were formed on the Nandi Plateau, the population probably amounted to a few hundreds at the most. The settlers brought with them institutions which had proved satisfactory in the concentration area and during the various migrations. These institutions facilitated the absorption of later immigrants and the creation of a tribal entity as the pioneer settlements expanded. The fundamental feature of the Nandi form of organisation was that control was exercised by local councils. These bodies deliberated on the day to day affairs of the *koret*, the smallest neighbourhood unit, and also had a voice in decisions affecting the *pororiet*, the largest autonomous unit, of which it formed part.

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* The population of the whole of Nyanza in 1900 has been estimated at one million.

† Nandi 2.6, Bantu Kavirondo 7.75, Luo 10.6 children in an average family.

Heads of families enjoyed considerable freedom of decision and action, but could be directed and disciplined by the *koret* council (the *kokwet*) when this was necessary in the general interest. The chief functions of the *kokwet*, at which all adult males had a right to be heard, were to organise collective activities, safeguard the natural resources of the *koret*, settle disputes, investigate anti-social acts, regulate social and ceremonial functions and to control certain agricultural and pastoral practices. *Kokwotinwek* (pl. of *kokwet*) representatives and two senior warrior leaders formed the *pororiet* council, which concerned itself with matters and disputes affecting more than one *koret*, major ceremonial functions, relations with other *pororosiek* and, above all, with the organisation of defensive and offensive military operations, including truce making, peace negotiations and the ransoming of prisoners. This concentration of power in the *pororiet* council, which the Nandi developed as their distinctive controlling authority, ensured conformity, cohesion and continuity within the *pororiet*, and enabled the constituent *korotinwek* to act together as an entity. This loose form of government fostered tribal solidarity, without unduly restricting individual freedom, and facilitated combined action in combating natural calamities and hostile neighbours. The system operated without hereditary or elected chiefs, an official class and, until the nineteenth century, without a "priestly" caste. Leadership at the lowest level of the *kokwet* was accorded by general consent to one of the elders; and the same method was followed in the selection of *pororiet* council spokesmen and warrior leaders. None of the offices was hereditary, and the elected holder retained his position only so long as his conduct merited the approval of his fellows.

In addition to family and neighbourhood ties, every man was connected through tribal institutions and practices with a large number of his fellow tribesmen throughout Nandi. These connections were created by membership of a clan, initiation into an age-set, residence in a *pororiet* and by the loaning and custody of cattle under the *kamanaganik* system.* Clans played an important part in such matters as marriage and the payment of blood-money, but as they were not localised, exercised no political functions and had no powerful leadership structure, interclan feuding did not prejudice tribal harmony and unity.[6] The age-set system regulated many personal and social activities, and ensured that a standing army was always in readiness to defend the country or to undertake raiding expeditions. When members of the original *pororosiek* (pl. of *pororiet*) broke away to form new settlements, they maintained close links with the mother sections by frequent visiting, by combining in raiding operations and by produce loans under the *kesumei* system.* Although inter-*pororiet* disputes arose from time to time, they seldom resulted in armed conflict with lethal weapons but were resolved by mock battles between warriors armed with wooden sticks.

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* Cattle were loaned, usually singly, to a man's friends as a mark of affection.

Tribal unity was also fostered by the *kokwet* courts, which favoured compensation for civil wrongs and reconciliation rather than the punishment of criminal acts, and adjudicated as neighbourhood forums on personal, land and community disputes. Although in all but the most serious anti-tribal offences the *kokwet* had no agents to secure compliance with its decisions, these were seldom challenged as the lot of the unrepentant offender against the accepted canon was an unenviable one. The tensions that commonly arise between rich and poor were largely avoided in Nandi society, owing to the social and economic security which all members of the tribe enjoyed through inheritance rules and the intricate system of relationships and responsibilities. All these factors, which gave the Nandi strength and unity in a stateless and classless society, were sustained by religious beliefs founded on respect for the ancestral spirits as upholders of the tribal code and intermediaries with God. The two aspects of Nandi society which played the most significant part in Nandi-British relations, were the absence of tribal or sectional leaders possessing the requisite authority to treat with the government or to enforce its demands; and the high degree of tribal discipline and cohesion, which forced the government to deal with the Nandi as a united people and not as a collection of separate, mutually antagonistic sections or clans.

Expansion of the tribe

After the pioneer settlements were firmly established, fresh immigrants from Elgon, Elgeyo, Kamasia and Lumbwa arrived to join Kakipoch and his comrades in south-west Nandi. This caused the Chebilat area to become overcrowded and overstocked, so that new land had to be sought to the east and north of the original settlements, as the southern plains had proved uncongenial and unhealthy to the Nandi and their stock. The occupation of fresh territory was carried out on a *pororiet* basis, either by the formation of new *pororosiek* or by the migration of offshoot sections from the original *pororosiek*. The first breakaway movements took the goat-owning sections into the Chesumei Forest to the north and east of Chebilat, and their cattle-owning kinsmen towards the east along the top of the escarpment. The latter operation was an untidy process, carried out in leap-frog fashion and resulting in small pockets of certain sections being surrounded by large bodies of people belonging to other *pororosiek*. Relations between the intrusive groups and the dominant *pororiet* were generally amicable, but the Kamelilo often proved difficult neighbours to the *pororosiek* in which they settled. The expansion process was accelerated by the need to seek fresh pastures for stock captured from the Luo, and from the more distant cattle-owning peoples who later came within the orbit of Nandi raiding parties.

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* *Kesumei* loans lessened the effects of food shortages as the harvest was earlier in the south-west than in the north and east.

By the middle of the nineteenth century the escarpment edge had been occupied as far east as Tindiret and the upper Nyando, where the Nandi and Lumbwa joined hands and thus prevented the Arabs from opening up the direct route from the Rift Valley to Kavirondo.* Some settlement had taken place north of the Chesumei Forest and a few groups had penetrated beyond the Kimondi into the forests on the western escarpment. All these movements were made without opposition, so that the area under occupation and the numerical strength of the tribe were being increased while the warriors' martial spirit and military prowess were being stimulated and exercised by successful raiding ventures in the south and west. This enabled the Nandi to consolidate their position before attempting to wrest the Uasin Gishu Plateau from the Masai, who could muster a much larger and more determined fighting force than anything the Nandi had faced before. After the Masai were eventually driven off the Plateau, the final stage of Nandi expansion in pre-colonial days began with settlements towards Lessos, and with the northerly extension of the occupied areas on the west escarpment.†

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* See Chapter 2.

† See p. 25 for the struggle with the Masai.

At some period, as more *pororosiek* were formed and more territory was occupied, the Nandi became a tribe. The designation, *Miot*, which had originally been used by all the Kalenjin who migrated from the concentration area, was abandoned, and the Nandi became known as the Chemngal to the other Kalenjin groups who had formed themselves into autonomous tribes.*

Nandi boundaries 1890

The problems commonly associated with the delimitation of tribal frontiers arise in relation to the Nandi, but they can be resolved more easily than is the case with many of their neighbours. Since the plateau immediately behind the south and west escarpments has not been occupied within living memory by any other tribe, the problem is limited to the country below the escarpments, and to the extent of Nandi occupation on the Uasin Gishu Plateau in the north and towards Mau on the east. Although pioneer travellers on the Uganda Road and the southern route through Lumbwa recorded little information about Nandi, their reticence on the subject is unimportant as a large number of maps and accounts were prepared between the 1895 and 1905 expeditions, which contain first-hand descriptions of the country in the vicinity of the Nandi boundary.[7] From tribal traditions and these eye-witness accounts, it is possible to present a fairly accurate picture of the extent of country under Nandi occupation in 1890. It is more difficult, however, to establish the limits of the Nandi "sphere of influence", that is to say the country which was used regularly by the Nandi for grazing, hunting and other purposes, and where occupation by another tribe could only have been effected and sustained by force of arms. Most of the territory falling within this definition was to the north and east of the Nandi homelands. Nandi warriors roamed at will with their herds in this extensive area, and raiding bands passed unmolested through this uninhabited tract on expeditions against neighbouring and distant tribes.

Below the south escarpment, the Luo occupied the plains around the head of the Kavirondo Gulf as far east as Kibos. A few Nandi herdsmen lived in the swampy, bush and elephant grass country near the middle reaches of the Nyando, but as the area was too uncongenial and unhealthy for large permanent settlements it was used mainly as a hunting preserve. Farther to the east, the Nandi and Lumbwa occupied respectively the northern and southern foothills of the upper Nyando and grazed their stock in the valley between. The limit of Nandi and Lumbwa occupation on the Mau extended to Kipkelio (present-day Lumbwa) and possibly as far as Londiani. Nandi settlements were found on the foothills of the west escarpment, and on the Kavirondo Plain to the east of the large no-man's land of forest and grassy scrubland which separated the settlers from the Kakamega (Idakho Isukha) and Kabras (Nyala). Farther south, forest and broken country provided a similar barrier between the Nandi and the Tiriki, Nyangori and Kajulu, all of whom lived farther west or south of their present locations. The Nandi had little difficulty in preventing the Luo and Bantu Kavirondo from breaking through the no-man's land. The eastward migration of the Luo took place after a government post was established at Kisumu in 1899, and the other tribes began to move in the same direction as the Nandi abandoned their settlements on the south-west frontier and migrated to the north and east. After the dispersal of the Uasin Gishu Masai, large numbers of Nandi crossed the Kimondi in the north, and a few settlements were formed around Kabiyet and towards Bwanga at the northern end of the west escarpment. The Tindiret area in the east was fairly heavily populated, a number of settlements were formed on the western slopes of the North Tindiret Range and a few families occupied parts of the country beyond Lessos. Central, north and north-east Nandi remained for the main part uninhabited, and was only visited during the dry season by warrior herdsmen who lived in temporary *kaptich* shelters.

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* "Chemngal", literally "many words", probably from the long deliberations that took place before decisions were taken.

Most of the tribes on the periphery of Nandi were occupying much the same areas in 1890 as they do today. The Kano Luo were settled around Kitoto's in the lower Nyando Valley, to the west of the country on both sides of the upper and middle reaches of the river which was grazed and hunted by the Nandi and Lumbwa. The Lembus and Kamasia were the nearest neighbours of the Nandi in the east, apart from small, scattered groups of Dorobo in the Mau and Tindiret Forests. The Kajulu Luo, Nyangori, Tiriki, Kakamega and Kabras occupied the country bordering on west Nandi, and thus constituted the eastern frontier of the Nilotic and Bantu Kavirondo tribal lands. The Uasin Gishu Plateau was uninhabited from the northern limits of Nandi occupation in the south to the first settlements of the Elgeyo (Keyo) on the edge of the Kerio escarpment in the north-east, and the distant Elgony on the Elgon foothills in the north-west. At the beginning of the colonial period, the Nandi boundaries were becoming fixed, largely on ecological grounds, in the south and west, where they were respected, albeit reluctantly, by the neighbouring tribes. The uninhabited country to the north and east of the Nandi homelands provided ample scope for territorial expansion, as the population and herds increased in numbers. The only conceivable threats to the inviolability of the Nandi frontiers were posed by the Central Nilo-Hamites in the north, a recrudescence of Masai intervention from the east, and the remote possibility of a military alliance of the various Luo sections, or the disunited Bantu Kavirondo tribes, in the south and west.[8]

Nandi as a military power

The organisation of offensive and defensive operations was based on the *pororiet* system. Fighting men from a number of adjoining *korotinwek* were embodied in a company (*siritiet*) under a *kiptaiyat* elected by his colleagues.* This locally raised unit could be readily mustered for action and formed part of the *pororiet* force, which was commanded by two senior warriors, who were members of the *pororiet* council and usually belonged to the age-set immediately above that of the majority of their men. All able-bodied males were embodied for defensive operations, but raiding parties were composed mainly of warriors. Junior elders could take part in raids if they were physically fit, and young boys also accompanied the warriors in order to gain experience and to carry out supporting duties away from the combat area.† Defensive arrangements and raiding plans were made by the two *kiptainik* in concert with the

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* The Nandi practised a modified form of the Masai *manyatta* system, with the warriors of a *siritiet* living together in special huts (*sigiroinok*) near the homesteads and outposts and on the *kaptich* grazing grounds.

† It is misleading to talk of "the warrior set in power"; the fighting force contained men from at least two age-sets, and there were several checks on the unbridled exercise of power by the warriors.

pororiet elders, some of whom were retired warrior leaders. From the middle of the nineteenth century, *pororiet* decisions were confirmed by the laibons, who forecast the events and outcome of raids and gave the participants protection by presenting the *kiptainik* with medicine (*setanik*) to avert disaster.

Every Nandi male was brought up from birth to regard himself as a protector of the tribe and an instrument for the advancement of tribal prosperity. Division of labour between the sexes left the able-bodied men free to devote most of their time to military activities and training exercises. A warrior's training was based on the comradeship and self-control that were inculcated through the code of behaviour which sustained the tribal organisation. Military aptitude, bravery, endurance and discipline were developed by games and herding duties in early boyhood, and by long journeys to salt licks, *kaptich* grazing areas and on raiding expeditions before initiation into warriorhood. The warriors were required to maintain their physical fitness by adherence to a strict diet, including abstinence from beer and tobacco, and to develop their martial qualities by military exercises, hunting, cattle herding in the *kaptich* and the manning of outposts. Although in other matters the Nandi were independent-minded and intolerant of control, in military activities the warriors obeyed the orders of their *kiptainik* without reservation. A warrior who failed in this respect might be beaten by his comrades, and denied his proper share of the loot from an expedition or his right to join a raiding party. But these considerations were less compelling than the desire for general commendation, the fear of public disapproval and the wish to avoid retribution at the hands of the laibons.

The main armament of the Nandi consisted of Masai-type stabbing spears, and the smaller, lighter varieties which were commonly used in the south-west for throwing or stabbing.[9] Secondary weapons included short swords for cutting or throwing, heavy wooden clubs for hurling or infighting and, on occasions, rocks and stones. Bows and arrows were used principally for hunting and defence. Sometimes the arrow tips were smeared with Acokanthera (*keliot*) poison, the effectiveness of which depended on its freshness and source. Light, manageable shields provided some protection to the bearer without restricting his mobility or the free use of his striking arm.

Defensive warfare

For a long time the Nandi enjoyed immunity from enemy attacks, owing to the absence of aggressive neighbours in the south-west, and the protective screen of escarpments and forests. The Luo and Bantu Kavirondo sometimes launched retaliatory daylight attacks on Nandi settlements below the escarpments, but never attempted to raid the Nandi Plateau. The Nyangori were the only tribe who penetrated the Nandi defences and raided, with varying success, into parts of south-west Nandi. As the tribal frontier was extended to the east and north, more serious opposition was encountered from the Segelai Masai in the upper Nyando Valley, and their Uasin Gishu and Naivasha kinsmen on the Plateau. This challenge forced the Nandi to strengthen and modify the measures which they had employed to secure the south-western frontiers from violation. These measures were designed to give early warning of enemy attacks by means of frontier patrols, permanently manned look-out posts on inter-communicating hilltops, and by the presence of warrior herdsmen on the outlying *kaptich* grazing grounds.* Since the Nandi could rely on natural features to deter enemy attacks in the escarpment and Chesumei Forest areas, the homesteads were scattered over the countryside and never concentrated into fortified villages. The same procedure was followed on the Masai frontier, where heavy losses would have been sustained if such villages had been overrun by warriors who were as practised as the Nandi in the art of surprise night attacks. The Nandi relied on pickets to alert the defenders in this sector and to assemble the warriors in selected mustering areas, and on the mobility of their herds to prevent them from falling into the hands of the predatory Masai. Non-combatants took charge of the cattle, after they had been driven from the plains, and shepherded them into refuges in the forests and hills, while the warriors returned to their fighting stations.†

As pressure from the Masai increased, defensive measures could no longer be left to separate *pororosiek* acting independently, and arrangements were made for several sections to combine their forces in order to resist the invaders.* These measures were generally successful but sometimes small parties of the enemy broke through the defences, and the Nandi were unable to prevent the Masai from using the frontier grazing lands and salt licks. Some warriors were killed and animals lost in these encounters, but the casualties were not sufficiently heavy to weaken the fighting strength and morale of the defenders. About the time that the Masai threat was finally removed, other intruders, the Karamojong, appeared on the scene, but their incursions were brought to an abrupt end by an outbreak of cattle disease. The Nandi were fortunate in being able to resist all the attempts that were made to violate their frontiers, and in being spared the humiliation of seeing their homelands laid waste by invaders.

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* The alarm was given by high-pitched cries repeated from hilltop to hilltop; the muster was sounded by horns.

† Masai spearmen were vulnerable to arrows in the forests.

Offensive warfare

Two forms of offensive warfare were undertaken by the Nandi; raiding against the Luo, Bantu Kavirondo and certain Nilo-Hamitic tribes; and expeditions against the Masai to extend the tribal frontiers.† Raiding operations were undertaken primarily for cattle and not to devastate the country, to slaughter or capture large numbers of the enemy, or to bring fresh lands and peoples under Nandi control. Raids were carried out in neighbouring areas, and in country which could only be reached after journeys of several days' duration. In the south, the Luo living on the plains around the Kavirondo Gulf were often raided, and occasionally their kinsmen beyond the River Sondu were also attacked by Nandi parties. In the west, raids were made against most of the Bantu peoples, the Luo on the north shore of the Kavirondo Gulf and against Kalenjin tribes like the Nyangori and Wangoma. In the north, all the Elgon tribes, Kalenjin and Bantu, were attacked, as well as the Karamojong and Turkana beyond, and the Suk, Elgeyo and Marakwet to the east of the mountain.

Some of the raids were merely opportunist adventures carried out by a handful of warriors, but the larger expeditions were organised by a number of *pororosiek* acting in combination, especially when fortified positions had to be stormed or determined opposition was anticipated. Operational plans, which were drawn up from the reports of spies and reconnaissance patrols, were submitted to the laibons by the *maotik*, who acted as intermediaries between the *pororiet* council and the ritual experts. The applications were sometimes vetoed, or more commonly modified, by the laibons, in the light of information received through their "secret service" system, but generally sanction was given and protective medicine issued to the *kiptainik*.

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* This inter-*pororosiek* co-operation did not result in the formation of a tribal army under a centralised command; see pp. 28 and 155 and Manners: The Kipsigis of Kenya, pp. 249-251.

† The Nandi never raided the Lumbwa and Lembus, and probably not the Kamasia.

Several of the raids took only a day to carry out, but others took more than a week and necessitated the carrying of rations in the form of stiff porridge and curdled milk. The warriors travelled in single file under their company leaders, but the senior *kiptainik* organised the party into divisions, including advance and rear-guards with outflankers on the march, and concerted measures for diversionary manoeuvres, the main attack, the seizure of cattle and for covering the retreat. On expeditions against distant tribes, marching took place at night and the day was spent lying up in forests or river valleys. This enabled the warriors to get into position for the night attack, which was planned to give them time to capture the enemy's stock and to drive them out of danger before daybreak. Surprise was essential, since the aggressors were generally outnumbered by the defenders, and fortified positions such as walled and ditched villages and barricaded caves had to be stormed.[10] The Nandi perfected the guerilla technique of the hit and run attack, and usually got away before counter measures could be undertaken by adversaries who were unaccustomed to venture from their homes during the hours of darkness.* The rear-guard sometimes had a running fight with the enemy but pitched daylight battles did not often develop from this form of harassment. The type of warfare practised by the Nandi did not lend itself to excessive cruelty or vindictiveness. Women and children were seldom attacked or captured and mutilation was uncommon. When recounting stories of engagements in which heavy fighting occurred, Nandi elders often end their narrative by saying the warriors withdrew, after the objective had been obtained, "as they had no wish to destroy their opponents as a tribe".

Traditions of other tribes confirm the extent and intensity of

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* The Luo name for the Nandi, Lumbwa and Masai, "Jo-Lango" (those possessed of a spirit) probably refers to their restless activity and their ability to move and fight at night.

Nandi raiding activities, and the successes achieved by the tactical methods which the warriors pursued with vigour under skilful and experienced leaders. Nevertheless the phrases "the Nandi raided the Kitosh (Vugusu)", "the Luo were attacked by the Nandi" are misleading. What they generally mean is not that the Nandi tribe attacked the Kitosh tribe, but that warriors from one or more *pororosiek* raided one, or at most a few, of the Kitosh sections occupying a certain village or a small part of the tribal territory. While the warriors were away raiding, the Nandi had no reason to fear that their homelands would be invaded by the Luo or Bantu Kavirondo, but large scale operations could seldom be organised until after Nandi was freed from the possibility of Masai attacks. Most of the raids took place during the dry season, when food was plentiful and travelling was easier for men and captured livestock. Raiding was usually restricted during the rains to tribes near the Nandi borders. As a result of these frequent, widespread raids, the Nandi became rich in cattle, the laibons strengthened their hold over the warriors, and adventurous elements from other Kalenjin tribes were encouraged to settle in Nandi by the prospect of sharing in the proceeds of successful expeditions. Although the warriors occasionally overreached themselves and were driven back empty-handed, by 1890 the Nandi had achieved a position of military supremacy and considerable wealth, which caused them to despise their foes and strengthened their attitude of exclusiveness.

Offensive warfare against the Masai necessitated the formulation of new tactics in order to meet the challenge of pitched battles on open ground. Some of their adversaries' methods and weapons were adopted, but two innovations can be attributed to the Nandi genius for military improvisation: the adoption of the square formation similar to that employed by British troops in tribal wars; and the shooting of arrows through a high trajectory into thick bush and other places where an enemy was concealed. Other improvisations were adopted when the Nandi came into conflict with Arabs and Europeans, both of whom were regarded as raiders with novel weapons bent on looting cattle and disrupting the Nandi way of life.* The Arabs were soon discouraged from seeking profit in Nandi but the British proved more stubborn. After the initial raids on caravans had resulted in the government's counter-raid of 1895, the Nandi learned to live with the newcomers in much the same way as they did with other enemies in times of truce. These truces were made by the *pororosiek* elders with the Kavirondo and Masai, in order to provide a breathing space or to allow Nandi women to trade with their neighbours in times of famine. Such arrangements were invariably short-lived. When the circumstances that made them expedient had changed, the truces were broken, either because the Nandi or Masai warriors found inactivity irksome, or when Nandi women were molested on their bartering expeditions in Kavirondo.

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* The Kavirondo possessed very few firearms compared with the rulers of the Uganda kingdoms, and the Masai scorned them.

The development of the Nandi, from a few small colonies of immigrants near the south-west escarpment to the status of the dominant power in Eastern Uganda, was made possible by the strength and flexibility of their military system and the character of the people.* Much of this strength was derived from the organisation, leadership, training and armament of the fighting force, and in the latter half of the nineteenth century from the supernatural backing of the laibons. But these factors only provided the framework of military power. The remarkable successes which the Nandi achieved over a wide area against numerically larger tribes can only be attributed in the final analysis to the bravery, endurance, discipline and dash of the warriors, and the martial spirit of the people.

The eclipse of the Masai

The first Masai to come into contact with the Nandi and Lumbwa were either the Uasin Gishu on the plains north of the Chesumei Forest, or a section known variously as the Kipchoek, Kipchneye or Segelai, who occupied the country in and to the south of the upper Nyando Valley. The Segelai were driven out by the Lumbwa but some of the dispersed sections re-occupied the valley, after it had been left vacant when the Lumbwa pushed southwards into Belgut. After the Nandi and Lumbwa had established permanent settlements on the high ground to the north and south of the Nyando Valley, the two tribes combined forces and expelled the Segelai from the country they had resettled.

A state of equilibrium was maintained for a long time between the Nandi and the powerful Uasin Gishu Masai. The Chebilat and Chesumei areas had few attractions for the Masai herds; and the Nandi, who had access to unoccupied land to the east of their original settlements, were not strong enough to wrest the Plateau pastures from the Uasin Gishu. No serious conflicts occurred until the Nandi began to edge out of the forest and to use the southern fringe of the Plateau grazing lands. This movement enabled the Uasin Gishu to raid cattle on the new *kaptich*, and forced the Nandi to improvise defensive measures to protect themselves and their stock from their northern neighbours.* The Nandi were generally on the defensive throughout this period, but one premature attempt was made in the middle of the eighteenth century to gain possession of the Plateau pastures. The Nandi were heavily defeated by a combination of the Uasin Gishu and Kaputei Masai and forced to retreat in disarray into the forests. After this engagement the Uasin Gishu remained in undisputed possession of the Plateau until about 1840, when they were beaten by the Laikipiak Masai at Lolminingai.† This gave renewed heart to the Nandi who had recruited their strength, after their reverse in the previous century, by raiding to the south and west and by avoiding major clashes with the Uasin Gishu.

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* Uganda extended to the Kedong Valley until 1 April, 1902, when the Eastern Province (first so named by Johnston in 1899) was transferred to the EAP.

The discomfiture of the Uasin Gishu occurred at a time when the Masai were losing much of their former power, as a result of a series of internecine quarrels which created unsettled conditions throughout Masailand for much of the nineteenth century. The Uasin Gishu were routed in the 1870's by the Naivasha and Laikipia Masai, and when the demoralised remnants tried to reassert their claim to the Uasin Gishu Plateau in the next decade they were defeated and finally dispersed by the Nandi in the Kipkarren Valley. About the same time the Segelai, who had infiltrated into the Nyando Valley for the third time, were annihilated by the Nandi and Lumbwa. Shortly afterwards the Laikipiak were defeated by the Naivasha Masai, so that the latter was the only section strong enough to contest the grazing rights on the Uasin Gishu Plateau with the rising Nandi power. Several inconclusive skirmishes took place between the contestants, until the Nandi eventually routed the Naivasha Masai at Siwo and chased them back to the Rift Valley. Although small parties of Naivasha Masai continued to raid Kavirondo and some of the smaller Kalenjin tribes, they seldom ventured near Nandi again.*

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* See p. 21.

† The extent of Masai occupation is shown by the many Masai place names still current in north and east Nandi.

The long struggle with the Masai had many important repercussions on the course of Nandi history. The presence of hostile forces on the northern borders and in the Nyando Valley kept the warriors in a constant state of readiness, and discouraged the growth of inter-*pororosiek* rivalries. Solidarity was essential for the tribe's survival, and friendly relations with the Lumbwa were necessary to ensure the safety of the Nyando Valley settlements. Nandi and Lumbwa warriors strove to emulate the military qualities of the Masai, adopted their weapons and improved upon some of their tactical methods. As the Uasin Gishu denied them access to the Plateau pastures, the Nandi confined their raids to the militarily weaker peoples in the south and west and thus built up the strength of the tribe without meeting serious opposition or setbacks. Masai occupation of the much more desirable Plateau grazing lands forced the Nandi to settle around Tindiret and in the upper Nyando Valley. It was the occupation of these eastern areas which subsequently brought the Nandi into conflict with the government, when the Tindiret sections raided caravans on the road over Mau and played havoc with the Protectorate's communications.

The dispersal of the Uasin Gishu and the defeat of the Naivasha Masai gave the Nandi unchallenged access to the pastures and salt licks throughout the extensive plateau region stretching from the Elgon foothills to the Nandi escarpment. New raiding areas were also opened up, or made more easily accessible, at a time when the number of men available for offensive operations was increased by the absorption of Uasin Gishu remnants, and the release of warriors from outpost duties and frontier patrols. Some of the new raiding areas were rich in stock, especially those which had enjoyed a respite from Masai depredations, and free passage across the Uasin Gishu Plateau gave the Nandi access to the trade goods and barter cattle of Arab traders on the northern caravan route to Kavirondo. When European expeditions followed the same route, the Nandi were able to keep them under surveillance and eventually to attack them.*

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* Thomson witnessed the return of a defeated remnant at Naivasha in 1884; see p. 59.

The evacuation of the Plateau brought some disadvantages to the Nandi: no warlike tribe was interposed between them and the warrior herdsmen of the Central Nilo-Hamites; and remnant parties of Uasin Gishu spearmen were enlisted to stiffen the forces of several of the Kavirondo tribes whom the Nandi raided.† Some of these remnants subsequently played an important role in Nandi-British relations as levies in punitive expeditions, informers, government agents and interpreters. Self-interest prompted the Uasin Gishu in all of these activities to hamper the establishment of friendly relations between the Nandi and the government. One Uasin Gishu "remnant", which had been granted asylum by the Nandi several years before the dispersal, proved even more effective in keeping the government and the Nandi apart. These were the laibon families, who gradually assumed control over ritual matters among the Nandi and eventually exercised considerable political power.

The laibons

No priestly caste had arisen among the Nandi. Their religion was based on individual observance with occasional participation in *koret* or *pororiet* ceremonies conducted by ordinary elders. The Kamwaike and Chemuri clans were especially expert in supernatural matters, and enjoyed a considerable reputation for their exceptional powers in this specialised field.[11] Some Uasin Gishu laibons were invited to practise among the early settlers in the Chebilat area, but had been expelled by the Kakipoch for fostering dissensions among *pororiet* members. Neither the indigenous practitioners nor the immigrant laibons exercised any political authority, but operated as personal consultants rather than tribal leaders. Concern over the anti-social activities of the local witchdoctors, and dissatisfaction with their effectiveness probably explain why the Nandi welcomed a family of Uasin Gishu laibons about 1850 and absorbed them, as *orkoik*, into the Talai clan. It was not unusual for a tribe to employ foreigners as sorcerers and, in this case, the Nandi presumably hoped that the laibons would help them against the Uasin Gishu, and would have information about the areas raided by their fellow tribesmen. Immigrant Uasin Gishu settlers possibly persuaded the Nandi that Masai power was dependent on the laibon system, and that it would be advantageous for the Nandi, who had imitated their rivals in other fields, to follow their example in this particular.* Furthermore, the long struggle with the Masai had made the Nandi elders realise that some form of central control was necessary, in order to defeat the enemy, maintain tribal solidarity and to keep the warriors under control.

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* See Chapters 2-4.

† See pp. 22 and 155 for the effect on Nandi war organisation and tribal preparedness for the British invasion.

The *orkoik* practised much the same methods as their Nandi predecessors: divination, omen interpretation, prophecy and the provision of medicines and charms. They lived in seclusion and gradually acquired a number of mystical attributes, which increased their influence over the Nandi and the effectiveness of their power to curse any tribesmen daring to question their authority. The first laibons were doubtless sagacious enough to tread warily so as to avoid giving unnecessary offence. Their successors slowly extended and consolidated their influence, as the successful outcome of their ministrations enabled them to increase their demands on the credulity of the people. This process was not carried on, however, without checks: their advice was sometimes flouted by the *pororosiek* councils; and several *orkoik* were murdered when their machinations were considered harmful to the general weal. Nevertheless, the laibons gained a position of considerable authority in a short span of about fifty years, and exercised powers over a wide field of *pororiet* and tribal activity. This consummation was not only a tribute to their bearing and ability, but also evidence that they fulfilled an acknowledged want in Nandi society.

Much of their influence as ritual experts derived from the comfort they gave to individual applicants, but the laibons were also credited with possessing powers which enabled them to control the weather and to secure the general health and prosperity of the people, as well as the fertility of the women and the fruitfulness of crops and cattle. As a result of the reputation they enjoyed in these matters, the Nandi *orkoik* were consulted on occasions by individuals and deputations from other Kalenjin tribes. The laibons sanctioned, but rarely attended, *pororosiek* ceremonies, and the

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* The laibons were said to have refused to sanction the disastrous Uasin Gishu attack on the Naivasha Masai.

Head Laibon was consulted on the initiation of important rites affecting the whole of the tribe.* Most of these rituals were concerned with social and economic matters, but some had a bearing on the political organisation of the tribe. The laibons wielded considerable political power in one significant particular: the right to grant or withhold approval for raiding operations. This was exercised by the *pororiet* laibons in the case of minor raids, but for all major enterprises the Laibon had to be consulted by the *pororosiek* councils concerned. Visible evidence of the laibons' protection was provided by the medicine carried by the *kiptainik*, while bravery and discipline were ensured by the belief that the Laibon could detach his head from his body, so that it could accompany the warriors on their expeditions. This intervention in the political field created strong ties between the Laibon and the warriors, but in many other matters the *orkoik* had little direct power or indirect influence. They could not, for example, interfere with proceedings before the courts or intervene in the choice of tribal leaders. There is, however, evidence to suggest that by 1890 the Nandi Laibons, like their Masai counterparts, were beginning to pretend to a greater degree of political authority than their predecessors had dared to envisage. These pretensions were encouraged by the *pororosiek* which had benefited from the Laibon's guidance, and had consequently developed an unreasoning belief in his supernatural attributes.

The *orkoik* fashioned an "administrative" system which could be readily integrated with existing tribal institutions. Every *pororiet* had a resident laibon, or laibons, who dealt with personal applicants, local ceremonies and minor affairs. These functionaries were a charge on the local people, who provided them with food and beer, in the form of presents or a levy, and supplied them with labour for their fields and households. The *orkoik* offered the Laibon hospitality, on the rare occasions when he travelled, and kept in touch with him by messengers. Communication between the *pororiet* council and the Laibon was entrusted to two *maotik* who, as council nominees, accompanied the *kiptainik* when they sought the Laibon's approval for a projected raid. The *maotik*, who also acted as secret service agents and kept the Laibon informed of events in their areas, had a vested interest in the maintenance of the Laibon's authority and the successful prosecution of raiding expeditions. Although the *maotik* system discouraged direct relations between the *pororiet* council and the Laibon, it provided the machinery for the exercise of some degree of centralised control over the tribe, and for furthering the Laibon's pretensions to political power. By 1890, the Nandi and Masai Laibons had undoubtedly increased their influence in some political activities, and had prepared the ground for further encroachments on personal, *pororiet* and tribal liberties.* The gradual progress towards a more centralised form of government received occasional checks in Nandi by the murder or expulsion of laibons who failed to give satisfaction.

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* Henceforth "laibon(s)" refers to the group generally and to *pororosiek* laibons; and "Laibon(s)" to direct descendants of the original Laibon, i.e. to the senior tribal Laibon.

The Nandi confined their reprisals to *pororiet* laibons until 1890, when Kimnyole was clubbed to death.[12] The Laibon was murdered by members of a few *pororosiek*, who were enraged by his failure to protect them from natural calamities and to ensure the success of a combined raid against the Kavirondo or Suk.† It was also possibly a manifestation of uneasiness at the Laibon's growing authority and the encouragement his pretensions had received, at a time when conditions were especially favourable for their rapid advancement. The tribal frontiers had been secured by the expulsion of the Arabs and the defeat of the Masai, prosperity in the form of looted cattle was enjoyed by the Nandi as never before and morale was at its peak.‡ This happy state of affairs was attributed by some sections to the Laibon and to tribal obedience to his commands.

The effect of Kimnyole's murder was soon felt throughout Nandi. His prophecies foretelling his death and the expulsion of the tribe by white men with an iron serpent caused general dismay, when cattle disease, famine and smallpox followed Kimnyole's death.[13] The *pororosiek* which refused to participate in Kimnyole's punishment allied themselves with his younger son, Koitalel, and accused the murderers of subjecting the tribe to the misfortunes which the Laibon had prophesied would follow his death. The result was that the Nandi were divided, disorganised and leaderless until 1899, when Kimnyole's elder son, Kipchomber, who represented the less militant sections of the tribe, exiled himself to Lumbwa and thus enabled Koitalel to assume his father's mantle with general consent.[14] The conflict between the two factions caused much the same confusion and lack of purpose among the Nandi in the early years of British rule as the Lenana-Sendeyu dispute among the pastoral Masai. In one important respect, however, the cases were dissimilar: when Lenana and Sendeyu were reconciled the East Africa Protectorate (EAP) had established a firm hold over its territory, whereas when Koitalel gained recognition as the sole Nandi Laibon, the Uganda Government had not.

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* A laibon could secure any Nandi girl as a wife despite objections by her family or betrothed—an extreme case of the invasion of personal liberty.

† There are many versions of this raid; some Nandi say the Laibon refused to sanction the raid.

‡ For the Laibon's part in the expulsion of the Arabs, see p. 47.

State of development in 1890

The Nandi lived in circular houses built of poles, mud and thatch. There were no villages and the homesteads were not protected in any way. The houses contained very little furniture and the occupants slept on mud couches with skin coverings. Most of the men and children were scantily clothed but married women wore a two-piece garment of dressed skins. Some elders possessed fur cloaks and the warriors wore short skin capes as a protection against the elements, and an assortment of accessories which were designed to strike terror into the hearts of their enemies.

The Nandi way of life was centred on the well-being and increase of the family herds. Small stock were housed in the homesteads and mature cattle in an enclosure nearby, except during the dry season when some of the animals were driven to the *kaptich* grazing grounds. Salt was obtained from a number of licks, which were usually situated in the lower-lying areas, so that long journeys had to be undertaken to visit them. Cattle were important not only for the material comforts they provided, but also because of the prestige and spiritual satisfaction which their owners derived from them. As a man without livestock was looked down upon by his fellows, every opportunity was taken to acquire cattle from raiding expeditions. Gifts of cattle were essential for the completion of marriage and other ceremonies, so that full participation in tribal life was impossible for a man so spiritless as to be without these symbols of manhood.

Agriculture and hunting played an important part in the Nandi economy, but proficiency in these pursuits did not command the same respect as success in stock raising. The staple crop was *wimbi* (finger millet) and small quantities of *mtama* (millet), pumpkins, bananas, sugar-cane, beans and tobacco were also grown in favourable areas. Planting took place in February or March and harvesting from August to October. Cattle were never harnessed for draught purposes, and cultivation was carried on with hand implements made by Nandi smiths or imported from Kavirondo. Owing partly to inefficient tools and the shifting system of cultivation, it was unusual for a family to work more than two acres of land. Damage by animals and insects and unfavourable weather often caused food shortages and sometimes famine. When supplies ran low, especially in the months immediately before the harvest, food was borrowed under the *kesumei* system or bartered from the Kavirondo. Even when the staple crop failed, the people were able to subsist off blood, meat and milk from their flocks and herds, eked out by game, honey, mushrooms, insects, wild fruit and vegetables. The Nandi were abstemious eaters inured to short commons and a monotonous diet. Grain was kept in the homestead attics and in small granaries nearby, but the Nandi had no means of storing surpluses for any length of time. Food was cooked on a sunken hearth in the hut floor, where the housewife prepared the traditional family dish of stiff porridge with a garnish of whatever relishes were at hand. Beer made from *wimbi* or honey was the perquisite of the elders, who also chewed tobacco or took it as snuff.

The Nandi family was self-sufficient in most of the activities of daily life. Help was freely given by neighbours with exceptional aptitudes for certain tasks, but there were few specialists who gained their livelihood solely from the exercise of their art. Smiths and potters were the only truly specialist craftsmen, but a number of skilled operators in other fields received rewards for part-time services. Among the latter were those experienced in midwifery, medicine and surgery, and others who professed powers of detecting the supernatural causes of misfortune or disease and of identifying sorcerers. The Nandi had evolved a way of life which suited their needs and environment and could be followed without assistance from other tribes. Labour was provided within the tribe and raw materials were derived from the land and its animal, vegetable, mineral and insectivorous products. Some barter trade was carried on with Kalenjin, Dorobo and neighbouring tribes largely by border sections during periods of severe famine. Border markets were established in exceptional circumstances, and occasionally cattle exchanges were arranged with the Kavirondo.* But for the most part the Nandi were well satisfied with their way of life, and had no desire to improve it by imitating or trading with their neighbours or by the acquisition of trade goods. Some military innovations were introduced as a result of the Masai wars, and a few crops, implements and agricultural techniques were borrowed from neighbouring tribes. Some of the Bantu Kavirondo strove to emulate their more warlike neighbours by imitating their dress, hair and weapon styles, and by adopting a modified form of the Nandi age-set system.

The setting 1880-1894

The last two decades of the nineteenth century were periods of transition during which the various tribes were adjusting themselves to the new conditions created by the decline of the Masai. Land which had long been forbidden territory to other tribes was left vacant, peoples who had enjoyed Masai protection were left to their own resources, and country which had been laid under tribute by Masai warriors became accessible to other raiders. The principal contenders for the spoils that were made available by the eclipse of the Masai were the Nandi in the south and the Turkana, Karamojong and Suk in the north. When the latter tribes irrupted on to the Trans Nzoia and Uasin Gishu Plateaus, their advance was halted by an outbreak of rinderpest which decimated their herds and compelled them to return to their homelands. The Elgony and Elgeyo began to graze their stock on the Plateau pastures but confined their activities to country near their tribal frontiers, where evasive action could be taken when Nandi raiding parties were sighted. In the east, the Kamasia edged into the grasslands below their mountain settlements, but extensive, permanent occupation of these areas was checked by the resumption of raiding to the west of the Rift Valley by sections of the eastern Masai. These raids, which avoided Nandi country, were the result of unsettled conditions among the pastoral Masai, whose supremacy east of the Rift Valley had been eroded by cattle disease, famine, smallpox, leadership quarrels, and by Kamba and Kikuyu aggression. The position of some of the eastern Masai had become so perilous in 1894 that Lenana had sought Hall's assistance at Fort Smith, the road post of the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEA Co.) nearest to Uganda. Other sections, whose customary raiding grounds in the east had become less profitable than in the past, were forced to turn their attention to the west in order to build up their depleted herds.

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* Two Nandi oxen were exchanged for one Kavirondo heifer.

The growth of tribal consciousness and unity was hindered by clan and section feuds among the Bantu Kavirondo, with the result that their eastern frontier had only advanced slightly towards Nandi in a tentative and piecemeal fashion. Behind the frontier tribes, the Kitosh and Wanga were expanding more rapidly and growing in strength. Pressure from the Teso had forced the Kitosh to move to the south-east, where they came into conflict with a loose confederation of neighbouring tribes under Wanga leadership. Mumia, the Wanga chief, had been shrewd enough to recognise the geographical advantages of his position on the caravan road near the Nzoia crossing. He had also been opportunist enough to see the advantages of allying himself with Arab caravan leaders, and of employing Uasin Gishu mercenaries for the purpose of extending his influence. When European travellers and Company officials appeared on the scene, Mumia assisted them and became the leading ally of the newcomers in Eastern Uganda. These alliances were particularly useful to the young chief as he was threatened by the Kitosh from the north and the Ugenya Luo from the south-west.[15] Since other sub-tribes of the Luo were prevented by the Nandi and Lumbwa from spreading to the east, large parties of migrants crossed the Kavirondo Gulf to join their kinsmen in the south. Other groups occupied parts of the high ground to the north of the Gulf and drove the Bantu Kavirondo to the north and east. The most warlike of these groups, the Kajulu, infiltrated into the escarpment area on the borders of Nandi and Nyangori. Although the Nilotic Luo were as tardy in developing a tribal consciousness as their Bantu neighbours, the sub-tribes combined on occasions to resist the Nandi and Lumbwa and to push back the Kisii, Abasuba and the Masai remnants in South Kavirondo.

The Lumbwa had extended their frontiers at the expense of the Masai in the south and the Kisii in the south-west. These successes had goaded the latter into making common cause with their traditional enemies, the Luo, and the two tribes inflicted a humiliating defeat on the Lumbwa at Mogori in 1890. This reverse caused the Lumbwa to turn their attention to the Kano and Nyakach sections of the Luo on their northern and western boundaries, and helped to strengthen the traditional ties linking the Lumbwa with the Nandi. These ties were becoming particularly important, as the Lumbwa were growing uneasy about the increasing number of Arab caravans passing through their territory, and both tribes were conscious that a new threat to their security had arisen with the advent of the white man into Lumbwa and the Uasin Gishu. The fortunes of the Nandi had undergone a number of vicissitudes during this period: the expulsion of the Masai had been followed by a series of military successes, and also by Kimnyole's death which had thrown the tribe into confusion and put a temporary curb on tribal aspirations. The Nandi were beginning to recover from this setback, which had not prevented their warriors from becoming the scourge of Eastern Uganda. It remained to be seen whether the recovery had been sufficiently complete to enable them to preserve their independence, if the powerful tribe of white men challenged Nandi claims to supremacy.[16]

References

1. Hobley, *Eastern Uganda,* p. 12; he noted: "for days together the whole of the country is enveloped in fog."
2. Matson, *EA Med. J* 34 (1957), p. 431, "The History of Malaria in Nandi".
3. West Nandi is regarded as the eastern limit of the great equatorial forest. Johnston, *Uganda Protectorate,* pp. 200, 318; Loveridge: *Forest Safari,* p. 92.
4. Berkeley to Anderson, 25 July, 1896, Royal Commonwealth Society, *Library Notes* 99, March 1965.
5. Johnston, *op. cit.,* p. 299; cf. Eliot, *East Africa Protectorate,* p. 88, "the most beautiful part of the Protectorate," and Eliot to FO, 9 April, 1902, FOCP, 7953/91.
6. The same applies to lineages; see Manners, "The Kipsigis of Kenya", p. 252 in Steward *Contemporary Change in Traditional Societies.*
7. e.g. maps of Vandeleur, Hobley, Smith, Evatt, Wortham, Gorges, Nicholson, Lindesay, Rumbold, Meinertzhagen and Bacon. For Nandi claims, see KLC Evidence; Nandi ADC to East African Royal Commission, 1 May, 1953; Nandi ADC memo 10 January, 1963, on constituency boundaries.

8. The Sirikwa, who had left the Plateau before it was cleared of Uasin Gishu and Naivasha Masai, seem to have had little influence on the course of Nandi history. Some were absorbed by the Nandi and other Kalenjin tribes, to whom they may have introduced the use of iron. If the Sirikwa were living north of the Chesumei Forest, when the Nandi began to leave the Chebilat area, this would have discouraged the migrants from occupying the plains beyond the forest, where they would have been vulnerable to attack when the Masai invaded the Plateau.
9. The large spears were over 7 feet long. The Kavirondo used very "long and inoffensive-looking spears" with small heads, and enormous shields; Lugard *Journal, Royal Geographical Society*, XIV (1892), p. 822.
10. Several accounts give descriptions and drawings of fortified Kavirondo villages and Elgon caves. See Vandeleur, *JRGS* IX (1897), p. 380 for an attack on a Kabras village.
11. The Nandi version of the Red Sea story casts a Chemuri in Moses' role; Matson, "Biblical Stories in Tribal Legends", *Kenya Weekly News,* 15 December, 1961.
12. For an imaginative reconstruction of the murder, see Le Breton, *Kenya Sketches,* Chapter 9.
13. The iron snake was later identified by the Nandi with the Uganda Railway; Matson, "The Coming of the White Man", *KWN,* 27 April, 1962. The Lumbwa say Kimnyole's death was followed by an eclipse of the sun, Towett, "Traditional History of the Kipsigis" (MS 1957).
14. See Matson, "Nandi Response to a Dynastic Dispute" and Cashmore: "Masai Succession Dispute" in Low (ed.) *Blood Royal* (forthcoming).
15. The Ugenya were known as the Wa-Nife or Wa-Nifwa. Crabtree's Diary (28 April 1894 and 27 May, 1894) and other sources suggest they lived very close to Mumias.
16. This summary is a synthesis of published and unpublished material which will be expanded and discussed in a separate volume. References have been omitted, but most of the topics are dealt with in works listed in the bibliographies to the three compilations on the Nilo-Hamites in the International African Institute's series, *Ethnographic Survey of Africa.*

    Other useful works include: H. Harman, *Black Samson,* Hutchinson, 1965.
    G. W. B. Huntingford, "Distribution of Certain Culture Elements in East Africa", *Journal, Royal Anthropological Institute* 91 (1961), p. 251, Nandi Place-Names, *African Language Studies* 2 (1961), p. 64.
    A. H. Jacobs, *Pastoral Masai of Kenya,* Ministry of Overseas Development (mimeo) 1963; *Masailand in the nineteenth century* (unpublished MS); Traditional Political Organization of the Pastoral Masai, D. Phil., Oxford 1965; "Bibliography of the Masai", *African Studies Bulletin* 8 (1965), p. 40.
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J. M. Weatherby, *UJ* 26 (1962), p. 200; *UJ* 28 (1964), p. 61.
G. S. Were, *History of the Abaluyia of Western Kenya,* East African Publishing House, 1967.
East African Institute of Social Research papers by Banow, Gulliver, Jacobs, Levine, Lonsdale, Pilgrim, Ruel, Sangree, Southall, Spencer, Weatherby, Whisson and Wipper, contain relevant material. Also essays in *Zamani* (1968), *Hadith I* (1968) and *II* (1970), *Ngano* (1969), all published by the East African Publishing House.

2

THE DEFEAT OF THE ARABS

The Nandi first came into contact with the outside world when their country was visited by Arab caravans, which bought ivory with trade goods from the coast and other continents.* The Arabs introduced a new factor into the Nandi economy, as the country had never been entered by Kavirondo traders, who had not developed a caravan system similar to that of the Kamba and Wanyamwezi traders. Although Baganda canoemen bartered goods with the Luo living along the margin of Lake Victoria and the Kavirondo Gulf, they did not penetrate far from the shore. Transactions between the Nandi and their neighbours were limited to border exchanges, and to journeys into Kavirondo by women searching for food in times of famine. Apart from these sporadic operations, Nandi was cut off for centuries from trading relations with other tribes; and it was not until 1899 that the first African sponsored caravans entered Nandi, after the establishment of the *Pax Britannica* had made it safe for Baganda chiefs to send trading parties through Eastern Uganda to the coast.

Arab caravans arrived in Nandi before the middle of the nineteenth century, although some authorities claim that African traders had carried coastal wares to Lake Victoria many years before.[1] The first Arab to arrive at Suna's court was Ahmed bin Ibrahim, who reached the Buganda capital about 1844, presumably by the "Tanganyika" route through Tabora.† Many years afterwards Ahmed told Shergold Smith that "when he first went to Uganda, an Arab caravan, numerous and well armed, tried to force a passage through the Masai country. They did so but arrived in

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* "Arab" is used to include Swahilis, Baluchis, Somalis and other Islamised coastal peoples.

† To avoid confusion with the southern (Lumbwa) route, the route through what was later German East Africa (GEA) is referred to as the Tanganyika route.

Uganda with a loss of six Arabs killed and 300 men killed, captured, or rendered unable to proceed". It would seem from this account that Arabs travelled to Buganda by the Masai route only a short time after their fellow countrymen arrived at Kampala from the south of the lake.[2] In the period between Suna's death and Mutesa's accession, a second caravan crossed Masailand and waited in Busoga for permission to enter Buganda, so it is clear that caravans were passing through Masailand, and possibly through or near Nandi, by the middle of the century. Since explorers and missionaries at the Uganda courts were told of other traders who had journeyed eastwards from the lakes as far as Masailand, there was evidently a two-way traffic between the lakes and the Rift Valley.[3] Parties using this route travelled in fear of the Masai and were sometimes attacked by them, but the Arabs soon adopted the expedients of forming combined caravans before entering dangerous areas, and of making *hongo* payments in order to persuade warlike tribes to grant them passage. It is possible that some of these attacks were made by Nandi, since the Arabs confused the Nandi with the Masai for several years after the first caravans had crossed the Rift Valley.[4] Moreover, had a crippling attack (such as that recorded by Ahmed bin Ibrahim) taken place in Masai country, the Arabs would probably have taken refuge with neighbouring agricultural tribes; whereas, if the attack took place farther to the west, the traders had nothing to gain from retracing their steps through Masailand and every incentive to push on into Kavirondo. There were apparently times during the pioneering period when the coastal traders were active in Eastern Uganda, and others when hardly any caravans used the Masai route. Although this route never became so popular as the older one through Tanganyika, it can be assumed that throughout the nineteenth century Arab caravans travelled beyond Masailand, and that some of them came into contact with the Nandi.

Nandi traditions associate the advent of the Arabs with the period when the Sawe were warriors, that is to say about the 1850's. This does not mean that no Arabs had been seen before that time, but rather that the most memorable contest between the tribe and the newcomers took place during this period. This association has been preserved in the name given to one of the Sawe sub-sets, in order to commemorate a major event in tribal history: the defeat of the Arabs at Kipsoboi and their expulsion from the country. The sub-set name, Marmar, is possibly derived from *marmar*, "to ornament a dress", and suggests that Nandi women used the looted beads and cowries to bedeck their leathern garments. Other evidence shows that this was far from being the first encounter between the Nandi and the Arabs. In 1854 Krapf listed some of the tribes known to "Swahili traders who travelled to the interior of the Wakuafi country in search of ivory". Among these were the Arramkani, Nandi, Kafirondo, Guasin-Gishu, Njamossi, Sukku and Walumbua, but the missionary evidently knew little about these tribes other than their names. The appearance of "Nandi" in this list is significant, as it is generally supposed that the coastal traders called the Chemngal, "Nandi", because of the resemblance between their rapaciousness and the habits of the voracious cormorant, which is termed *mnandi* in Kiswahili.[5] As the nickname had passed into common parlance at the coast by 1854, the Nandi were evidently well known to the trading community for some time before that date. The nickname might have been earned by the Nandi warriors in one important engagement, but it is more probable that it was coined because of several attacks launched over a long period. Arab caravans on their journeys from Ukambani to the Lake are known to have been raided by other tribes, none of which received a similar sobriquet, so the presumption is raised that the Nandi must have been particularly severe and successful in their attacks.

Nandi is not mentioned in the works of other pioneer explorers, who were concerned primarily with the coastal areas, Gallaland, the Nile and Tanganyika routes and Buganda. Stanley sailed past the head of the Kavirondo Gulf during his circumnavigation of the Lake in 1875, and placed Nandi on the map in *Through the Dark Continent* but, until Thomson crossed the Uasin Gishu Plateau in 1883, all that was known of the tribe came from reports brought back to the coast by Arab traders. These reports were recorded and published by Léon des Avanchers, Wakefield, New, Denhardt, Christie and Farler.[6] Wakefield, the Methodist missionary at Ribe, derived most of his extensive information from Sadi bin Ahedi, who had probably reached Lake Victoria by the Masai route before 1860. Although some of the routes are difficult to follow and there is a great deal of geographical and ethnological confusion, the amount of information collected in the various accounts indicates that Eastern Uganda had been fairly thoroughly worked over by Arab trading caravans.

In his account of the route from Tanga to Lake Nyanza via Naivasha, Wakefield described the district of Lumbwa beyond Mau, which the Walumbwa and Wanandi inhabitants called Kiskis, and noted that it was subject to Wakwavi raids. The country between "Kaverond" and "Nandi", which "is also also known by another name, that of Ndei Ngwalle", was occupied by agriculturalists called Wamawka, who were "considered as the subjects of the Wakaverond and Wanandi—their neighbours—a few hours to the north and south". The route continued from Nandi to Barani and across the Gwaso Ngishu (Uasin Gishu), where the Wakwavi lived in temporary settlements as neighbours of the Nandi, to the northern base of the large wooded Nandi Mountain.

> The Wanandi live on the summit which they cultivate. They are also extensive cattle owners, and, like the Walumbwa, secure their cattle at night in houses, as they fear the Masai and Wakwavi. On account of their fear of these wandering and insatiable robbers, their cattle are not taken to the pasturage until the sun is high in the heavens—about 10 a.m. —and they are brought back about 3 in the afternoon. Other prudent and cautionary measures are also adopted to protect and secure their coveted property. Outposts and scouts are daily sent to watch—a goodly distance off—in various directions, against a surprise, whilst the herdsmen attend to pasturing the cattle. The duty of scouting, or keeping watch, is performed alternately, and is daily changed. Thus, one day they are farming, and the next standing sentry!—an irksome necessity, arising from human cupidity!—the violent greed and covetousness of savages!

The neighbouring district was a populous area inhabited by the Wachamwali, who cultivated "millet, beans, bananas (the latter in large quantities), wimbe, etc. and have much cattle". The inhabitants of the Chamwali district, which extended westwards from the Nandi Mountain to the Lake, were evidently not connected with the Chemngal but were most probably the Kitosh or another of the Bantu tribes of North Kavirondo. One of the caravan routes passed from the Lake through Chamwali and past the northern extremity of the Nandi Mountain to the Uasin Gishu Plateau, on much the same line as that followed later by the Uganda Road. Another ran from South Kavirondo and Mawka to the Uasin

Gishu at a distance of about ten miles east of the Nandi Mountain. The Nandi Mountain is shown on the map as a range running roughly NNW to SSE in a position south of the Equator, but which is otherwise approximately correct in relation to Lake Victoria, Kavirondo, Elgeyo and Uasin Gishu.* It is noteworthy that Nandi Mountain is taken as a standard by which other hills are measured, and that the traders recognised that the Nandi and Lumbwa were kinsmen and different from the inhabitants of the Kavirondo Plain.

New added many details about the Lumbwa route and the Kavirondo tribes, and plotted the northern caravan track which Thomson followed in 1883. New did not mention the Nandi district or people in the text of his book, but introduced the name on his map to denote a mountain range running from north to south in approximately the correct position, apart from the fact that he followed Wakefield in placing it much too far south. Denhardt recorded four camping sites in the dense forest on the Nandi Mountains, but these are not plotted on his map, which shows Nandi as a large area extending from the Lake Plains below the Nandi Range in the west to Njemps in the north-east. Stanley's map in *How I found Livingstone in Central Africa* (1872) contained an unnamed range roughly on the line of the Nandi west escarpment, and six years later the same range was designated "Nandi" on the map in *Through the Dark Continent.*†

The above accounts show that the caravan trade in Eastern Uganda was centred on two principal routes: the northern through Njemps, Kamasia, Elgeyo, Uasin Gishu and North Nandi to Mumias; and the southern from Naivasha over Mau and through Sotik, Lumbwa, Sendege's and Kitoto's to the turning station at Mumias. It was common practice for caravans to do a round trip by going up on the southern route and returning by the northern. Njemps and Mumias were used as staging posts on the northern route, and Kitoto's gradually took over this function from Sendege's for the southern caravans. At these posts caravans were rested and revictualled, sick porters were left to recuperate and the main party awaited the arrival of sections, which had gone off on trading ventures of their own, before beginning the return journey across Masailand to the coast. Mumias was apparently the only place in Eastern Uganda where caravan leaders played a significant part in local affairs. They used Mumia's village as the headquarters for raids into surrounding districts and helped the Wanga against their traditional enemies. Fortunately these aggressive tactics were not often employed until about the 'eighties, so that the alliances, destruction and slaving, which were typical of the Tanganyika route, were never reproduced to the same degree in Eastern Uganda. As enterprising and resourceful leaders and a large number of men were needed in order to ensure a safe passage, caravans through Masailand were never as numerous as on the better known Tanganyika route, and in some years promoters, leaders and porters could not be found to risk their capital and lives on expeditions to the ivory grounds west of Mau.[7]

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* The southern end of Nandi Mountain was six hours' journey (say ten miles) from the Lake; the Arabs did not distinguish the Lake from the Kavirondo Gulf; the latter was first accurately described by B. Whitehouse in 1898.

† The range is placed south of 1 deg. S and about 60 miles from the Lake.

The Arabs found Nandi much more difficult to enter than the country of most of the tribes with whom they did regular business. The only easy approach was from the north-east, but a caravan on the Uasin Gishu route had to march for two or three days before reaching the principal Nandi settlements overlooking the Nyando Valley. Since this journey lengthened the march through foodless country, caravans usually made straight for Kavirondo where food was abundant and there was no fear of opposition.* This is confirmed by Nandi traditions which state that the Arabs entered the country from Mumias in the west or from Kiboswa and the Kibos River in the south. Caravans seldom entered and camped in Nandi, but preferred to exchange trade goods for ivory at places below the south escarpment or in East Kabras and Kakamega. Transactions were often entrusted to Sotik or Dorobo agents, whom the traders sent "to purchase the ivory as the Wanandi will not allow the Swahilis into their country".[8] This middleman system, which the Arabs were driven to adopt because of the casualties they suffered when they tried to trade direct with the Nandi, was a risky business, and the traders preferred to buy tusks from the Kavirondo, who obtained them from the Nandi in exchange for heifers. Hollis described one of the methods employed by the Nandi:† "On arriving at the frontier the Coast people were usually met by a few old men who told them in course of conversation that there was a large supply of ivory at a place situated two or three days' journey from the camp, but that only a small party consisting of ten or twenty men might go to barter for it. So great was the avidity of the Swahili trader that he often fell into the trap, and a small party would be despatched laden with cloth, wire and other trade goods, only to be ambushed by the Nandi and massacred."[9] Another artifice practised by the Nandi was to lead prospective buyers into the depths of the country by the wrong road and then to attack their camp at night.

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* Food was generally obtainable at Njemps but not always in Kamasia or Elgeyo.

† Cf. the experiences of West's porters, p. 100.

In order to guard themselves against such stratagems, the Arabs fell back on the customary expedient of entering into blood-brotherhood with the Nandi. "A Swahili and a Nandi would sit opposite to each other, and, after each had cut the back of his hand, the wound was sucked by the other."[10] This ritual was a novel procedure to the Nandi, who never considered themselves bound by a ceremony which was alien to their traditions. Huntingford states that the Nandi had to coin a word, *kaliet*, from the Kiswahili *kalia*, "sit opposite to", because there was no word in their own language for the concept of blood-brotherhood.[11] The murder and spoliation of people with whom blood-brotherhood had been performed was naturally regarded by the Arabs as treachery. But even if the Nandi participants honoured their pledge, they were powerless to bind their fellow tribesmen, so that while a caravan remained in the country it was always liable to be attacked.* Traders who were enterprising enough to enter Nandi often regretted their rashness, and a number of them were killed at some of the places that are still known as Kapchumba.† The Arabs' reluctance to enter Nandi was well known to the coastal porters, who passed the information on to European caravan leaders: "through the Nandi country no caravan has penetrated; twice Swahili caravans have tried but have experienced so much opposition that they have had to beat a very discomfited retreat."[12] Even if traders were not intending to enter Nandi country they were always liable to be attacked when in its vicinity. Caravans were kept under surveillance at some distance from all the tribal boundaries, but most of the attacks were launched by the Tindiret and escarpment *pororosiek* when the traders were crossing the Nyando Valley on the route between Lumbwa and Kavirondo.

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* Europeans were equally ignorant of Nandi organisation and made the same mistake; see pp. 93-99.

† *Chumba* was coined from Kiswahili *Jomba* to denote a stranger from the coast, cf. Kikuyu *Comba;* it was later applied to anybody who wore clothes, including Europeans, so that all the places called Kapchumba are not associated with Arab traders.

The Nandi showed scant respect for the caravans or their leaders: the porters were called *otuagik* (slaves) and the Arabs were ridiculed as being womanish because of their long cloaks and hoods. The Nandi developed a technique, similar to that practised by the pastoral Masai, for reducing the effectiveness of the large number of firearms the caravans carried. After drawing the enemy's fire by a sudden rush, the warriors threw themselves to the ground and then charged straight at the caravan after the first volley was discharged; the porters stampeded as they could not recharge their muzzle-loaders in time, and were speared as they ran away in panic. Nandi elders give an amusing representation of this manoeuvre, which made the warriors scornful of firearms until they attempted to use similar tactics against the Sudanese troops at the battle of Kimondi in 1895.* The Arabs found the Nandi more than a match as tacticians, and evidently realised that military occupation of the country was the only method of overcoming Nandi resistance. There was no Kitoto or Mumia in Nandi to offer the Arabs hospitality, to seek an alliance with them against rival sections or tribes, and to ensure that promises made to the traders were honoured by the people. The policy of co-existence, which the Arabs were accustomed to follow in their relations with chiefs in whose territory they established staging posts, could not be pursued in Nandi; and the Nandi leaders could not be induced to accept *hongo* payments in return for assurances that the traders could pass as peacefully through the country as they did through Masailand. The Arabs would doubtless have been willing to pay for freedom from attacks, but the beads, cloth, wire and other articles which formed their stock in trade had little appeal to the Nandi, owing to their conservatism and economic self-sufficiency. Although the Arabs used cattle as a medium of barter in their transactions with tribes to the north of Njemps and Elgon, this form of trade goods was seldom carried on either of the Kavirondo routes. The Nandi might have found it convenient to negotiate cattle exchanges with the Arabs, instead of with the Kavirondo, but the presence of animals would have slowed down a caravan's rate of marching and rendered it liable to attack by the Masai, Nandi and Lumbwa. Their failure to arrive at a satisfactory accommodation with the Nandi must have been galling to the Arabs, especially after they had mastered the technique of crossing Masailand in safety. Resentment at being worsted eventually induced the traders to attempt their only major incursion into the Nandi homelands.

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* See p. 142.

This episode took place in the 'fifties, when the Sawe were warriors, and accounts for the association between that age-set and the Arabs in Nandi traditions. The traders must have been in considerable strength, as stockaded posts were established at Kimatke on the track between Kibigori and Chemelil, at Kipsoboi on the south escarpment overlooking Chemase, and at Kobujoi in the Chesumei Forest. The Arabs stayed some time among the Nandi bartering beads, cloth and ornaments for ivory, sheep and goats. All went well until the Arabs felt they were firmly established in their principal fortified encampment at Kipsoboi. They then began to act in a provocative manner and to show their scorn of the local people: donkeys were let loose to trample the *wimbi* and *mtama*; porridge was poured over one man and flour over another; and attempts were made to imprison some Nandi youths and to interfere with women and girls. When these needlessly stupid acts, which were characteristic of the conduct of coastal caravans towards tribes they despised, produced the inevitable reaction from the Nandi, the Arabs placed four shields against a tree and ordered the Nandi to shoot at them with arrows. When the arrows failed to penetrate, the Arabs fired through the shields with their muzzle-loaders to the chagrin of the Nandi spectators.[13] After the Arabs insulted the warriors by pouring gruel over their heads and shaving off their cherished pigtails, the Nandi became so furious with their guests that they sought permission from the Kaptalam laibon to kill them. He agreed and the Nandi stormed the post. Some accounts credit the laibon with making the defenders' ammunition disappear, while others state that when the surprise attack was launched the gunmen had their weapons with them on parade but no ammunition.* The assault was successful and the entire garrison was speared on the spot with the exception of one man, who escaped down the escarpment to Chemase but was killed before he could reach his comrades at Kimatke. In order to anticipate reprisals, the Nandi marched on Kobujoi, sacked the post and killed all its inmates with the exception of one man who reached Chemursoi and eventually escaped. When the party at Kimatke heard of the massacres, they dismantled the post and left the country.

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* See pp. 96 and 159 for the Laibon's power to render ammunition ineffective.

The arrogance of the traders and the indignities which they offered to the Nandi at Kipsoboi support Johnston's pronouncement about the tribe's relations with alien intruders: "It is to be feared, from what we know of the way in which Swahili traders treat the natives of countries they traverse, that the blame for this hostile attitude on the part of the Nandi originally rests with the Zanzibar and Mombasa caravans."[14]

By planting stockaded strong points in South Nandi, the Arabs evidently intended to occupy the country permanently in order to cow the warriors, to reduce the incidence and severity of their attacks on caravans using the Lumbwa-Kavirondo route and to open up the district for ivory trading. The location of the Kimatke post on the track between Kibigori and Chemelil suggests that the Arabs hoped to reduce the distance between Naivasha and Lake Victoria by using the direct route over Mau and through the Nyando Valley. The operation was conducted with some skill and tact in the initial stages, and might have had a successful outcome if the Arabs had persevered with conciliatory measures, instead of antagonising the Nandi by acts which were possibly reprisals for past losses. The traders were mistaken in thinking that actions, which other tribes had submitted to without complaint, would be accepted by the Nandi once they had seen the caravan's superiority in forces and armament. This misapprehension about the character and temper of the Nandi proved the undoing of the Arabs and led to their expulsion from the country. After the two posts were overrun and the third abandoned, the traders made no further attempts to occupy Nandi or to seek revenge for the humiliating rebuff they had suffered.

After the massacres at Kipsoboi and Kobujoi, caravan leaders fell back on the policy of avoidance, which they adopted whenever stubborn resistance was encountered, and followed the long detour across the Uasin Gishu Plateau, which remained the recognised route to Uganda until Sclater's Road was constructed in 1896 after the first Nandi expedition.[15] Reports continued to reach the coast about Eastern Uganda and especially Kavirondo, but Nandi remained simply a name on the map and little additional information was recorded about the district or people. One collector of these reports commented in 1882 that:

> In the north a range of high mountains is visible called Nanda (*sic*). These mountains are inhabited by a tribe called Wananda, never visited on account of their ferocity. They are armed with bows and arrows, and large knives. They are constantly at war with the Kavirondo people and attack all strangers who venture near them. They were described to me as wearing knives on their arms, at their waists, and on their thighs.

The Nandi, thus, were not only feared and avoided but also credited, incorrectly, with possessing some of the weapons of the Central Nilo-Hamites.[16] Several of the reports refer in general terms to the hostility of the Nandi towards Arab caravans but give no details of specific incidents. This was probably because survivors seldom escaped to tell the tale, and the leaders were naturally reticent about the failure of their attempts to subdue the warriors and to occupy the country. The fuller accounts that were published after Thomson's expedition revealed that caravan traffic in Eastern Uganda was on a considerable scale and widespread in extent. But none of the travellers' reports from 1883 to 1895 records the presence of coastal caravans in Nandi, the Upper Nyando Valley or even on the track between Uasin Gishu and Kabras.* The omission of Nandi from these accounts is confirmed by explorers' "slave route maps", which show that Arab caravans did not approach Nandi except in the extreme north.

The freedom which the Kavirondo are said to have enjoyed from slave trading and its concomitant abuses, has been attributed to the barrier which the Masai and Nandi presented to the coastal caravans. Masai and Nandi hostility were undoubtedly factors which made the northern circuit less attractive to the speculator and operator than the Tanganyika route, but the incidence of deterrent attacks was reduced to a minimum by the working agreement which the Arabs established with the former tribe and by their policy of avoiding the latter.* Nevertheless, the fear of such attacks had an indirect bearing on the slave trade. The large caravans that were necessary to ensure a safe passage through Masailand and the country near Nandi contained a considerable number of spare men, so the Arabs had no need to adopt their normal practice of capturing slaves in order to obtain the manpower required to carry ivory to the coast. But some of the caravans, which visited Kavirondo at regular intervals, engaged in slaving in addition to more legitimate pursuits and devastated parts of the country in the process.[17]

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* Several caravans were reported in Lumbwa during this period, by Jackson, Smith, Pringle, Neumann, Spire, etc.

The Arabs were forced to make a long detour to avoid the Nandi warriors but other Kalenjin tribes allowed the traders to pass through their country without much opposition. The Kamasia, Elgeyo and Nyangori were not strong enough to offer much resistance, and the much more powerful Lumbwa only attacked the intruders when their demands became excessive or their conduct intolerable.† The Nandi, who lived in a compact area which was easily defensible and difficult of access, were in a better position to deter intruders than their much more numerous Lumbwa kinsmen. The latter were dispersed over a much larger area, which was relatively easy to enter and to leave, and divided into three sections (Sotik, Lumbwa and Burgani), who were separated from one another by extensive belts of unoccupied land. The eastward movement of the Nandi was carried out from one defensible location to another and did not involve them in conflicts with other tribes, whereas the Lumbwa were continuously engaged on a war of territorial aggrandisement at the expense of the Kisii, Luo and Masai. The only easy means of approaching Nandi was from the north through grazing country devoid of cultivation, but Lumbwa was generally entered from the Masai plains to the east, so that caravans descending from Mau encountered the Sotik, the section with the greatest admixture of Bantu blood and the most extensive agriculture. Traders using this route bought ivory from the Lumbwa, who probably had more to sell than the Nandi, and also tapped the markets in Kisii and South Luo country, which were difficult to approach unless caravans passed through Lumbwa. The Lumbwa were much more of a mixed people than the Nandi and were, in consequence, possibly less martial and insular in outlook. These contributory factors help to explain the different attitude which the Nandi and Lumbwa adopted in their dealings with the Arabs, but it was probably the indignities which the Nandi suffered at Kipsoboi that were mainly responsible for strengthening their resistance to the coastal caravans.[18]

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* The most famous Masai attack was the annihilation of a large caravan at Mbaruk in the 'seventies.

† In retaliation for an attack at Kabaraton in Kajulu, an Arab caravan entered Nyangori and made a fortified camp at Tombua, from which sallies were made until the Nyangori sued for peace and paid tribute; the Arabs then left for Maseno via Gambogi (pers. com. M. Jackson, 5 February, 1957). There are no traditions of caravans crossing the vulnerable Nandi frontier in this area.

Although the Nandi were the only people in Eastern Uganda to keep the coastal traders at arm's length, and to remain isolated from many of the influences which they introduced among other tribes, the advent of the Arabs had some important effects on the course of Nandi history. The massacre of the Arabs and the resulting policy of avoidance enabled the Nandi to devote all their resources to the expulsion of the Masai. No extra men were employed to keep caravans under surveillance from the permanently manned outposts, and the presence of Arabs in Kavirondo or Lumbwa did not halt Nandi expansion to the north and east. The successful outcome of the laibon's intervention in the Kipsoboi affair encouraged the Nandi in their struggle with the Masai, and increased their respect for his powers, which were seen to be equally as effective against *chumbek*, or strangers from afar, as against traditional enemies of the tribe.* The Nandi did not receive much material gain from their encounters with the Arabs. Small quantities of trade goods were introduced before peaceful trading operations were stopped by the massacres, and a certain amount of loot was seized from the ransacked camps at Kipsoboi and Kobujoi and from smaller trading parties. A number of guns were captured in these incidents, but the Nandi showed little interest in using weapons which had proved ineffective against their spears, and traded most of them to the Kavirondo for cattle. Cloth also had little appeal to the hardy mountaineers who contented themselves with acquiring beads and other ornaments. A small variety of the latter became widely distributed throughout the country in such a manner as to suggest that they were obtained by seizure rather than barter.

The exclusion of the coastal traders prevented the formation of

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* This was possibly the laibon's first significant intervention in tribal affairs and undoubtedly hastened Nandi acceptance of the immigrant ritual experts.

"Swahili" settlements in Nandi and thus obviated the need to assimilate alien elements into the tribe. The Arabs' policy of avoidance insulated the Nandi from diseases that were introduced or spread by caravans—smallpox, dysentery, syphilis and cholera among others—and shielded their cattle from the infections that often decimated the herds of other tribes near caravan routes.[19] The Masai suffered considerably from natural calamities of this kind, so that the resulting impoverishment and debility impeded the growth, and at times even threatened the continuance, of Masai power. The Lumbwa were more afflicted than the Nandi by diseases conveyed from outside sources, and the latter were not introduced to some of the more bestial forms of cruelty that were often practised in areas frequented by Arab caravans.[20] Probably the most important benefit which the Nandi gained from their victory over the Arabs was the fillip it gave to tribal morale and exclusiveness. The feeling of superiority which this induced was strengthened by the failure of the usually persuasive intruders to prevail on any of the tribal leaders or sections to enter into an alliance with them against the rest of the tribe. The Nandi had every reason to be proud of their achievements, since they alone of all the tribes in Eastern Uganda had withstood the onslaught of the foreigners' new-fangled weapons, and had maintained their tribal solidarity in the face of potentially disintegrating influences.

The effectiveness of the Nandi response to the Arab challenge was well known to other tribes and helped to create the "Nandi legend". This legend lengthened the route to the Lake by several marches, saddled caravan leaders with additional duties and expense, and forced porters, on short commons towards the end of the foodless stretch from Kikuyu or Njemps, to toil for many extra miles so that they could reach the plenty of Kavirondo in safety. Swahili porters were notoriously braggarts in their professions of contempt for the *Washenzi* (savages) of the interior, but even they did not attempt to hide their fear of the Nandi from European enquiries. This fear discouraged recruitment for caravans beyond Kikuyu and was the cause of casualties among those who engaged for the perilous journey to the Lake. "What not infrequently happens is that a porter . . . is alarmed at some report there are Masai or Wanandi . . . in the neighbourhood and with the impulsive recklessness and want of forethought characteristic of the uneducated African, flings down his burden and flies into the bush."[21] The exploits of the Nandi warriors were evidently rehearsed in the safety of the coastal ports, as caravan leaders were alleged to have explained discrepancies in the number of their porters by relating "most circumstantially how such and such men were cut up in the Suk or Nandi country".[22] The detour around Nandi prevented the acquisition of reliable information about the country south of the Uasin Gishu route and few, if any, of the most experienced caravan leaders or their staff could speak the Nandi language. Because of these disabilities, Nandi was entered by Europeans much later than most of the districts in the vicinity of the Uganda Road and, when entry was eventually made at the end of 1895, force had to be used as the way had not been prepared by Arab caravans.[23] Before Cunningham's forces entered the country in 1895, the Nandi had watched European travellers from a distance and had found them indistinguishable in dress, activities and armament from the Arabs whom the warriors had come to despise.[24]

It was fortunate in some respects that the Arabs antagonised the Nandi at an early stage in their relations. Had the traders been able to enlist the help of the Nandi and their brethren against the Kavirondo, such an alliance might have created the same chaos and devastation in Eastern Uganda as the understanding between the Arabs and the warlike Yao and Ngoni caused in Nyasaland before the Slavers' War of 1888-1896.[25] Sir Charles Eliot was surprised that Islam had had so slight an effect on the Masai, Nandi and Lumbwa "who, as warrior tribes, ought to have proved favourably disposed to its tenets", but considered this was caused by the fact that these tribes only "saw occasional Arabs, but they never made the acquaintance of a Mohammedan state, or realised the power of the religion as a drill and discipline, both social and military".[26] Nandi disdain for the Arab adherents of Islam originated at Kipsoboi and was strengthened by the conduct of their co-religionists, the Sudanese soldiers, who fought under the British flag. This antipathy proved fortunate for the Uganda Government during the mutiny of 1897, when an Islamised warrior tribe enjoying friendly relations with the Sudanese mutineers would have caused a serious disruption of the Protectorate's communications in the Eastern Province.*

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* See Chapter 13.

Long before the advent of the white man in Eastern Uganda the Nandi had taken the measure of the first invaders to enter their country from the coast. The Arabs never became a formidable power in the area and for a few years the Nandi could not distinguish between their caravans and those of their European successors who travelled by the same routes. At first, the British made no effort either to force their way into Nandi or to challenge the dominant position which the tribe had built up, and gave no indication that they were the strangers from the east who were destined to fulfil Kimnyole's prophecy.* But the Nandi discovered in 1895, when they resisted the Government's claim to a right of passage through their country, that the British were more tenacious adversaries and better riflemen than the Arabs whom they so closely resembled. Before this discovery was made, the Nandi stood aloof from the developments that were going on around them, and were confident they could preserve their independence from being violated by the new *Chumbek* at Mumias, as effectively as they had expelled their predecessors from Kipsoboi and closed the direct road over Mau to intruders from the east.[27]

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* See p. 31.

References

1. Gray, *UJ*, 11 (1947), p. 80; 22 (1958), p. 76; *TNR*, 49 (1957), p. 226; Gregory, *Great Rift Valley*, p. 296; Burton, *JRGS*, 29 (1859), p. 275.
2. Smith's preamble, "to go back 25 years" infers the caravan arrived in 1852, but as Ahmed had made three trips to Uganda before Suna's death in 1856, the caravan evidently arrived before 1852. *C. M. Intelligencer*, March 1878, p. 159. Speke, *Journal of the Discovery of the Sources of the Nile*, p. 187.
3. e.g. Speke, *idem*, pp. 127, 155, 187, 239, 428-29, 509; Grant, *A Walk Across Africa*, pp. 161, 279; *JRGS*, 42 (1872), p. 243.
4. For the Tanganyika Arab's fear of the Masai and other tribes on the north-east shores of the Lake, see Speke, *What Led to the Discovery of the Nile*, (1967 reprint), pp. 310-11, Burton, *op. cit.*, pp. 18, 263.
5. Krapf, *Vocabulary of the Engutuk Eloikob*, pp. 27, 30. He was presumably unaware of the derivation of "Nandi", as there is no entry in his *Dictionary of the Suahili Language* (1882) for *mnandi*, the cormorant; the word is not in Madan (1903) or Binns (1925) but is in the *Standard Dictionary*, (1935).
6. des Avanchers, *Bull, Soc. Géog. Paris*, XVII, (1859), p. 153; XII (1866), p. 163. Wakefield, *JRGS*, 40 (1870), p. 303; IV (1882), p. 742. New, *Life, Wanderings, and Labours in Eastern Africa*, (1873). Denhardt, *Petermann Mittheil.*, (1881), p. 130 (summarised in Gregory *Foundation of British East Africa*, p. 45). Christie, *Cholera Epidemics in East Africa* (which does not mention Nandi). Farler, *JRGS*, IV

(1882) p. 730. See also O'Neill, 30 June, 1876 (CMS Archives CA 6/018); Mackay, 15 December, 1876 (CMS Archives, CA, 6/016).

7. Over 1,000 men were needed for a combined caravan; Farler, *JRGS,* (1882), p. 730.
8. Pringle, *JRGS,* II (1893), p. 132.
9. Hollis, *The Nandi,* p. 3.
10. Hollis, *idem,* p. 84.
11. Huntingford, *Nandi Work and Culture,* p. 1. The more usual connotation of *kalia* is "to lie in wait for"! *kaliet* is commonly used by the Nandi for "peace and quietness" and the personal name Kalya has a similar meaning, but both words might have been derived originally from Kiswahili.
12. Pringle, *op. cit.,* p. 134, Peters, *New Light on Dark Africa,* p. 234.
13. These were common caravan tricks, see e.g. Höhnel, *Discovery of Lakes Rudolf and Stefanie* ii, 249.
14. Johnston, *op. cit.,* p. 245.
15. North-East Embu, Suk and Ruanda were avoided for the same reason; Stigand, *Land of Zinj,* p. 257; Wakefield, *op. cit.,* p. 326; Wymer, *Man from the Cape,* p. 53; Burton, *op. cit.,* pp. 249-251; Gray, *TNR,* 49 (1957), p. 240; Stanley, *Through the Dark Continent* (1868) i, 453, 455, 469.
16. Farler, *JRGS,* IV (1882), p. 737. A wrist knife in the National Museum, Nairobi, is said to be from Nandi but these weapons were never in common use.
17. Thomson, *Through Masai Land,* pp. 503, 506; Jackson, *Early Days in East Africa,* pp. 169, 196; Lugard, *Rise of our East African Empire* i, 195, 353, 445 ii, 575; URy Survey Report Cmd. 7025, pp. 97-99 and slave route map. Jackson-IBEA Coy. (16 September, 1890, FO 84/2264), states large caravans seized slaves to carry ivory.
18. See Manners, *op. cit.,* pp. 221-22, in *Contemporary Change in Traditional Societies.*
19. See e.g. Christie, *op. cit.,* Thomson, *op. cit.*
20. Ross, *Kenya from Within,* p. 25; Thomson, *op. cit.,* p. 507.
21. Hardinge-FO, 6 March, 1896, FOCP, 6849/6.
22 McDermott, *British East Africa or IBEA,* pp. 270-71.
23. J. W. H., *Mackay of Uganda,* p. 421; Thomson, *op. cit.,* p. 488, but see Lugard, *op. cit.,* ii, 577.
24. cf. Speke, *What Led to the Discovery of the Nile,* p. 313, Burton, *op. cit.,* p. 256.
25. Moyse-Bartlett, *The King's African Rifles,* p. 7; Chapter 2 (i).
26. Eliot, *op. cit.,* p. 43; see p. 297 for a fuller discussion.
27. cf. Stanley, *Through the Dark Continent,* i 150: "Information is only conveyed along the lines of traffic, and does not filter into those countries which are ostracised from common interests and events by the reputed ferocity of their inhabitants and their jealous hostility to strangers, even though they may actually border upon the localities where those interests and events are freely discussed."

3

THE COMING OF THE WHITE MAN

Several Kalenjin soothsayers probably foretold the coming of the white man, as prophecies on the subject have been recorded from almost all East African tribes. But only the prophetic utterances attributed to Mongo and Kimnyole are remembered in Nandi today.[1] The former was made by a Kaptumois diviner from the Kapsabet area, who foretold the arrival of white people possessed of great power, and warned the Nandi against trying to fight against them. The latter was the circumstantial pronouncement which was made in dramatic circumstances by the Laibon before he was murdered in 1890.* Both prophecies were made long after white men had begun to explore the interior of East Africa, and Kimnyole's not until seven years after the first European had crossed Nandi. This suggests that the formidable subjects of the prophecies, who were regarded as being too powerful for the Nandi to resist, were neither the Arabs, whom the Nandi had defeated, nor the Europeans whose much smaller caravans had passed quickly through the northern grazing grounds without inflicting any damage on the tribe. Although larger European expeditions travelled the Uganda Road after Kimnyole's death, the Nandi thought their leaders were Arabs and evidently had no fear that they were the instruments by which the Laibon's prophecy would be fulfilled. The differences between the two kinds of intruders were only appreciated several years after the first European had set foot in Nandi, so that the tribe's introduction to the white man was a gradual process and not the sensational event it often was in other parts of East Africa.

Many years before the soothsayers' prophecies, the investigation of a northern route from Mombasa to Lake Victoria had been canvassed by explorers and missionaries in Africa and Europe.

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* See p. 31.

The opening up of this route was first mooted in 1824 by Lt. Emery, the British Governor of Mombasa, but it was not until November 1883 that a caravan under European leadership crossed Masailand and North Nandi to reach the north-eastern shores of Lake Victoria.[2] Joseph Thomson, the leader of this expedition of the Royal Geographical Society, and James Martin, his transport assistant, were the first Europeans to enter Nandi. In comparison with Arab trading caravans and the expeditions that subsequently followed his route, Thomson's pioneer party was a small affair mustering barely a hundred men, only one of whom had previously visited Kavirondo. The confused and sketchy information which Thomson gathered from the accounts of missionary compilers, and from caravan traders whom he met at the coast and during his journey, strengthened his obsession with the perils of the Masailand crossing, but the little he had gleaned about the country farther to the west was also far from reassuring. When he parted company with Jumbe Kimameta, his companion across Masailand, at Njemps, Thomson marched on "with the agreeable knowledge that the last three caravans which had preceded me had each lost more than a hundred men by violence", and that these losses had stopped the despatch of caravans from Mombasa during the 1882-83 season.[3]

After leaving Njemps on 16 November 1883 and scrambling up the western wall of the Kerio Valley, Thomson reached the top of the Elgeyo escarpment, where he noted that "due west shaded gently away the treeless plain of Guas' Ngishu, unbroken except by one slight eminence, till in the distant horizon rose the conical peak of Surongai, the boundary-wall of Kavirondo".* The caravan proceeded across the plain and camped in the Sosiani Valley, where Thomson got a clear view of "the high forest region of Nandi, which seems to be a curious counterpart of Kikuyu. It appeared in the south as a long dark ridge running apparently NW and SE". As the caravan approached the western hills "the country became more diversified and pleasing—rolling in gentle undulations and dotted over with a flowering shrub. Game existed in very great numbers". After a day's easy marching, the caravan "entered a more hilly country and had to cross a large river three times, much to our discomfort". As the "Dorobo" guide had returned to Elgeyo, Thomson was proceeding "entirely at haphazard", so two headmen were sent to spy out the land in order to prevent the caravan from being taken by surprise. The following day Thomson climbed to the top of the range of hills, only to find "a narrow valley and a second range of hills beyond". Three men accompanied the explorer on a reconnaissance of the valley, which was "chiefly remarkable for the length of the grass which made walking a serious labour, and for the number of small streams flowing north to the River Nzoia". When the caravan reached the top of the second range "we were relieved and gratified to find Kavirondo lying at our feet and soon we were pointing out to each other curling columns of smoke and square patches of variegated green, which told of inhabitants and cultivation". After the descent had been negotiated, a strong enclosure was made at the base of the hills and the caravan camped for the night. The following day Thomson reached the fortified village of Kabras, after "five weary marches" from the Elgeyo escarpment.[4] Thomson's route led him farther to the north than the line taken by most of the later caravans, and followed the Sosiani and Kipkarren Rivers before crossing the two parallel ranges which form the northern extremity of the Nandi escarpment.

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* The "slight eminence" was possibly Sergoit Rock or Kamulat Hill; the "conical peak" Kamulat, Kaptepe or Bwanga; present-day Osorongai appears rounded in shape from Elgeyo.

Thomson did not see any Nandi people, houses, cultivation or other signs of habitation, and his gratification when he saw the populated and cultivated Kavirondo Plain was a sentiment which was echoed by many of his successors. The caravan crossed Nandi during the dry season, when it was customary for large numbers of cattle to be grazed on the *kaptich* pastures, so the absence of livestock from the northern grasslands must have been caused by exceptional circumstances. The herds had probably been withdrawn from the outlying *kaptich* as a precaution against pleuro-pneumonia, which had decimated the Masai cattle, and against raids by Masai warriors seeking to recoup the losses they had suffered from the disease.* The Nandi outposts had undoubtedly been strengthened if there was a danger of Masai attacks, so that Thomson would not have passed unnoticed, especially as he had to shoot game for food and to "fire repeatedly" in order to prevent buffaloes from scattering his men. The caravan probably appeared to the hilltop scouts to be nothing more than a small Arab trading party, which was unworthy of attack when the warriors had more important duties to perform.

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* The Naivasha incident (below) supports this proposition.

Thomson returned from Lake Victoria via Elgon and Elgeyo and did not cross Nandi again. After he arrived at Naivasha in March 1884, "the remnants of a war-party got back from Nandi, near Kavirondo, where they had been utterly thrashed and one-half of their number killed, the rest returning home in ones and twos, some without spears, many without shields". Thomson did not appreciate the significance of this event, though he was possibly witnessing a turning point in East African history: the eclipse of the Masai as a powerful force in the country to the west of the Rift Valley and the beginning of the period of Nandi dominance in Eastern Uganda.[5]

Thomson's expedition charted the route from the Rift Valley to Kavirondo, which eventually became the recognised way of reaching the Lake after Jackson, Smith, Neumann and Pringle had demonstrated the disadvantages of the southern route through Sotik and Lumbwa. The northern approach, which followed the line taken by trading caravans after the expulsion of the Arabs from Nandi thirty years earlier, became the Uganda Road, the lifeline along which flowed men, supplies and arms to Kavirondo and the countries across the Lake. The adoption of this route set the pattern for the future development of the Kavirondo region, created the conditions which enabled Mumia to attain a position of preeminence, reduced the importance of the staging post at Kitoto's and led the government to concentrate its efforts on North Kavirondo to the detriment of the central and southern areas. In the course of time the location of the Uganda Road gave rise to the "Nandi question", which was destined to be the most disturbing factor in the politics of the region until 1906.

But the advent of the white man had no immediate effect on the Nandi, and Thomson's small caravan passed uneventfully without giving the tribe any inkling of the shape of things to come. Thomson's map and narrative added a few details about the Nandi and their country but nothing about the tribal homelands.* The few remarks which the explorer made about the characteristics of the tribe confirmed the opinion held by coastal traders that they were people best left alone, with the result that later expeditions continued to make a lengthy detour in order to avoid Nandi, despite the inconvenience and hardship this caused to caravan leaders and their men. Thomson observed that "the Wanandi are allied in language and customs to the Wakamasia and Waelgeyo, though much braver and more warlike. In their intractable character they resemble the Wakikuyu, and neither can trading-caravans enter peacefully their domains nor Masai warriors forcibly". He added that the Masai found the Elgumi and Nandi tribes "to be the most difficult to deal with, the one from its great numbers, the other from its fighting powers".[6] These observations, and his account of the return of the broken Masai warriors to Naivasha, warned later travellers that the perils of the Mombasa route were not confined to the crossing of Masailand, and that attempts to force an entry into the Nandi heartlands should not be lightly undertaken. Thomson's views were respected by his successors and the interior of Nandi remained a blank on the maps until Cunningham's expedition in 1895.

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* The map corrected the error concerning the latitude of Nandi. See p. 43. In the text (p. 467) Thomson located the Uasin Gishu Plateau correctly but placed it too far south on the map.

The next European to cross Nandi was James Hannington, the first Bishop of Eastern Equatorial Africa, who left Rabai in July 1885 to open up the northern route to the CMS stations in the interior, which Krapf and Rebmann had advocated thirty years before. Before his elevation, Hannington had experienced the tribulations of the Tanganyika route, which he described as "the march of death", so he decided, after consulting Thomson and several experts at the coast, to investigate the Masailand crossing. Hannington's small caravan, consisting of his deacon, Fundi Jones, Pinto, a Goan cook, and 200 porters had a less eventful passage through Masailand than Thomson, whose route he followed. When he left the Elgeyo escarpment and entered the swampy Uasin Gishu Plains the weather was threatening and the rivers in flood, so the Bishop deviated to the north of Thomson's route in order to make only one crossing of the chest-deep Kipkarren River. After traversing a long valley covered with very tall grass, the caravan reached the top of the hills overlooking the Kavirondo Plain, where the sight of human habitation prompted the weary traveller to enter a verse of thanksgiving in his diary for 3 October 1885.[7] The caravan pressed on but had to camp after losing its way in the dense long grass; and did not arrive at Kabras until the following day. The Bishop did some shooting in Nandi but did not see any people or notice any signs of habitation.

After confirmation of the Bishop's murder at Luba's on 29 October 1885 reached Mumias, Fundi Jones left for the coast with 150 men. The deacon set off with some trepidation as on the up journey the caravan had created amusement because of its small size, but Jones managed to cross North Nandi and Masailand without incident. Hannington and Jones' caravans added little fresh information about Nandi and made no impression on the tribe. In the space of two years three small, vulnerable caravans had entered the north of the country without interfering with the Nandi or being attacked by them. The Baganda viewed the Bishop's enterprise in a different light, however, and Mwanga fell back on an ancient prophecy, (which was similar in substance to that published by Kimnyole in 1890), in order to have the Bishop murdered and thus save Buganda from invasion from the east. Hannington had declared "I am about to die for the Baganda, and have purchased the road to them with my life", but seven years passed before the next CMS caravan crossed Nandi in order to make good the martyr's claim.[8]

Dr. Gustav Fischer, the next European to cross Nandi, had no reason to interest himself in the country or its people. He was concerned primarily with succouring Dr. Junker and was advised to avoid Buganda, because of the unsettled conditions created by Hanningon's murder, and to march through Kavirondo and Busoga to his destination in Bunyoro. His route took him through South Kavirondo, Lumbwa and the Kano Plains to Mumias, which he left on 22 March 1886 to return to the coast by Thomson's route through North Nandi and Masailand. Fischer was in a hurry as he was short of food and acceptable trade goods, and presumably his small expedition did not meet any Nandi. The only information he recorded about the highlands to the east of Kabras was that the country rises "to a high plateau which is up to 2,300 metres above sea level; juicy pastures covered the soil here and at the bottom of the valleys were small strips of forest and numerous streams had appeared as a result of the storms".[9]

Shortly after Fischer returned to the coast, controversy arose about the route to be taken by an expedition to extricate the beleaguered Emin Pasha from the Equatorial Province. Thomson's offer to lead a caravan across Masailand was not taken up, and

Stanley contrived to convince the expedition's backers to sanction an approach by the Congo route instead. Owing to this decision and to the quashing of two subsequent proposals (that Emin and his soldiers should be settled on the north-eastern shores of Lake Victoria, and that Stanley should return to the coast by the Masai route), this huge, heavily armed expedition did not come into contact with the Nandi. The history of the tribe and of Eastern Uganda would probably have followed a different pattern, if such an encounter had taken place in 1887 between the Nandi and a man of Stanley's resolution.[10]

The conflict between the Nandi and the white man might also have been expedited by the powerful expedition to Lakes Rudolf and Stefanie under the leadership of the equally resolute Count Teleki and Capt. Höhnel in 1887-88. But the explorers' caravan turned north at Njemps and did not enter Nandi. Höhnel's account included information gleaned from porters and tribal informants about several areas which were not visited by the caravan. None of this intelligence referred to Nandi, except for the statement that the Segelai of Nakuru were defeated by other Masai sections and took "refuge in Mundi (*sic*), a forested district in the highlands on the west".[11]

The first caravan to be despatched across Masailand by the IBEA Company, which had been granted a charter to administer the British sphere on 9 October 1888, was commanded by F. J. Jackson. His instructions were "to explore the territory, establish or mark out stations, and to make treaties and cultivate friendly relations with the various tribes."[12] Accompanied by Ernest Gedge, Dr. Mackinnon and James Martin, Jackson left Machakos with 535 men on 6 August 1889 and marched westwards over uninhabited country from Naivasha through the Mau Forest to Sotik. The Sotik were friendly at first but later became so aggressive that a party was sent against them, which captured 170 head of cattle, about 2,000 sheep and goats and killed 40 warriors. Jackson made blood-brotherhood at Buret (Baveti) on 13th October 1889 with Menya Kisharia, "the chief of Lumbwa", who was given a Company flag after concluding a treaty on the standard form. Kisharia ceded to the Company "all his sovereign rights and rights of government", in return for which the Company granted him "their protection and the benefit of their rule and government".[13] The caravan then passed across the uninhabited hills overlooking the Lake and camped in Kach among stone-walled villages, which the Luo had built as a defence against Lumbwa raiders. Jackson contrasted these, and the similarly fortified villages which he found throughout Kavirondo, with the isolated and unprotected houses that were scattered over the hillsides in Lumbwa. After making treaties with the Luo under Kitoto of Kano and Kisero Punda Mero of Kisumu, the caravan marched for three days over uninhabited bush country before arriving at Mumias on 7 November 1889. Jackson refused to help Mumia against the Ugenya and proceeded to Turkana to collect ivory to defray the cost of the expedition. "Wrecked burnt and deserted villages" provided gruesome evidence of the handiwork of Arab caravans in Kitosh, and Jackson noted that "this unfortunate country" was also plundered by Masai and Nandi raiders.

Jackson became acquainted on Elgon with the extent and severity of Nandi raids against their kinsmen on the northern and south-western slopes of the mountain. The Sebei had been harassed for several years by the Nandi, who had raided the district shortly before the caravan's arrival and "cleared off nearly all the cattle, besides killing a good number and burning the villages". These frequent depredations had caused the Sebei, "notwithstanding (the) great natural advantages of their present abode", to talk of removing themselves to the neighbourhood of the Lago (Bo'ok) on the south-western slopes in order to avoid extermination. Their plight prompted Gedge to observe that the Sebei "must have a miserable time of it", and to hope that the Nandi would raid "whilst we are here. They'd catch it hot". Four days afterwards reports came in that Nandi warriors had been seen higher up on the mountain, and the Sebei, whose non-combatants and cattle were rushed off to safe hiding-places, expected an attack when the moon rose that night. Gedge declared that "should they come we will try and damage them before they get away again", but the night passed without incident. The following day Jackson and Gedge were recalled from a shooting expedition, when Martin heard that 1,000 Nandi had attacked the villages in the next valley on the previous afternoon.* A large number of Sebei were killed in the engagement, and the Nandi carried off 200-300 cattle and burnt the villages for the loss of only one man who had been caught up a tree.* Gedge surmised that the presence of the 500 strong caravan had saved the neighbouring villages from attack, but was annoyed that the incident would disrupt the purchase of food supplies and force the caravan to move on sooner than was intended. Guides were obtained to take the party over the mountain and shortly after entering the forest the caravan struck the path taken by the Nandi raiders, "whose tracks were quite clear, and exposed tree roots crossing the path bore the fresh marks of the jabs with the points of the iron-shod shafts of their spears".[14]

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* The numbers were probably exaggerated but the party must have been a large one for a daylight attack to be launched.

When the caravan came to the first of the Elgon caves at 7,500 feet on the south-western slopes, they found it contained a village of thirty huts, but this was unoccupied as the result of a raid "at no very distant date", in which the Nandi had slaughtered all the occupants.[15] Kimangichi made a treaty with Jackson and told him that the Lago formerly lived in mud-walled villages, until these had to be abandoned because of Nandi raids, which had driven his people to take refuge in fortified caves higher up the mountain, where they had remained ever since. Several of these deserted villages with "bones lying about" were passed as the caravan descended the last slopes of Elgon and entered the rolling bush country on the borders of Kitosh.

When Jackson returned to Mumias on 4 March 1890, he found that Dr. Peters had passed through and concluded a treaty with Mumia's uncle, Sakwa, whom the German had helped against the Kikelelwa (Nyala). Leaving Dr. Mackinnon at Mumias to look after sixty sick porters and the few confiscated Lumbwa cattle which had not succumbed to lung disease, Jackson hurried to Kampala at the head of the first European caravan to travel to Buganda over the Mombasa route. Before leaving, Jackson induced Sakwa to renounce the pledge he had given to Peters in exchange for a treaty with the Company, and to hoist the Company flag in place of the Hohenzollern eagle. On the return journey from Buganda Jackson made treaties with Majanja of Kitosh and Mumia. Leaving eleven men to guard the Company's stores at Mumias, Jackson reached Kabras on 26 June 1890 and travelled to the coast on Thomson's route through North Nandi, Elgeyo, Kamasia and Njemps, where he signed a treaty with Losora Lonon.

Jackson's passage across "the uninhabited wilderness" between

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* Trees were used as scouting positions during raids.

Kabras and Elgeyo did not bring him in touch with any of the people he had heard so much about on Elgon, and his description of the western escarpment as the "Suk Hills" suggests he was unaware that he was passing through Nandi country. The expedition's map showed Nandi as a densely forested area bounded by the north, south and west escarpments, but with no other features except the Kipkarren-Nzoia River complex. The northern half of the western escarpment is shown as unoccupied land devoid of dense forest, and Jackson apparently considered the caravan track passed well to the north of Nandi territory.[16] He did make a mental note, however, that the Nandi must have "circled round Ketosh to the south-east and also to the eastward of Kabras" in order to avoid giving the alarm and timely warning to the inhabitants of the "much favoured" raiding grounds on Elgon. Jackson surmised that the fact that complaints of Nandi depredations were not heard at Mumias, "where the air was always full of rumours of raids and counter-raids from all quarters and far distances", could be attributed to the skilful execution of this stratagem. But there was another factor which also had a bearing on the absence of rumours about Nandi raids which Jackson had noted at Mumias. The warriors had apparently switched their attentions from the Kavirondo raiding areas, because of the risk of infecting their herds by the introduction of diseased stock, and were concentrating on the Elgon tribes, whose cattle were more isolated from sources of infection and could be driven into Nandi through uninhabited and disease-free country.*

Jackson was left in no doubt as to the depredations which other tribes, including two to whom the Company had promised protection, suffered from Nandi raids, but he made no suggestions for honouring the treaties with the Lago or Kitosh so as to afford them protection from future attacks. He was more concerned with containing the Masai threat and realised that the Company had insufficient resources to tackle the more distant Nandi as well. Jackson approved of firm measures against recalcitrant tribes, such as Teleki had carried out in Kikuyu, and contended that the Masai "never will be content to remain in their own country until they have met with some crushing defeats by the Company's officials when raiding or on the warpath *outside* their own country".

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* Jackson's cattle died at Mumias but he did not mention cattle disease on the Elgon expedition.

This dictum was not applied to the Nandi, although they had carried out a devastating raid in the next valley to the one in which Jackson's powerful caravan was encamped on Elgon. He evidently anticipated that the Masai were more likely to attack Company caravans, on the route which he advocated for the Uganda Road, than the Nandi, who were thought to live some distance from Thomson's route and from the more southerly alternative line from Nakuru to Kabras. Jackson recommended stations at Ngong and Njemps to provide food for caravans, and an intermediate defensive post with a "fairly large force" at Naivasha to watch over the Masai.* No suggestion was made for a similar post between Naivasha or Njemps and Mumias, an omission that was probably attributable to the Company's financial difficulties and the fact that no European caravans had been attacked by the Nandi.[17]

While Jackson was in Turkana, the German Emin Pasha Relief Expedition led by Dr. Carl Peters and Lt. von Tiedemann crossed North Nandi to the south of Thomson's route. The small, heavily armed but poorly victualled caravan fought its way up the Tana and through Embu, Kikuyu, Laikipia (where a pitched battle was fought with the Masai), Kamasia and Elgeyo.† Peters climbed to the top of the Elgeyo escarpment on 19 January 1890 and entered the uninhabited Uasin Gishu Plateau. He compared the latter with Laikipia and noted that "the equivalent to Kikuyu . . . is furnished on this side by the land of Wandi (*sic*) in the south". After fording the Sosiani, the caravan marched through daily thunderstorms in a direct line to the Kipkarren, and then deviated slightly to the south to a camp on the western slopes of the Surungai Hills. Peters was probably the first European to see any Nandi in their own country, as he induced four "Dorobo", who visited his camp on the Surongai Hills, to spend the night there and to show him the way to Kavirondo. They pointed out the Kabras villages from the top of the escarpment, but declined to go on with the caravan as they said "they were at war with the Kavirondo people".

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* Gedge was left at Kampala, and small detachments at Wakoli's and Mumias. Jackson met Masai laibons (including members of Mbatian's family) on the Kinangop and at Naivasha and gave them blank treaty forms "as medicine", but did not make blood-brotherhood with them.

† On leaving Witu on 27 July, 1889, the caravan consisted of 120 men including 25 Somalis, but was smaller when it reached Nandi. All the men were armed with breech or muzzle-loaders.

This was true, but the guides were evidently too shrewd to show the intruders the best route down the precipitous western escarpment. Peter did not resort to his usual practice of chaining up his guides but allowed the four men to go free. This unwonted liberality was regretted the next day, as the descent proved a hazardous undertaking and was not accomplished until the third attempt. The small caravan passed without incident, and it was probably fortunate for Peters that he did not treat the Nandi guides as he had treated their Kamasia and Elgeyo kinsmen. Although hundreds of warriors were raiding on Elgon at the time, the Nandi could have taken a heavy toll of von Tiedemann's small section, which lost its way and made a wide detour to the south, and of the 400 head of Masai cattle with the rearguard, which became separated from the main parties. On 28 January 1890 Peters arrived at the fortified village of Kabras, where "you could go out walking without arms, and only a walking-stick", and then proceeded to Kampala at the head of the first European caravan to reach Buganda from a northern port.[18]

While Jackson was returning to Mombasa across the Taru Desert in August 1890, another Company caravan commanded by Capt. F. Lugard was pushing its way upcountry along the Sabaki route. Lugard was ordered to build a station near Ngong, another farther west and then to await fresh instructions. These reached him at Dagoretti, where he established a station in October 1890. He was to proceed with all speed to Uganda (which had been recognised as part of the British sphere by the Anglo-German agreement in the previous June) in order to undertake the administration of the country on the Company's behalf. Accompanied by William Grant and Fenwick de Winton, Lugard led his caravan of 66 Sudanese and Somali soldiers and 285 porters out of Dagoretti on 1 November 1890 to follow the most expeditious path to Kampala. After studying Jackson's report, Lugard struck due west from Lake Nakuru in the hope of reaching the break in the hills between Nandi and Lumbwa.[19] An easier passage over the Mau seemed practicable on a north-westerly bearing, but Lugard noted that "if we go in that direction we strike the Nandi-land, which is impassable without heavy fighting, and into which no caravan has at yet penetrated". He aimed to pass south of Nandi without entering Sotik or Lumbwa, where he thought the people were likely to be embittered as a result of Jackson's conduct. The ascent of Mau proved too much of an obstacle, however, and the caravan branched off to Njemps and then followed Thomson's route. The top of the Elgeyo escarpment was reached on the 21st and a rapid march was made across the Uasin Gishu Plateau, where Lugard saw numerous skeletons of animals which had been stricken down with rinderpest. From the Kipkarren crossing, he steered a course much farther to the south than that taken by previous caravans and, after passing through a huge forest, reached the summit of the Nandi escarpment on the 26th. The descent to Kavirondo took over six hours and proved "the hardest bit since we left Mombasa", as it could only be negotiated in places by "crawling down the face of smooth rocks". After reaching the grassy Kavirondo Plain, the caravan marched for ten miles before passing the first of the fortified Kabras villages, and eventually arrived at Mumias on 29 November 1890.

Although Lugard penetrated much farther south than his precessors and "passed through the north of the hostile Wanandi country", he did not reach the northern limits of the settled homeland area to the south of the Teresia Forest. Lugard, who was the first white man to enter the country from the east after Kimnyole's prophecy, did not meet any Nandi during his journey, which was made at a time when the rinderpest epidemic kept the *kaptich* areas clear of cattle.[20]

Once the Company had established its position in Buganda by Lugard's treaty with Mwanga and the chiefs on 26 December 1890, officials in Kampala had to be supplied and reinforced by regular caravans from the coast. Most of the caravans passed safely through North Nandi without encountering any warriors or reporting any signs of habitation. Martin and Major Eric Smith led several of these expeditions and, in February 1891, the former pioneered a new line to the Uasin Gishu Plateau through Nakuru and Ravine, which superseded Thomson's longer route through Njemps, Kamasia and Elgeyo.* This eliminated one of the principal detours on the Arab caravan track but did not shorten the route through North Nandi. Smith's chief contribution to the search for a better line for the Uganda Road was his reassessment of the practicability of Jackson's southern route for Company caravans and for transporting a steamer to the Lake. Smith and Neumann passed through Lumbwa without opposition in February 1891, but during Neumann's return journey in May, he was wounded and thirty-eight of his men were killed when his camp was attacked in Sotik "in revenge for Jackson's cattle raid". This incident, coupled with Smith's failure to find a suitable steamer harbourage on the Kavirondo Gulf, confirmed the Company in its use of the northern route. Smith returned with Martin over the shortened Uasin Gishu route, which the former considered "perfectly impossible for a regular caravan route", although he observed that "the country between Kabras and the skirts of the Mau Forest is certainly the finest for agricultural (probably pastoral) purposes that I have seen in the interior". He also noted that "this upland country was once inhabited by the Wakwavi, who were driven out by the Masai, who, however, make no use of the country themselves, probably from fear of the Nandi, a tribe who are at war with everyone, and into whose country only a very few Swahilis have penetrated".[21] Smith saw no Nandi himself and was simply retailing the opinions that were commonly held about the tribe.

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* Ravine (Eldomiano) was known to the Arabs (Denhardt, *op. cit.*), but the route was seldom used. Martin and Smith each made six journeys to Uganda from 1891 to 1894, some of them together.

One of the few Company caravans which did catch a glimpse of the Nandi was commanded by Gedge, who had memories of their exploits when he was on Elgon with Jackson. One of his headmen was told that a large Nandi war party was on its way to Kabras, and when some of the warriors were seen watching the caravan about half a mile from Gedge's camp to the east of the Surongai Hills, he "secured the camp with a good boma and gave out ammunition pending a possible night attack". He noted "The Wanandi have a very bad reputation—nasty treacherous devils. If they come here they will get bullets".*

When the large, well-appointed railway survey party divided at Naivasha on 17th April 1892 in order to investigate the practicability of crossing the Mau by either of the recognised caravan routes, its commander, Major Macdonald, was aware of Sir Guilford Molesworth's opinion that "the only probable chance of obtaining an inexpensive railway is in heading the cross drainage by passing through the Gwash Ngishu Plateau, and then descending to Ugowe Bay by the valley of the Nyando River. . . . To attempt to take a line further to the north would, in my opinion, be useless", as it "would not only involve a considerable detour but would also fall into very broken ground".[22] The consulting engineer's strongly worded recommendation was not followed up, however, and Capt. Pringle plotted Smith's route through Lumbwa while Macdonald surveyed the Nzoia basin instead of exploring the Nyando River.

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* Gedge's Diary, 3 March, 1891; he left Kampala on 14 January, 1891 after handing over to Lugard.

Pringle's elimination of the southern route as a possible line for the railway caused it to be finally rejected for caravan purposes except by Arab traders. As a result of this decision the Lumbwa were left to their own devices for a decade, and Macdonald's failure to investigate Molesworth's line perpetuated the detour round Nandi on the northern caravan route for a number of years. The surveyors' findings confirmed Thomson's approach to the Lake from the north, and set the pattern for the opening up of Kavirondo until Blackett explored the Nyando Valley route in 1898. During his journey through Lumbwa and Kavirondo to Mumias, Pringle found that the huge stone-walled village in Kach, which Smith had described as being much larger than Mumias and "by far the biggest collection of huts I have seen in the interior", had been raided at night by the Lumbwa, who had massacred or scattered the Luo occupants. Pringle also discovered that the Nandi were "the terror of their neighbours in South Kavirondo, and are constantly harrying and raiding them", so that the Luo had "no encouragement to increase their flocks, which are always a great attraction to their more warlike neighbours of Nandi and Lumbwa". The reports which Pringle heard about the prowess of the Nandi warriors were not confined to raids on their neighbours, as he was told they were "even treated with much respect by the redoubtable Masai" and that Arab traders had to send Sotik and Dorobo agents into their country to purchase ivory. Pringle did not enter Nandi, which he described as "an inhospitable mountainous district" where honey was plentiful.

The main party took Martin's route across the Uasin Gishu Plateau to the Three Hills of Nandi, where Macdonald and Foaker followed the left bank of the Kipkarren and Nzoia to Mumias, which was reached on 16 May 1892.* During the return journey from Kampala with Lugard in the following July, the survey caravan passed numerous deserted villages on the eastern slopes of the

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* The Three Hills of Nandi were probably the Ndalat range (Kamulat, Ndalat, Kaplemur) or Kaptepe Kamulat and Kakiptui.

Kabras Hills which had been abandoned after a Masai raid. Macdonald decided that his section would "endeavour to examine the Nandi route as far as possible", so he parted from Lugard near the Three Hills of Nandi in order to inspect a gorge to the south of the Sosiani. The exploration was accompanied by a fighting force, including ten of Lugard's Somalis, "in case he (Macdonald) meets the Wanandi". Five days later Macdonald rejoined Lugard on the road to Ravine, but as he had only covered forty-seven miles during this period, Macdonald could not have penetrated very far into north-east Nandi. This small diversion, which was the only attempt that was made to investigate Molesworth's suggested line, was carried out when the survey was virtually complete, and Macdonald was harassed by food shortages, smallpox and inclement weather.[23]

When Macdonald arrived at Kibwezi in September 1892, he was ordered to return to Uganda to "report fully on the causes of the recent troubles". He was surprised to find a party of about twenty Nandi warriors in the Mau Forest, and to discover the well marked path which they were using for their journey to Kamasia. He thought it would be most interesting to follow this path back into Nandi, "but my caravan was too weak to attempt such a venture". This encounter evidently revived Macdonald's interest in Molesworth's route, as he hoped to lead a caravan through Nandi on the return journey from Kampala, if he could secure sufficient time-expired men in Buganda to form an expedition strong enough for the purpose.* Macdonald was detained in Buganda longer than he had anticipated, and did not carry out the projected exploration of Nandi when he crossed the Uasin Gishu Plateau on the way to the coast in April 1894.[24]

After parting with Macdonald at Kibwezi, Pringle proceeded to the coast with the draft notes for the railway survey report. Owing to the difficult nature of the country and the speed with which the survey had been carried out, Macdonald had been forced to keep close to the caravan track, so that the route which he recommended only deviated slightly from the line of the Uganda Road. Molesworth's suggested route to Ugowe Bay was brushed aside somewhat cursorily: "this route . . . has not actually been traversed by the railway survey parties, but enough was seen on this plateau of the Guaso Ngishu, and from the valley of the

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* He had only 44 men in the up caravan in November 1892.

Nyando River at the foot of the Nandi Hills, to form an opinion and a rough estimate of cost of such a line by such a route". Instead of following the Nyando River, Macdonald proposed that the railway should run through the Sergoit, Sosiani, Kipkarren and Nzoia valleys to Kavirondo with the terminus at Berkeley Bay. The report was optimistic about the reactions of the various tribes to the undertaking, and did not anticipate "any opposition on the part of the natives of the country to the construction of the railway". The petty thieving and night robberies which were to be expected, especially before the line was in operation, could be dealt with by police but, in order to gain the goodwill of the natives, strong measures would be needed to protect them from extortion by Swahilis and other aliens. It was recognised that some railway and telegraph material was usable as trade goods or for manufacturing purposes, but much of it could not be removed without mechanical appliances and the remainder could be protected by numerous posts and frequent patrolling. The Kikuyu and Masai were considered to be "the only people who would be at all likely to be in opposition to such an undertaking". The latter were said to look down upon all other tribes as very inferior beings, "with the exception of the Wasuk and Wanandi who have resisted them successfully", so that they and their cattle were immune from Masai raids. Macdonald's optimism concerning the negligible opposition which the railway was likely to encounter was not shared by Little Englander critics of the scheme, one of whom prophesied that "men armed with Winchester rifles would have to be stationed at every 100 yards in order to keep off the attacks of the natives".

Among the benefits which Macdonald hoped the railway would bestow on the country were the opening up of the Uasin Gishu Plateau as a cattle ranching area by European enterprise, and the ending of Masai raids. The unwarlike Kavirondo, who were "generally in an abject state of fear of attacks from the Masai, Wanandi and Walumbwa" would cease to be "the easy prey of their powerful neighbours" and would be "benefited beyond measure by freedom from raiding", which had reduced the formerly large cattle and food producing districts round the Kavirondo Gulf and in Kitosh into scantly cultivated areas almost denuded of cattle. The restoration of a thriving economy throughout Kavirondo would be especially advantageous, as the only products that were considered worthy of mention in the Kalenjin areas were ivory and *wimbi* in Kamasia and Lumbwa, and tea as a potential crop on the Elgeyo and Mau escarpments. Pringle's maps showed that only a belt extending about fifteen miles northwards from the south Nandi escarpment was thought to be under cultivation, and that there were no Masai raiding and Arab slave routes near Nandi apart from the old caravan track down the Kipkarren Valley to Kavirondo.[25]

While Pringle was completing the railway survey report, Lugard was campaigning in England for the retention of Uganda. He advocated a protectorate over the whole of the British sphere with a Governor residing in Kikuyu or on the Mau Plateau. He supported the construction of a railway through the hinterland desert and fly belt, with a transport organisation beyond railhead operated from a central station at Ravine and a subsidiary depot on the Nzoia. He rebutted the charges that construction gangs would be in danger from tribal attacks and that railway material could easily be stolen. He urged that communications ahead of the railway should be by heliograph rather than telegraph, and recommended a signalling station on the crest of the Nandi escarpment. The Governor's duties would include checking indiscriminate Masai raiding, implementing the treaties by which the Company had promised protection against enemy attacks, and the initiation of agricultural experiments on the Mau Plateau. Lugard forecast that the country between the coast and Uganda would prove the most promising for development, and advocated the colonisation of the uninhabited Mau Plateau by European ranchers and Asiatic agriculturalists. Several of these suggestions were likely to bring the Government into conflict with the Nandi, but Lugard evidently thought their opposition could easily be overcome by the small force of Sudanese soldiers and police which he suggested should be placed at the Governor's disposal.[26]

Macdonald arrived back at Kampala on 9 December 1892, twenty days before the first unofficial caravan from Mombasa reached Mengo. This party, which redeemed Hannington's pledge to the Baganda, consisted of nine CMS missionaries led by Alfred Tucker, the Bishop of Eastern Equatorial Africa. The experiment convinced Tucker that the Mombasa road was preferable to the Tanganyika route, and could safely be used by the women missionaries, whom he hoped to recruit for work among the Baganda. No Nandi were seen by Tucker's party, but the Bishop noticed that the most easterly of the Kabras villages had recently been overrun and abandoned before the occupants could take away their belongings.[27]

Hard on the Bishop's heels came a caravan led by Ernest Gedge, who had left the Company's service and was returning to Uganda as the special correspondent of *The Times*. While crossing the Uasin Gishu Plateau early in January 1893, Gedge complained that "this road is a fraud as it comes far too much to the north after leaving Mau. If it only went direct there would be a saving of at least two good marches". He found the Kabras villages nearest to the base of the Surongai Hills deserted as the result of a recent raid by the Nandi, who had carried off all the stock and destroyed many of the houses. His experiences on Elgon in 1890 made Gedge much better acquainted with the activities of the Nandi warriors than most of his contemporaries, and more ready to acknowledge that the spoliation of the Kavirondo was not entirely the handiwork of the Arabs and Masai. In order to protect the Elgon and Kavirondo tribes from future depredations, Gedge suggested that colonies of Sudanese soldiers, emancipated slaves and followers should be established in Kavirondo and on the Uasin Gishu Plateau, "where they would act as a wholesome check upon the Masai and Wanandi raiders".[28]

At the end of February 1893 the large caravan of the Uganda Commission, which Gladstone's government had authorised largely as a result of Lugard and Tucker's representations, passed through North Nandi on its way to Kampala. The caravan, which included Ernest Berkeley, who was later to play an important part in Nandi affairs, was commanded by the Commissioner, Sir Gerald Portal, who had been instructed to report on the retention of Uganda and the future administration of the British sphere. When the caravan was approaching the Nandi Hills through apparently uninhabited country, Dr. Moffat shot a waterbuck which he left in charge of a porter. The man went away for a while and when he returned the carcass had been carried away, "taken by Nandi who had evidently been watching; extremely fortunate they did not kill the boy too". The following day near the Kipkarren River Portal met a party of Nandi, who shook hands all round and said they were the rearguard of a larger band which was going to raid a tribe living in country three days' march to the north.* After crossing the western escarpment Portal noted that "the population on the outskirts of Kabras and Kavirondo is now very sparse and scattered, although, judging from the great number of deserted villages which we passed at frequent intervals during the march, this district must have been far more densely inhabited and thoroughly cultivated in quite recent times". He surmised that this devastation had been caused by the Masai, whom he described as "an unmitigated curse to the country", and deplored the fact that "the few tribes living on their outskirts—such as the people of Nandi, who appear to enjoy an immunity from the Masai in consequence of some inter-tribal treaty or arrangement—endeavour to copy their more powerful neighbours both in dress and in the fashion of their arms, and in the practice of carrying out sudden and sanguinary raids against the inhabitants of more peaceful districts".

The Company's flag was replaced by the Union Jack at Kampala on 1 April 1893, and Nandi came under the nominal control of the Uganda Commission, though no arrangements were made to administer the tribe. Portal offered Roddy Owen and Major Smith a "separate administration" over Busoga, Kavirondo and Kabras but neither accepted the assignment, the former choosing to remain in Bunyoro and the latter preferring his appointment as Superintendent of the Uganda Transport. Portal also supported Gedge's suggestion that some of Emin Pasha's former Sudanese should be settled on the western borders of Masailand and near the Kipkarren River, in order to keep the Masai and Nandi in check and to secure the safety of the Uganda road caravans. But no action was taken to implement these proposals before the Commissioner left for the coast on 30 May 1893. Owen considered these colonies would restore confidence to the Kabras and Kavirondo, so that when the eastern marches of their country were re-populated and cultivated, they could provide caravans with food. He, too, considered the plight of the Kavirondo was caused by the Masai, who would have to be bound by an enforceable treaty between their Laibon and the government, or brought under control by stringent reprisals in order to ensure the safety and food supplies of caravans.[29] Portal instituted a token administration under Capt. Arthur in Busoga and sent Purkiss from Fort Smith in August 1893 to establish a station on Berkeley Bay, but Nandi remained unadministered and virtually unknown.

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* Raymond Portal described them as Dorobo; he and his brother distinguished them from the Masai whom they resembled, "but not so gaudy".

Portal was delayed on the return journey for over a month between the Kipkarren and Mumias by news of Selim Bey's rebellion in Buganda and Col. Rhodes' illness. He eventually left Mumias on 26 July 1893 but did not see any Nandi during this period. Portal's report contained similar recommendations to those proposed by Lugard, including acceptance of the Company's treaty obligations and the central station at Ravine. He stressed the value of a railway in times of conflict and the suitability of the country to the east of Kavirondo for European settlement. Although he suggested that the jurisdiction of the Commissioner at Kampala should not extend farther east than Kavirondo, he urged that "the system of transport by the English road must be made the safest, cheapest and quickest", but did not advance any proposals for safeguarding the road between Ravine and Kabras.[30]

After Portal's departure from Kampala, Macdonald remained in charge until Col. Colvile came up to relieve him in November 1893. The new Commissioner was persuaded by Hall not to push on from Fort Smith with a flying column through Masailand, but when Colvile reached the Molo River he left the main column with twenty men (only seven of whom were armed) and his valet, Frederick Spire, and proceeded by forced marches over the Mau to Mumias. In the light of after events Colvile's impulsive action was foolhardy in the extreme, and might easily have precipitated the conflict between the government and the Nandi. But at the time it aroused no comment, because the general obsession with the "Masai menace" masked the growth of Nandi predominance in Eastern Uganda.

Colvile disagreed with Portal's contention that the country between the coast and the Lake "was valuable chiefly as being the road to Uganda", and questioned whether Buganda was the most important part of the British sphere as it was so far from the sea. He depicted the Uasin Gishu Plateau as "waiting with open arms to welcome" the first settlers, and noted that wheeled transport could be introduced from Ravine to the Nandi escarpment, where the Nyinyin Range presented "an impassable barrier to carts until a road has been made". Kabarega's activities in Bunyoro prevented Colvile from initiating any transport or administrative improvements in the road districts, however, and when Grant was withdrawn from Luba's for the Bunyoro campaign, Purkiss exercised general control over Kavirondo and Busoga from Berkeley Bay and the projected post on Elgon was left in abeyance.[31]

Shortly after Colvile crossed Nandi another small and poorly armed caravan came up from the coast. This was the Royal Society's expedition under the botanist, Scott Elliot, who saw only three Dorobo between Masailand and Kavirondo. He considered the Masai were a "diminishing and failing race" and observed that "the Wanandi, Walaikipia, Wasuk and other races are encroaching upon them, and I do not think they will ever again be the dangerous people which they were a few years ago". This opinion was beginning to gain ground in official quarters: Portal recorded that the "Masai won't hurt European caravans and say openly they don't want a feud with the white men"; and Berkeley asserted they did not "offer any serious source of danger" and showed "a marked disinclination to quarrel with the white man".[32] Elliot also hazarded the hypothesis that the Bahima had been forced to conquer the tribes on the western shores of Lake Victoria, because they had failed to subdue the Nandi and Masai in the east.[33]

Two months after Scott Elliot passed through, a composite caravan of over 200 men crossed North Nandi from west to east under the leadership of Lionel Dècle, a French professional traveller and journalist, who was completing the last stage of his journey from the Cape. After crossing the Surongai Hills, where he saw seven lions, and the Kipkarren, Dècle noticed a number of men hiding in the distance. When the warriors were hailed their leader came forward and shook hands. Dècle wrote a circumstantial account of the parley that followed, in the course of which the leader, who gave his orders "with an authority not to be disobeyed", and his men declared they did not want war. Dècle was told an "impossible story" that the "El Nandi Masai" warriors thought his party was a Swahili caravan which had returned to the country to buy more ivory from them. The warriors were told that Dècle was a white man, whose caravan belonged to the great queen, "Queeny", and that it was not the custom of white men to give the presents or *hongo* which the Nandi had demanded of him. The traveller warned his visitors that it would be dangerous for them to come near his camp, but some of his men, who conversed with the warriors in the Masai language, informed him that the camp would be attacked that night because of his refusal to pay *hongo* or to sell an ox to the Nandi leader. The camp was placed in a state of readiness and Dècle tried to put what heart he could into his men, who protested "they should not sleep that night, as the El Nandi are very bad men who come crawling up to you like snakes". The night passed quietly, however, and the caravan left in the morning for Ravine without being molested. The journalist's account was probably exaggerated and embellished with details from the writings of other travellers, but—if his Masai-speaking emissaries had understood correctly—his caravan was the first to be threatened by the Nandi.[34]

During the early months of 1894 the first European caravan, since Pringle's survey party in 1892, approached Nandi from the south and camped for several weeks at Kitoto's, where there was a permanent settlement of coastal traders. The expedition was led by a German zoologist, Oskar Neumann, who had been "fighting the natives and looting" during his journey through Kavirondo from German East Africa. He made a number of excursions from his base at Kitoto's towards the foothills of the south Nandi escarpment. Neumann left the Kano Plains on 16 April 1894 and marched through Tiriki to Mumias, where he met Crabtree and Rowling, who were negotiating for land for a CMS station, and Lt. Villiers, who had been sent to establish a government post on the Uganda Road in Kavirondo.[35]

Villiers recommended that the station should be sited at Mumias, and Jackson found Spire in residence there in November 1894, when the former Company official returned to Uganda as a government servant. Owing to staff shortages, Colvile's valet had been absorbed into the establishment and sent to Mumias in July 1894, when Hardinge insisted that a European should be stationed there to receive consignments from the coast and to supervise caravans. Spire had experienced difficulties over food supplies and trade goods, caravan deserters, ivory traders, inter-tribal fighting, the activities of mercenaries and the Company's abortive attempt to reassert its rights in Kavirondo. Help had been forthcoming from Mumia, and also from Kitoto, who had asked Spire to honour the Company's treaty and to protect him from "his neighbours, who are continually burning down his villages and killing his folk".[36]

Hobley, Macallister, Foaker and Martin passed through Nandi in January 1895 in a caravan which marked the real beginning of British administration in the Eastern Province. The party kept well to the north of the Nandi homelands as it was understood that "they were likely to be unfriendly", and no settled occupation was seen until the travellers reached Kabras. Martin returned from Mumias to take charge of Ravine, where George Wilson had left a token garrison to guard the fort which he had built there in October 1894, and where one of his headman had made blood-brotherhood with the Kamasia. Edward Muxworthy had submitted the first application for agricultural land in the Eastern Province in the previous July, when he asked for a grant of forty acres near the Molo River to the east of Ravine. When Martin arrived at his new station on 18 December 1894, he reported that the garrison, fortifications and food supplies were inadequate and that government property was in danger of being destroyed by Nandi and Lumbwa raiders. His anxiety on this account was increased when a headman in a caravan, which Martin was taking back to Ravine from Mumias in February 1895, was attacked at Guasa Masa. The victim, who had fallen behind to bring in a sick porter, was wounded by Nandi who also commandeered his wife. The attackers could not have been very numerous or determined as the headman escaped with his life, and the caravan reached Ravine without further casualties.[37]

When Hobley returned to Mumias on 19 February 1895 to begin his momentous association with Kavirondo and Nandi, he found several of Spire's difficulties had been resolved, but that inter-tribal raiding and occasional attacks on government employees continued. The district was in a very disturbed state as a result of events in Wanga, Ugenya and Kikelelwa, but Spire's anxiety about the station's safety, after forty-six of his men had been massacred by the Kitosh in December 1894, was allayed by the punitive measures which Grant had taken against the offenders in the following month. While these events were taking place, the invalided Commissioner returned to the coast, and Jackson was left in temporary charge at Entebbe.[38]

1894 and the first half of 1895 saw a great increase in the number of travellers of all categories: officials, missionaries, explorers and traders. All of their caravans, except Oskar Neumann's, followed the well-worn track across North Nandi, which was invariably described as an uninhabited and foodless waste. Traffic along the Uganda Road had increased annually since 1890, so that

Peter's description of the Uasin Gishu Plateau as "a solitude only broken once in a couple of years by a caravan wending towards the west", was out of date before it appeared in print.[80] In the eleven years after Thomson first crossed Masailand to the end of 1894, 26 European caravans passed through Nandi to the west and 19 in the opposite direction. In addition to these large and generally well disciplined expeditions, a large number of small, poorly-armed parties of mailrunners and porters also crossed the northern grazing grounds. During the five months' period beginning in March 1895, 36 of these parties travelled between Ravine and Mumias, and only one of them reported that Nandi had been seen on the journey. This was a mail party of only eight askari, who met some tribesmen at the Sosiani River but were not molested by them. None of the travellers recorded the presence of Arab caravans on the Uganda Road between Mau and Kavirondo, although trading parties were frequently reported in regions farther north and on the southern route through South Kavirondo, Lumbwa and Kitoto's. European caravan leaders were anxious to cross the foodless stretch between Kikuyu and Kavirondo as quickly as possible, and there was no incentive for them to deviate from the direct route in order to seek supplies from the cultivated parts of Nandi. No provocation was offered by any of the caravans, and the only casualties they suffered were the wounding of a headman and the capture of his wife, in an attack which was carried out for patently personal reasons. None of the other caravans was attacked or, with the questionable exception of the episode recorded by Dècle, even threatened by the Nandi. Only two leaders, Portal and Dècle, parleyed with a band of warriors, and in both cases their representatives declared that they wished to avoid hostilities. On the other hand, the Nandi (unlike their Kalenjin kinsmen and the Kavirondo) did not assist any of the caravans, apart from the somewhat cursory and possibly misleading information which Peters was given by the four "Dorobo".

In view of the incidents which occurred in the second half of 1895, it seems surprising that no opposition was offered to the forty or more caravans which passed through Nandi in the first half of the year. But few of these caravans offered the warriors the prospect of such large quantities of easy loot as they could expect to gain from tribes which they had been accustomed to raid for a number of years. Most of the caravans under European leadership were large, well-armed expeditions which were organised to deter marauders, so that operations against them would have tied down a large number of warriors until circumstances were favourable for a successful surprise attack. Furthermore, none of the caravans travelled with large herds of livestock, and even the bigger ones only had a few milch cows and a small number of animals which were kept as reserve rations for slaughter when game was unobtainable. The only transport animals used by the caravans were pack donkeys, which held little appeal for the Nandi. Although the smaller parties, which only carried mail, food, trade goods and occasionally a few sheep and goats, would have been easy prey, the Nandi allowed them to pass unmolested. The warriors exercised considerable forbearance towards the intruders, and their apparent lack of interest was probably due to the fact the caravans neither offered sufficient inducement for pillage nor provoked the warriors into taking retaliatory measures against them. It is significant that the first European to be attacked was the leader of a small caravan containing a number of cattle, and the partner of a man who had killed two Nandi without just cause.

Despite the amount of movement taking place on the periphery of Nandi between 1890 and 1895, the information that was recorded about the country and people was scanty and largely derived from caravan porters and alien tribesmen. Some facts had however been established. It was recognised that the Nandi terrain was as broken as that of the Kikuyu highlands and difficult of access. The ferocity and military prowess of the warriors were confirmed by the scope and intensity of their raids against the Luo, Bantu Kavirondo and Elgon peoples, and the fear which these raids created among their victims. Arab caravan leaders and their porters shared these fears and avoided the Nandi but not the Masai. Although several Europeans failed to distinguish the Nandi from the Masai and Dorobo, and thought they spoke the same language, it was realised that the Nandi were different from the Kavirondo but akin to the people of Lumbwa, Elgeyo, Kamasia and Elgon. Information on other important matters was, however, lacking or conjectural. None of the contemporary maps contained topographical details of the country between Kabiyet and the south escarpment, and only guesses could be made about the strength of the tribal army. The Nandi were considered akin to, and imitators of, the Masai, but no hypothesis was raised on this premise to suggest that a tribal leader might be found who would be as authoritative and amenable as Lenana. Nothing was known of the factors in the tribal organisation which made the Nandi less prone to divisive influences than the Masai and Kavirondo, nor of the strong ties that bound the Nandi to their kinsmen, and especially to the Lumbwa.

The conclusions that were drawn from the evidence available to travellers on the Uganda Road were that the Nandi were less powerful than the Masai but likely to prove more treacherous, and that it was prudent for the time being to leave them alone. The Nandi, for their part, had little reason to conclude that the intruders were very different from, or much stronger than, the Arabs, or to suspect that the newcomers whom the warriors watched passing through their country would, in the course of time, affect their way of life and restrict their freedom of action.*

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* Europeans were called devils because of their dress and colour. Since their firearms made the same sound as that made when Nandi women struck their skin skirts during a dance, Europeans were regarded as females who could easily be defeated. (S. K. arap Ngeny, Nandi Resistance to the Establishment of British Administration, *Hadith* ii, 124.

References

1. See Matson, The Coming of the White Man, *KWN*, 27 April, 1962.
2. Gray, *The British in Mombasa, 1824-26,* p. 83. Others interested in the Masai route were Krapf, Rebmann, Roscher, Von der Decken, Speke, Purdy, Gordon, Grant and Rigby.
3. Thomson, *Through Masai Land,* p. 455; Huntingford, *Nandi Work and Culture,* p. 1, states that Thomson was warned about the Nandi; Thomson refers to the "bloodthirsty character" ascribed to the Kavirondo (idem, p. 472).
4. Thomson, *op. cit.*, Chapter XI, *JRGS*, VI (1884). J. B. Thomson, *Joseph Thomson*. Rotberg: *Joseph Thomson and the Exploration of Africa* (1971).
5. Thomson, *op. cit.*, p. 566; the party was presumably one that refused to accept the verdict of the battle of Siwo. See p. 27.
6. Thomson, *op. cit.*, pp. 469, 438.
7. "As when the weary traveller gains", a hymn by a nineteenth century poet, James Montgomery. Dawson, *James Hannington,* pp. 358-59; *Lion Hearted,* pp. 173-74; *Last Journals,* pp. 202-05.
8. Dawson, *James Hannington,* p. 389.
9. Fischer had reached Naivasha from Pangani before Thomson in 1883. Petermann's Mitt. 1886; *JRGS, VII-IX* (1885-87).
10. Stanley, *In Darkest Africa;* J. B. Thomson, *op. cit.,* Chapter VII, Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 240, Gray, *UJ*, 29 (1965).
11. Höhnel, *op. cit.,* ii 289. See p. 25.
12. McDermott, *op. cit.*, p. 113.
13. Sotik casualties differ in the various accounts; also the name and location of the Lumbwa chief. Two puppies were chopped in two for the

ceremony; Manners, *op. cit.*, pp. 249-251. The original treaties are in KNA; see Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, 1909, Chapter 74; Gray, *UJ*, 12 (1948), pp. 25, 231; Thomas, *UJ*, 13 (1949), p. 171; 24 (1960), p. 260. The treaties were approved by the FO, 30 June, 1891.

14. Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 241, suggests they were taken off course owing to the guides' fear of the Nandi, but Gedge's Diary (12-14 February, 1890) shows the ascent was premeditated.
15. Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 247, gives a different version from the contemporary accounts. Weatherby, *UJ*, 26 (1962), pp. 200-12, dates Nandi raids against the Sebei from the 1880's, Lago 1870's and Kony (south-eastern slopes) 1850's.
16. WO(ID) 814, November 1890; *JRGS*, XIII (1891). The plane table sheets have been presented by Mr. H. B Thomas to the Royal Geographical Society.
17. Jackson-IBEA Coy., 16 September, 1890, FO 84/2264; *op. cit.*, Chapters XII-XVIII; Gedge's Diaries; Gedge's photographs, *Royal Commonwealth Society Library Notes* 116; Ravenstein, *JRGS*, XIII (1891), *UJ*, 12 (1948), p. 129. Gedge's diaries are at Rhodes House, Oxford.
18. Peters, *New Light on Dark Africa*, Chapter VIII.
19. A fuller version of the FO 84/2264 report with map and route notes was sent to Lugard at Dagoretti. The gap was described variously as Gabaren, Kavaren, Jaberas and Kitaven. Hannington may have intended taking a similar route to Sendege's; *JRGS*, VII (1885), p. 539; VIII (1886), p. 190.
20. Lugard, *Rise of Our East African Empire*, Chapter XIV; Perham and Bull, *Diaries of Lord Lugard* i, Chapter IX; Perham, *Lugard*, Chapter XI; *JRGS*, XIV (1892).
21. IBEA Coy.-FO, 24 September, 1891, FOCP, 6261/200; Thomas, *UJ*, 23 (1959), p. 134.
22. IBEA Coy.-FO, 9 October, 1895, sending Molesworth's Report 1 May, 1891, FOCP, 6671, p. 7.
23. Macdonald and Pringle's Diaries; Pringle: *JRGS*, II (1893), p. 112; Macdonald, *Soldiering and Surveying in British East Africa*, Chapter V and VII; Perham and Bull, *op. cit.*, Chapter IX. The page headed "Notes on the Uasin Gishu" is blank in Macdonald's Diary.
24. Macdonald, *op. cit.*, Chapter IX.
25. Cmd. C 7025, 1893; Hill, *Permanent Way*, Chapter IV and V; Molesworth's Report, 28 March, 1899, FO 2/558.
26. Lugard, *op. cit.*, i, Chapter XVI, XVII; ii, Chapter XLI, XLII, XLIII; Cmd. Africa 4 (1892), p. 88. The Mau Plateau included Nandi.
27. Nickisson's Diary, 6 December, 1892; Tucker, *18 Years in Uganda*, i, Chapter XVII.
28. Gedge's Diary 9, 13 January, 1893; report to *The Times*, quoted in *Zanzibar Gazette*, 4 October, 1893.
29. Owen-Rhodes, 29 March, 1893, ESA, A/2/1.
30. Gedge, Gerald and Raymond Portal's Diaries; Portal *Mission to Uganda;* Cmd. C 7303, Africa 2 (1894); FO 2/60; FOCP 6497/161; Bovill, *"Roddy Owen"*.
31. Colvile, *Land of the Nile Springs*, Chapter I, II; Colvile-FO, 8 April, 1895, FOCP, 6717/32; Colvile-Grant, 17 November, 1893, ESA A/3/1.
32. Portal-Anderson (pte), 22 February, 1893, FOCP, 6454/279. Annex. 4 to the Departmental Report on East Africa, 17 April, 1894, FOCP, 6849.
33. Elliot, *Naturalist in Mid-Africa*, pp. 26, 253; *JRGS*, VI (1895), p. 301. He lost 16 donkeys, five cattle and 17 loads ten days' march from Fort Smith, probably to the Kamasia or Nandi; Hall's Letters, 15 March, 1894 and Diary 27 February, 1894.
34. Dècle, *Three Years in Savage Africa*, pp. 466-70; he evidently did not distinguish between the Nandi and Masai; FO2/250.

35. *JRGS*, V (1895), pp. 79, 384; V/ii, (1895), pp. 274, 296; Crabtree's Diary, 24 April, 1894; Villiers-Com., 19 May, 1894, ESA A/2/2. The CMS decided to withdraw from Kavirondo in June 1894.
36. Colvile, *op. cit.*, p. 295. Hardinge was Consul-General in Zanzibar with supervisory authority over Uganda. Spire Papers; correspondence in ESA A/2/2, A/2/3, A/3/2; Berkeley-FO, 5 December, 1895, FOCP, 6827/284/320; Colvile-Hardinge, 19 May, 1894, ESA A/32/2; Lonsdale: *Political History of Western Kenya*, 1883-1957, Chapter 3. (Clarendon, forthcoming); Were, *History of the Abaluyia of Western Kenya.*
37. KLC Evid. iii, 3348; G. Wilson-O i/c Ravine 10 October, 1894, ESA A/2/3; Hardinge-FO, 13 July, 1894; FO-Hardinge, 2 November, 1894, FOCP, 6617/176, 6661/96. Martin-Com. 19 December, 1894, ESA, A/2/3; Matson and Sutton, *UJ*, 29 (1965), p. 165; Diary of the Camps (now unfortunately lost) 24-28 February, 1895.
38. Correspondence in ESA, A/2/3, A/3/2, A/4/1. Spire's men went to Kitosh to recover stolen guns.
39. Peters, *op. cit.*, p. 291.

4

THE BEGINNING OF CONFLICT

Once the British Government had reluctantly decided to take over the Company's responsibilities west of the Kikuyu escarpment, it was only a matter of time before the local administration came to grips with the Nandi, as the raiding activities of the warriors were bound to involve the government in its role of protector to friendly tribes.[1] The government was also anxious to shorten the Uganda Road by eliminating the detour through North Nandi, which many travellers considered irksome and unnecessary. Representations made by Lugard in 1894 convinced the British Government that the military establishment recommended in Portal's report would have to be increased, owing to "the necessity of controlling certain tribes which are apt to give trouble on the borders of Kavirondo".* The Foreign Office justified the additional expenditure on the grounds that "if no hold were kept over Kavirondo, the communications with the coast would be at the mercy of the natives".[2] The policy to be followed in the territories east of the Nile was to be one of general supervision, but in practice, owing to the scanty resources that were sanctioned to put the policy into effect, district officers had to confine their activities to the areas in the immediate vicinity of their stations and the Uganda Road. Officers had no time to devote to projects for administrative or economic development, as their efforts were concentrated on securing the safety of the Uganda Road and on improvising a rapid, safe and efficient transport service. In order to achieve this end, stations had to be established, garrisons provided and arrangements made to supply caravans and garrisons with trade goods and food. These services were organised not in connection with the administration of the tribes in the road districts, but in order to safeguard the lines of communication with Buganda, which was the cardinal object of government policy. The Company had made no attempt to administer the country between Fort Smith and the Lake, so Protectorate officers had nothing to build on when they began their arduous task, except the treaties which Jackson had concluded with eight of the "Kavirondo" chiefs.*

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* "Kavirondo" was used for the country east of the Sio river, including Nandi.

When Hobley† was posted to Mumias in February 1895 to take charge of the huge area bounded by the Sio River, Kitoto's, Mt. Elgon and Ravine, the instructions he received from Jackson were similar to those given by Colvile to Spire in the previous July, when Mumias was occupied for the first time as a permanent station.[3] The main emphasis was placed on the rapid passage of goods and mail; the imposition of ivory duty and other dues; the collection of food for caravans; and the improvement of transport facilities. In drafting instructions for Hobley's guidance in his relations with the tribes in his district, Jackson followed the lines laid down by the Foreign Secretary for the administration of Kavirondo. Lord Kimberley had decreed that "our arrangements should not go beyond such agreements with the Chiefs as may be necessary for the maintenance of friendly relations between them and the Protectorate, the suppression of the Slave Trade, and facilities for trade". Hobley was accordingly instructed to "interfere as little as possible in local affairs", and advised that "the authority of the various recognised chiefs . . . should be upheld as far as possible and desirable". He was authorised to "deal with Kavirondo natives committing acts against the government", but warned that if "reinforcements are required for any punitive expedition, you will report the circumstances, when arrangements will be made from headquarters".[4]

These vague generalisations left much to the discretion of the individual officer, and this enabled Hobley to pacify and administer Kavirondo in accordance with the time-honoured Foreign Office practice of allowing "the man on the spot" considerable latitude in taking decisions and implementing policy. As a skeleton of official policy Jackson's instructions were bound to fail, unless the Commissioner was prepared to meet requests for reinforcements when help was sought by a local official. Such requests were certain to be made, as the resources at the latter's command were insufficient to ensure the safety of the road, or to deal with any but the most minor embroilments with local tribes. The truth of this proposition had been demonstrated before Hobley arrived at Mumias. Spire with a garrison of only twenty-five men had failed to deter the Wanga from attacking Ugenya, and his presence at Mumias had not prevented the Kitosh and Ugenya from combining for a raid against villages only four miles from the station. His attempts to control the Kabras, Kikelelwa and Kitosh, who intimidated caravans, looted a Foreign Office mail bag and gave refuge to armed deserters, were only partially successful. These hostile acts threatened the Uganda Road and had to be discouraged, but settled conditions could only be restored by the direct intervention of the district officer, since in Kavirondo (unlike Buganda) there was no native authority powerful enough to control refractory sections and to maintain law and order. There was a limit to what a local official could do, however, and when the Kitosh cut up a large government party in December 1894, reinforcements had to be obtained from Busoga to punish the offenders and to prevent the disaffection from spreading.

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* See pp. 62-64.

† C. W. Hobley, AMICE, (1867-1947); joined IBEA Coy. 8 March, 1890, as a geologist. Most of his service had been spent in the coastal hinterland on road making, water supplies, exploratory surveys and transport. He transferred to the Uganda Government on 31 August, 1894, as a 1st Class Assistant.

The disaster in Kitosh had made plain the danger of trying to extend the government's authority too quickly, and of undertaking operations in areas some distance away from Mumias or the Uganda Road. Hobley recognised the weakness of his position and accordingly strove to strengthen the far from reliable Wanga alliance, to win over the chastened Kitosh and to come to terms with the Kikelelwa and Kabras.* The most easterly tribe in his district, the Nandi, were reputed to be doughty fighters but, as they had not attempted to resist the passage of caravans along the Uganda Road, Hobley was only too willing to leave them alone. Apart from Kitoto's plea for protection from continual attacks by his neighbours, the only exploit of the Nandi warriors to be brought to Hobley's attention in the first half of 1895 was reported by Martin's headman, Juma Raschid, who met a large party of raiders returning from Sebei with a herd of looted stock. Although the Elgon raiding ground was far from the Uganda Road and not occupied by a tribe with whom friendly relations had been established, Hobley suggested this matter should "be enquired into at the time of the Kitosh expedition", as "the presence of roving bands of these lawless individuals is productive of great havoc among more peaceful natives".[5] Hobley's representations did not convince Jackson that the time was opportune to humble the Nandi, or that any attempt at subjugation would be worth the risk of forcing the people into an attitude of open hostility to a government they had hitherto chosen to ignore. But when the Nandi began to attack trading parties and caravans in July 1895 these outrages could not be ignored. Prestige and policy demanded redress for acts which brought the administration into contempt and threatened the safety of the Uganda Road.

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*Jackson warned OC Kavirondo about Sakwa's machinations against the Kikelelwa, and Mumia's "anything but satisfactory conduct" and his susceptibility to Arab cajolery. A fortnight after Hobley's arrival at Mumias, Mumia went out to fight the Ugenya "unknown to me".

Caravans on the Uganda Road before 1895 were commanded by explorers, missionaries, Company and government officials, journalists and scientists. Their leaders concentrated on getting over the ground as quickly as possible and generally avoided embroilments with people along the route. Jackson seized large numbers of Lumbwa cattle in October 1889 and supported Wakoli the following March against his neighbour, Karendi; Peters helped Sakwa to chastise the Kikelelwa in 1890 and Pringle had a minor dispute with the Naivasha Masai in 1892, but these were exceptional occurrences. Caravan leaders usually rejected requests for assistance in inter-tribal feuds, and contrived to pass through quietly without antagonising the chiefs and people or becoming involved in local politics.

In 1895 the pioneer caravan leaders were joined by men of a different stamp, the private traders. The latter were usually individuals working independently or in partnership with the sole object of amassing profits. They were naturally sensitive about the losses they incurred through caravan delays and critical of government interference or control. Some of them realised that profits could be made more quickly by inciting tribes to undertake hostile operations against their neighbours and, on occasions, the traders themselves took sides in inter-tribal quarrels. Few of them had enough capital to tide them over losses caused by excessive delays and other setbacks, and their expensive caravans had to be kept moving so that trading operations could continue without interruption.

Some of their number undoubtedly deserved the stricture passed on traders as a class by Eliot: "the methods of pioneers are sometimes summary and it is beyond doubt that several tribes have become hostile to the white man because they have been alarmed by the conduct of unscrupulous traders".[6] On the other hand, they had an important and legitimate part to play in bringing Africans into contact with the products of the outside world, and in supplying the risk capital for the purchase and marketing of local produce. Most of the traders came from a different social background from that of the officials and missionaries, who were suspicious about the legality of some of the traders' activities and concerned about their meddling in tribal affairs. None of the pioneer traders and transporters made much profit from their enterprises and most of them, including large, well-established firms such as Smith, Mackenzie and Co., quitted the business after incurring heavy losses through natural calamities and tribal raids.

Almost all the trading parties that entered Eastern Uganda before 1895 were brought up by Arabs. The few Europeans who had entered the field had met with little success in their ventures. G. C. Leith engaged in some questionable operations from Sakwa's in the early part of 1893, in the course of which he became embroiled with the Kitosh and Ugenya; and Gilkison, who was sent to Mumias in September 1894 to reassert the Company's taxation and trading rights in Kavirondo, was rebuffed by Spire. After Gilkison's discomfited return to Fort Smith in November and Muxworthy's death from blackwater in Kabras in the same month, no traders were reported in Eastern Uganda until the arrival of Peter West at Mumias on 20 March 1895.

West was in partnership with Andrew Dick, who was establishing a chain of stores and transport posts from the coast to Lake Victoria. West's past history was typical of that of many other pioneer traders. A very poor account was given of his conduct in South Africa, where it was said he was "always drunk and was expelled from the Cape Mounted Rifles for gun running".[7] In July 1893 he was cutting *boriti* poles for export at Chuyu, in the coastal district of Shimoni, and two years later D. J. Wilson reported that "Shimoni is almost deserted owing, I hear, to Mr. West's extraordinary conduct". After joining Dick, West established a store at Nzoi in Ukambani without reference to Ainsworth or Mombasa, an act which Ainsworth regarded as "part of Dick's general policy of antagonism to the Company's authority".[8] From Nzoi West took a caravan of contract goods to Mumias, where he did local transport work for Hobley. While awaiting the arrival of his senior partner, West spent a month buying ivory in Kabras, where he got in touch with some Nandi from a "frontier district", whom he found so friendly that he made blood-brotherhood with one of their chiefs. When the trader returned to Mumias, he built a house and started a vegetable garden in preparation for the branch which the partners proposed to open at the station.

Dick was a choleric Scot and by nature a rebel. His antipathy to authority was increased when he was dismissed from the Company's service on a flimsy pretext, after he had given two years' efficient and loyal service as Chief Accountant. After his dismissal he embarrassed the Company whenever the chance occurred. Twice he organised the Mombasa merchants' opposition to Company decrees, and in 1894 and 1895 he quarrelled with officials Ainsworth, Hall and Hobley, as well as Stuart Watt, the missionary, and Trader Gemmill. When Dick entered the transport business on his own account, Smith, Mackenzie and Co. sub-let to him a considerable part of their contract for carrying government loads to the Lake. While honouring this contract, Dick devoted his energies to establishing a chain of stores along the Uganda Road and to seeking land on which to produce food for caravans. His efforts were encouraged by the government, and it seemed at one time that he would achieve a similar position in the British sphere to that held by Stokes in German East Africa. At the time of his death Dick had eleven posts on the Uganda Road and boasted he could produce six porters to anybody else's one. These activities stretched his credit to the limit and made tremendous demands on his energies and temper. After the death of his brother, David, in 1893 Dick carried on alone until he took on West as a partner.[9]

At the time of his first journey west of the Rift Valley in June 1895 Dick was suffering from indifferent health. He was also in considerable financial difficulty owing to the losses he had suffered through cattle plague and at the hands of Masai warriors and Mazrui rebels. In order to keep the trader's organisation working, Berkeley agreed to pay Dick in advance for the work he had contracted to do for the Uganda Government.[10] This concession enabled the trader to extend his interests towards the Lake, but the events that occurred when he arrived in Kavirondo did nothing to lighten his burdens or ease his mind. The herd of cattle which Dick had sent on ahead of his caravan was stampeded by lions on the Uasin Gishu Plateau, and some of the animals were lost. Hobley revoked Martin's permission for Dick to build a store at Ravine, on the grounds that sanction had first to be obtained from the Commissioner, and insisted that Dick's trade goods should be brought from Kabras to Mumias to be assessed for duty. Although Hobley was acting in accordance with Jackson's instructions, Dick considered these actions obstructive, and the latter demand as tantamount to an imputation that he was seeking to evade the payment of duty. The trader's opinion of government officials was not improved when a case against West's headman for stealing food from Dick's caravan was dismissed, as "the evidence fell through".[11]

When Dick left Mumias on 23 June 1895, three of his rifles were looted by the Kikelelwa, who had also stolen a rifle and ammunition when one of West's men was murdered. The Kabras were "upset" by these outrages and had massed to fight the Kikelelwa, who had laid an ambush and been seen prowling round one of Dick's "shops". "At first (Dick) was inclined to go out at once to punish them", but he decided against taking action himself, as West thought it would take the caravan and its Sudanese escort from the Mumias garrison three days to punish the offenders. Dick urged Hobley to send men and ammunition to reinforce West's fifty rifles, so that the combined force could obtain redress for the trader's losses. A peremptory note was addressed to West forbidding him to take action against the Kikelelwa, and an urgent appeal was sent to Grant to hasten with troops to punish the offenders, as Hobley considered it impolitic to give Dick grounds for thinking the government ignored his complaints. Although Hobley was satisfied the Kikelelwa deserved to be punished, he was suspicious that Dick's offer to assist was prompted by his desire to obtain some of their cattle for his own use. Hobley's suspicions on this account were probably not entirely groundless. When Dick had helped Russell, the District Officer at Fort Smith, to punish the Guru-Guru Kikuyu only a month before, the tribesmen had fled and the raiding force "could only wipe up the country, which we did pretty successfully, scooping up the goats in hundreds".[12] Dick was somewhat naturally incensed by Hobley's refusal to employ the trader's men against the Kikelelwa, in circumstances similar to those in which Russell had welcomed his help against the Kikuyu.

After leaving West in Kabras at the end of June 1895, Dick went on to the Guasa Masa (Kipkarren) River, where an incident occurred which initiated the "Nandi question" and coloured the history of Eastern Uganda for the next decade. In the early evening after Dick's caravan had camped on the east bank of the river, two Nandi arrived holding grass in their hands as a sign of peace and asked for food as they were starving. Dick ordered the headman to tie both of the visitors up and then to give each of them 100 strokes with the *kiboko*.* After being questioned in the Masai language by an askari who taxed them with stealing rifles from the caravan, the Nandi denied the accusation and asked whether they would have walked into the camp if they had taken the rifles. The prisoners also denied any knowledge of the whereabouts of the cattle which had been stampeded on the Uasin Gishu Plateau, but admitted that the beasts had been driven away by other Nandi who had found them straying. When Dick demanded to be taken to the homes of the thieves, the two Nandi said they did not know where the culprits lived. The prisoners were tied to a tree for the night and next morning, after their arms had been trussed behind their backs and their legs tied together, they were thrown into the river and drowned. When the caravan moved off, a crowd of warriors were seen to be watching its movements from a rocky hillock some little distance from the camp. Dick fired three shots at the warriors and, after one of them had been hit, the Nandi dispersed and the caravan moved on.[13]

Rumours of this incident reached Mumias some time after it had taken place, and more than a month elapsed before Hobley and Martin were able to forward eye-witness accounts from two of Dick's men, and from two Swahili traders who had travelled as passengers with the caravan. Berkeley,† the new Commissioner, and Jackson considered the episode as reported to be "very serious" but "incredible", and Hobley was instructed to report again after making fresh enquiries. There were some discrepancies in the original statements, such as the subjects on which the Nandi had been interrogated and the sequence in which the events took place.

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* *Kiboko* is a raw-hide whip.

† E. J. L. Berkeley (1857-1932); consular service, Zanzibar 1885-91; 1891-92 Administrator, IBEA Coy., Mombasa; 1893 Portal's Uganda Mission; 1894 Member of Departmental Committee on East African Administration; 14 June, 1895, left Mombasa to take up appointment as Commissioner of Uganda.

However, Hobley was unable to obtain any fresh evidence either to corroborate or refute the reported facts. No Nandi witnesses were forthcoming as the government was not in touch with the tribe, and Dick's death in November 1895 made further action pointless. The Commissioner discussed the episode with much charity towards Dick, especially as Berkeley had been in charge of the Company when Dick had mobilised the Mombasa merchants against its decrees. The Commissioner was naturally reluctant to condemn a fellow countryman out of hand, and his experiences with caravan staff disposed him to accept the possibility that the evidence of the Swahili traders was prejudiced and the statements of Dick's employees were influenced by personal considerations. His trading competitors were undoubtedly becoming anxious about Dick's monopolistic tendencies, and there is some evidence that a number of the Swahili caravan leaders were indebted to him financially. There seems little doubt, however, that the recorded statements are substantially correct. Probably the most favourable construction that can be put on Dick's conduct is that his service at the coast had given him the impression that all Africans could swim, and that he had the victims (unshackled) thrown into the river merely to frighten them. But whether his action was a criminally stupid piece of horse-play or a dastardly cold-blooded murder, the outcome was the same. The Nandi had been provoked into open hostility to the white man and into seeking vengeance for the murder of two of their fellows.[14]

After Dick had parted from his partner in Kabras, West began trading with the Nandi. He had been warned officially by Hobley that "the Nandi are well known to be a treacherous, cruel and bloodthirsty race who kill merely for the sake of killing", and also privately by Ansorge, the government doctor at Mumias. These warnings were disregarded by West, who was evidently satisfied that the agreement he had made with the frontier chief would be honoured. He told Ansorge that he was aware of their reputation for treachery, but boasted that he could trade with the Nandi without anxiety, though it would be dangerous for anyone else to do so. West had not heard of the outrage committed by Dick at the Guasa Masa a few days after the partners had parted, as news of this incident did not reach Mumias until after West's death.

West pitched his camp in a wood below the west escarpment, three hours south-east of Kabras Village and two hours from the nearest Nandi houses. The trader had with him a Masai woman, "his faithful and intelligent helpmeet for many a long year", thirty picked porters and a number of their wives. Although he had twenty-five head of cattle and forty-six sheep and goats with him, West was so confident of the accommodation he had arrived at with the Nandi that he omitted to take the elementary precaution of constructing a defensible boma, or even of slashing down the long grass surrounding the camp. His armoury consisted of fifteen guns, two private rifles and a revolver, but most of these were tied up in his tent and only a few had been issued to his men. West was received with great friendliness by his blood-brother, through whose good offices he hoped to prosecute his business. When two tusks were brought in to camp, the Nandi demurred when he offered them a cow and calf instead of the three cows they demanded, but he bought the other one, probably from the Kabras, for a cow and three goats. As no more ivory came in, West went to Nandi but was unable to travel round the country owing to a bubo. After this had burst he returned empty-handed to camp. About the 7th of July he sent his headman, Mwenyi Amini, into Nandi with three men to tell the tribesmen to bring in ivory to the camp. Two days later the headman, who had been well treated on his mission and given food and a goat, returned with two Nandi who said they had two tusks for sale. The headman and his colleagues were sent back with the visitors to fetch the ivory. They had not returned by the evening of the 14th when a Nandi man and woman passed the camp on their way towards Kabras. When the travellers were asked for news of the headman's whereabouts, they said he had gone to some distant villages but would probably be back in a day or so. The two Nandi spent the night in the camp and in the morning proceeded on their way.[15] West was apparently not alarmed by the prolonged absence of his headman, as on the 15th he sent five askari to Kabras to buy food, presumably with the intention of remaining in camp until the negotiations with the Nandi were concluded. Furthermore, he made no effort to strengthen the camp in which his party had lived in safety for twenty days.

The five askari returned with food from Kabras in the evening, and at two o'clock on the morning of the 16th the camp was rushed by Nandi warriors, who stabbed their spears through the tents before any shots could be fired by the occupants. No guard had been set and no alarm given, so most of the sleepers were quickly despatched. A few managed to crawl out of their tents, however, and to conceal themselves in the long grass. From their hiding-places they heard West cry out "Give me my gun", but his tent was surrounded by stabbing warriors and the trader and his help-meet were killed before they could leave their tent. West was speared in the side and abdomen, stripped of his clothes and left where he lay. Having completed their "premeditated and carefully planned" task, the warriors slaughtered two of the animals and ate them raw, fired off the guns and then decamped at dawn with the remainder of the stock and other loot.* Eight survivors eventually made their way to Kabras and Mumias, where their wounds were dressed by Dr. Ansorge. A party of thirty Kabras warriors went to the camp in the morning, but on reaching the scene of the massacre they returned home.[16]

News of the attack was a severe shock to Hobley and came as a rude awakening to the Uganda and EAP administrations, the Foreign Office and missionary societies.[17] The road was closed to mail runners and small caravans, until a system of escorts could be improvised from the small garrisons at Mumias and Ravine, and the safety of even large, well-armed parties gave rise to anxiety. Several important caravans were on the road to Uganda at the time: the first division of the *William Mackinnon* steamship loads, the first party of Catholic priests to travel by the northern route, the Commissioner of Uganda, and Bishop Tucker's caravan with the pioneer CMS women missionaries. Apart from the danger of attack, these caravans could not look to Ravine to replenish their food supplies, as Martin's scanty reserves would soon be depleted unless troops could be provided to escort grain from Kavirondo or Kikuyu. Moreover, West's murder was certain to have repercussions in many other fields. Not only would the offenders have to be punished, but this would probably necessitate the extension of government jurisdiction to a district which hitherto had been ignored, and the establishment of control over a people with whom the administration had little desire to meddle. Some steady progress had been made in pacifying the Kavirondo tribes near the Uganda Road, but these achievements were of little account unless unimpeded passage through Nandi was assured. Before this could be brought about, Jackson's plans for an intermediate station on the road between Ravine and Mumias would have to be implemented, men would have to be diverted from other districts to garrison the station, provide escorts and to undertake punitive measures, and a greater proportion of the Protectorate's resources would have to be allocated to safeguard the Uganda lifeline.

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* Some loot was recovered by the 1895 expedition and some from the Laibon's house in 1900; see p. 141.

The successful outcome of the Nandi raid boosted tribal morale and increased the self-confidence of the warriors, who had shown that the white man with his guns was equally as vulnerable as their other adversaries to the Nandi spear. It also strengthened tribal faith in the powers of the Laibon, who had apparently sanctioned the raid, since he received a share of the loot and interviewed one of the Swahili survivors.* West's camp had been overrun without a shot being fired in its defence,[18] and the Nandi believed that the Laibon had rendered the ammunition useless through the agency of the dew.† The first white stranger from the east whom the Nandi had attacked since Kimnyole's prophecy, had been defeated without difficulty, so that the warriors were encouraged to raid other intruders into the Nandi homelands. The Nandi success was not lost on their neighbours, who had evidence that the warriors they feared had treated the powerful newcomers as cavalierly as they did their traditional foes. This was particularly true of the Kabras, some of whom had seen at first hand the completeness of the Nandi success, and the Wanga, who witnessed the arrival of the wounded survivors.

News of the murder reached Ravine on 30 July 1895 and Martin informed Hobley that a combined attack on the station by Nandi and Kamasia was imminent. Martin's staff consisted mainly of invalided porters and was inadequate to supply escorts or even to defend the partly completed fort. He asked for the loan of some fit askari until reinforcements could be sent from Uganda, and warned Hobley that at least ten armed men would be needed for parties travelling between Ravine and Kavirondo. In order to ascertain the views of the Kamasia on the Nandi outrage, Martin had to send out for the chiefs because the Kamasia had suddenly discontinued their daily visits to the station to sell locusts to the garrison. The only information he received was brought by a woman, who came stealthily to the station at night, and reported that four days previously five Nandi had taken a message to her chief informing him of the attack on West, and asking the Kamasia to combine with them for an attack on Ravine. The chief demurred on the grounds that arrows and spears were no match for guns, but he agreed to the proposal when the Nandi claimed that, as they had killed one European despite all his weapons, they could easily kill another. Martin gave credence to this report and also to the possibility that the Nandi and Kamasia would seek the aid of the Suk and Lumbwa. He repeated his request for reinforcements but added (so tenuous was the government's hold on the road districts), that he could not cope with too many owing to shortage of food at his station. To Martin the danger was very real, as his station, which had been put into a state of siege against sudden attack, was only one day distant from Nandi and two from the nearest Lumbwa villages. He had to increase the guards on his cattle, which could only be grazed near the station as Nandi warriors were seen spying on them. The warriors disappeared when Martin tried to get in touch with them, but he feared they had not left the vicinity of the station.* No attack was launched against Ravine and the Kamasia, who had kept away from Ravine since West's murder, eventually rejected the Nandi overtures. The threat had passed for the time being, though there were rumours that the Nandi had gone to seek help from the Lumbwa for an attack on the station.[19]

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* The Swahili claimed the Laibon "preserved (a tin of corned beef) with great veneration".

† See pp. 47 and 159 for the Laibon's power to make ammunition ineffective.

Martin had strengthened his garrison of ten askari and forty porters by enlisting seven Sudanese "settlers", but Hobley was not in a position to give him much help. Not only was he concerned about the pacification of the Kitosh and the punishment of the Kikelelwa, but the Kabras had declared their intention of blocking the road to the passage of caravans. On 13 July 1895 Brown of Smith, Mackenzie and Co. was attacked at Port Victoria, and Hobley had to send twenty-five men from Mumias to protect him. Grant had been instructed to assist Hobley in restoring order in Kavirondo, but had been diverted from his task by raids in his own district, and by Baganda interference in Busoga affairs. Jackson at Entebbe was also able to do little to help. Although he had sent Grant fifty Sudanese and some Baganda irregulars for the projected Kitosh and Kikelelwa operations, the Acting Commissioner agreed with Grant's contention that affairs in Busoga were more important than those in Kavirondo, and authorised Grant to settle the problems in his own district before going to Hobley's assistance. Twenty-five reservists were drafted from Singo (where they were relieved by prisoners from Kampala) as replacements for the men Hobley had sent to Port Victoria, and George Wilson persuaded the Baganda chiefs to detail 120 armed men to carry the mail between Kampala and Kavirondo.[20] Although Jackson thought the Nandi should be punished for their "most brutal and cold-blooded" attack on West, whose conduct he considered to have been beyond reproach, he was opposed to hasty action by Grant's small force, if punitive measures were likely to bring about a conflict between the government and the entire tribe. If punishment could be localised, it should be quick; if general, then it should be thorough enough to prevent the Nandi from becoming a serious threat to the Protectorate's communications. But Jackson decided a fortnight after West's murder that operations against the Nandi should be deferred, with the result that the offenders escaped retribution for nearly four months.[21]

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* See p. 79 for Martin's fears of an attack in December 1894. Wilson's post was evacuated on 5 May, 1895 for the fort which Martin began in January.

Hobley, too, had no wish for a general embroilment with the Nandi as he had enough problems on his hands nearer home. He instituted enquiries to ascertain which section of the tribe was responsible for West's murder, and to confirm that the attack was unprovoked.* It was during these enquiries that Hobley found out about Dick's outrageous conduct towards the two Nandi at the Guasa Masa ford in the previous month. Owing to his own ignorance of Nandi and the little information he could glean from their Bantu neighbours, Hobley was unable to discover much of moment. Some informants, including Sakwa, asserted that the Kikelelwa were the culprits, but their evidence was suspect as there was a long-standing feud between the Wanga and the alleged offenders. Other sources implicated the warriors from Chief Kiberiti's area, which was said to be south-east of Kabras and near the place where the murder occurred.* Hobley would have preferred to deal with this incident as he did with similar outrages in Kavirondo but, owing to lack of knowledge and his inability to get Kiberiti's Nandi or Bantu neighbours to co-operate in isolating the offenders, it was impossible to restrict punitive measures to the culprit's section, so that the only alternative was action against the entire tribe. Hobley realised what this would entail, but his overriding duty was to secure the Uganda Road and, with Dick's brush with the Kikelelwa in mind, to afford to traders the protection which they had the right to expect from the government. Hobley was doubtless relieved that when West was murdered Dick was far away from Kavirondo, and unable to embroil himself with the Nandi on account of his partner's death, as he did subsequently with the Masai over a dispute in which he had no direct interest.†

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* This procedure became standard practice during Hobley's tenure of office in Kavirondo, and was followed by Ainsworth and Jackson after the Kedong massacre (see p. 172). Girouard's Memoranda 18 May, 1910, laid down a similar policy for EAP officers.

By murdering West the Nandi added the stigma of treachery to their previous reputation for bloodthirstiness and truculence. But the opprobrium that was heaped on the tribesmen at the time did not take into account their attitude towards the alien concept of blood-brotherhood, and the fact that no so-called chief was able to guarantee that his people would honour any undertaking he might enter into on their behalf.[22] From a European standpoint the breaking of such a pledge was certainly treachery, if the murder had in fact been committed by persons who had offered the trader their friendship. It is not, however, certain that the attack was carried out by followers of the chief who had welcomed West to his country. Nandi warriors roamed at will within and beyond the tribal boundaries, and did not confine their raiding activities to areas specifically reserved for their particular *pororosiek*. West's sojourn in the no-man's land between Nandi and Kabras would have been known throughout Nandi,[23] and the prospect of looting a mob of cattle from a small, defenceless camp was one calculated to attract warriors from all over the country. The attack may have been made, therefore, not by West's blood-brother or Kiberiti's followers, but by one of the many wandering bands which were particularly active at the time in terrorising the Kabras.‡ Furthermore, if the hypothesis is accepted that the attack on West's camp was a reprisal for the incident at the Guasa Masa ford, the warriors who carried out the reprisals were presumably comrades of the men Dick had murdered. But the welcome that West received when he entered Nandi, and the time that elapsed between the two incidents, suggest that neither the murdered men nor their avengers came from the area of the chief with whom West had made blood-brotherhood. This presumption is also supported by the drowned men's statement that they were starving when they entered Dick's camp, which implies that they had travelled some distance from their homes.

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* Kiberiti is not a Nandi name but probably a nickname given by his neighbours to a border "chief", who was fiery like a match (*kiberiti* in Ki-Swahili). The 1895 expedition found looted goods in this area, see p. 141.

† See p. 172.

‡ See p. 81. Frequent Nandi raids had caused the Kabras to move away from the confines of Nandi at the time.

Reports from the two survivors of the party which West's headman had led into Nandi to fetch ivory, leave no doubt that any intruders were considered to be fair game, and that the tribe as a whole were not prepared to be bound by undertakings entered into by a border chief for his own purposes. When the headman arrived at the village where West had been promised ivory, two old men took a Swahili and Nyamwezi to a river, where two large tusks were recovered from the water.* The porters were taking the tusks away when they were set upon by warriors, who seized their guns and would have killed them but for the intercession of the old men who claimed them as slaves. On their return to the village, the captives were shown the place where their comrade had been murdered while he was killing a chicken.† One of the old men tried unsuccessfully to sell the Nyamwezi porter, who managed to escape from his owner but had to give himself up when almost dying from hunger, after wandering about for several days in search of a way out of the country. The Nandi were angry with the unfortunate porter and were about to kill him when his comrade saved his life by a ruse. The Swahili ingratiated himself with a Nandi widow, whom he married, and the couple eventually escaped and reported to Pordage in Kabras on 11 October 1895.[24] Pordage took them both to Ravine as he thought they would be able to give useful information about the Nandi country and people. Shortly afterwards the Nyamwezi also made his escape and was sent down to the coast with Dr. Ansorge in February 1896. The details of the survivor's story should be treated with reserve. There are several points in it which are contrary to Nandi custom, and allowance must be made for the fecund imagination of the caravan story-teller.

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* All that was visible from the bank was a small, dry twig used as a marking buoy.

† The murdered man had probably stolen the chicken; the fate of the fourth man is not recorded.

The Nandi had forced themselves to the notice of the administration by murdering a European and by jeopardising the Protectorate's communications between Ravine and Kavirondo. They had shown that the white man was vulnerable to their spears and had killed the first European to penetrate any distance into their country. It was impossible to forecast, from the little that was known of their tribal organisation, whether West's murder was an isolated incident provoked by Dick's outrage—"a tragic case of vicarious Nemesis" as Hobley later termed it—or whether it was to be the prelude to a series of incidents aimed at challenging the government's authority and at keeping inviolate the tribal boundaries.[25] Prestige and the maintenance of communications demanded that retribution should be swift and thorough. But owing to other commitments and inadequate resources, punishment was delayed. In the interval the Nandi, who were plagued with none of Jackson's problems, took advantage of the government's apparent ineptitude and perpetrated a series of outrages on the Uganda Road, which convinced the government that the only way to deal with the rival power in Eastern Uganda was to crush the Nandi by bringing the truculent warriors to heel.

As no punishment followed the murder of West, the Nandi were "now like an agitated swarm of bees", and before reports of their first success had reached Entebbe or Mombasa, the warriors struck again.[26] The first division of steamer loads for the *William Mackinnon* left Ravine on 15 July 1895 in a caravan, under G. W. Lewis of Smith, Mackenzie and Co., which included two European mechanics, twenty Indian artisans and over 400 porters. Before Mumias was reached on the 26th over twenty loads had been lost, most of them when the caravan was attacked by the Nandi and thrown into confusion on the Uasin Gishu Plateau. One of the mechanics returned to the scene of the attack and recovered a few of the loads, but altogether seventeen were lost.* Tools which were to be duplicated in later consignments formed the bulk of the missing loads, so no serious damage was done, but the absence of tools restricted the amount of work which the fitters could do when the steamer parts arrived at Port Victoria. A rifle was taken in a night attack on the steamer camp in Kabras, but this raid was thought (probably erroneously) to have been carried out by the Kikelelwa. The speedy inauguration of a steamer service was a major enterprise designed to hasten the flow of goods to Buganda, and Hobley was obliged to escort future steamer caravans from Ravine to the Lake, after the attack on the first division had shown that the contractors were unable to provide adequate protection for the loads.[27]

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* A few loads were recovered later but ten were never found.

The attack on the steamer party confirmed that extra precautions were needed to safeguard even large caravans on the section between Ravine and Mumias. Guards were provided for mail and food parties, and private caravans were held up until they could proceed with such escorts as Hobley could arrange with the limited resources at his command. Despite these extra precautions the Uganda Commissioner's caravan lost several loads near Kabras on 7 August 1895, including two rifles, a shotgun and a loaded donkey. Berkeley had been told on the way up of caravans being molested at various points on the road "by sallies at dusk on stragglers from long grass", and he thought the situation sufficiently serious to send back an escort for Bishop Hanlon's much smaller party, which was ten days behind the Commissioner's.[28]

raids after

Despite the warnings from Lewis' returning steamer caravan that hostile natives were ahead, and the precautionary measures taken by the five priests in Hanlon's party, one of the Bishop's askari was speared near the Guasa Masa ford on 13 August 1895, before the arrival of the escort which Berkeley had sent from Mumias. One of the three askari, who had been sent back to help a porter in to camp, relieved the straggler of his load and hurried on ahead of his comrades. He was attacked when alone and encumbered with his burden by warriors who sprang at him from the long grass. After plunging three spears into his back and stripping him of his clothes, the Nandi made off with a tin box containing Father Plunkett's private goods including breviaries, altar books and a clarionet.* When Plunkett returned to the scene of the outrage with some askari, they found the murdered man lying on the path. As the caravan was followed as far as the Nzoia by bands of warriors, Father Prendergast thought that some of the porters who ran away with their loads must also have fallen to the Nandi spears.[29]

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* The tin box was recovered during the 1895 expedition, p. 142.

News of this attack did not reach Ravine in time to stop a small party, which had been sent on in advance by Munro, of Boustead, Ridley and Co., with beads to buy food for the CMS caravan he was leading, and to deliver urgent letters for Mengo. The advance party consisted of 25 contract men, and six porters carrying loads which the Mill Hill Fathers had been forced to leave with Martin. Although camp was pitched near the Guasa Masa ford, at the place where Dick had drowned the two Nandi in June and Hanlon's askari had been speared the previous week, no protective boma was erected and no guards were posted. About two o'clock in the morning of the 22nd August, a large party of Nandi warriors—said to have numbered as many as 200—rushed the sleeping camp and speared all but seven of the occupants. It was a moonless night and the Nandi adopted the same tactics as they employed when raiding enemy tribes: after keeping the caravan under observation all day, the warriors had hidden near the camp throughout the early part of the night and had launched the attack well before dawn. Most of the survivors made their way westwards to Mumias in company with the down mailmen, whom they had met some distance from the scene of the massacre. Dr. Ansorge treated the wounded, including one man who had suffered a deep puncture in the nape of the neck, a pierced thigh, several gashes in his arm and a wound which had left a portion of the scalp hanging from his head. One man reached Ravine where Rattray, the doctor with the CMS caravan, sutured a wound caused by a spear thrust through the porter's left arm and over his chest.

Martin and Tucker were not at first disposed to believe the wounded man's story, although he had Hanlon's shoes and some pencils in his mat. But two days later the missionaries, who had been warned by an askari before entering the Mau Forest to keep together, to post sentries and not to go far from camp, met a party of mailmen who had recovered Hanlon's prayer-book and Archdeacon Walker's watch at the Guasa Masa, and confirmed the wounded survivor's account of the massacre. Tucker and his party arrived at the Guasa Masa on 11 September 1895 and gazed at the devastation caused by the Nandi warriors. All the loads had been prised open and their contents ransacked. The packages of beads, which had been brought up to pay for the porters' food on their return journey to the coast, and other trade goods were gone. Other articles, many of which must have mystified the warriors, were strewn on the ground in a charred state. Newspapers, letters and Luganda religious books for the CMS mission were lying higgledy-piggledy with vestments, images, monstrances and church furnishing which the Mill Hill Fathers were taking up for their new mission. Bishop Tucker picked up one volume of Bishop Hanlon's Pontificale, which the latter was taking up for the consecration of the White Fathers' new Bishop. Some of the looted articles were afterwards recovered, but most of them and the nine loads of mail were lost.* Hobley sent a strong force of Sudanese to retrieve the mail and to escort the CMS caravan into Mumias, where Tucker found a few of the letters awaiting him which he had written at the coast three months before. The Bishop's caravan passed on, but the scene at the Guasa Masa, especially the poisoned arrows which were found in large numbers around the camp, had a chilling effect on the new men in the party and on the pioneer lady members of the Uganda Mission.[30]

This attack confirmed beyond doubt that the Nandi were up in arms and that West's murder was not an isolated outbreak. Further confirmation was received shortly afterwards when Martin learnt that a small party of Mombasa traders had been cut up on the Mau by Nandi or Lumbwa raiders earlier in the month. These incidents were, however, followed by a temporary lull in attacks on the Uganda Road. This was due partly to the fact that only large caravans or strongly escorted parties passed between Ravine and Mumias, and that some of the Nandi were seeking allies for the investment of Ravine. But the warriors' inactivity was caused in the main by the lack of central direction and a plan of campaign, so that individual bands were left to raid when and where they chose. The preparations going on at Mumias and at the newly established Kabras food post probably caused the Nandi to stay their hand, while the formation of the Guasa Masa station on 23 September 1895 acted as a temporary deterrent to hostilities in that area.† From statements made by the truce emissaries after the expedition, the Nandi evidently expected that punitive measures would be taken against them, and consequently kept themselves and their cattle out of the way until they saw what the government intended to do. When it looked as if the government was unwilling to institute reprisals for raids which had inflicted considerable casualties on the victims, but had been carried out with only insignificant losses to the Nandi, the warriors again took the initiative. They realised that an assault on Ravine or Guasa Masa would not be as easy or profitable as attacks on caravans, and early in October 1895 raiding operations were resumed.

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* The mail contained letters and parcels sent from England in April and May; the last news received in Uganda was in letters dated 15 March, 1895, from England and 23 April, 1895, from Mombasa. The loss of the Guasa Masa mails was all the more severe as a mail was lost in GEA in October.

† See pp. 126-129.

On 2 October 1895 a small caravan under Mohamed Bau with thirty rifles, two loads of spare ammunition, fifty head of cattle and twenty sheep and goats left Guasa Masa for Ravine. The caravan belonged to Martin, who had been allowed on entering government service to dispose of the trading assets he had acquired during his service with the Company. Capt. Sitwell sent twenty Sudanese to escort the caravan as far as the Uasin Gishu Plateau, for what he thought was the dangerous part of its journey. As the escort returned to Guasa Masa after an absence of only two days, Sitwell was evidently ignorant of the extent of Nandi territory towards the east. Martin knew there were Nandi houses within a day's march of Ravine, but this fact was not generally known until Vandeleur marched from Tindiret to Ravine during the punitive expedition. During the march, Mohamed Bau's caravan met a war party of 500 Masai from the Kikuyu District, who were going to raid Kitosh. Shortly afterwards when the caravan was encamped near a wood outside the Mau Forest two days from Ravine, the camp was rushed by ten Nandi warriors on the night of the 6th. Although Sitwell had advised Mohamed Bau to take precautions, especially on camping for the night, no protective boma was erected and the raiders met with no opposition. Eight porters and a woman were killed, six men were wounded and 42 of the cattle and all the small stock were looted. Four guns were lost and 250 rounds of ammunition could not be accounted for, although the only shots fired during the attack were ten cartridges let off by Mohamed Bau. The mails were lost in the confusion but were brought into Ravine by Pordage sixteen days after the attack. Mohamed Bau claimed that the camp had been overrun by the large Masai party, which he had met a day or so before the attack, but it was subsequently proved that the raid had been carried out by a handful of Nandi warriors. The raiders were presumably part of a large band which had been lurking round Ravine for some time. They had sent threatening messages to the station on 6 October 1895, and a week later the garrison was alerted after the Kamasia had reported that a Nandi attack on the fort was imminent.[31] These incidents demonstrated that the Uganda Road was insecure for small parties, not merely near the Guasa Masa ford and in East Kabras but throughout its entire length from Ravine to Kavirondo.[32]

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Two days after news of Mohamed Bau's disaster had been brought to Guasa Masa by Major Smith, Pordage and a well-armed caravan of 160 men were threatened on 13 October 1895 by a large body of Nandi warriors at a camp on the Kamasai River below the Nyinyin Hills, only a day's march to the west of Guasa Masa fort. Pordage was awakened at one o'clock in the morning by a cry from the sentry that the *washenzi* (savages) were gathering round the camp. When he went out to investigate, Pordage saw several figures with spears surrounding the camp. As they did not move when he roused the askari, three volleys were fired at the besiegers. The Nandi retired, leaving two of their number dead on the ground, and traces of blood on the grass suggested that some of their comrades had been wounded. The incident alarmed Pordage, as travelling with the caravan was the Swahili survivor of West's party, who had informed him of the warriors' intention to attack all caravans on the road near Guasa Masa and then to invest the fort itself.*

After leaving Guasa Masa on the 15th with his force augmented by ten Sudanese soldiers, Pordage camped at Kiboko where several Nandi were discovered setting fire to the grass round the camp. The following afternoon, a party of porters, who had been sent for water about half a mile from a camp on the Uasin Gishu Plateau, was attacked by thirty Nandi warriors, but their rush was checked by the rifle fire of the five askari forming the water guard. Pordage went to the rescue with fifteen soldiers but the Nandi decamped and got away unscathed from a party sent out in pursuit of them. The hills around the camp became "suddenly alive" in the late afternoon with groups of armed men, but nothing could be done to disperse them, as the warriors kept out of rifle shot and Pordage could not risk a sally against such numbers.[33] After an uneasy but uneventful night, the caravan was followed for several miles the next day by about 400 warriors massed on both sides of the track. Groups of Nandi watched the camp every night until the Mau Forest was reached, but no attack was made on the caravan, which arrived safely at Ravine on 21 October 1895.

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* See p. 100.

Apart from the averted attempt to overrun Pordage's camp near the Nyinyin Hills, no attacks were launched on the western section of the road after the establishment of the Kabras food depot and the Guasa Masa fort. But on the night of 1 November 1895, when the punitive expedition was assembling at Mumias, a party of Nandi warriors descended on a fortified Kabras village a little to the south of the garrisoned food depot, burned a number of houses and killed nine of the occupants.[34] Throughout October, the Nandi had kept the initiative and their attacks had gathered momentum, so that it became evident that the road would not be safe until the long-deferred punitive measures were carried through, with a thoroughness that would cow the warriors and disabuse them of their trust in the Laibon's powers.

The raids on the Uganda Road, which began with the attack on West's camp in July, continued until November with increasing intensity as a result of the success that attended the first encounter between the Nandi and the intruders from the east. Although the epithets "bloodthirsty", "truculent" and "treacherous" were bestowed on the tribe as a result of the attacks, these pejoratives were not entirely justified, if the hostilities were undertaken as legitimate acts of revenge for Dick's unprovoked and cold-blooded murder of the two Nandi visitors to his Guasa Masa camp. Moreover, if West had taken the precaution of making his camp secure against surprise attack, and had inflicted losses on the Nandi comparable to those suffered later by the Masai at the hands of his partner in the Kedong, the warriors would probably have been less inclined to follow their natural bent and to heed the exhortations of the Laibon.* The road attacks did not, however, amount to a general rising against the government and other intruders. The raids were carried out by small bodies of wandering warriors watching for an opportunity to strike, and not by a tribal army following a co-ordinated plan. Although the participants were given the general blessing of the Laibon, it was impracticable for him to sanction every opportunist raid.

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* See p. 172.

The operations were well-planned and efficiently executed and showed that the warriors were not lacking in leadership or discipline. They modified their customary raiding tactics to suit the new conditions and found that surprise night assaults, planned after a study of the enemy's weaknesses, and attacks on stragglers enabled them to achieve their objectives without undue risk against caravans when camped or on the march. The only casualties the Nandi sustained were the two warriors killed by Pordage in Kabras, and none of the survivors from other raids claimed to have caused the Nandi any losses at all. The warriors were not foolish enough to attack strong caravans on the march or to attempt to overrun fortified positions. They decided not to attack the solitary European and his men at Ravine or Guasa Masa, and even the small Sudanese garrison at the Kabras food post was left in peace. Both the government stations were kept under observation, and prisoners taken during the expedition claimed that the warriors had assembled in force on three occasions to attack Guasa Masa, but had dispersed after receiving reports from the forward pickets about the state of preparedness at the fort.[35] The projected investment of Guasa Masa indicated a degree of inter-*pororosiek* planning and co-operation that was evidently lacking in the raids on caravans. The failure to co-ordinate operations against the enemy's lines of communication prevented the Nandi from pressing home their initial advantage, and enabled a few quite small parties to travel between Ravine and Kavirondo without being molested.

Some property was looted in all the raids but robbery was not the sole, or even the chief, motive for the attacks. The Nandi had previously shown little interest in any of the novelties, other than beads, that were brought from the coast by Arab traders; and they had no use for most of the even stranger European articles, many of which they did not bother to take away. The only property that had any real value to the Nandi were the cattle looted from West and Mohamed Bau, the beads from Boustead, Ridley and Co.'s caravan, and rifles and ammunition which could be bartered to the Kavirondo for stock.[36] If the raids were not reprisals for the outrage at the Guasa Masa, possibly they were simply manifestations of a spirit of adventure and the traditional urge to acquire cattle. They were not the result of "the general thieving propensities" which were attributed to the Nandi by their victims. The caravans were apparently regarded by the Nandi as sections of a nomad tribe with tented camps in place of night *manyattas*. The nomads had been allowed to pass unmolested through the country for a number of years, but in 1895 they provoked the hostility of the Nandi and provided an outlet for the aspirations of the junior initiates of the militant Kablelach age-set.

The raids reported in 1895 were carried out over a wide area stretching from Elgon in the north and Kabras in the west to Ravine in the east. Most of this territory was occupied by other tribes or, in the case of the Mau and Guasa Masa regions, was thought to be uninhabited. Apart from the suffering caused to the victims of Nandi caravan raids, the successes achieved by the warriors against the government undoubtedly had an unsettling effect on neighbouring tribes. Berkeley considered that some of the hostile demonstrations made by the Kitosh, Kikelelwa and Kabras could probably be attributed to this cause.[37] The warriors taking part in the raids came from a number of *pororosiek* and especially from the Tepingot, Kamelilo and Kapchepkendi in the north-west and the Tindiret sections from the south-east. Although there are no records of the activities of the southern *pororosiek* during the period, this does not mean that raids on their traditional enemies had ceased, but that no complaints were received at Mumias from tribes who were not in regular communication with the station.

Hobley had no means of discovering which of the *pororosiek* threatened the Uganda Road and so he was unable to follow his usual procedure for dealing with dissident sections. In Kavirondo, he was almost invariably able to identify and isolate the offenders before punishing them swiftly and soundly, in what he and his colleagues firmly believed was in the offenders' best interests in the long run, and as an example to their neighbours. In Nandi, the government had to pay the penalty for avoiding the tribesmen, and of official ignorance concerning their country, organisation and customs. The Commissioner had no alternative, therefore, but to accept Hobley's representations for a large punitive expedition to punish and pacify the tribe as a whole for the misdemeanours of what may have been merely a handful of warriors.* The government feared that the hostility shown by the perpetrators of the 1895 outrages was general throughout the tribe, and that the measures successfully practised in Kavirondo would have no effect in Nandi. The risk had to be run, therefore, that a punitive expedition would antagonise any friendly elements in the tribe, and unite the Nandi in opposing the invasion of their country.

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* The CMS missionary, Baskerville, regarded the 1895 raiders as highwaymen; Johnston referred to them in 1900 as bandit bands.

References

1. Portal's agreement with Mwanga 29 May, 1893, and confirmed by Colvile 27 August, 1894, (Wild, *Story of the Uganda Agreement*, pp. 63, 71). Protectorate declared over Buganda 18 June, 1894 (*London Gazette*, 19 June, 1894), but not extended east of the Nile until 30 June, 1896.
2. Report on the Administration of East Africa, 17 April, 1894, FOCP, 6489. The Nandi were mentioned specifically as being "an especially turbulent tribe". (Hardinge-FO 28 September, 1895, FOCP 6805/60).
3. Colvile-Spire, 15 July, 1894 (Spire Papers).
4. Kimberley's minute, 18 May, 1894, FOCP, 6557/178. Jackson-Hobley, 2 February, 1895, ESA, A/5/1.
5. Hobley-Com, 3 June, 1895, ESA, A/4/1; twenty-five armed Swahili caravan deserters were with the Nandi. Jackson-Hobley, 26 June, 1895, ESA, A/5/1 approving the Kitosh expedition.
6. Africa 6 (1903), Cmd. 1626. cf. Johnston, *The Man Who Did the Right Thing*, p. 337. Cf. the right assumed by Boyes, Gibbons, Gemmill and Dr. Kolb to maintain "law and order" and, if needs be, to personate government officers.
7. Capt. Arthur of the Zanzibar army, 3 August, 1895, FO2/93.
8. Mombasa Archives, 31 August, 1895; *ZG*, 16 August, 1893; FO2/97. Wilson and Ainsworth were Company (later EAP) officials at Vanga and Machakos respectively.
9. Matson, "Andrew Dick", *KWN*, 14 November, 1958. Mbotela, *The Freeing of the Slaves in East Africa*, p. 76, for an African assessment, "a brave and able man, famous round about for good character and kindness."
10. Berkeley's explanatory note, 13 March, 1897, in ESA, A/4/8. FO2/252.
11. Dick-Berkeley (pte), 24 July, 1895, ESA, A/6/1. Hobley noted on 19 June, 1895, that "he felt very worried at the injustice and misinterpretation of Dick."
12. Hobley-Com., 26 June, 1895, sending Dick-Hobley, 24 June, 1895, ESA, A/4/1. Russell's Diary, 15 May, 1895.
13. Hobley-Com., 1 August, 1895; 25 August, 1895 (sending Martin-Hobley, 31 July, 1895), ESA, A/4/2. Berkeley-Hobley, 2 September, 1895, ESA, A/5/1. Hobley first heard of the outrage from Kabras chiefs when they visited Mumias with the agent Hobley had sent to enquire into West's murder: *Kenya: from Chartered Company to Crown Colony*, p. 88.
14. Berkeley-FO, 3 March, 1896, FOCP, 6849/184. Bishop Tucker was "glad to find the report we heard on the road to the effect that the hostility of the Nandi had been provoked by unjust and harsh treatment of the natives by another European trader has no foundation in fact", but he gives no reasons for discrediting the original report. (Mengo, 5 November, 1895; *C.M. Intelligencer*, April 1896, p. 274). In 1900 he wrote: "Then came Dick and his agents, who by cruel and unjust treatment stirred up the (Nandi) people to hostility and revenge". (Tucker-Com., 29 October, 1900, ESA, A/22/1, Hobley-Com., 8 June, 1895,

ESA, A/4/1. Hobley had no reason to defend Dick but he was apparently not convinced of his guilt. (*From Chartered Company,* p. 89.) The Nandi do not swim.

15. In his draft Jackson called the visitors spies but this was omitted from the despatch. Jackson-FO, 3 August, 1895, FOCP, 6805/128.
16. Hobley-Com., 18 and 22 July, 1895, 25 August, 1895, ESA, A/4/2; Ansorge, *Under the African Sun,* p. 55; Hobley, *From Chartered Company,* p. 88.
17. The FO heard of the incident on 21 October, 1895; Hardinge-FO, 28 September, 1895, FOCP, 6805/60.
18. Vandeleur, *Campaigning on the Upper Nile,* pp. 109, 117.
19. Martin-Hobley, 31 July, 1895; Martin-Com., 1 August, 1895, 7 September, 1895, ESA, A/4/2.
20. Correspondence in ESA, A/4/2 and A/5/1. The first Baganda mail party arrived at Mumias on 9 October, 1895.
21. Jackson-Hobley, 27 July, 1895, 30 July, 1895, ESA, A/5/1.
22. The Masai treated blood-brotherhood in the same cavalier fashion as the Nandi; Hollis: *The Masai,* p. 322.
23. Vandeleur, *op. cit.,* p. 111, criticised West for camping in no man's land, where he was "a prey to any of the enterprising young warriors".
24. Ansorge, *op. cit.,* p. 56; Pordage-Com., 13 October, 1895, ESA, A/4/2. The first news of the Laibon's existence came from the Swahili.
25. Hobley, *From Chartered Company,* p. 89.
26. Hobley, idem, p. 89.
27. Hobley-Com., 26 July, 1895; Macallister-Com., 19 August, 1895, ESA, A/4/2.
28. Sitwell's Diary, 7 August, 1895; Berkeley-FO, 9 August, 1895, FOCP, 6805/132.
29. *St. Joseph's Advocate,* Winter 1895; Biermans, *Short History of the Vicariate of the Upper Nile;* Gale, *Uganda and the Mill Hill Fathers,* p. 104.
30. Berkeley-FO, 6 September, 1895, FOCP, 6805/249, sending Hobley-Com., 25 August, 1895, ESA, A/4/2; Tucker, *op. cit.,* p. 19; Miss Furley's Diary; Walker, 7 September, 1895, and Rattray's Diary in CMS Archives.
31. Mohamed Bau (presumably the Mohamed Ban of *Lugard's Diaries,* iii, 436), was an experienced caravan leader. Sitwell's Diary; RSD; Sitwell-Com., 13 October, 1895, ESA, A/4/2; Hobley-Com., 16 October, 1895, Martin-Com. and Sitwell, 29 October, 1895, Sitwell-Com., 9 November, 1895, ESA, A/4/3.
32. Hobley-Com., 13 September, 1895, ESA, A/4/2; he claimed the only dangerous spots were near the Guasa Masa and Sosiani fords.
33. Pordage-Com., 13 October, 1895, ESA, A/4/2, 21 October, 1895, ESA, A/4/3. His estimate was 300 groups of twenty to thirty men, but this is either a slip of the pen or grossly exaggerated.
34. Berkeley-FO, 21 December, 1895, sending Cunningham-Com., 3 November, 1895, ESA, A/4/3, FOCP, 6827/289; Sitwell's Diary; Vandeleur, *op. cit.,* p. 110.
35. Vandeleur, *op. cit.,* p. 114; See p. 141.
36. Vandeleur, *op. cit.,* p. 117, for the Nandi attitude to firearms.
37. Berkeley-FO, 2 November, 1896, Report on Trade and Industry, ESA, A/34/2.

5

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE NANDI CHALLENGE

When Hobley reported West's murder to headquarters, he was apprehensive that the trader's death would make the Nandi aggressive and the road unsafe. He asked for a punitive expedition and apparently considered that settled conditions could be restored by a demonstration in force, without the need for full-scale pacification measures followed by costly occupation and administration of the country. Jackson recognised that the policy of avoidance had failed and concurred in Hobley's request for "drastic punishment", because of the treacherous way in which the Nandi had acted. After the Nandi and Kikelelwa raids on the steamer caravan, the Acting Commissioner informed the Foreign Office on 3 August 1895 that he intended to punish both tribes, so that caravans would be safe from further molestation. Berkeley, the new Commissioner, after discussing the matter with Hobley at Mumias, informed the Foreign Office that he supported Jackson's proposed action.[1]

Jackson was presumably satisfied that Kiberiti had been correctly identified as being responsible for West's murder. He authorised Hobley to take action against the alleged offender as soon as possible, if this could be done effectively by the force which William Grant was marching from Luba's to Mumias for the Kitosh expedition. Jackson was evidently doubtful of the practicability of this suggestion, however, since he added that if punitive measures were likely to embroil the entire tribe, Hobley was to await reinforcements so that the operations "may be conducted on such lines as will prevent any possibility of the Wanandi from ever being a serious menace to our transport service to and from the Ravine". Hobley was also advised to seek Martin's views about the likelihood of general embroilment if Kiberiti were punished, and to obtain information from some of Martin's private employees who were reputed to know Nandi well.[2] Three days later Hobley was told to defer the Nandi operations, presumably because Berkeley was approaching Mumias, where he would be able to deal with the situation on the spot. Jackson's change of mind was probably influenced as well by his fears that localised punitive measures would lead to a generalised conflict and endanger other caravans that were known to be on the road to Uganda. Furthermore, his encounter with the Nandi on Elgon in 1890 gave Jackson grounds for thinking that a tribe which could despatch a thousand warriors against the Sebei might prove a tougher proposition than the Kitosh or Kikelelwa.[3]

When Berkeley reached Mumias on 8 August 1895, Grant had already arrived, with 150 Sudanese regulars, a Hotchkiss and Maxim gun and 900 Baganda and Basoga auxiliaries, to help Hobley to restore order in his district. Although the Commissioner apparently shared Jackson's doubts as to the expediency of sending Grant's force against the Nandi, he sanctioned immediate action against the Kitosh and Kabras. After these tribes had been pacified, Berkeley decided that steps would be taken "as circumstances may render it advisable, at once or later to deal with the Nandi". This vague phrasing indicated that Berkeley, who (as a member of Portal's Uganda Commission and the Departmental Committee of 1894) was aware of the reputed strength and prowess of the Nandi, did not want precipitate action taken against them. He evidently intended to leave the question in abeyance until he had discussed it with Jackson, and had received confirmation from his military advisers that troops could be spared from Buganda to strengthen Grant's forces. After consultations with Jackson and Cunningham,* Berkeley concluded that a force made up of large bodies of auxiliaries stiffened by a core of Sudanese regulars, such as had been employed in Kitosh and elsewhere in the Protectorate, would prove ineffective against the Nandi. The Commissioner decided to despatch a large body of regular troops under experienced officers, in order to ensure the success of the expedition and to avoid similar questions to those raised in Parliament after the recently concluded operations against Kabarega.[4]

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* Major G. G. Cunningham was Assistant Commissioner and Commandant; he returned to Entebbe, a few days after Berkeley's arrival, from the Bunyoro war in which he was wounded and Capt. Dunning killed. Hansard 4th Series XXXIII, 13 May, 1895.

Hobley was unaware of the Commissioner's decision and after the massacre of the mail party had closed the road to small caravans from Ravine to Kabras, he pleaded again for a punitive expedition. He informed Berkeley that Grant and Sitwell had returned from the successful Kitosh operations, and were waiting at Mumias with 140 Sudanese for the Commissioner's reply. Although Grant had considered only a month before that he could punish West's murderers with the force he had taken to Kitosh, he now estimated that 400 Sudanese would be needed for the task. These reinforcements would have to come from stations west of the Nile, and Hobley was doubtful whether Kakungulu and the Baganda auxiliaries would volunteer for further operations.[5] It was probably fortunate for Grant that he refrained from entering Nandi shortly after West's murder. He was not a professional soldier, his force numbered less than 150 regulars and the Baganda allies had proved to be lacking in discipline. A frontal attack like the rush at Kimondi would probably have discomfited his troops and the auxiliaries would undoubtedly have suffered heavy casualties.*

The delay in punishing the Nandi was regretted by Hobley and his colleagues, but it was preferable to hasty action leading to more acute embarrassment. Meanwhile the local officials had to be content with taking such measures as they could to contain the Nandi until the expedition was assembled. The Nandi warriors must have regarded this inexplicable procrastination as a sign of weakness, or even fear, on the government's part, as they were ignorant of the difficulties causing the delay. Reinforcements were slow in reaching Mumias, with the result that the measures taken locally failed to secure the road or to contain the Nandi. Even after the construction of the Guasa Masa fort had provided a base astride the Uganda Road in North Nandi, the Protectorate's tenuous hold over the territory east of Mumias could not safeguard caravans from molestation.

When West was murdered there were only three administrative officers east of the Nile: Grant at Luba's, Hobley at Mumias and Martin at Ravine; and the only specialist officer in the region was Dr. Ansorge, one of the three Protectorate medical officers, who was stationed at Mumias. None of the administrators was a professional soldier and the nearest military officers were stationed in Kampala. When Berkeley arrived at Mumias in August 1895, the Kavirondo district staff had been increased by Macallister's transfer to Port Victoria, where he was chiefly concerned with preparations for the assembly of the *William Mackinnon* and the construction of port facilities. It had originally been intended that his engineering knowledge should be utilised in this manner while he assumed control of the Kavirondo district, so that Hobley could be released for duty elsewhere. This convenient arrangement was cancelled, however, because Hobley was confronted with a multitude of political problems which could not be dealt with effectively from Port Victoria.[6] Berkeley realised that Hobley would need reinforcements to solve these problems, so he confirmed Jackson's decision to second Grant for operations against the Kitosh, Kikelelwa and Kabras, and instructed Sitwell, who had been destined for a senior post in Western Uganda, to stay at Mumias until the situation had improved. Abdul Malek, who had also come up with Berkeley, was detained at Mumias, so that Hobley would have greater freedom of movement after the Nandi expedition. Thus, of the three officials who left Mombasa in June 1895, only the Commissioner proceeded beyond Mumias to Buganda. Moreover, two officials, Bagge and Foaker, had to leave their posts in Buganda so that Grant could be relieved at Luba's in order to go to Hobley's aid. The result was that of the eighteen administrative and specialist officers serving in the Protectorate in August 1895, eight were located east of the Nile, including six in "Kavirondo". This represented almost a three-fold increase compared with the position when Hobley reached Mumias in the previous February. The large proportion of officials engaged in keeping open the lines of communication diminished the prospects of extending government jurisdiction west of the Nile, and retarded the progress of the more settled areas.

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* See p. 142.

When Colvile was invalided at the end of 1894, the Protectorate military establishment numbered about 1,200 Sudanese troops, 250 of whom were on the reserve. No regular troops were stationed in Kavirondo, where the Mumias and Ravine garrisons consisted of a handful of caravan askari and porters. Early in 1895 Jackson sent small detachments of reservists to both stations, where there were also a number of "Swahili" labourers and messengers who could be used in an emergency for military duties. Hobley complained in September that the Mumias garrison had been reduced to thirty Sudanese reservists, six of whom were too old or too ill to leave the station, so that it was difficult for him to find ten men to escort mail and other small parties on the Uganda Road. This sorry state of affairs at the most important transport station between Fort Smith and Kampala had been brought about by events elsewhere in Hobley's district. The Mumias garrison had been depleted in order to protect Ravine against threatened Nandi attacks, and by the transfer of thirty men to Macallister at Port Victoria.[7] The resources placed at Hobley's command were intended to garrison the three government posts and to protect caravans, but not to undertake extensions of jurisdiction or punitive operations. The only striking force east of the Nile was stationed at Luba's and commanded by Grant,* so that punitive measures in Kavirondo had to be entrusted to the OC Busoga, with Hobley acting as political officer. This dependence on Grant and his 100 Sudanese meant that for long periods when they were occupied elsewhere, Hobley was condemned to inactivity and unable to do very much to secure the Uganda Road against attack.[8]

The regular supply of arms and ammunition to Martin, Hobley and Grant also presented some difficulties. The bulk supply was forwarded through Mumias or German East Africa to Kampala for distribution as occasion demanded. A large proportion was sent to Bunyoro, the principal conflict area, and supplies for the districts east of the Nile were kept to a minimum. For operations in Busoga and Kavirondo, loads of ammunition and specialist arms, like Maxim and Hotchkiss guns, had to be carried by porters, canoes or sailing boat from the reserve stores in Buganda. On occasions, such as the Bunyoro operations in March 1895, Hobley and Grant had to return arms and ammunition to Kampala.

The Ravine and Mumias garrisons had also to be supplied with rations, or with trade goods where these could be used for local purchases of food. There were no villages in the immediate vicinity of Ravine and the Kamasia were reluctant to sell the small amount of surplus grain they produced. Small quantities were obtainable at times from the distant Njemps and Elgeyo, but Martin was dependent for his food supply on Kavirondo for most of the year. Caravans taking loads to Mumias returned to Ravine with food purchased by Hobley from the Kavirondo chiefs. When this arrangement did not suffice to keep Ravine supplied, Martin had to send small food parties to Mumias to make good the deficiency. But after the Nandi began attacking caravans, food parties could only make the journey when soldiers could be spared to escort them. Fortunately, when Martin's position was becoming more and more precarious in September 1895, owing to the virtual closure of the Mumias Road, Ainsworth sent Kikuyu porters with food loads to Ravine from Fort Smith.*

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* Grant arrived in Uganda with Lugard in December 1890; during his Company and government service he gained experience and showed considerable competence in operations against tribal adversaries. The Kitosh expedition was deferred for nearly three months as Grant and the Sudanese could not be spared for the task. Jackson-Hobley, 26 June, 1895, ESA A/5/1.

Smith, Mackenzie and Co., the contractors for the transport of goods from Ravine to the Lake, were unable to do much towards ameliorating the food situation, as their resources were stretched to breaking point in carrying other government loads, stocking their trading posts at Mumias and Port Victoria and in transporting the *William Mackinnon*. When the Nandi closed the road, the contractors were so hard put to it to meet their obligations that Archibald Brown, their agent, asked Hobley in October 1895 for firearms, so that he could provide his own escorts for the caravans he was organising to remove the load blockage at Ravine. The amount of food required to feed the garrisons, station staff, caravans, and the sick porters left at roadside stations is reflected in Hobley's estimates for the year 1896-97, which totalled 223 tons for Mumias, Port Victoria, Ravine and Guasa Masa. At the first two stations a great deal of the food was purchased locally with trade goods, but 79,600 lb. had to be transported to Ravine from Mumias and Fort Smith and 65,700 lb. from Kabras and Mumias to Guasa Masa.

Before a punitive expedition could operate in Kavirondo, it was necessary to lay in large additional supplies of food for the soldiers, auxiliaries and followers. Although some grain was usually confiscated by an expeditionary force, regular supplies and reserves had to be maintained to victual the troops throughout the operations, and to feed them on the return journey to their stations. On occasions this consideration influenced policy and timing and prejudiced the security of the road stations.* Sitwell proposed deferring action against the Kikelelwa in August 1895, because he feared that the consumption and destruction of food during the operations would upset the feeding arrangements for the Nandi expedition. The following month Hobley decided it would be unwise to undertake operations in Kabras for similar reasons. The treaty imposed on the Kabras chiefs bound the signatories to supply food to the government, and helped to solve some of Hobley's problems in setting up and servicing the food post in East Kabras and the Guasa Masa station.

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* For the fate of one of these caravans and its effect on the recruitment of Kikuyu porters, see Chapter 7.

Although food was plentiful in the country around Mumias, where Spire had organised a market in November 1894, Hobley was sometimes unable to purchase supplies because of a shortage of trade goods. He was reduced to one week's supply of beads in April 1895, and Jackson had to send fifty head of cattle to Mumias as a substitute for trade goods, so that food could be bought for government caravans. Although the local people brought in grain to the Kabras food post in September, purchases were limited to the amount that could be exchanged for meat from slaughtered animals. The position improved a month later when Major Smith delivered fifteen loads of trade goods to Mumias, in time for the purchase of food for the Guasa Masa post and the Nandi expedition. During this anxious period Hobley held large stocks of Maji Bahari beads, which were brought up by almost every caravan, but were unacceptable to all the tribes with food to sell in Kavirondo and Busoga.† A considerable number and variety of trade goods were needed to pay and feed the government staff in Kavirondo: Hobley put his monthly requirements for April 1895 at fifteen loads (1,000 lb.) of beads and other items; and in his annual estimates for his four district stations for 1896-97 he asked for 303 loads (20,000 lb.). A great deal of time was taken up in buying, bagging, transporting and issuing food, as well as in accounting for transactions carried out with a confusing variety of differently priced trade goods. These burdensome duties seriously restricted the amount of time which station officials could devote to the administration of their districts.[9] Once an expedition had entered hostile country trade goods were of no use, so that large numbers of porters had to be engaged to carry food from the base and to replenish their sacks with grain taken during the expedition from growing crops and granaries.

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* E.g. Martin's inability to feed reinforcements for Ravine, p. 97.

† Cowries were unacceptable at Mumias; the Kamasia and Elgeyo would only accept iron wire, white beads or unbored cowries. Spire had to stop buying food from Kitoto's when his cowries ran out. Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

Most of the problems connected with the supply of food and trade goods arose because of the lack of a rapid, efficient transport service. This weakness also affected decisions regarding the approval and timing of punitive operations, which were taken less on policy considerations than on what could be done within the context of the inadequacies of the transport system. The maintenance of the life-line from the coast through Kavirondo to Kampala was the main preoccupation of district officers in Uganda and the EAP. It was also a source of constant anxiety to Foreign Office officials, who recognised that "the matter is serious if anything was to happen in Uganda needing immediate assistance".[10] It was, therefore, the threat to the lines of communication, rather than the desire to extend the government's effective jurisdiction, that led to the punitive measures against the Kitosh and Kikelelwa, the Kabras settlement and the Nandi expedition.

The contract for the carriage of goods to Uganda was worked by Smith, Mackenzie and Co. on the stretches between Mombasa and Nzoi, Ravine and Lake Victoria, with the intermediate section being operated by the EAP. The caravans that were organised at irregular intervals under this arrangement did little to help the road stations, as most of the loads were consigned direct to Entebbe, so that many items had later to be sent back from the capital to Kavirondo by road or canoe. Some government caravans operated under Major Smith, the Transport Superintendent, but these were also made up almost entirely of loads for Buganda. Smith made three round trips to Kavirondo in 1895 with large caravans, which had to be supplied with huge quantities of food at Mumias for the return journey. Smaller government caravans operating in the Kavirondo district were the responsibility of the local officials, who employed station staff as carriers and escorts. No Arab or Indian caravans travelled on the Uasin Gishu route in 1895, and Dick was the only independent contractor carrying out government assignments, though Martin and Major Smith also engaged in transport operations and their privately owned facilities were sometimes employed on government business. Almost all the loads were carried by porters, but coastal professionals were becoming increasingly difficult to obtain. This shortage of experienced porters had arisen owing to the numbers who had died, settled or been detained upcountry, their employment in large numbers in the Mbaruk rebellion at the coast, and their recruitment by Sclater for the Uganda cart road project.* Spire, Hobley and Martin had failed to persuade the people in the neighbourhood of their stations to sign on as porters, so reliance had to be placed on employed staff for local transport purposes. No carts operated in Kavirondo and only a few donkeys, most of which were owned by Major Smith and Martin and based at Ravine. Smith, Mackenzie and Co. had intended sending a large number of donkeys to Brown for the Uasin Gishu section, but this plan was shelved until escorts could be provided for them on the unsettled stretches of the road. District officers spent a lot of their time on transport business, supervising government caravans, inspecting private parties and preparing food. They also cared for sick porters as the medical facilities for the road districts were meagre. Dr. Ansorge was nominally in charge of the whole region from Mumias, but he had scarcely any subordinate staff under his command, and medical supplies often ran down to dangerous proportions owing to delays in deliveries of stores from Mombasa or Entebbe.

Soldiers required for punitive measures in Kavirondo had to march long distances to the scene of operations. This also applied to auxiliaries, who came from Buganda and Busoga for the Kitosh and Kikelelwa campaigns, as well as to the porters and followers who accompanied every expedition. When reinforcements were sent from Buganda, they had to travel the 140 miles from Kampala to Mumias on foot. Some could be transported across the Lake but the supply of Busoga and Busesse canoes could not cope with the numbers involved. The only two sailing craft on the Lake were the *James Hannington*, which was under charter from the CMS to the administration, and the government's twenty-five feet steel boat.[11] Both of these small ships were fully occupied in bringing up stores from German ports south of the Lake, or occasionally from Berkeley Bay, and their holding capacity made them unsatisfactory vessels for ferrying large bodies of soldiery. On the overland route a bottleneck often occurred at the Nzoia, which was a difficult and time-consuming obstacle to pass when the river was in flood. When Grant was crossing his troops there after the Kitosh expedition, three of the five ferry canoes were swept away, and he asked for six replacements to be sent from Busoga before the arrival of the Nandi expeditionary force. A wire rope was sent to Hobley in October so that the crossing facilities could be improved, but owing to difficulties in procuring suitable timber the work was probably not completed before the punitive forces reached the Nzoia a month later.

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* See Chapter 9. Sclater was expected at Ravine in November 1895 with 800 men whose food would have to be carried from Mumias and Fort Smith.

Difficulties in transporting men and equipment and in securing adequate food supplies were some of the chief reasons why action against the Nandi was delayed for four months after West's murder. Another cause of delay was the multiplicity of other commitments facing the young Protectorate. The principal aims of government policy at the time were to consolidate the position in Buganda, to defeat or contain Kabarega, to safeguard the Upper Nile and to maintain communications with the coast. Buganda was quiet enough, but the government had failed to capture Kabarega and to break his power in the west. Grant was ordered to leave Busoga with his Sudanese in March 1895 to join the forces engaged against the Banyoro. These operations lasted into June, but two months later Kabarega made another bid to re-enter his kingdom. He failed but remained at large. Cunningham nevertheless considered that Kabarega's failure had demonstrated to his people that their leader's power was broken, so that it was only necessary to retain sufficient troops in the country to deal with minor skirmishes. This campaign had been conducted on a considerable scale over a wide expanse of territory. Large bodies of troops had been tied down and huge armies of Baganda auxilliaries deployed against the considerable numbers of gun and spearmen which Kabarega could put into the field. The Nandi had no guns and were nothing like as numerous as the Banyoro, but it was fortunate for the Protectorate that the only two tribes who offered a determined resistance to the government did not engage in hostilities at the same time. Had they done so, it is doubtful whether the straitened forces at Cunningham's command could have maintained their position on two widely separated fronts.

If the Uganda Government had been faced with operations on its right and left flanks, little assistance would have been forthcoming from the sister protectorate. When the EAP was declared on 15 June 1895, the Company forces totalled 866 men, only 255 of whom were Sudanese. These troops were dispersed throughout the Protectorate but the majority were fighting the Mazrui rebels in the coastal strip. Indeed, far from being in a position to aid Uganda (as in the mutiny operations of 1897-98), or even to offer assistance (as during the 1900 Nandi expedition), Hardinge had to seek the help of the Zanzibar forces, a 300 strong Indian contingent, an entire regiment of sepoys and the Royal Navy in order to quell the coastal rebels.[12] In addition to this major commitment Hardinge had garrisons and escorts to maintain, and his officers had to tackle some minor outbreaks in the Ulu and Kikuyu districts. No arrangements had been worked out for military co-operation between the two protectorates: each had its own separate army and tackled its military problems independently of the other.

Although Grant was called upon to undertake punitive measures in Kavirondo, he also had responsibilities as OC Busoga. Despite the prior claims of his own command, his troops had assisted Spire in a dispute with ivory traders at Kitoto's in August 1894, and in the following January he avenged the massacre of some Zanzibaris, who had been sent from Mumias to recover stolen guns from the Kitosh. In his own district, where he had outposts to watch for infiltrators from Kabarega's forces, and to discourage slaving caravans between North Busoga and Bunyoro, Grant was continually plagued by Baganda interference in Busoga affairs, including raids on protected settlements. He had also to deal with intertribal raids near the vaguely defined administrative border between his district and Kavirondo. After his return from the Bunyoro campaign in June 1895, the Basoga raided the Bamia, and in a counter-raid following another Basoga attack the Wakedi killed 300 of the aggressors. As a leading Busoga chief, Kayranya, was also causing trouble at the same time, Grant was justified in representing to Jackson that affairs in his own district were at least as important as immediate compliance with Hobley's request for the punishment of the Kikelelwa for their alleged offences against Dick and West.[13]

Punishment of the Kitosh, Kikelelwa, Kabras and the Nandi had to wait while Grant set his own house in order, and until his troops were rested after the gruelling Bunyoro campaign, and the Hotchkiss which was required to breach the walls of the Kitosh fortresses could be carried to Mumias from Kampala. Jackson sent

Grant 50 Sudanese, a large force of Baganda volunteers under Kakungulu and the Hotchkiss at the end of July 1895. With these reinforcements Grant, accompanied by Hobley, Sitwell, Ansorge and some Wanga and Masai allies, stormed and sacked two of the Kitosh strongholds. The tribe was severely punished for attacks on its neighbours (including the protected Lago*), thefts of rifles and for harbouring deserters from Mumias station and government caravans.[14] Six days after the Kitosh expedition returned to Mumias on 26 August 1895, Grant and Sitwell marched the victorious troops, with 400 Baganda and Basoga rifle-armed levies, against the Kabras, who had been disturbed by the anti-government activities of the Kitosh and Nandi, and had threatened to oppose the passage of caravans through their district. On the road to Kabras 300 of the Baganda tried to pillage some villages in the Kikelelwa Forest, but suffered a severe rebuff. About 60 Baganda were killed as a result of this act of indiscipline, so Grant changed his plans and attacked the forest-dwellers instead of the Kabras. Although the Kikelelwa had been implicated in several hostile acts, including the theft of rifles from Dick and West and the murder of some of Hobley's men, and had forced small caravans to make a wide detour in order to avoid the Kikelelwa Forest, Grant had previously decided to postpone action against them because of the need to conserve food supplies for the Nandi expedition.[15] The Kikelelwa were punished but Hobley was able to come to terms with the Kabras, largely because of the moral effect caused by the sacking of the reputedly impregnable Kitosh fortresses. The Kabras treaty was typical of the settlements which Hobley made with most of the Kavirondo tribes. Its terms indicated the sort of relationship which might have been formed between the Nandi and the government, if the Nandi had been similarly overawed by the military might of the Protectorate, and if Hobley had been able to get in touch with Nandi leaders of sufficient authority to pledge the good faith of their people, and to ensure that such pledges would be honoured. The Kabras agreed "in every way to place themselves under the control of Her Majesty's Government", in return for protection against spoliation by caravan leaders and the Nandi. They also promised to sell grain to travellers and to allow a food post to be set up in their country. The Kikelelwa chiefs soon made their submission and consented to leave their forest for land provided for them near Sakwa's. Shortly afterwards, the principal Kitosh leaders came in to make peace, so that by the end of October 1895 Grant and Hobley had brought the troubled area to the north and north east of Mumias near the Uganda Road firmly under government control.[16]

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* The Lago chief, Kimangichi, sent emissaries to Hobley on 1 June, 1895, to complain of Kitosh raids; they carried the Company flag which Jackson had given the chief on 2 February, 1890, see p. 64.

Some of the other Kavirondo tribes proved an embarrassment to the administration, especially the Ugenya, Maragoli, and the Wanyala around Port Victoria. Brown of Smith, Mackenzie and Co. was attacked on 13 July 1895 by the Wanyala, when he was investigating a site for a branch store, and forced to retire to Samia Boma with his small party. Grant sent Brown 23 Sudanese and Hobley detached 25 men from his small garrison at Mumias to extricate the trader. This was an unfortunate incident, since it demonstrated, in conjunction with Dick's complaints, that Hobley had insufficient men to provide effective security for the traders whom he was anxious to encourage to open up the district. Grant visited the scene of the attack on his way to the Kitosh expedition but decided that punitive measures were unnecessary, as the Wanyala apeared to be friendly, and inexpedient, as Brown and Macallister were both dependent on the local people for their food supplies. No further action was taken after a Wanyala emissary promised Hobley to pay a cattle fine and provide a hostage as an earnest of future good behaviour. This settlement enabled Macallister to begin his task of assembling the *William Mackinnon*, and Brown to proceed with the erection of a trading store. Problems elsewhere in Hobley's district had to be left until the road had been secured and the Nandi brought under control. Nothing could be done to accede to the request for a station to protect the Njemps from their hostile neighbours, and no officers or troops could be spared to form the Elgon post, which Colvile had recommended in December 1894, or to protect Kitoto and other Luo chiefs from Nandi and Lumbwa raids.

Reason for the delay [illegible]

Another consideration which caused the government to hesitate about taking rapid action against the Nandi was that its local representatives had no reliable information about either the topography of the country or its people. The interior of the country was unknown to government officials, and very few trading caravans or Kavirondo tribesmen had penetrated beyond the no-man's land which separated the Nandi from their neighbours.* This was a vastly different state of affairs from that obtaining elsewhere in the Protectorate. The administration normally found little difficulty in getting people to volunteer information, and to provide guides with first hand knowledge of the terrain to accompany an expedition. Tribesmen in many districts performed these offices even against their own kindred, but this practice could not be followed among the Nandi. The only intelligence useful to the commander of a punitive expedition was the knowledge that the warriors were likely to prove formidable adversaries, but even this assumption was qualified by the opinion held in London and East Africa that the Nandi were potentially much less of a threat to the Uganda Road and British supremacy than the Masai. When Cunningham was planning the expedition he found that the "only information that was available about the country is summed up in the following extract from the *Handbook of British East Africa* issued in 1893 by the Intelligence Division of the War Office. 'Nandi is a high forest region north of Burgani, and has not been explored owing to the hostile character of the Nandi, who have been able to resist all attacks of the Masai and to frighten off Swahili caravans'."[17] Cunningham received little additional information at Mumias from Hobley, Mumia, caravan porters, Uasin Gishu Masai and other tribesmen. No assistance could be gained from contemporary maps, which showed "Nandi" as a blank area contained within the south and west escarpments and with no natural features or routes other than a tentatively sketched representation of the Nzoia river system. This lack of knowledge proved a grave drawback to Cunningham and was responsible, in part, for his failure to strike a decisive and lasting blow against the Nandi.

We have seen that the measures instituted to secure the lines of communication and to restore law and order in the troubled Eastern Province, had to be devised and timed in relation to a number of factors over which the administration exercised little control. The first objective in the phased operations to assert the government's authority was to secure the Kavirondo sections of the Uganda Road from Kabras to Mumias. This was achieved, through the Kitosh and Kikelelwa operations and the Kabras agreement, by local officials without depleting the Buganda and Bunyoro garrisons. The successful prosecution of this phase of the operations ensured the safety of the Mumias base, unimpeded movement along the Uganda Road west of Kabras and the provision of food for the Nandi expedition. The second objective was to contain the Nandi threat to the Protectorate's communications while the hostile western tribes were being pacified, and until sufficient forces and supplies had been built up to ensure the defeat of the Nandi. Owing partly to the inadequacy of the local forces deployed to counter the Nandi threat, and partly to the negligence of some of the caravan leaders, these measures were only partially successful. The third objective was to establish a food depot in East Kabras, and a station at Guasa Masa to act as a control point for the Uganda Road and a base for the Nandi expedition.

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* See Chapters 2 and 3.

Hobley's conciliatory negotiations with the Kabras prepared the ground for a food depot in their country. Although the chief function of this post was to collect food for the Guasa Masa station and the Nandi expedition, it was hoped that the Sudanese garrison would protect caravans and the neighbouring tribes in an area where several of the Nandi raids had occurred. Unfortunately for Hobley, the purchase of food was hampered by a shortage of trade goods; and the presence of the Sudanese did not prevent the Nandi from raiding Pordage's caravan and villages in East Kabras. The post was established by Grant on 17 September 1895 in a deserted village three quarters of an hour's march from Martini's. The ditch was cleared, the site cleaned and a store house built with wood brought in by Kabras from the neighbourhood of the post and Martini's. Four days later Grant and Sitwell left to reconnoitre a site for the Guasa Masa station,* and a Sudanese sergeant was left in charge of the food post with a garrison of ten men.[18]

The Kabras food depot was formed to meet a temporary need; the Guasa Masa station was established to complete a chain of control posts along the Uganda Road. The need for such a station had been recognised by several travellers, and the project was first mooted officially by Colvile in November 1893 as part of his transport scheme.† He recommended a post on the Guasa Masa, as a subsidiary of Ravine, to control the stretch of road which Colvile considered should be worked by carts and Kavirondo porters.[19] But his preoccupation with affairs in Western Uganda prevented the Commissioner from putting his recommendation into effect. Jackson decided in May 1895 to take advantage of the impending arrival of J. M. de Winton* to establish the post, as an amenity for caravans and a base for the improvement of the road to Ravine. This decision was probably influenced by the arrival of the *William Mackinnon* at Mombasa, the urgent need to expedite the delivery of ammunition loads and the presence of private traders in Kavirondo. But neither Jackson nor Hobley, who was instructed to site a small stockaded outpost on the western borders of the Uasin Gishu Plateau, commented on its potentialities as a deterrent to Nandi attacks on traders and caravans. De Winton did not arrive, however, and Hobley could not carry out Jackson's instructions as there was no spare officer available for the project.[20] If the post had been established in June 1895, it would have lessened Hobley and Martin's difficulties after West's murder, and might have postponed, or even prevented, the conflict with the Nandi, since Dick would hardly have drowned the two Nandi under the walls of a government fort.

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* See pp. 106-107.
† See Chapter 3.

While Berkeley was at Ravine in July 1895 on his way to Uganda he investigated allegations of the maltreatment of caravan porters. As a result of his enquiries, he recommended that Ravine should be the main station for the territory east of the Kabras Hills, and that two sub-stations should be formed, one between Ravine and Kikuyu, the other between Ravine and Mumias. He considered the proposal to be so intimately connected with the transport system that he recommended that Sclater's road party should be used to construct the two posts, and that the cost of construction should be charged to the road account. His despatch was sent off on the day before he heard of West's murder, so the proposal for the western sub-station was not conceived as a means of countering the Nandi threat to the road. Moreover, when he outlined his plan to restore settled conditions in the Eastern Province in August, Berkeley did not refer to the new station's role in bringing this about.[21] He probably thought at the time that West's murder was an isolated outrage, which was unlikely to have serious repercussions on the security of the Uganda Road. It was not until news of the ensuing caravan attacks reached the Commissioner at Entebbe in September that he ordered the immediate formation of a military post between Ravine and Mumias, in order to protect caravans in the Guasa Masa area. Although military requirements were to be given decisive weight in siting the fort, Sitwell was directed to choose a site which would be suitable later for an administrative station, and for the staging post which Berkeley had recommended in his transport scheme.[22] The third condition was easier to fulfil than the second, as a post on the fringe of Nandi could scarcely function effectively as an administrative headquarters. Guasa Masa and its successor, Kipture, were both sited on the perimeter of Nandi, and it was not until the move to Kaptumo in 1901 that a station was located in a thickly populated area. This was contrary to the general practice of placing stations in central positions, so that district officers could keep in touch with the people.

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* De Winton, a cousin of Sir Francis of the IBEA Co., was appointed on 28 February, 1895; he reached Ndi, where he had to resign on 25 June, 1895, (FO2/91); the vacancy in the district administration was filled by Pordage, who was engaged for dhow building and public works at Entebbe.

Sitwell was instructed to discuss the siting of the station with Hobley, who had considered the matter with Jackson and Martin some months earlier. Hobley was also to provision the garrison, which Sitwell was to form from the Sudanese troops and Baganda auxiliaries who had been employed in the Kitosh expedition. Command of the enterprise was to be shared between Grant and Sitwell, as Berkeley considered the task too exacting to be undertaken by a single officer. The functions of the post were outlined by the Commissioner in his typically discursive manner:

> It is to be understood that the expression 'the protection of the road' includes military measures that may recommend themselves to you (and be within your means), the attacking and dispersing of any collection of hostile forces in the neighbourhood of the road, the capturing of any armed or otherwise suspicious looking Nandi, and generally speaking the adoption of any aggressive measures that may contribute to secure the safety of the road, but I am indisposed to advise any operations against the Nandi tribe pending the completion of all necessary measures and preparations here for the organisation of a punitive expedition for this special purpose.[23]

Berkeley's proposals met the recommendations made by Martin, who had pressed for a strong guard at the Guasa Masa to escort mail caravans from the Mau escarpment to Kabras, and Hobley, who had drawn attention to the need to provide protection in the dangerous areas near the Guasa Masa and Sosiani fords. Sitwell decided not to employ Baganda auxiliaries, partly owing to their reluctance to venture so far from their homes and partly because of the difficulty of feeding them at the new station. The food supply also worried Hobley, who was short of trade goods and could only offer meat to the Wanga and Kabras in exchange for grain. Since Mumias could not supply the porters needed to carry provisions to Guasa Masa and for station duties, Hobley asked headquarters to send forty men to perform these tasks.

Grant and Sitwell left the Kabras food depot on 21 September 1895 with a force of 145 Sudanese and a Maxim to march to Guasa Masa. After crossing the gap in the Kabras Hills, the troops made a strong boma and camped in the valley on the other side. The following day the march was continued to the Guasa Masa (Kipkarren) and after the river had been bridged, a site for the new station was selected on a ridge on the east bank of the river to the south-west of its confluence with the Sosiani. No Nandi had been seen on the journey or near the river, but a large thorn enclosure was erected as a precautionary measure to command the river crossing. A stockade measuring fifty yards by forty yards was pegged out inside the enclosure, which had a good view on all sides and was close to water and wood supplies, and a start was made on the station buildings. Hobley arrived on the 24th with 170 head of cattle to be used as food or barter goods, and the "tools to make a station in Africa: 2 hatchets, 20 native hoes, 1 pick, 2 slashers, 1 saw"—and even these had been "borrowed" from the Company loads which Gilkison had left at Mumias in October 1894. Hobley approved the site as suitable for a fort and administrative station and, on 25 September 1895, the Union Jack was hoisted for the first time in a government post on Nandi soil.[24]

While awaiting his joining orders for the Nandi expedition, Sitwell completed the wooden stockade, a store house and guard room, cleared tracks from the fort to the river and the Uganda Road, built a bridge over the river, and slashed and stumped the area surrounding the station. Forty men were engaged on escort duties between Ravine and Guasa Masa and parties were sent frequently to the Kabras post for food supplies. Forty Lendu porters from Kampala and a number of donkeys brought 100 loads of food on 30 October 1895 and remained at the fort. Hobley and Sitwell reconnoitred the country to the north-east and patrolled as far as the Sosiani: Hobley explored the hills to the south-east of the fort and Sitwell gazed over the countryside from the Three Hills of Nandi. During these journeys only two Nandi were seen at some distance to the south of the station; in the same area two deserted villages were visited, and near the Sosiani two old encampments were discovered with fires in them which were thought to have been about a week old. The only other evidence Sitwell obtained of the existence of the Nandi came from the large number of grass fires to the south and west of the fort,* and the news that the warriors had raided Kabras.[25] The garrison was alerted on 6 October 1895 when a party of 800 warriors were seen advancing on the fort. The Sudanese manned the defences, as the invaders were thought to be Nandi, but they turned out to be Masai opportunists from the Kikuyu district on their way to Kitosh to join an expedition, which they had heard the government was sending against that tribe. Sitwell stopped them from proceeding on their errand, and persuaded them to join his contingent for the Nandi expedition. They went back home to make arrangements for this, but they had not returned to Guasa Masa when Sitwell left with his column of the Nandi Field Force on 10 November 1895.

Although Sitwell only commanded the country immediately surrounding the station, his arrival at Guasa Masa coincided with a pause in raiding activities in the area. His presence might, therefore, have caused the Nandi to stay their hand, while they watched developments and assessed the chances of an assault on the fort. But even after Guasa Masa had been put into a state of defence, the garrison did not prevent the Mohamed Bau massacre, the attacks on Pordage in Kabras and on the Uasin Gishu Plateau, and the raid on the Kabras village. During the course of the Nandi expedition it was thought that the construction of the station had caused the Nandi around Kabiyet to move away to the south-west. But probably Guasa Masa's most important contribution to the peace of the region was the fortuitous one of preventing the Masai warriors from raiding the disorganised and dispirited Kitosh.

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* The large fires would have been lit not in preparation for cultivation, but to allow the grass to benefit from the rain which fell almost every day.

References

1. Hobley-Com. 18-22 July, 1895, ESA, A/4/2; Jackson-FO, 3 August, 1895, Berkeley-FO, 9 August, 1895, FOCP, 6805/128/132. A policy of avoidance suffered a similar fate when it was applied by the EAP to the Somalis.
2. Jackson-Hobley, 27 July, 1895, ESA, A/5/1. Martin's men, who had traded in and near Nandi, were to be sent to Mumias for questioning; e.g. Kichagga, who brought three tusks to Mumias from Nandi on 25 May, 1895.
3. Jackson-Hobley, 30 July, 1895, ESA, A/5/1. See p. 63.
4. Berkeley-FO, 9 August, 1895, 6 September, 1895, FOCP, 6805/132/249.
5. Hobley-Com., 25 August, 1895, ESA, A/4/2.
6. Berkeley-FO, 3 August, 1895, FO2/93.
7. Hobley-Com., 16 September, 1895, ESA, A/4/2.
8. Grant took 1,200 Sudanese "settlers" from Emin Pasha's followers to Luba's in October 1893, (Macdonald, *op. cit.*, p. 298), and some were left there by Thruston early in 1895 (Jackson-Grant, 2 February, 1895, ESA, A/5/1).
9. For an amusing account, see Portman *Station Studies*, pp. 250, 256.
10. Hill's minute to Hardinge-FO, 8 June, 1895, FO, 107/36; Mungeam, *British Rule in Kenya, 1895-1912*, p. 20, for the EAP.
11. Thomas, *UJ*, 25 (1961), p. 43; Ansorge, *op. cit.*, p. 33 (photograph).
12. The campaign cost £50,018. The 24 Baluchistan Regt. mustered 749 men and remained in the EAP until June 1896. Mungeam, *op. cit.*, Chapter 2; Cashmore, Sheikh Mbaruk bin Raschid (unpublished MS); Studies in District Administration in the EAP, 1895-1913, Chapter 4, (unpublished Thesis) 1966.
13. Grant-Com., 1 July, 1895, ESA, A/4/2; Jackson-Grant, 4 July, 1895, ESA, A/5/1.
14. Berkeley-FO, 4 September, 1895, 6805/248; correspondence in ESA, A/4/2; Sitwell's Diary; Hobley, *op. cit.*, p. 82. Grant's force: 150 Sudanese, 938 Baganda and hundreds of Wanga and Uasin Gishu Masai allies; casualties 24 killed, 56 wounded. Kitosh losses 420 killed, hundreds wounded, 300 prisoners; 1,660 cattle and 1,476 small stock captured.
15. Sitwell's Diary; Hobley, *op. cit.*, p. 86; reports in ESA, A/4/2.
16. Hobley-Com., 16 September, 1895, 12 November, 1895, ESA, A/4/2, A/4/3. The Kabras also agreed to behave peacefully to caravans; to give up deserters; to succour sick porters; to recover stolen property; to give up law breakers; and to refer disputes to Mumias. The terms were much wider than those of the standard treaty form (see Berkeley-Hobley, 28 September, 1895, ESA, A/5/1) and included matters outside the scope of tribal law; Lonsdale, *op. cit.*, Chapter 3.
17. Cunningham-Berkeley, 26 January, 1896, FOCP, 6849/54.
18. Sitwell's Diary.
19. Colvile-Portal, 11 November, 1893, FOCP, 6539/113; Colvile-FO, 29 March, 1894, FO2/71.
20. Jackson-Hobley and de Winton, 25 May, 1895, ESA, A/5/1.
21. Berkeley-FO, 30 July, 1895, FOCP, 6805/50; he left Ravine on 29 July, 1895, with Martin, who returned to Ravine on 30 July, 1895, with news of West's murder; RSD. Berkeley-FO, 9 August, 1895, FOCP, 6805/132.
22. Berkeley-Sitwell, 2 September, 1895, ESA, A/5/1.
23. Berkeley-Sitwell, 2 September, 1895, ESA, A/5/1; Martin-Com., 7 September, 1895, Hobley-Com., 13 September, 1895, ESA, A/4/2.

24. Sitwell-Com., 25 September, 1895, ESA, A/4/2; Sitwell's Diary. Vandeleur, *op. cit.*, p. 144 "I have seldom seen the Union Jack floating over a more barren, inhospitable looking place". Sketch in Vandeleur, *JRGS*, IX (1897); map in Berkeley-FO, 8 February, 1896, FOCP, 6849/54. The fort is incorrectly located in Vandeleur's book. Matson and Sutton, *UJ*, 29 (1965), p. 168.
25. Sitwell's Diary.

6

THE FIRST NANDI EXPEDITION

When Cunningham returned to Entebbe from Bunyoro in September 1895, he discussed the Nandi problem with Berkeley and Jackson and made plans for the punitive expedition. Jackson had favoured a simultaneous invasion of the country by two columns, one operating from the Mau and the other from the Kavirondo Gulf. This scheme was discarded as impracticable, however, and it was decided that the approach should be made from the land side only, with Guasa Masa as "the base of operations or point of departure". Although Jackson's plan might have had a demoralising effect on the Nandi warriors and have resulted in the capture of large numbers of livestock, the problems it raised were too great to be overcome with the resources available. As there was no station on the shores of the Gulf, the nearest point on the Lake which could be used as a base was the newly established post at Port Victoria. The administration controlled insufficient shipping to service a force at Port Victoria, and it was questionable whether the Basoga canoemen, many of whom had recently returned from an arduous voyage to the Bunyoro operations, would be prepared to volunteer for further service away from their homes, especially as Grant had found it difficult to persuade the Basoga chiefs to allow their men to make the long journey to Bunyoro in March. Furthermore, the food position on the Gulf Plain was unknown and, apart from some sporadic relations with Kitoto, Hobley was not in touch with any of the other Luo chiefs in the area. As nothing was known about the country south of Kabiyet or the approaches to Nandi up the south escarpment, it would have been difficult for Cunningham to plan the movements of two widely separated columns, so as to time a rendezvous between them on the Nandi Plateau. The Nandi would have had early warning of troop concentrations on the plains below them, but

Cunningham had little chance, whatever plans he made, of surprising the warriors, as it was known that scouts were posted on the hills to guard against sudden attacks. The proposed assault from the Mau could only have been based on Ravine, but this would have caused the postponement of the expedition until the base had been stocked with food carried from Kavirondo or Kikuyu.[1]

Cunningham's final plan was to split the force into two columns in order to get the enemy between two fires. He hoped this manoeuvre would either drive the Nandi from the forested region between Kabras and Kabiyet, or prevent them from seeking refuge in it. If the plan succeeded the troops could engage the enemy on favourable terms near the latter place, where the country was reported to be more open, and drive them to the south. Cunningham with No. I Column was to try to find a direct road from Kabras to Kabiyet, but, if this proved impracticable, he intended to march to Guasa Masa and join forces with Sitwell for the drive to the south. Sitwell's No. II Column was to leave Guasa Masa three days after Cunningham had left Mumias, and to rendezvous with the main party at Kabiyet on 11 November 1895. As Cunningham was confident that caravans would not be molested on the Uganda Road while the operations were in progress, only twenty men were detailed to garrison Guasa Masa. Thus, with thirty more men based at the fort for escort duties and the ten rifles at the Kabras food post, sixty soldiers were allocated for the defence of the Uganda Road. Foaker was ordered to take charge of Guasa Masa, but Sitwell was subsequently instructed to attach him to his column if the presence of an officer at Guasa Masa was not essential. Cunningham was anxious to have six Europeans with his force so that it could be deployed in several columns. Because of the small number of porters that could be spared for the expedition, there was little scope for the planning of commissariat arrangements. All ranks were to be issued with five days' rations and the porters were to carry a small reserve, but Cunningham realised that the columns would be forced to live off the country, so that their movements would be dictated more by the need to replenish their food supplies than by purely military considerations.[2]

Cunningham decided to base the expedition on Mumias rather than Guasa Masa, as the latter station had to be supplied with food from Kavirondo. This decision probably gave the Nandi the impression that the British invaded their country as allies of their Kavirondo enemies, just as the Kitosh had considered that Mumia had called on the British for the August expedition instead of using his former allies, the Arab traders and Masai mercenaries.[3]

When Cunningham made his dispositions to assemble the field force, he had to draw many of the reinforcements from Bunyoro, nearly 150 miles north-west of Kampala.* Capt. Pulteney was withdrawn from the newly established fort at Nakabimba and Lt. Vandeleur, who was serving as a 2nd class civil assistant, was summoned from Hoima. Nakabimba was left in charge of a Sudanese officer with sixty men and similar arrangements were made at Hoima, so that the three remaining Europeans in Bunyoro were all located at the Masindi headquarters.[4] Orders were also sent to Bunyoro for Dr. Mackinnon to replace Dr. Ansorge, who had asked for home leave after the Kikelelwa operations.† Capt. Sitwell, who was serving as a 1st class civil assistant, and Grant were already in Kavirondo, and Foaker was instructed, after handing over Luba's to Bagge, to proceed to Guasa Masa so that Sitwell could take part in the expedition. Owing to a resurgence of hostility on the part of the Kikelelwa and the unsettled state of his own district, Grant had to be sent back to Luba's, where he could deal with urgent local problems and also be held in reserve to go to Hobley's assistance at Mumias if need arose. Two military, one medical and three civil officers eventually took part in the Nandi expedition, or half the military and medical personnel in the Protectorate at the time and nearly a third of the district administration. In addition to the participants, some of the other district officers serving east of the Nile performed supporting duties connected with the operations.‡

Jackson had instructed Hobley to act as political officer during the Kitosh operations, but he was not asked to take part in the invasion of Nandi although the territory was nominally under his control. The Nandi expedition, which was regarded primarily as a military enterprise, was left entirely to the Commandant, who also acted as Assistant Commissioner to Berkeley. Hobley stayed at the base at Mumias, where he forwarded mails and supplies, and collected food for the expedition's return to Buganda. He was kept informed about Cunningham's plans and progress and would probably have been summoned to Nandi, if the field force had contacted any chiefs with whom a treaty could have been negotiated.[5] Berkeley realised Hobley was not in a position to advise Cunningham on what sections of the tribe merited punishment for the various outrages, and was consequently unable to fulfil one of the chief functions of a political officer. Moreover, the Commissioner had decided to place Jackson in charge of the Ravine and Nandi districts, and to restrict Hobley's authority to the country west of the Kabras Hills.

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* See p. 121. The six Bunyoro posts were manned by 400 men.

† Ansorge was later transferred to Bunyoro but was detained in Buganda by an accident, so there was no doctor in Western Uganda after Mackinnon's departure.

‡ Hobley and Malek (Mumias), Martin (Ravine), Macallister (Port Victoria), Grant (Luba's), Bagge (Luba's and later Mumias).

Cunningham marched to Kampala with one and a half companies of regular troops, 106 of whom accompanied Vandeleur from Hoima with about 800 followers, and Pulteney brought in 42 more Sudanese from South Bunyoro. After the field force was completed by a large detachment of troops from the Kampala garrison, about 400 riflemen from I, IV, V, and IX companies, with a Maxim and 600 porters and followers left Kampala on 14 October 1895 to march to Mumias. This huge caravan caused a stir among the people along the road as it marched through Jinja, Busoga and Kavirondo. Never before had so many Sudanese troops been seen in one caravan in these districts, and this show of force confirmed the truth of the rumours concerning the military prowess of the Nandi. Cunningham reached Mumias on 29 October 1895, where he was joined two days later by Dr. Mackinnon, who had hastened from Bunyoro and crossed to Port Victoria in the steel boat. When the expedition finally assembled, it consisted of five Europeans, seven native officers, 367 soldiers and 23 auxiliaries, and almost equalled in number the largest regular army ever sent against Kabarega—an eloquent tribute to the reputation of the Nandi warriors. All Cunningham's men were Sudanese with the exception of a small body of "drilled and disciplined" Baganda auxiliaries, and a few armed Swahili porters in the Maxim detachment. After Sitwell's column joined the expedition, the force totalled 428 regulars, or more than a third of the active and reserve military establishment for the whole Protectorate. The troops had recently been re-armed with new Martini-Henry rifles and both columns had one Maxim each. No Hotchkiss was taken because of its indifferent performance in the Kitosh operations, the number of porters needed to carry it, and the absence of fortified posts in Nandi. Ammunition was plentiful, as the supplies which Jackson had brought up in December 1894 had been augmented by West and Dick's deliveries in the middle of 1895.

One of the weaknesses of the expedition's organisation was the shortage of porters and the reliance that had to be placed on Sudanese women and boys. The latter assisted their men folk with their burdens but had to be fed. Station officials in Kavirondo and Mau had made fruitless attempts to persuade the local people to volunteer as porters, and only a few of the employed staff could be diverted from their normal duties to march with the troops. The total carrier strength of the expedition was only 110 Swahilis and 80 Lendus, more than half of whom had marched from Kampala with Cunningham's column. The rest of the Swahilis were presumably recruited from the Mumias station hands, and thirty of the Lendus were probably taken from the forty porters who had been sent from Buganda to maintain food supplies for Guasa Masa. As several of the Swahilis were specialist carriers with the Maxim sections, only a small number of porters were available to carry food, baggage and ammunition. It was impossible in these circumstances for food to be carried for over a thousand people for a lengthy campaign. This factor reduced the freedom of action which the commander needed for effective action against the Nandi and circumscribed the force's movements. The followers were eventually reduced to 350, but even so Cunningham was forced to rely on the collection of quantities of the recently harvested grain every few days in order to feed the soldiers, followers and porters.

The employment of native allies had been standard practice in the Bunyoro campaigns, in which huge crowds of Baganda accompanied the troops and acted almost as independent armies. Over 2,000 had taken part in the operations in February 1895, and in the following August between 15,000 and 20,000 Baganda assisted Cunningham in his last campaign against Kabarega. As early as May 1891, Lugard had noted their shortcomings as allies, and other officers had complained of their lack of discipline, their tendency to panic under pressure and their propensity for looting.[6] When Grant was mustering the force for his operations against the Kavirondo in July 1895, he was severely critical of the conduct of Kakungulu's men in the Bunyoro campaign, but nevertheless decided to employ a number of Basoga and Jackson's Baganda contingent. The behaviour of the 900 auxiliaries who fought under Kakungulu in Kitosh was commented on variously by officers with the expedition; and after its conclusion Grant discharged all but 400 gunmen, partly because of the difficulties in feeding a larger number. The Baganda had foraged for themselves in Bunyoro, but Grant realised the Nandi expedition would pass through the villages of tribes enjoying British protection, and that "it would never do to let them loot friendly natives".[7] Berkeley instructed Sitwell to employ Grant's 400 gunmen to patrol the Ravine road, but, after the rough handling they received in their indisciplined attack on the Kikelelwa, Sitwell decided to dispense with their services. The Baganda were not enthusiastic about being employed so far from their homes, and Sitwell was worried about supplying them with food. Although events in their own country had taught the Baganda to respect British weapons and expertise in warfare, they were probably not anxious to face the Nandi, about whose ferocity and prowess they must have heard from the Kavirondo.[8] Berkeley eventually reversed Jackson's decision to send Baganda auxiliaries with the regular forces, as he felt that "the fighting in Kitosh and their recent misadventure in Kikelelwa appear to have considerably damaged their ardour for warlike operations". The Commissioner enunciated the general principle that their employment should never "extend beyond operations connected with the defence or security of their own frontiers", and added, somewhat ungenerously, "I should doubt it being of much practical assistance elsewhere".*

Spire had recruited Kavirondo volunteers for the operations against the Kitosh in January 1895, and Hobley had employed large numbers of Wanga spearmen against the same tribe in August. Mumia and Sakwa also provided auxiliaries for the force which Grant led against the Kabras in the following month. This readiness to accompany expeditions against their Kavirondo neighbours contrasted with the refusal of the Wanga and other friendly tribes to volunteer for service against the dreaded Nandi.† The Uasin Gishu Masai refugees in Kavirondo, who hired themselves out as mercenaries to Mumia and other chiefs, also sent contingents from four of their settlements to help Spire against the Kitosh. Two hundred of their warriors accompanied Hobley on the August campaign but they, too, did not volunteer for the Nandi expedition. The Eastern Masai, who played an important role in later Nandi operations, promised Sitwell that, "after strengthening themselves", they would return to take part in Cunningham's expedition. The 800 warriors, who had been bent on a raid against the much more numerous Kitosh, did not return to fight the Nandi.* It is surprising that the Masai were unwilling to volunteer for an expedition, from which they could hope to secure substantial gifts of cattle from the large Nandi herds. The upshot was that no Baganda, Basoga, Kavirondo, Uasin Gishu or other Masai took part in the expedition with the exception of the few Baganda who marched from Kampala under Sgt. Chongo.[9] The lack of auxiliaries diminished the expedition's chances of capturing much loot, but the precariousness of the food supply and the absence of volunteers left Cunningham with little choice but to enter Nandi without an accompanying force of mobile spearmen.

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* Baganda casualties in Kitosh in August 1895 were nine killed, 32 wounded. Berkeley-FO, 1 October, 1895, FOCP, 6805/252, contrast Johnston's faith in Baganda military prowess during the 1900 Nandi expedition.

† The Wanga, etc. were raided by the Nandi as well as by the Kitosh. When Hobley sent punitive patrols against Kavirondo offenders in 1896, he always had to turn away Wanga, etc. who wished to join in.

One of Cunningham's greatest problems was to obtain guides capable of leading the expedition across the frontier and through the country. No Nandi could be secured for this office and no prisoners had been taken in any of the Nandi raids. Jackson's suggestion that some of Martin's men would be able to help, and Hobley's hope that the Kabras would provide useful information both proved fruitless. Six Uasin Gishu Masai volunteered to take the field force across the border, but eventually only two of them, who had been in Nandi as boys many years before, could be persuaded with difficulty to undertake the task. Two Kabras also went a short way with the troops to point out a path up the west escarpment, but neither of them would venture far into Nandi. Sitwell also found a Masai at Guasa Masa who offered to guide his column. None of the guides was of much use: Cunningham had to retrace his steps before finding a path up the west escarpment; and Sitwell was led completely off his route to the rendezvous at Kabiyet, with the result that he wandered about in Kavirondo for eighteen days before entering the populated parts of Nandi.

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* The strengthening would take the form of an increase in numbers, or the consumption of meat and "courage medicines" in accordance with Masai custom; Hollis: *The Masai*, p. 337. See p. 130.

After Cunningham had found his own way up the escarpment, he had to rely on his compass to plot his daily marches. The same method was used by Vandeleur to pioneer a route to Ravine as his Uasin Gishu guide had only a vague idea of the lie of the land. Martin provided Vandeleur with two additional Masai guides who possibly went back into Nandi for the second phase of the expedition. Sitwell could not procure any guides at Sendege's, and Kitoto's men refused to accompany the troops up the south escarpment. No reference is made to the Nandi wife of the Swahili survivor from West's party, nor of her husband, who was reputed to have learnt Nandi during his detention in the country.[10] One or both of them may have accompanied the troops, as place names are given in the expedition report and map with sufficient accuracy for them to be related to names now current in Nandi, but this information may have been obtained from prisoners.* With no guides to show him a better route, Cunningham steered a course from Kipsomoitei to the northern wall of the Nyando Valley, which enabled him to further the subsidiary aim of the expedition—the search for a road route through Nandi—possibly at the expense of the main objective—the subjugation of the tribe.

Before leaving Mumias, Cunningham sent fifty men and a party of irregulars from Sakwa's to punish the irreconcilables in the Kikelelwa Forest. The Sudanese found the forest deserted and the houses burned. All the food had been removed by Kabras looters, so that none remained to augment the expedition's supplies.

Cunningham marched out of Mumias on 4 November 1895 to the left bank of the Narongare (Lusumu) beyond Sakwa's, and the next day the column camped eight miles south-east of the Kikelelwa Forest. A detachment marched through the abandoned forest, and on the 6th the forces from the abortive Kikelelwa diversion rejoined the main body at the Kabras food depot. The following day the expedition began its main task. After half an hour's march along the Uganda Road, Foaker with ninety men from I Company, twenty reservists, and a number of porters and followers went on to Guasa Masa, while Cunningham turned east, left the border villages of Kabras, crossed the Anoldamwe and Katumbi rivers and camped at the foot of the Nandi escarpment south of Kamobir Hill. West's camp was passed during the march and the troops witnessed the devastating effectiveness of the Nandi raid in the previous July. After marching south on the 8th, the column turned east again and began to ascend the forbidding escarpment. In the first Nandi huts that were reached at an altitude of 6,000 ft., articles looted from West's camp were recovered. A patrol that was sent out to the east dispersed a body of Nandi, and another that went southwards was halted by dense forest, after making the first strike of the expedition in which two men were shot and sixteen cattle and nine goats captured. A fair amount of cultivation was seen and stocks of *wimbi, mtama,* and tobacco were taken from the empty huts.[11]

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* See pp. 100-141. It was commonly thought until Hobley produced a short vocabulary in June 1896 that Nandi and Masai were the same language.

The next day the troops had to retrace their steps to the bottom of the escarpment, as no path could be found through the forest at the top. After marching two miles to the north, Cunningham discovered a track leading up to the crest of the range (6,850 ft.). Two hours' marching in an easterly direction through thick forest brought the column into open, undulating country with scattered houses, and camp was pitched at Kipsomoitei (6,627 ft.). During the gruelling march, arrows fired at the troops by bowmen lurking in the forest wounded a Sudanese follower. Patrols captured a few animals, killed four Nandi and recovered some iron wire, ammunition and a cooking pot. Among the cattle was a black bull which was identified by the Zanzibaris as West's property. An irregular's Snider was hit by a Nandi bullet, the only occasion throughout the expedition when rifles were used against the troops.* On the 10th Cunningham turned north and marched through forest containing open glades and waded through three swamps before camping at Kimong. Archers attacked the column but only hit one cow. A party of Nandi was dispersed with the Maxim, and a patrol sent to the north reported no signs of Sitwell or the enemy. After an easier march eastwards over grassy spurs, the column camped on the west slopes of Kabiyet (7,126 ft.) on the 11th. The country round the camp was uninhabited and the whole area was said to have been evacuated after the construction of the Guasa Masa fort. As Sitwell had failed to keep the rendezvous, patrols were sent out to find him. One detachment returned from Guasa Masa on the 12th with the news that the missing column had marched westwards and descended the escarpment to Kavirondo. A party patrolling the country east of Kabiyet saw nothing, but a Nandi "village" was surprised to the west of the camp by a detachment which killed ten people and recovered three guns, a broken crucifix and other articles which had presumably been looted from Hanlon's loads. Three Nandi were captured—the first prisoners the expedition had taken.*

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* The Kavirondo had a few guns but the Nandi were reputed to be as scornful of firearms as the Masai. Identification of the bull suggests the Swahili survivor was present.

As food was running low and he did not want to tire his men searching for Sitwell in country which had seemingly been abandoned by the enemy, Cunningham decided to proceed without him. During the return march to Kipsomoitei on the 13th, shots were fired at some Nandi near the track and a patrol captured three head of cattle and brought in a "Dorobo" woman, who confirmed the news about Sitwell's route.† Cunningham had no information on topography or population upon which to base his choice of route, so he decided to steer by compass to the Usun bluff which could be seen in the south-east from Kipsomoitei camp. The column encountered some opposition before reaching camp at Kombe, but the Maxim dispersed the enemy, one of whom was killed by the rearguard and another captured by foraging porters. The country was more heavily populated than around Kabiyet and, fortunately for Cunningham, a good supply of grain was found in the empty huts. Three Nandi were killed and one rifle recovered by a party patrolling west of the camp. The Baganda irregulars, who had been sent with a section of IV Company to patrol to the south-east, came across some fresh cattle tracks, so they pushed on ahead with only three soldiers. A large force of Nandi got between the patrol and IV Company, which was forced to retire and send for reinforcements. IX Company was left to guard the camp and V Company, the remainder of IV Company and some more irregulars went to extricate the beleaguered Baganda.

Heavy firing could be heard as the relieving column marched towards the Kimondi, to a place where the river was about six feet deep with steeply sloping sides. One section held a primitive bridge spanning the river at this point and V Company were kept in reserve, while the remaining three sections of IV Company covered by the Maxim crossed over and ascended the left bank.

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* See p. 108 for information obtained from the prisoners.

† Forest-dwelling Nandi were often so described in early accounts; see Chapter 3.

> Only a few natives could be seen on the ridge and it was with astonishment we suddenly saw a crowd of about 500 coming over the top of the hill at great speed, apparently excellently organised, and formed in three sides of a square, above which a dense thicket of long-bladed spears flashed in the sunlight. Wheeling to the left as if by some common impulse, on they came in spite of the Maxim gun posted behind the river, and charged down with tremendous dash on to the force which was some way up the slope on the east bank, and which closed up as well as it could to face the impending attack. It was a critical moment, but luckily the Sudanese stood firm, and as the great mass of natives approached closer the heavy fire began to tell. Nearer and nearer they came, and it almost seemed that they would overwhelm No. IV Company, which had to bear the brunt of the attack; but at last, wavering before this leaden hail, which they had never before experienced, their ranks broke and they scattered in all directions, leaving many of their number on the ground. Half a company left at the bridge had, on the first alarm, advanced to the support of their comrades, and the flying natives had now to run the gauntlet of the fire from these men as they retired over the hill, leaving the ground strewn with their big shields and spears. It was a splendid charge, and if continued for 30 yards or more would have been a successful one.[12]

V Company was sent to cut off the warriors' retreat, but owing to the approaching darkness Cunningham decided not to risk following the enemy up. Over a hundred Nandi were left dead on the field, but the warriors had killed fourteen soldiers and irregulars, including Sgt. Chongo, whose scarlet tunic was rent with many spear holes, and two porters. IV Company had stood firm and saved the day, but the disciplined bravery of the Nandi warriors had made a lasting impression on the Sudanese troops and their British officers.*

The following morning IV and IX Companies went out to reconnoitre but saw only a few of the enemy, so Cunningham moved camp across the Kimondi to Kapkobis, with an escort of two companies to guard the baggage. A follower foraging near the Kombe camp was speared but no other incidents occurred. A halt was made on the 16th so that grain could be collected, and one Nandi was killed by the foraging parties. Three quarters of an hour before dawn on the 17th, the sentries sounded the alarm when they discovered that a large party of warriors had crept up unseen to within a hundred yards of the camp. Not discouraged by their losses in the Kimondi charge, the Nandi attempted the sort of night attack which had brought them many successes on raiding expeditions. The spearmen were unable to penetrate the five feet high thorn enclosure, however, and their assault on the camp was repulsed by repeated volleys from the Sudanese. The attackers retired in confusion leaving one man dead and a quantity of weapons, but succeeded in carrying off their wounded. After a reconnoitring company had reported that the route ahead was clear, the expedition crossed the Amai River into a populous well-cultivated area and camped at Kipture on the 17th.* Large numbers of Nandi were seen and quantities of food were collected from the houses, but the column was not attacked on the march. Hostile demonstrations were made on the road next day and the demonstrators had to be dispersed by skirmishers. When the Mogong and Choimin rivers were crossed, a blood-stained cloth (presumably taken from a man wounded in a previous encounter with the expedition) was hung on one of the bridges as a gesture of defiance to indicate that the Nandi did not consider themselves beaten after their reverses at Kimondi and Kapkobis.† As large bodies of warriors were massed in front of the column and on its flanks when the ascent from the Choimin began, the Maxim was brought into action and the column closed up, while IX Company skirmished in front to prevent the enemy from rushing the long caravan of porters and followers. No attack was launched, however, and camp was pitched on Teito Hill (7,119 ft.), the centre of a heavily populated district. Although parties of Nandi could be seen driving off sheep and goats from the surrounding hillsides, only a small number of animals were captured by Sudanese patrols. Cunningham obtained his first view of the Nyando Valley,

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* See p. 114 for the probably disastrous effects of such a charge on Grant's much smaller force. See illustration facing p. 114. The Nandi locate the battle-ground at Kipsirwo.

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* "Little huts were scattered about the countryside without any protection whatever, showing that the natives had never had anything to fear from their neighbours." Vandeleur, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

† In contrast to later observers, Vandeleur noted (*op. cit.*, p. 119) that the bridges "are quite the best I have seen constructed by natives". The animals used them without difficulty.

Lumbwa and the Kavirondo Gulf from this camp, while to the north-east he looked over the uninhabited Uasin Gishu Plateau.

One of the prisoners, who was unable to walk, was released on the 19th with a message explaining why the country was being invaded, and warning the Nandi of the consequences of further ~~provocative~~ acts. The column then began the descent of the south escarpment and dropped down 900 feet towards the Sagane River to camp at Kabarer (Kamwentowe). Patrols, which climbed the steep face of Usun Peak north of the camp, captured some livestock and killed nine Nandi. Parties of warriors, who had been kept under observation by the column's outflankers during the march, gathered at dusk to the west of the camp, and soon afterwards the sentries fired on a man who was probably scouting to locate the cattle enclosure. One man and a number of the animals were wounded when arrows were fired into the camp during the night, but no general attack developed. Soon after the column left on the 20th to continue the descent to the Sagane Valley, huge boulders were sent crashing down on the winding caravan as it struggled down a steep path under an overhanging hill. Panic seized the porters, two of whom were injured by rock splinters, and order was not restored until the Maxim had swept the top of the hill and dislodged the stone throwers.[13] After completing the descent, the column marched in an easterly direction through a well-cultivated area along the river to camp at Mitete. In the late evening showers of arrows descended on the camp, wounding one man and a cow, but the shooting ceased when the troops returned the fire.

From the head of the Mitete Valley, Cunningham began the ascent of Mau. The column ascended 2,900 feet through thick forest, in ~~which a path~~ had to be cut, and camped on the wet, cold plateau sixteen miles west of Ravine. The Nandi were still in evidence: during the march they wounded two cattle, and shadowed the column into camp, where they got round the picket on the distant water point and speared two followers. The strenuous march through the forest continued in driving sleet on the 22nd, until an open table-land was reached with only patches of forest. Camp was pitched eight miles from Ravine, but the force had suffered severely from the mist and cold and Cunningham decided to turn back with the dispirited porters and followers and the company which was without greatcoats.

Vandeleur went on with fifty men to survey the road, to take despatches for Berkeley and to carry two sick soldiers into Ravine for treatment. Vandeleur's path took him past Lake Narasha, through a belt of bamboos and finally entered a thick forest, where a passage had to be cut for the caravan. Vandeleur, who had been afraid that he had taken the wrong line or that his compass was inaccurate, was relieved when he came out on to the Uganda Road in a clearing and was able to make camp at Campi ya Mwiba, seven miles west of Ravine. The caravan's arrival at Martin's station on the 24th was opportune as it strengthened the wavering loyalty of the Kamasia. They were naturally sympathetically inclined towards their Nandi kinsmen but were, in the meantime, bringing Martin small quantities of food while they awaited the result of the expedition. The Kamasia thought that Vandeleur intended to raid their country, but three days after his departure they came into Ravine with two goats and offered to be friends with Martin. Cunningham's report was sent off with a composite party of mailmen and traders, whom Martin had detained at Ravine because of the possibility of their being cut up by Nandi on the road to Guasa Masa. Vandeleur's return journey passed without incident and his detachment rejoined the expedition near Mitete on 26 November 1895.[14]

The wisdom of Cunningham's decision to leave the inhospitable Mau Forest was demonstrated, on the day he parted from Vandeleur, by the collapse of two of the porters. The column halted on the 25th, when Cunningham and Pulteney escorted by a company of Sudanese climbed the Tindiret Range south of the Mitete valley. About 200 Nandi were seen on a high hill three miles farther south and large stocks of food were confiscated from the houses. Three looters were speared by the Nandi and troops had to be rushed to the scene to rescue their comrades. A short march the next day took the caravan to a place one mile south of the original Mitete Camp (20 November 1895), where Vandeleur's detachment rejoined the expedition. Throughout the arduous march with steep ascents and descents over the Tindiret Hills on the 27th to Kibbitalet, the troops were continually harassed by the Nandi, despite the fact that a company was detailed to skirmish ahead in extended order and the Maxim was frequently used to prevent the warriors from rushing the column. The following day, when large bands of the enemy were watching from the neighbouring hills as the march proceeded across country cut up by ravines, a few animals were captured and four Nandi were killed. Camp was pitched on the 29th near Mt. Endubo close to the Nyando Valley in an area which Vandeleur thought was probably the limit of Nandi occupation. The rivers Endubo and Emboga were crossed the following day before the column reached the Nyando Plain. The troops turned north on 1 December 1895 and, after cutting drifts down the steep sides of the Engolatni (Enolgotwe), camped at the foot of the south escarpment. Here Cunningham noticed a well worn cattle-road leading down to the plains, and heard news of Sitwell's column from a solitary, old Kavirondo who eked out a miserable existence nearby.*

The column climbed the 2,000 feet high escarpment on the 2nd by a fair path along a small water-course through dense, cold mist, which reminded Vandeleur of the unknown country described by Rider Haggard in *The Children of the Mist*. Beyond the bare granite rocks at the edge of the escarpment, camp was pitched at Chibonyai (6,400 ft.), from which place Kabiyet Hill could be seen. No opposition was encountered during the march but the following day, when the expedition moved west and then north-west to the Chesumei Forest, on a track made slippery by heavy rain, the troops were frequently harassed by archers hidden among the undergrowth. After crossing the headwaters of the Kibos River, the column camped at Kakimno (6,445 ft.) in the middle of the forest. On the 4th the march continued to the north-west through dense forest to a camp at Kabaren (5,998 ft.), near some small hills covered with blocks of granite.† Many Nandi houses were seen on the edge of the plateau, the arrow attacks continued and five Nandi were killed close to the camp. After a two hours' march through the forest in a westerly direction, the column crossed the no-man's land between Nandi and Kavirondo and camped at Runyi in Tiriki, where the people were friendly and cultivation widespread. As a parting shot, the warriors harried the rearguard for most of the way and wounded one Sudanese for the loss of two Nandi killed. A soldier died on the march from jaundice and cold, but the men were greatly inspirited when they found themselves in a friendly, fertile country and away from

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* The cattle track probably led to the Kiboin salt lick near Kibigori.

† Probably the Koiparak cluster. The ascent of the escarpment was made up the valley to the east of Kapkolei.

Nandi. During the crossing of the Yala on the 6th a cow and calf were stolen by the Kakamega, against whom reprisals were taken. Apart from this incident and the spearing of six looters, no opposition was encountered. On 9 December 1895, five weeks after the expedition had left its base, Cunningham marched into Mumias, where Jackson and Hobley had no news of the whereabouts of Sitwell's column.

When Sitwell and Foaker left Guasa Masa on 10 November 1895 with 168 Sudanese, 51 porters, a crowd of followers and a Maxim, their instructions were to proceed south, for an estimated distance of fifteen miles, to join Cunningham at Kabiyet on the 11th. Unfortunately Sitwell, who was deceived by his Masai guides either through their ignorance of the country or fear of the Nandi, led the column to the west instead of to the south. It is strange that such an experienced campaigner was misled in this way.* He had recently climbed the Three Hills of Nandi, and the unobstructed view he obtained from this vantage point of Kabiyet and the intervening country had enabled him to assure Cunningham that there were several good paths leading from Guasa Masa to the site of the rendezvous. Moreover, on his journey up from the coast and during his service in Kavirondo, Sitwell had acquired a working knowledge of the Uganda Road and Kabras.

According to his diary, Sitwell believed he had arrived at Kabiyet, after marching for six and a half hours, on the day he left Guasa Masa. After halting there on the 11th without sighting the main column, he marched the following day through a belt of thick forest and then descended the west escarpment to a camp which he designated "Kabiyet II". Four Nandi were seen on the march, one of whom was shot. The 13th was spent in fruitless attempts to locate Cunningham, but as a fire lit on a hilltop brought no response, Sitwell moved east by south on the 14th, passing one of Cunningham's camps on the way, and climbed a short distance up the escarpment to camp close to the scene of West's murder. No Nandi were seen on the march but a few were sighted on top of the escarpment. The column marched south the next day and patrols, which were sent out to burn scattered houses on the hills, confiscated food and a few goats. A halt was called on the 16th while fresh efforts were made to find the main column. A good many Nandi watched the patrols from the hilltops but there was no sign of Cunningham. After a short march the next day, patrols were sent out to burn houses and destroy crops, during which operations two followers were killed. House and crop destruction continued on the 18th, while Foaker went south through the forest till he reached the Yala, where he saw several Nandi and a number of cattle tracks. Camp was pitched in the forest on the other side of the river the following day, and the huts and crops in the vicinity were destroyed. During an eleven mile march to the south-west over an almost impassable road through the forest on the 20th, the Nandi attacked the column and wounded three men with poisoned arrows.

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* Sitwell was commissioned in 1876; Captain 1886; Afghan War 1879-80; Egyptian Expedition 1882; Egyptian Army 1892-95.

Camp was pitched on 21 November 1895 in Tiriki, where Sitwell had to send men out for food, although the people expressed a desire for peace.* The column proceeded in a south-westerly direction on the 22nd through friendly, cultivated country and then descended the south escarpment. Ten men were sent to Kitoto's and the march was resumed towards Sendege's on the following day. The people were civil but too frightened to provide Sitwell with a guide. The column marched to Kitoto's on the 24th over a road a foot deep in water and through a large river, which came up to the soldiers' chins during the crossing. Two days were spent in camp and messengers were sent off to Mumias for trade goods. Kitoto supplied the troops with ample supplies of food, but despite this plenty fifteen men had to be flogged for looting villages. As none of the Luo would venture up the escarpment to see if Nandi cattle were grazing at the top, Sitwell left on the 27th and after marching two miles to the east climbed the south escarpment.†

Sitwell found plenty of cultivation on the plateau but the people were far from friendly. A strong boma was built and the Nandi given until the morrow to bring in twenty head of cattle. This demand was not complied with, so burning parties were sent out on the 28th. Three times the warriors attempted to rush down the hill to attack the fire-raisers but the attackers were thrown back by heavy fire from the camp. At three o'clock the next morning the Nandi attacked in great force and gained entry to the zariba before the sleeping sentries could raise the alarm. Pandemonium was caused when the narrow confines of the camp became jammed with Nandi spearmen and Sudanese soldiers. Sitwell was grazed by a spear and shot three Nandi with his revolvers, including one who was on the point of spearing him. There were five bullet and four spear holes in Sitwell's tent, but the 1,957 rounds loosed off during the chaotic five-minute encounter killed only four of the enemy. Government losses were three killed and five wounded, so the honours were fairly even. The camp was strengthened at daybreak and Foaker took out a strong party to burn houses and collect food. These operations continued on the 30th when four Nandi were killed and one bullock captured.* On 1 December 1895 the column marched down the escarpment to the accompaniment of abuse and flights of arrows from the unchastened Nandi. Sitwell rested his men at Kitoto's for six days, while food was being bought for the return journey with the trade goods received from Mumias, and further efforts were made to trace Cunningham. After settling accounts with Kitoto and presenting him with a Snider carbine in recognition of his help and hospitality, the column left on the 7th to return to Mumias, where Sitwell reported to Cunningham on 12 December 1895.

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* Possibly Nyangori (Terik) as Sitwell described them as being half Nandi and half Kavirondo. The route in Sitwell's Diary differs slightly from that given in Cunningham-Com, 26 January, 1896, FOCP, 6849/54.

† The route was probably along the River Chebirir and the camp at Lamaiywo near Chepsiria. The Nandi remember this route and camp were used by government troops during one of the expeditions. Cunningham-Com, 26 January, 1896, FOCP, 6849/54 says Maraba, a little north of Lamaiywo. See p. 152.

Sitwell's arrival brought little comfort to the commander of an expedition which had been designed "to bring the Nandi to their bearings". Cunningham was, moreover, conscious that the column under his personal command had not achieved the success he had anticipated. Although about 145 Nandi were killed—one hundred of these at the battle of Kimondi—the casualties inflicted had not restrained the warriors from attacking the column whenever opportunity presented itself. Only 91 head of cattle and 657 sheep and goats were captured by the main column and four men, one woman and a boy taken prisoner. No contact had been made with the Nandi leaders, who had given no signs of their willingness to admit defeat. Cunningham had been handicapped by indifferent guides, the need to replenish his food sacks at frequent intervals and Sitwell's failure to rendezvous with the main column. But it is improbable that the presence of Sitwell's troops at Kimondi would, as Cunningham claimed, have enabled him to "mop up the Nandi to extinction". Sitwell's tally was even less impressive: a large number of huts were burned and quantities of food destroyed or confiscated, but only nine Nandi had been killed, one bullock and two goats captured, and none of the enemy had been taken prisoner. Cunningham was disquieted about the effects which "the half-successful night attack" on Sitwell's camp might have on the Nandi, and fearful lest their elation over its outcome might lead to a renewal of attacks on caravans.

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* The operations immediately before and after the attack on Sitwell's camp may have done more damage than he realised, as a part of a *koret* near the Lamaiywo camp is called Kipkoro (from *korokta*, a shin bone), because of the number of bones found there after a fight with government forces. It is not certain, however, whether the name was coined in 1895 or during a later expedition.

Despite the losses suffered by the expedition and the weariness of the troops as a result of the continual hard marching over a difficult terrain in unfavourable climatic conditions, Cunningham decided it was politic to resume operations before the Sudanese, who had been drafted from Uganda to crush the Nandi, returned to their stations. During the second phase of the operations, the Assistant Commissioner hoped to get in touch with some of the Nandi leaders, in order to prepare the ground for a lasting settlement of what he feared might easily develop into an intractable problem. Berkeley considered Cunningham's decision a wise one, "as the situation remained very unsettled and this may lead to something more definite".[15]

Sitwell was despatched to Kampala and Foaker was ordered to Guasa Masa with some of the troops from the second column. Cunningham, Pulteney, Vandeleur and Dr. Mackinnon, with 410 Sudanese, a few Masai guides and a crowd of porters and followers, left Mumias on 14 December 1895 and camped at Sakwa's. After marching by the usual route to Kabras, the column followed a more northerly line than the one taken in November, and proceeded due east from the Kabras villages to a camp north of Kamobir Hill. Cunningham then turned south-east and passed west of Tabolwa rock to camp on the 17th two miles north of Kipsomoitei. When the expedition halted a mile and a half south-east of Kombe, it was found that the huts in the neighbourhood had been abandoned. After their arrival at Kipture on the 19th, Cunningham and Vandeleur saw a crowd of Nandi in the distance, who shouted out that they wanted peace. They refused to come into camp, but suggested that Cunningham should go to Ravine if he wished to meet the elders for a discussion on peace terms. While these exchanges were taking place, the Nandi killed a Sudanese follower, who was cutting wood near the camp, and a Mnyamwezi porter was posted missing at evening roll-call. The next day the column marched south-west, crossed the River Mogong and camped on Kaboi Hill. A live disembowelled goat, a dead chicken and a hand cut out of leather were placed on the approaches to the Mogong bridge, either as a gesture of defiance or as a magical charm to prevent the troops from crossing.[16] A company, which travelled independently of the main column on a more southerly route, captured some sheep and killed a few Nandi when it was attacked by bowmen on the Choimin ford. A short march was made on the 21st to the edge of the south escarpment and two companies, which made a sweep to the west under cover of the camp Maxim, killed 18 Nandi and captured 94 ~~cattle~~ and 1,200 sheep and goats. A woman prisoner was sent to inform the people that if they wished for peace they must come into camp before seven o'clock the next morning. No emissaries appeared before the expedition marched off at six a.m. to camp in a thickly populated area south-west of Chibonyai. A detachment patrolling south of the camp had a running fight with the enemy, before capturing a large herd of cattle in an enormous ravine leading up from the plain. Three Nandi were killed and one Sudanese wounded in this engagement.

On the 23rd the column moved to the edge of the escarpment at Maran (6,455 ft.) where the Nandi turned out in force all round the camp but refused to come to close quarters. Two companies, which were sent out against them with a Maxim, killed 22 Nandi and captured 94 cattle and over 1,200 small stock, for the loss of one follower killed, one Sudanese wounded and one porter missing. On Christmas Eve the column marched in a westerly direction through thickly populated country to Maraba, near the place where Sitwell's camp had been attacked. Numerous huts were destroyed, and two soldiers were wounded while driving the Nandi into the forest and hills. "An extraordinary piece of magic, consisting of a live dog, and a snake* with its head fixed in a pumpkin —the two tied together, was found outside the zariba" on Christmas morning.[17] The prisoners forecast that an attack would be made

Cf. Walton 1904

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* The snake suggests the paraphernalia were arranged by a laibon. See p. 159.

that night, and around midnight the camp was roused by firing from the sentries. Large numbers of spearmen were seen approaching the camp, but they were dispersed by a couple of volleys from the Sudanese. The march on the 26th led the column through wild, difficult country with numerous narrow passes between the hills. During the march the head of the column was charged by a body of Nandi lying in ambush in a rocky defile at the entrance to a deep gorge. The irregulars in front were thrown into a panic and ran back on the soldiers, who managed to disperse the attackers after some wild firing.* Four Nandi were killed and the troops arrived at Chebilat Hill (5,800 ft.) without further incident. The limit of Nandi occupation was reached a short distance beyond Chebilat the following day. After crossing the Kibos and Sanga rivers and marching for two hours through the intervening bush, the expedition camped in friendly Tiriki country. A diversion was made on the 28th against the Maragoli, who had closed the road from Mumias to Kitoto's by raids on their peaceful neighbours. Hobley had investigated these raids but had failed to get in touch with the Maragoli, who he regarded as being "allied to the Nandi". Cunningham fined the chief 50 head of cattle, took two of his sons into Mumias and secured promises of future good behaviour. After passing through friendly Kisa country, the expedition returned to Mumias on 31 Decembeer 1895.[18]

In some respects the second phase of the operations had been more successful than the first: government casualties were fewer, more stock had been seized (139 head of cattle and 1,500 to 2,000 sheep and goats) and retribution had been meted out to Sitwell's assailants. But Cunningham had again failed to strike a decisive blow by bringing the enemy to battle and Nandi casualties, some thirty-three killed and a few wounded, were fewer than in the first phase. A few prisoners had been taken and a number of houses burnt, but the one almost derisory request for peace had not resulted in negotiations with the tribal leaders.

The military methods employed by the Nandi to meet the novel challenge of disciplined riflemen under experienced officers were similar to those which had proved so effective in tribal warfare. Apart from the one occasion when firearms were used, the warriors relied on traditional weapons for attack and defence. Unfortunately for the Nandi, the poison smeared on the arrow heads was stale, so that wounds from these missiles did not cause generalised blood poisoning, providing the arrows were pulled out quickly after penetration.* The field force never took the Nandi by surprise, and scouts manning the hilltop outposts kept the columns under observation throughout the expedition. The frontal charge at Kimondi was one of the routine evolutions employed in attacks on Masai spearmen in open country, and the night raids on Cunningham's camps were similar to those carried out against fortified Kavirondo villages, the cave hideouts on Elgon and trading caravans. The bombardment of camps with flights of arrows fired through a high trajectory was copied from the technique employed against Masai warriors concealed in bush country. Persistent pressure was kept up on the columns by harrying their flanks and rear, and stragglers were picked off on the march and near the camps—the same tactics that were used when small parties of Masai occasionally penetrated the perimeter shield of Nandi outposts. Only one ambush was sprung although the expedition passed through many areas suited to this form of attack, but this was presumably because the passage of a large caravan through the heart of their country was a new experience to the Nandi. It is, therefore, creditable to their military genius that this stratagem was introduced so soon after their first experience of a demonstration in force.

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* The irregulars were Baganda, or possibly Kavirondo or Uasin Gishu Masai who joined the expedition for the second phase.

The steadfast conduct of the Sudanese and their bravery at Kimondi caused the Nandi to respect the government troops, and to acknowledge that they were more formidable adversaries than the Arabs, Masai or Kavirondo. The warrior leaders had learned that the Sudanese could not be overrun in open warfare after their first volley was discharged, and that, even when they were strung out on the march, they could retaliate with long-ranging rifle and machine gun fire against harrying attacks.† Moreover, surprise night assaults were found to be more dangerous to press home in the face of watchful Sudanese sentries than was the case with sleeping villagers and caravan porters. As a result of experience gained in this first encounter with trained troops, the Nandi war leaders effectively modified their tactics in later campaigns. Massed charges were abandoned; camps were attacked only when reconnaissance showed that precautionary measures were inadequate; and raids and ambushes were only undertaken against small detached parties and stragglers, or on columns when concealment was possible and retaliation difficult. The war leaders did not, however, make the mistake of going on to the defensive or of putting their faith in fortified positions. Such measures were alien to the Nandi character and tribal strategy, and the Kitosh expedition had shown that fixed defences were as vulnerable to riflemen and Maxims as to Nandi spearmen. Concentration of forces gave the initiative to the attackers and, in the event of defeat, resulted in heavy casualties among the defenders.* The Nandi appreciated that their chances of survival depended on their skill in wearing down the heavily laden troops, and in avoiding collisions with them in conditions favourable for their deployment. Furthermore, the Nandi leaders apparently realised that their new adversaries could only be overcome by concerted action, through the sort of centralised control that had been improvised to meet the Masai threat.† In 1895 opposition was local and fitful but in later campaigns there was a greater degree of co-ordination and co-operation.‡

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* The staleness might have been caused by the delay in launching the expedition. See pp. 21-25 for Nandi tactics in tribal wars.

† See p. 46.

Cunningham and his fellow officers conceded that the Nandi "did not belie their reputation and showed themselves to be the reverse of a despicable enemy". Vandeleur acknowledged in his description of the Kimondi battle that "the charge was a revelation to us, after fighting the cautious Wanyoro and Arabs towards Lake Albert, and at once accounted for the warlike reputation and prestige amongst other East African tribes which the Wanandi possessed. Such an onslaught would have annihilated any smaller force without firearms, or a weakly guarded caravan travelling in single file along the Uganda Road". This tribute from a junior officer was confirmed by his senior and much more experienced commander: "The Nandi have proved a sporting lot. They charged quite like understudies of the Dervishes, although of course they did not get home". This reputation for dash and courage persisted and forced military officers to modify their tactics in subsequent operations against the tribe. Lt. Lloyd-Jones commented on the Kisii expedition of 1908 that "if the Kisii had been anything like our old enemies the Nandi of 1895, and had charged home with the spear, not even the coolness of the regimental officers and the gallantry of the old time Sudanese . . . could have averted a debacle". Some officers who fought the Nandi in the later expeditions were disappointed that the warriors no longer made frontal charges, and a few even queried whether the Nandi reputation for valour had been justly earned.[19]

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* Four hundred Kitosh were killed when two of their villages were sacked as against 185 Nandi casualties in seven weeks' fighting.

† The inter-*porosiek* co-operation that secured the defeat of the Masai lapsed when the threat was removed. There was no machinery for mustering a tribal army under a centralised command when Nandi was invaded after being free from external threats for more than a decade; see pp. 22-28.

‡ The healing of the tribal split caused by Kimnyole's death also helped to bring this about. See p. 32.

The Sudanese had given a good account of themselves when charged by the Nandi at Kimondi, by maintaining their morale in spite of almost daily harrying, and in accomplishing long, hard marches with hardly any respite. There was little unauthorised looting and the penalty paid by the occasional straggler kept the columns in close formation. Moreover, as the operations took place after harvest and before planting there were few standing crops in the fields to tempt pillagers. Food supplies were generally ample for the expedition's requirements, but several members suffered from fever and chest affections brought on by the cold, damp and mists of the highland region. Rain fell almost every day during the first phase of the operations, and marches were often made and camps pitched in wet conditions.*

Although Cunningham had every reason to be proud of the conduct of the Sudanese, the expedition had shown that sufficient troops had to be mustered against the Nandi to enable sweeps to be carried out simultaneously by several columns. It was also essential to reduce the number of followers and to increase the carrier strength, so that troop movements were not dictated by the need to replenish food supplies. This was particularly important if operations were undertaken before the harvest, since Nandi food reserves were meagre for several months of the year. Cunningham's failure to capture any significant number of cattle had shown that Sudanese troops were unsuited for this task, and that auxiliary spearmen would have to be recruited for the purpose. As climatic conditions were very different from those experienced by the Sudanese in stations and campaigns in West Uganda, Dr. Mackinnon recommended that the troops should be properly clad and provided with blankets in future operations against the Nandi.[20]

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* Cunningham recommended that the troops should be awarded the East and Central Africa Medal. The Nandi admitted they were troubled by the presence of women in the columns.

After considering Cunningham's report, Berkeley was hopeful that the objects of the expedition had been achieved, but he was realist enough to have reservations regarding the assumption that the problem had been finally solved. He noted in a private letter that "we shall have to keep a pretty sharp look out down there and relax no precautions for the protection of the road", but in his official despatch the Commissioner made the most he could of the expedition's achievements: "It appears beyond doubt that (the Nandi) are now desirous of behaving for the future in such a manner as may call for no further reprisals on our part, and I trust this disposition on their part will lead before long to the conclusion of some definite treaty of peace and friendship." Berkeley considered that the achievement of this desirable consummation would be demonstrated by the cessation of raids on caravans, but warned that the Nandi characteristic of "extreme shyness and reserve" would probably delay the establishment of friendly relations and lasting peace.[21]

Cunningham was more sanguine than Berkeley, though the immediate military results of the operations were not as conclusive as he would have wished. After the considerable setback they had received at Kimondi, he had been unable to force the Nandi to a general and decisive engagement. The Kablelach warriors were weary rather than cowed, and the losses they had suffered were unlikely to deter the junior members of the age-set or their successors, the Kimnyike, from resuming hostilities against the government.* Because his force had been too small and cumbersome to enable him to organise mobile columns to scour the forests and ravines for hidden stock, Cunningham had failed to convince the warriors that their animals were endangered by forays by government troops. Very little livestock was seen as the expedition plodded from point to point, and many of the animals had been removed to Lumbwa probably before the invasion began from the north-west. Since the troops had departed without leaving a force to occupy the country, the Nandi probably considered the operations were little different from the large-scale raids which they themselves undertook against other tribes. The burning of huts caused inconvenience but no lasting hardships, as plenty of materials were at hand for rebuilding, and the Nandi were accustomed to move their homes at frequent intervals.* Crop destruction created local grain and beer shortages, but this measure was nothing like as efficacious against cattle-owners as against agriculturalists. It did not lead to wholesale migrations, although the country round Kabiyet and Kombe was temporarily abandoned, and some of the people were driven homeless and foodless into the caves and forests, while others sought refuge in Elgeyo, Kamasia and Lumbwa.†

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* The *saget-ap-eito* ceremony, transferring "power" from the Kablelach to the Kimnyike, took place in 1892.

Nevertheless, the expedition had diverted the attention of the Nandi from the country near the Uganda Road. The warriors had been too occupied watching the field force and guarding their stock to organise raiding parties so far from the scene of operations, so that escorted parties passed safely from Ravine to Mumias while the troops were in Nandi.‡ Tribal faith in the military superiority of the warriors had been weakened by the reverse at Kimondi, and the Nandi had been warned that they were confronted with the strongest challenge they had yet encountered. Cunningham was evidently satisfied there would be a respite from Nandi hostilities for a considerable period, as he considered that the government's authority could be upheld by only one company after the expedition returned to Kampala. Grant was ordered to send VI Company from Luba's to Kavirondo, although this transfer left Grant with only forty-nine men to police the whole of Busoga. Hobley was instructed to retain three-quarters of the men at Mumias and to send the remainder to Guasa Masa, where they could be reinforced by their comrades at Mumias if need arose.[22]

Although Cunningham had not been specifically entrusted with the task of setting up a government post in Nandi or of initiating measures for the administration of the tribe, the political results of the expedition were as inconclusive as the military. As Cunningham had failed to meet the tribal elders or warrior leaders for the purpose of negotiating a peace treaty, the only form of government control which could have been instituted would of necessity have been one of military occupation. But this would have tied down a large part of the field force for a considerable time, and created immense difficulties of transport and supply. The operations had a successful outcome in one particular, however, as they temporarily disturbed the people's trust in the supernatural powers of the Laibon. His assurances that the gunpowder would get damp from exposure to the dew, and thus prevent the cartridges from going off, had proved false—and the Laibon had fled to Lumbwa.* Attempts to oppose the passage of the expedition by magical deterrents also proved unavailing, but these were probably devised by local practitioners without reference to the Laibon. Cunningham's minor diversions against the Kikelelwa, Maragoli and Ugenya had, in fact, a more obvious and immediate effect on the political settlement of the region than the Nandi operations. These tribes had felt the overwhelming power of government arms and had asked for peace. The road from Kabras to the Lake was cleared of hostile elements, and regular communications were re-established between Mumias and Kitoto's for the first time since Spire had left Kavirondo.†

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* The burning of houses, the fires in which had been extinguished before the occupants left, caused great consternation at first among the Nandi, to whom matches were unknown.

† Large areas of Ugenya were abandoned after Cunningham punished the tribe in January 1896.

‡ This section was kept working at a time when the Kikuyu-Ravine stretch was closed after the Kedong massacre; see Chapter 7.

Cunningham's efforts to subjugate the Nandi were followed with interest by other tribes, many of whom were keen to see their traditional enemies humbled. The Kavirondo, who had been impressed by the array of military might assembled for the expedition, were probably surprised that the Sudanese had returned to Kampala without conquering the Nandi, and without escorting the tribal elders into Mumias to discuss peace terms with Hobley. Cunningham had not even managed to follow the precedent, set by Grant in the Kitosh expedition, of bringing a number of women and children into Mumias as hostages, with the object of inducing their men folk to come in to arrange for the prisoners' repatriation. The effect of the Nandi expedition in forwarding Hobley's work of pacifying his district and consolidating his hold over the Kavirondo was, in fact, less important than Grant's operations earlier in the year and Cunningham's profitable encounters with the Kikelelwa, Maragoli and Ugenya.

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* Similar assurances were, however, believed in later campaigns. The Laibon fled to Lumbwa again in 1897 and 1900; see pp. 262-264.

† The Ugenya had murdered messengers, threatened caravans and raided Wanga and other protected tribes. After being punished in January 1896, they sent emissaries to make peace with Hobley at Mumias.

The disruption caused to the Nandi way of life, by the dispersal of their stock and the destruction of their crops and homes, possibly discouraged other Kalenjin tribes from throwing in their lot with their kinsmen. The Kamasia had temporised about helping the Nandi before and during the expedition, but Vandeleur's sudden appearance at Ravine had persuaded the local people to adopt a more friendly attitude towards Martin. Shortly afterwards some of the Uasin Gishu Masai families left their settlements among the Kamasia and took up residence near the station. The Elgeyo also sent representatives to make friends with Martin, and early in January 1896 the Kamasia, who had sent four warriors to Nandi for information about "the recent war", refused to offer hospitality to the Nandi peace emissaries. The Nandi apparently received no active assistance during the expedition from the Lumbwa warriors, but their country afforded refuge to Nandi stock and asylum to the Laibon. After Cunningham had left Nandi, Martin was warned that the Lumbwa intended to raid the Ravine cattle, but no attack was launched against the station and two months later the Lumbwa came in for peace.[23] The Nyangori watched Cunningham's column march through Tiriki and Maragoli, and may even have had their own country invaded by Sitwell's troops. Farther afield, the expedition had fortunate results on relations between the government and the Masai. Ainsworth asserted that "after the Kedong massacre, I am almost inclined to think that if it had not been for the rumours which the Masai had got hold of about the expedition in Nandi country . . . the Masai would not have been in such a humour to have kept quiet".[24]

In the longer term the expedition had important and far reaching results. For the first time reliable information had been recorded about the topography, climate and products of a large part of Nandi, and a map produced of the routes of access into the country. Little had been gleaned about tribal organisation apart from the discovery that there were no tribal chiefs. Some erroneous views were formed on the position and powers of the Laibon, who was thought to be the ruler of Nandi by analogy with Lenana's position among the Masai, though the latter was traditionally no more a ruler than his Nandi counterpart. The close connections between the Nandi and Lumbwa passed unnoticed, with the result that this factor was not taken into account when later expeditions were planned.[25] By far the most important items of information brought back by the expedition were the practicability of a caravan road through Nandi, and the possibility that a road and railway route could be found through the Nyando Valley to the Kavirondo Gulf. Berkeley and Cunningham confirmed the views of Lugard, Colvile and others that the healthy, fertile Nandi Plateau was a promising area for white colonists. Vandeleur was enthusiastic about its grazing potentialities and suitability for horses, and forecast that the Nandi forests would supply timber to tree-denuded Kavirondo as well as fuel for the lake steamers and the railway. Dr. Mackinnon praised Nandi methods of iron manufacture and cultivation and suggested the country might prove suitable for tea plantations.[26]

Berkeley realised that much more attention had to be given to strengthening the Protectorate's hold over its eastern territories, and more resources allocated for their administration. He also appreciated that Hobley's efforts in Kavirondo would be hampered if his jurisdiction continued to extend to Nandi, and might be jeopardised unless the Nandi could be brought under closer administrative control. Indeed, Hobley's achievements in Kavirondo made an effective settlement of the Nandi problem a matter of urgency, so that tribes which had been accorded British protection could be assured of immunity from raiding. In order to strengthen the government's control over the Eastern Province, the Commissioner posted Jackson, his senior assistant, to Ravine. This decision destroyed the fiction that the Protectorate's sole interest in the area east of the Sio River was the maintenance of communications along the Uganda Road, and gave official recognition to Hobley's views on the need to control and develop the "intervening country" between Kikuyu and Busoga by positive measures. As a further step towards the implementation of this change of policy, Berkeley decided that a civil station should be established in a much more central position than Guasa Masa. Cunningham considered this proposal would do more than anything else to consolidate the gains achieved by the expedition, as "the Nandi, seeing we meant to stay, would make overtures for peace".[27]

By far the most important improvement achieved as a result of the expedition was the re-routing of Sclater's cart road. Cunningham's report and Vandeleur's map were used for this project in 1896, and two years later they provided the basic knowledge which led to the realignment of the Uganda Railway. Cunningham's reconnaissance came at an opportune time: Sclater's road party was approaching the Mau, the steamer loads were on their way up from the coast, and more and more caravans, including private trading ventures, were using the Uganda Road. As a result of his travels in the interior of Nandi, Cunningham outlined plans for the reorganisation and speeding up of the transport system between Ravine and the Lake, and helped to complete the task of shortening the road, which Martin began in February 1891.*

The government failed in 1895 to subjugate the Nandi at the first attempt, but it was hoped that control would gradually be established through a garrisoned post, and that friendly relations would follow as Nandi suspicions were allayed by the presence of a government officer in the centre of the country. Once the attitude of hostility to foreign occupation changed to one of acceptance of government control, administrative measures could be introduced similar to those which Hobley had initiated among the Kavirondo. These hopes were not fulfilled. The abortive campaign of 1895 was followed by ten years of uneasy peace, interspersed by several outbreaks of active hostility, which threatened the security of the Protectorate's communications and caused considerable suffering to the Nandi. During this period, in which the pacification of the rest of the Eastern Province was completed without much difficulty or bloodshed, the Nandi fought to retain their independence and strove to uphold the prerogative to raid other tribes, who had accepted British protection freely or after only a token resistance.

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* See Chapter 9.

References

1. Berkeley-FO, 1 October, 1895, FOCP, 6805/252.
2. Cunningham-Com, 3 November, 1895, ESA, A/4/3, FOCP, 6827/289.
3. The Baluyia thought the Sudanese were sent against them at Mumia's instigation; Were, *op. cit.*, p. 163, Osogo, *Nabongo Mumia*, p. 19.
4. Ternan, *Some Experiences of an old Bromsgrovian*, Chapter 22.
5. Cunningham negotiated a treaty with Ankole in 1894; Thomas and Scott, *Uganda*, p. 247.
6. Perham, *Diaries of Lord Lugard*, ii 163; Colvile-Hardinge, 15 July, 1894, Africa, 7 (1895), Cmd. 7708.
7. Grant-Com, 7 July, 1895, 14 July, 1895, ESA, A/4/1.
8. Berkeley-Sitwell, 2 September, 1895, ESA, A/5/1; Sitwell-Com, 14 September, ESA, A/4/2.

9. For a description of Chongo and his scarlet Guards tunic, see Vandeleur, *op. cit.*, p. 107. Some irregulars may have joined the force when it re-entered Nandi in December 1895. The many references in Baganda oral accounts to participation in the expedition can probably be explained by the fact that Grant's force was originally intended to be used against the Nandi as well as the Kitosh; see pp. 112-114; R. W. Ashe 23 September, 1895 (Walker Papers); A. Wright, *UJ* 13 (1949), p. 240.
10. Vandeleur, *op. cit.*, p. 109, suggests the couple accompanied the troops.
11. Cunningham-Com, 6 November, 1895, 26 January, 1896, FOCP, 6827/289, 6849/54; Vandeleur, *op. cit.*, pp. 109-131.
12. Vandeleur, *op. cit.*, p. 115. Austin's Diary 18 April, 1898.
13. Rocks were used by the Banyoro, Chagga, Nyakwai (Teso) and other hill tribes; Thruston, *African Incidents*, p. 189; Stahl, *History of the Chagga*, p. 213; Austin, *With Macdonald in Uganda*, p. 164.
14. Martin-Com, 1 December, 1895, ESA, A/4/3; RSD; Vandeleur, *op. cit.*, p. 124.
15. Cunningham-Com, 13 December, 1895, ESA, A/4/3; Berkeley-Anderson, 23 December, 1895, FO2/93.
16. Vandeleur, *op. cit.*, p. 132; and p. 102 for similar practices in Bunyoro; "the Sudanese were always chary of going near these". See p. 159.
17. Vandeleur, *op. cit.*, p. 133.
18. Berkeley-FO, 13 January, 1896, 8 February, 1896, FOCP, 6849/2/54; Vandeleur, *op. cit.*, p. 132; there are discrepancies in the accounts of events from 22 to 24 December, 1895; Moyse-Bartlett, *op. cit.*, p. 65.
19. Vandeleur, *op. cit.*, p. 116; Cunningham-Com, (pte.) 22 November, 1895, ESA, A/34/1; Cunningham-Com, 26 January, 1896, FOCP, 6849/54. Vandeleur commissioned 6 February, 1889; Cunningham commissioned 22 October, 1881, Egyptian War 1882, Nile Expedition, 1884-85, Sudan Frontier Field Force, 1887-89. Lloyd-Jones, *KAR*, p. 100. Hobley-Com, 27 December, 1899, ESA, A/4/23.
20. This was only partly achieved in later campaigns owing to transport difficulties. Porters were the chief sufferers; Vandeleur, *op. cit.*, p. 112.
21. Berkeley-Anderson, 23 December, 1895, FO2/93; Berkeley-FO, 8 February, 1896, FOCP, 6849/54.
22. Cunningham-Com., 10 December, 1895, ESA, A/34/1; Grant-Com, 23 December, 1895, ESA, A/4/1. No despatches were published in the *London Gazette*, FO-WO, 10 July, 1896, FOCP, 6861/15; it is "not proposed . . .to call public attention to the operations against the Wandi (*sic*)." Cunningham, Pulteney and Vandeleur were appointed D.S.O.'s for services in Bunyoro and Nandi; Sitwell was mentioned in despatches (FO2/111, 29 September 1896). FO83/1794/1796.
23. See Chapter 7, RSD, 8 December, 1895 (Uasin Gishu Masai), 18 December, 1895 (Elgeyo), 4 January, 1896 (Kamasia), 1 January, 1896, 5 March, 1896, and 24 March, 1896, when Jackson made blood-brotherhood with the Lumbwa. Towett, *op. cit.*
24. Ainsworth-Hardinge, 20 March, 1896, FOCP, 6849/144. See Chapter 7.
25. e.g. Jackson-Com, 5 October, 1896, ESA, A/4/6.
26. Cunningham, *JRGS*, IX (1897), p. 391; Vandeleur, *op. cit.*, pp. 134-36; Mackinnon-Com, 18 March, 1896, ESA, A/4/4.
27. Cunningham-Com, 31 January, 1896, ESA, A/4/4 and 10 December, 1895, ESA, A/34/1, "when they found they could do nothing to the post, they would come in".

7

PEACE AND THE KEDONG MASSACRE

When the Assistant Commissioner returned to Kampala early in January 1896, he left the negotiation of peace terms to the district officials. Prospects for a lasting and general peace were far from encouraging, however, and Cunningham admitted that tribal suspicions could only be allayed, and peaceful relations established, after Nandi had been occupied for a considerable period. Events during the expedition had given few grounds for optimism that the people were anxious for an understanding with the Protectorate authorities. An abortive exchange about peace negotiations had taken place near Kipture during the second phase of the operations, but the Nandi had acted on that occasion as if they were equals, not suppliants, and had stipulated that discussions should take place outside their country at Ravine. A few days later the warriors had refused to comply with the demands conveyed to them by a released woman prisoner.* Since Cunningham had failed to crush the Nandi by a decisive victory, or to occupy their country, there was no question of the government imposing its will on a beaten enemy before the troops were withdrawn. No leaders with whom negotiations could have been opened were captured, or even contacted, and the prisoners taken were too few to be used as hostages to compel the Nandi to visit a government station in order to sue for their release. District officers had no alternative, therefore, but to await Nandi emissaries at Ravine or Guasa Masa. It would have been foolhardy for a civil officer, with the small forces at his command, to have entered Nandi in order to undertake what the Commandant with 400 trained soldiers had failed to accomplish. The warriors had demonstrated, by their skilful, stubborn and united resistance, that the methods so successfully practised by Hobley in Kavirondo would not produce the same quick and easy results in Nandi. The operations against the Bantu Kavirondo and the Nilotic Ugenya had followed a set pattern: a column from Mumias marched into the offending tribe's territory, and after defeating the warriors in a short skirmish or cowing them by a display of military strength, Hobley captured their livestock, took a number of prisoners as hostages and levied fines on the spot. In most instances a conference was held in the centre of the tribal territory, at which a treaty was imposed and a blood-brotherhood ceremony performed.* Tribal leaders often accompanied Hobley on the remainder of his tour and went back with him to Mumias, where presents were exchanged and rewards given. Sometimes when there was insufficient time to implement the more construcive part of the process, representatives of the beaten tribe subsequently visited Mumias to accept a settlement.[1] Government officials discovered in their first encounter with the Nandi that they were dealing with a very different adversary. After a lengthy, full-scale expedition under professional leadership, all that could be hoped for was that some sort of understanding could be reached with an enemy, which had been harassed but not defeated.

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* See pp. 151-152.

It was unfortunate that during the first phase of the expedition an event occurred in the Kedong Valley, which forced Jackson, when he arrived to take over at Ravine, to turn his attention from the Nandi to the Masai.† He was disturbed by the rumoured intention of the EAP to undertake punitive measures on Uganda soil against the Masai for the Kedong massacre, and fearful lest the long expected Masai rising was about to begin. As Cunningham's forces had secured a breathing space in Nandi and raids had ceased on the road between Ravine and Mumias, Jackson decided to tackle the more urgent problem on the Protectorate's eastern borders which threatened to disrupt communications on a hitherto peaceful section of the Uganda Road. He left Ravine on 27 December 1895 and did not return until 20 January 1896. The only government representatives in the Mau District, with whom the Nandi could treat during his absence, were Foaker at Guasa Masa and Martin at Ravine, neither of whom had Jackson's standing and authority.

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* The rite was sometimes performed between neighbours to prevent inter-tribal hostilities.

† See p. 171. First reports of the incidents of 26 to 28 November, 1895, arrived at Ravine on 6 December, 1895 but had not reached Mumias when Hobley handed over Mau District to Jackson on 12 December, 1895. Cunningham had not heard the news when he re-entered Nandi on 14 December, 1895. Jackson learnt of the massacre on 20 December, 1895 at Ravine and reported to Berkeley on 26 December, 1895 after discussions with Pordage. RSD.

The Kamasia asked Martin on 1 December 1895 if peace would be granted to the Nandi if they requested it. Martin discovered that the spokesmen had been asked by the Elgeyo to act as intermediaries following a request by a Nandi woman who had sought refuge in Elgeyo, and replied that he would refer the matter to Berkeley at Entebbe.[2] Eight days later rumours were current at Ravine that the Kamasia had been asked by the Nandi to seek a settlement on their behalf, but no definite requests reached Martin. It was not until 1 January 1896 that a delegation of nine Nandi arrived at Ravine to ask for peace. After accepting the gifts they brought—two goats, two sheep, two pots of honey and a fowl—Martin assured them that their request would be granted when Jackson returned from Fort Smith in about twenty-five days time. The presents were derisory from a wealthy, cattle-owning tribe, even if the visitors came from one of the poorer, forest-dwelling sections, and suggest that the application might have been purely exploratory. The emissaries were given food and shelter for the night, and Martin urged them to leave two of their number at Ravine, while the remainder returned to Nandi to tell their kinsmen that a decision would be reached at the end of the month. Martin evidently suspected that the delegates were spies or the advance party of an invading force, as he distributed arms and ammunition to the porters and instructed them on their duties if the station were attacked during the night.* The Nandi declared on the morrow that they were all anxious to return home to look after their families and property, and none of them could be induced to stay. Before leaving the next morning to visit the Kamasia, the emissaries refused to divulge the number of guns and other looted articles which they had in their possession at home.

The peace party returned to Ravine after staying only one night among the Kamasia as their hosts had denied them food. The Nandi were told that the Kamasia would have nothing to do with them unless they made their peace with the government. Although Martin repeated his demand that some of the party should remain at the station as an earnest of their desire for peace, the Nandi insisted that their people would become anxious if they did not return home. Martin had to let them go after they had promised to return in twenty days time with some of their elders. They left on the 5th with a goat and enough food for a journey lasting twenty days. The amount of food demanded was excessive for a journey to the most distant parts of Nandi, and the transaction smacks of the contemptuous effrontery which the delegates had shown in their choice of gifts for Martin. The outrageous demands were complied with, however, either because Martin was anxious to humour his visitors or was ill-informed about the extent of Nandi territory. During their stay at Ravine the emissaries visited the Uasin Gishu Masai and gave them a goat, which the recipients assured Martin was handed over in repayment of an old debt.

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* Martin was also worried about the rumoured assault by the Lumbwa, see p. 160.

The Kamasia told Martin on the 27th that the Nandi would soon be suing for peace, but the emissaries failed to return at the new moon as they had promised, and it was not until 10 February 1896 that they revisited Ravine. This delegation consisting of six elders and four warriors brought no presents, and excused their belated arrival on the grounds that they had found another expedition in their country when they arrived home after their previous visit.* Jackson had a long talk with the delegates, who stated their case "with the most marked frankness", and from them he learned that their hostility had been aroused by Dick's outrage on the Guasa Masa.† Although the Nandi had expected that a punitive expedition would be sent against them after they had wreaked their vengeance on Dick's partner, they had been encouraged to extend their hostile activities by their success in killing a white man and raiding caravans without loss to themselves. Confidence in their military prowess, which was heightened by their belief in the supernatural powers of the Laibon, had convinced them that they could defeat any invader. But the emissaries admitted they had been surprised when two columns were sent against them, and "the destruction of their houses and crops and the loss of cattle and most of their other possessions, besides the loss of so many of their best fighting men", had demonstrated their vulnerability to invasion and made them desirous of peace.[3]

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* Cunningham had left Nandi several days before the emissaries returned home, but the Nandi possibly expected the troops to return later. RSD.

† This is the first recorded meeting between the Nandi and Jackson, who first crossed the Mau in 1889.

While noting their reputation for being "treacherous to a degree", Jackson was evidently impressed with the bearing and sincerity of the delegates, who for their part seemed delighted when he offered them peace. No formal treaty was made or blood-brotherhood ceremony performed, and Jackson contented himself with exhorting the Nandi to show their peaceful intentions by refraining from molesting mailmen and caravans on the Uganda Road. The Nandi responded by promising to keep their young men in order and not to break the peace again. They also volunteered to bring in to Ravine or Guasa Masa all the guns and looted property in their possession. Three of the party remained at Ravine, while two spokesmen left with the mail escort to tell Foaker that peace had been made, and to spread the news among the sections living near his fort. Jackson hoped that these harbingers would persuade some of the northern *pororosiek* to visit Guasa Masa to see for themselves that friendly relations had been established between the government and the Nandi. The rest of the peace party returned to their homes on the 12th as bearers of similar tidings to the tribe at large.

Jackson's initiative in sending the spokesmen to Guasa Masa proved fruitful, as Foaker was visited by a deputation on 29 February 1896. The party consisted of seventeen Nandi, two of whom were described as chiefs. They brought an 80 lb. tusk as a present and asked for peace. Foaker made blood-brotherhood with the delegates, who told him the Nandi were sick of hostilities as they had been living in the forest for three months and were afraid to return home to re-build their burnt-out huts. After staying only one night at the fort, the emissaries departed and promised to bring in food to Guasa Masa. This offer was welcomed as a friendly gesture, but Foaker realised that very little food would be brought to a station so far away from the chief producing areas in South Nandi. When Cunningham passed through Guasa Masa on his way to the coast a few days later, he asked Foaker to sound the Nandi during their next visit to the fort about their reactions to the proposed new road through their country.[4] The peace delegates evidently failed to return to Guasa Masa, however, as the brass wire, which was sent from Mumias for the negotiations and to pay for the promised food supplies, was subsequently returned. Had any favourable developments taken place, such as visits from friendly Nandi, food purchases for the garrison or acquiescence in the proposed re-routing of Sclater's Road, Foaker would undoubtedly have notified Jackson or Berkeley. But neither of Foaker's superiors received reassurances on these matters, so it must be presumed that after their short initial visit the Nandi decided to leave Foaker to his own devices at Guasa Masa.*

The conduct of the peace negotiations and the limited scope of the terms agreed between the parties were tantamount to an admission that the Nandi could not be treated as a beaten enemy after the 1895 expedition. Instead of a formal peace treaty, signed by chiefs in the presence of a large assembly of elders and warriors and witnessed by leaders of neighbouring tribes, which it was Hobley's custom to impose in Kavirondo, Jackson and Foaker had severally accepted a few general promises made by parties of ten and seventeen delegates respectively. Foaker had followed the routine practice of performing a blood-brotherhood ceremony, but neither official had ordered the Nandi to pay a fine, which was the recognised symbol before the introduction of hut tax that a hostile tribe had made its submission to the government. This omission cannot be attributed to concern about the relatively slight losses sustained by the Nandi during the expedition, so much as to the knowledge that the local officials were powerless to ensure compliance with the demand.†

Jackson had no means of judging how representative the delegates were of the tribe on whose behalf they purported to negotiate, and to what extent their promises would be honoured throughout Nandi. The delegates were identified neither by name nor *pororosiek*, so Jackson could not assess whether the submission was local or general. This information would have meant nothing in any case to the district officers, since they were equally as ignorant about personalities as they were ill-informed about tribal structure. Jackson's dilemma in this regard stresses one of the chief problems encountered by the early administrators: the search for a leader representative enough to treat with the government, and also powerful enough to restrain the headstrong youths from indulging in hostile activities. Jackson was evidently not satisfied that the

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* There are no entries for food purchases or return presents for the peace party in NCB. The Nandi seldom had surplus food in February.

† See pp. 45-99 for Nandi views on blood-brotherhood. Cf. the Kabras peace terms p. 123.

"chiefs" in the two peace delegations met this requirement. When Hobley was faced with similar situations in Kavirondo, he was invariably in possession of some of the relevant facts, and could usually judge whether he was negotiating with leaders of authority or men of straw. Moreover, Jackson's considerable experience in treaty-making* had probably caused him to hold different views on the value of the procedure from those of his colleague in Kavirondo.[5]

Jackson's readiness to accept general promises from the Nandi can probably be explained by the administration's conviction that the immediate and most important objective of the 1895 expedition had been attained—the safety of the Uganda Road. It would have been foolhardy in the circumstances to antagonise the Nandi unnecessarily, when their goodwill was needed for the construction of Sclater's Road and a station in the south of the district. Although Berkeley and Cunningham had doubts concerning Nandi reactions to these proposals, both pinned their faith on reaching a more general and lasting understanding with the tribal leaders, when memories of the expedition had dimmed and Nandi suspicions of the government's intentions had been allayed by peaceful occupation of the new post. Berkeley was content to proceed with his long-term policy of gradually increasing the administration's strength in the Eastern Province, and to defer the final settlement of the Nandi question until he had the resources to attempt it without misgivings. The Commissioner was hopeful that further military measures would be unnecessary, and anticipated that "time and opportunity will no doubt bring in due course the friendly relations between ourselves and the Nandi, which circumstances have not allowed of our establishing at once". He was particularly anxious to bring this about as he was optimistic that Nandi producers would be able to supply the food requirements of Ravine and Guasa Masa and make them less dependent on Kikuyu and Kavirondo. Berkeley's views were in accord with Foreign Office policy in these matters, which deprecated the formulation of demands and the acceptance of commitments, unless the demands could be enforced and the additional responsibilities had an immediate relevance to the furtherance of the government's principal aims.[6]

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* See p. 62 for Jackson's treaties, some of which the Company and Protectorate had failed to honour.

Cunningham's expedition and the period of peace that followed it merely secured the position as it was before West's murder, except that Nandi had been raided for the first time since the defeat of the Masai, and two small, questionably representative parties had promised that attacks on caravans would cease. So long as these promises were honoured, Berkeley was not prepared either to sanction measures likely to necessitate further punitive operations, or to insist that an undertaking should be exacted from the Nandi that they would refrain from raiding other tribes. Subsequent events showed that the arrangement with the government was regarded by the Nandi as having no more validity than the truces which they were accustomed to make with other enemies, and did not preclude them from raiding other tribes. The whole episode illustrates the fundamental weakness of the Protectorate in its early days: the government seldom had the resources to devote to a major problem until it could be brought to a satisfactory conclusion, or to concentrate its forces long enough to undertake anything but patching up operations.

The conciliatory settlement which was concluded after the Kedong massacre foreshadowed that the government's treatment of the Masai would have more in common with the measures practised in Kavirondo, than with the policy that was considered expedient for containing the Nandi threat. West's murder and the Kedong massacre were similar episodes in many respects. But the different methods employed in dealing with them demonstrated the isolation of the Nandi, and led officials to recognise that the "Nandi question" called for special treatment. This attitude of mind was to have an important effect on the pacification and uneven development of the Eastern Province for the next decade. The "Nandi question" arose, and was accorded special treatment, partly as a result of historical factors but mainly because of the strength and stubbornness of the people's resolve to maintain their independence.

On 25 November 1895 an EAP caravan, commanded by a Swahili headman and consisting of 137 Swahili askari and 1,038 Kikuyu porters, was returning to Fort Smith from Ravine, where it had delivered loads for the Uganda Government. After passing Naivasha the caravan began a series of provocative acts in the Kedong Valley against the Masai encampments along the route: milk was filched from a kraal, the headman abducted two Masai maidens, the caravan's drums were used to stampede the herds of cattle and a calf was stolen. The last incident, which led to the shooting of the stolen animal and the death of some of the Masai who attempted to recover it, caused the warriors to launch a mass attack against the caravan, despite the elders' efforts to restrain them. After some casualties had been inflicted by the Swahili gunmen in the initial stages of the engagement, the caravan was routed and put to flight. The guns and loads were abandoned and 99 Swahilis and 456 Kikuyus were massacred by Masai spearmen. News of the disaster was brought on the following day by survivors to Fort Smith, where Andrew Dick persuaded a French scientific explorer, de Versepuy, and his companion to join him in a sortie to punish the victorious Masai. After rejecting Gilkison's order to leave punitive measures to the government, Dick killed over a hundred warriors and drove off 195 head of cattle and 65 donkeys. The attackers had to withdraw to Fort Smith, however, when Dick was killed after a brave stand against overwhelming odds. Gilkison and Lewis reconnoitred the Kedong the next day, but returned to Fort Smith after failing to get in touch with the Masai, who had retreated to the hills. Dick's intervention in the dispute was ostensibly to uphold the prestige of the white man, but the EAP officials suspected that his action was prompted by the prospects of rustling some of the Masai cattle for his projected trading expedition to the north.*

Nothing further happened until 17 December 1895 when Pordage, who was leading a steamer caravan from Fort Smith to Ravine, heard the Masai version of the incident. On his arrival at his destination on the 20th, Pordage reported to Jackson, who hurried to Fort Smith. Here he found Ainsworth and also Lenana, the Masai Laibon, who had been visiting the station with five chiefs when the massacre occurred. As a result of their investigations the two senior officials agreed that the Swahilis (and to a lesser extent, the Kikuyus) were the aggressors, and that no further action against the Masai was justified. The stock looted by Dick's raiding party were retained as compensation for the families of the slaughtered Kikuyus, and the Masai returned the caravan's guns and other goods, which had been left lying where they fell in the Kedong Valley. On the return journey to Ravine, Jackson interviewed Lenana at Kijabe and held discussions with other Masai leaders on the Rift Valley plains. Lenana, who had expected punitive measures to be taken against his people, agreed to order the warriors not to build their encampments near the Uganda Road, and welcomed the government's proposal for a station at Naivasha. By the time Jackson returned to Ravine two months after the massacre, he was confident that the immediate danger had been averted and the foundations laid for a lasting and strategically important peace.[7]

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* See p. 91 for the Kikelelwa and Guru-Guru incidents. Similar caravans, usually with a European in charge, left Fort Smith every other month.

Before West's murder and the Kedong massacre, government policy regarding the Nandi and Masai was identical in aim and method. The objective in both cases was the protection of the Uganda Road throughout the long foodless stretch between Kikuyu and Kabras. So long as caravans were not molested, the administration was averse to provoking collisions with either tribe. In the first two years after the government assumed control, nothing happened to cause such a collision, and no stations were established to administer the Nandi and Masai and to control the activities of their warriors. The nearest government posts were at Ravine and Mumias, where the district officers could only turn a blind eye on raids against tribes which lived any distance from the road and stations. But this state of affairs could not last for long: Masai raids against the Kitosh jeopardised the settlement which Hobley had arranged with this formerly hostile tribe; the Naivasha Masai's participation in raids against the protected Kikuyu and Kamba might prejudice food supplies, and recruitment for the Ravine caravans; and the Nandi were bound sooner or later to despoil some of the Kavirondo tribes to whom Hobley had promised protection by treaty.* When the clash of interests occurred, the successful solution of the ensuing problems would depend on the statesmanship of the local officials—and the readiness of the Nandi and Masai to accept their decisions.

Despite the commonly held opinion that the Masai were more to be feared than the Nandi, certain historical factors were conducive to the belief that a settlement might be concluded more easily with the former than the latter. Since Thomson's crossing of Masailand in 1883, the Masai had become well-known to travellers through the Rift Valley. They had offered no concerted opposition to caravans, but had developed a vested interest in them, at first by the exaction of *hongo* and later by the sale of firewood, donkeys, curios and small quantities of foodstuffs. Nearly all caravans carried a Masai-speaking interpreter, so that easy communication was possible between caravan leaders and the occupants of the Masai kraals along the Uganda Road. Unlike the Nandi they had never striven to keep themselves aloof from the government, and in the EAP Lenana had even solicited Hall to shelter Kapte and Matapatu refugees against harassment by their Kilimanjaro kinsmen. Although little was known of the Purko Masai on the Rift Valley Plains, Hall had established friendly relations with their fellow-tribesmen near his station. In particular, he had won the confidence of Lenana, who was quick to appreciate that the British connection increased his standing among his people and could become the means of his attaining political power as the tribal Laibon, to which he could not pretend on traditional grounds. This significant shift of power in the Masai system of government was encouraged by Hall and his superior officer, Ainsworth, since Lenana provided a more convenient channel for reaching the tribe as a whole than the alternative method of dealing separately with the leaders of the dispersed sections. Lenana sought to strengthen the alliance, as it had proved its usefulness in settling the refugee sections and in furthering his claims in the succession dispute with his brother, Sendeyu.[8] Although the division of the Masai by the inter-protectorate boundary created some administrative complications for the two governments. Lenana exercised considerable influence among the Uganda Masai and provided a link between the two divisions of the tribe and the district officer at Fort Smith. The understanding between Lenana and Hall was a decisive factor in relations between the government and the Masai, and was largely responsible for the maintenance of peaceful conditions in the Rift Valley and along the Uganda Road before and after the Kedong massacre.

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* The Naivasha Masai raided frequently in the EAP. In August 1894 they raided the Machakos cattle boma and Hall noted that the passage of these warrior bands through his district was not unusual; Hall's Letters.

On the other hand, the Nandi Laibon, far from seeing the British connection as an aid to greater political power, had incited the warriors to attack West and the road caravans and had received the credit, and some reward, for the success of these enterprises. Cunningham's expedition had weakened the Laibon's position to some extent, but many of the Nandi believed that the warriors had escaped defeat and the enemy had left the country as a result of his supernatural intervention. The Laibon had not intervened in the peace negotiations or tried to meet the government's representatives, but had fled to Lumbwa where he continued his machinations to rid Nandi of the invaders. On the government side, Jackson and Hobley had failed to get into communication with the Laibon or other tribal leaders, so they were in a less favourable position to negotiate with the Nandi than were Hall and Ainsworth with the Masai. In addition to these factors which encouraged the government to hope for a peaceful settlement with the Masai, there was a growing awareness that the strength of the tribe was failing while the power of the Nandi was in the ascendant.[9]

The Nandi attack on West's camp was similar to the Masai massacre of the Fort Smith caravan since both threatened the Uganda Road and took place some distance from the nearest government station. Moreover, West was killed in retaliation for Dick's murder of the two Nandi at the Guasa Masa, and the Kedong caravan had been cut up as a result of the provocation it had offered to the Masai. Dick's death was caused by his impetuous attempt to avenge the caravan massacre, after he had disregarded Gilkison's orders just as West had refused to heed the remonstrances of the Mumias officials. Both were private traders, but the Nandi and Masai were seemingly confused about their victims' connections with the government. The Nandi probably regarded West as a novel type of Arab trader who had entered their country from the caravan headquarters at Mumias, where another white stranger from the coast had already meddled in the affairs of some of the Kavirondo tribes after the manner of his kind; and the Masai were convinced that Dick's sortie was the punitive column which they expected to be sent against them from Fort Smith.[10]

The two incidents differed, however, in some particulars. The Masai attack on the government caravan was on a far greater scale than the Nandi raid on the private trader's camp, and was likely to have more serious repercussions on porter recruitment. In contrast to the handful of predominantly coastal professionals in West's party, a large number of people under British protection were killed in the Kedong, and the slaughter of the Kikuyu porters endangered the friendly relations which Hall had so painstakingly fostered since 1893 among their fellow tribesmen around Fort Smith. The attack on West's camp, which took place three weeks after Dick's outrage at the Guasa Masa, was a premeditated operation, whereas the Masai, who had shown considerable restraint in the early stages of their encounter with the caravan, had acted in hot blood when they were provoked beyond endurance. It was also unlikely that the Masai would have launched a premeditated assault at a time when Lenana and five of their chiefs were visiting Fort Smith. The warriors had no choice but to oppose Dick's intervention when the trader's party arrived on the scene, as he made no effort to hear the Masai version of the massacre but attacked at once. Finally, the Nandi raiders had suffered no casualties in their carefully planned attack on West's camp, whereas Masai losses in men and stock were considerable and had caused them to respect the fire power and bravery of the white man.*

The initial official reaction to both incidents was the same: the offenders must be punished in order to secure the Uganda Road and to regain prestige. Grant was ready to take immediate action against the Nandi and Gilkison against the Masai. But both were prevented from undertaking speedy reprisals owing to other commitments: Grant had been instructed to punish the Kitosh, Kikelelwa, Kabras and Wanyala; and Gilkison was ordered to send part of his small, locally trained garrison to help Ainsworth against the Kamba.† It was perhaps fortunate that reprisals had to be deferred in both cases as Grant and Gilkison might have been roughly handled by the Nandi and Masai. Inquiries into the causes of both disasters were instituted without delay: Hobley sent a detachment to seek information from the chiefs in the neighbourhood of West's camp; and Gilkison, after despatching a sergeant with thirty askari to ascertain the extent of the disaster and to recall Dick, made an unsuccessful attempt to get in touch with the Masai. A considerable time elapsed before Hobley received news from his emissaries, and it was three weeks after Dick's death before Pordage discussed the incident with the Masai. Pordage met the leaders of several sections during his journey to Ravine in December, and Jackson gave presents to the Masai chiefs whom he interviewed on the road later in the same month. But after West's murder no European official tried to get in touch with the Nandi or to enter their country.[11]

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* Masai casualties were slightly lower than those suffered by the Nandi in the 1895 expedition.

† Fifty Swahili askari and 800 Masai went to Machakos on 27 November, 1895 and returned to Fort Smith on 14 December, 1895.

The government's inaction puzzled the Nandi and Masai, who thought that reprisals would follow swiftly after both incidents. The Nandi were undeterred by this contingency, but the Masai convinced Pordage and Jackson that they wished for peace, and offered to pay a fine. The warriors promised to keep their encampments away from the Uganda Road, and honoured their representatives' undertaking to restore the government guns and other property; but the Nandi kept the goods they had looted from West and, a few days after their initial success, began a series of attacks on Uganda caravans. It was the desire of the Masai for peace and the continuing hostility of the Nandi that finally decided the different course of action which the government pursued in its relations with the respective tribes. Conciliation was possible in the case of the Masai, who had already suffered considerable punishment, and Jackson and Ainsworth were able to come to an arrangement with Lenana and their other leaders. The settlement was made in the presence of the Kikuyu elders, who were satisfied that the Masai were not at fault and mollified by the compensation that was awarded to the families of the slaughtered porters.* The agreement with the Masai was only possible because Lenana had shown that he had sufficient authority over his people to ensure that the pledges which he made on their behalf were honoured. Lenana could justify his ready acceptance of the settlement proposals by reminding his people of Mbatian's advice that they should not oppose the newcomers, and his prophecy that disaster would befall the Masai and their herds if they killed a white man. This authoritative backing enabled Lenana to restrain the Masai warriors, whereas their Nandi counterparts seemed bent on disproving Kimnyole's prophecy that the white man would come and take their country.†

It was very much in the government's interest to seek a peaceful arrangement with the Masai. A longer stretch of the Uganda Road was threatened by their warriors than by the Nandi, and military operations against the Masai would necessitate the deployment of large forces over a much more extensive area. Moreover, the Masai were thought to be more powerful than the Nandi—yet Cunningham's expedition had shown that the Protectorate's resources were inadequate to secure the submission of determined and experienced warriors fighting on their own terms. Operations in Masailand would entail the closure of the Uganda Road at a time when great efforts were being made to take up the *William Mackinnon,* and to clear the backlog of arms loads which Colvile had ordered in 1894. A Masai expedition would also delay the construction of Sclater's Road and the proposed station at Naivasha. Furthermore, as the fighting could not be confined to the Masai in Uganda, it would have serious repercussions in the EAP and might jeopardise Machakos and Fort Smith and their food supplies.*

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* The punishment received by the Masai had not been at the hands of the government. Their stock losses were similar to those suffered by the Nandi in the 1895 expedition. It was feared that the Naivasha Masai would attack the Kikuyu, and that the Kikuyu would seek reprisals against the Masai and attempt to capture Lenana. The Ngong post was evacuated temporarily and the Masai settlers removed to Fort Smith.

† See p. 31. See p. 160 for the effect of the Nandi expedition on the Masai. Africa, 7 (1897).

Jackson and Ainsworth were relieved to find they could offer the Masai peace without loss of prestige. After seeing Lenana at Kijabe, Jackson was convinced that a Masai rising had been averted, and hopeful that the restoration of settled conditions would encourage the Kikuyu to enlist as porters for the caravans upon which Ravine was dependent for much of its food supplies.† Peace in the Rift Valley also enabled the government to consolidate its position there by means of the new post at Naivasha, which Lenana had welcomed. The Kedong affair presented a favourable opportunity for consulting the Masai about this project, whereas the complementary station at Guasa Masa had been established hurriedly, and without the consent of the Nandi, in order to deter the warriors from continuing the raids that had begun with the attack on West's camp.

Many of the considerations affecting the Kedong settlement did not apply to the Nandi, so that the government was forced to acknowledge, after West's murder, that even the exploration of their country with a view to shortening the Uganda Road could only be undertaken by a considerable armed force. The district officers had little difficulty, therefore, in persuading Jackson and

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* There was also a possibility of international complications as the Masai in GEA might have become involved.

† When Hall returned from leave in July 1896 the Kikuyu provided full complements for the caravans.

Berkeley that punitive action against the Nandi was necessary and unavoidable. The Foreign Office approved Berkeley's proposals and the Nandi were punished, but they remained the gravest threat to the security of Eastern Uganda for the following decade. The conciliatory arrangement made with the Masai was also approved by the Foreign Office, which expressed its gratification that the tribe could be controlled without resort to forcible measures, "the extent and effect of which it might be difficult to control, and which should not be undertaken without reference home". As a result of this accommodation, the Masai settled down under British rule and ceased to threaten the Protectorate's principal interest in their country—the security of the Uganda Road.[12]

References

1. See ESA, A/4 series for examples of this process.
2. Martin-Com, 1 December, 1895, ESA, A/4/3; RSD.
3. RSD. Jackson-Com, 11 February, 1896, in Berkeley-FO, 3 March, 1896, FOCP, 6849/184. Berkeley's despatch reads "the destruction of crops and the loss of cattle and other possessions besides the loss of many of their best fighting men", a common device used by commissioners to minimise the effects of punitive measures. A two-pronged attack was a novel departure east of the Nile.
4. Cunningham-Com, 3 March, 1896, ESA, A/4/4.
5. Cf. Hardinge-FO, 11 June, 1896, FOCP, 6861/28 on treaties, "empty mockery", "fiction". Kavirondo leadership was based on clans and lineages; for Nandi see p. 14. Lonsdale, *op. cit.*, Chapters, 1, 4 for a discussion on "the search for a chief".
6. Berkeley-FO, 8 February, 1896, FOCP, 6849/54. For FO Policy in EAP see Mungeam, *op. cit.*, Chapters 2 and 3. Hardinge-FO, 19 December, 1895, FO107/39; FO-Hardinge, 16 January, 1896, FO107/47.
7. There are many conflicting versions of the Kedong affair in FOCP, FO2 series, Zanzibar, Mombasa and Entebbe archives, Jackson, *op. cit.*, Goldsmith, *John Ainsworth;* Mbotela, *Freeing of the Slaves in East Africa;* Russell's Diary; Ainsworth Papers; de Romans, Soc. Géog. Paris, 1896, p. 372.
8. See Hall's Letters for his relations with Lenana and his use of Masai levies and soldiers; Matson, *Story of a District Officer, KWN,* 18 October, 1963 to 15 November, 1963. Ainsworth-Hardinge, 20 March, 1896, FOCP, 6849/144: "Had Lenana not been the strong man he is, and a great friend of the European, nothing would have saved the situation" after the Kedong massacre.
9. e.g. Hardinge, Africa, 7 (1897), Cmd. 8683.
10. The Kikuyu called Dick "White Swahili" Mbotela, *op. cit.*, p. 77.
11. Berkeley-Jackson, 17 February, 1896, ESA, A/5/2.
12. Berkeley did not await FO approval before sanctioning the Nandi expedition; FO-Berkeley, 28 December, 1895, FOCP, 6805/271. FO-Hardinge, 16 January, 1896, FOCP, 6827/54. Berkeley approved Jackson's arrangement: "there could be no question in the circumstances of our taking hostile steps against the Masai". Berkeley-Jackson, 17 February, 1896, ESA, A/5/2.

8

REORGANISATION IN THE EASTERN PROVINCE

During his journey to Uganda in July 1895, Berkeley decided to strengthen the government's tenuous hold over its eastern territories. This decision was taken in the first place because of the need to control the Uganda caravans, and thus prevent further allegations about the death and abandonment of porters, indifferent supervision and inadequate medical services. The Nandi attacks on the Uganda Road convinced the new Commissioner that his requests for more staff and stations could also be justified by the need to ensure the safe passage of caravans, and to provide escorts for Sclater's road party and the ships that were in transit to the Lake. These objectives could not be achieved by three district officers and the small garrisons at the two staging posts of Ravine and Mumias, and the transhipment and steamer construction station at Port Victoria.[1] Berkeley realised that the safety of the road could not be ensured in a political vacuum, and without undertaking the pacification of the people living in its vicinity. This meant that district officers would have to go beyond the limits set by Jackson's instructions to Hobley, if tribal activities likely to embarrass the government or to endanger the road were to be controlled.* Berkeley went further and enunciated the general principle that it was the administration's duty not merely to hold certain posts but to develop the country around them. He justified an increase in the number of officials from twenty-one to twenty-seven on the grounds that extra men would allow more knowledge to be obtained of the various districts and for initiating experiments for their development.[2] As far as the eastern territories were concerned, the Commissioner was particularly impressed, like Lugard, Portal and Colvile before him, by the resources and potentialities of the plateau country stretching westwards from Ravine.†

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* See p. 86.
† See Chapter 3.

Nothing revolutionary could be attempted with an increased establishment of six officers, which barely filled the gaps caused by sickness and leave, and with the grant-in-aid pegged by the Treasury at £49,000. Nevertheless, a more forward-looking, long-term policy was accepted in principle by the Foreign Office, if only by default. It remained for Berkeley to do what he could, within the itemised framework of the Protectorate estimates, to implement his policy of strengthening the Eastern Province administration. But any increases of staff and expenditure in this area would be at the expense of the rest of the country, and would be dependent on the demands made on Berkeley's resources by events in other districts. Fortunately 1896 was a quiet period in Uganda as a whole. The only military activity was a small, abortive expedition against Kabarega in October, so the Commissioner was able to devote his time and talents to the re-organisation of the civil administration.

Berkeley's first move, the founding of Guasa Masa station, was forced on him precipitately by the Nandi threat to the road. His second was the division of the Eastern Province into two districts, Kavirondo and Mau, and the posting of his most senior and experienced officer, Jackson, to take charge of the latter from Ravine. The Foreign Office, which had been harried by complaints from the CMS about the shortcomings of the transport system, welcomed this proposal and considered it a "wise step to plant a strong man at the principal point in the line of communications". Jackson's writ was to run within the area bounded in the east by the EAP, in the north-west by the Kabras Hills and in the south and west by the Nandi Hills. To the south of the Nandi escarpment Jackson's jurisdiction extended to the German frontier, including Lumbwa, and in the north "as far as circumstances and the gradual development of your administration may render advisable".[3] His authority would be exercised at the outset through the existing stations at Ravine and Guasa Masa, but it was hoped that another post would be established at Naivasha or Elmenteita. Ravine was to remain the focal point for the reorganisation of the Mau District, and Guasa Masa was to function merely as a military post until the end of the Nandi operations.*

In order to supervise the extensive area entrusted to his charge,

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* Jackson was posted to the Eastern Province in 1897 and 1900 for special duties; Chapter 14.

Jackson was to have the assistance of Vandeleur, who was to take over Guasa Masa so that Foaker could be transferred to Ravine. But Vandeleur resigned and Foaker had to remain at Guasa Masa. When Martin left for the coast on 27 December 1895, only two officers, Jackson and Foaker, were stationed in the Mau District, but de Silva, a Goan clerk who had been employed privately by Martin because of the latter's illiteracy, was taken over by the government. But for de Silva's presence at Ravine, where he acted virtually as a civil assistant, Jackson would have been confined to the neighbourhood of his station. Berkeley hoped to remedy this unsatisfactory state of affairs when the estimates for 1896-97 were implemented in April 1896. These provided for four civil assistants and a doctor, together with eight subordinates (clerk, hospital assistant, three interpreters and three Swahili headmen) and eighty porters for the three stations in the Mau District. In addition to the civil establishment, Jackson was allocated one Sudanese company (three native officers and 109 men) to police the whole district and to perform garrison and escort duties.*

On general issues affecting Uganda as a whole, Berkeley instructed Jackson to arrange a postal service between Mumias and Kikuyu, the stretch where "most difficulty has hitherto existed for ensuring regularity and speed". On district matters Jackson was advised:

> Your principal duties will be to develop and maintain friendly relations with the native tribes in your district, with the chiefs of which you should, where it has not been done and where opportunity offers, make treaties on the form of which I enclose herewith six copies. You should also use your best endeavours to induce the neighbouring food producing communities to bring supplies for the use of your station and of passing caravans and, as opportunity may offer, strive to attract into your immediate neighbourhood for the purpose of settling there any natives, whose presence and industry in agricultural or other useful directions would seem desirable.†

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* One 1st class (Jackson); two 2nd class (Foaker and Major Smith, the latter a 1st class official posted to Naivasha, April 1896); one third (not filled). Dr. Macpherson arrived at Ravine on 11 April, 1896. Before he learned of Jackson's transfer, Cunningham had posted a quarter of VI Company (seemingly reservists) to Ravine; another quarter company was later drafted there from Mumias.

† For Jackson's treaties of 1889-90 with the Lumbwa and Njemps see p. 62-64. There is no record that Jackson used any of the treaty forms.

These objectives had a direct bearing on the security of the Uganda Road and the provisioning of caravans. In this respect Berkeley's orders followed the pattern set by the instructions given to Spire in July 1894 and Hobley in February 1895.* The Commissioner's advocacy of treaty making, however, went beyond the warning given to Hobley "to interfere as little as possible in local affairs", and recognised that the security of the Uganda Road depended on the leaders of the people living in its vicinity acknowledging the supremacy of the government.

Jackson found the implementation of his instructions a slow and uphill task. The mail service was improved and the runners given protection, but he had little success in persuading many of the Kamasia or Uasin Gishu Masai to settle near Ravine. Food purchases from these sources were irregular and negligible, so that Ravine was dependent throughout 1896 on Fort Smith, Kavirondo and Kitoto's for its food supplies. After taking over Guasa Masa station on the way down from Kampala, Jackson arrived at Ravine on 20 December 1895. A week later he went to Fort Smith to investigate the Kedong massacre and did not return to his headquarters until 20 January 1896. Leaving Dr. Macpherson or de Silva in charge at Ravine, Jackson undertook tours to establish stations at Naivasha in March-April and the Nandi station at Kipture in June-July. He also visited some of the Elgeyo and Kamasia sections in August and the Njemps in September 1896. A small punitive sortie was made against the Elkakimor Kamasia on 6 November 1896, when four rifles which the offending section had bought from the Nandi were recovered.[4] Jackson did not go himself to Lumbwa but the district was visited twice by his subordinates. The station headman was sent in March 1896 to buy food and to bring in an ivory and slave caravan, and the following month de Silva went to enquire into the alleged massacre of an Arab caravan in Sotik. As it was found that the massacre had occurred at a place eight marches distant from Ravine, Jackson admitted he could do nothing to punish the Sotik. He threatened to send a punitive force accompanied by 5,000 Naivasha Masai, if the Sotik refused to pay a fine and hand over the culprits, and hoped that this threat might induce the Lumbwa to coerce the Sotik into compliance with his demands. Berkeley approved Jackson's action, but warned that if an expedition was necessary it would have to wait as there were no troops available for the task. He also took the opportunity to advise Jackson that "although it must be our constant endeavour to extend our influence and control . . . , so as to prevent or punish outrages of this nature, yet we can only gradually fulfil this task", and added that the government could not be responsible for disasters to trading parties, which entered "our territories without reporting themselves at one of our stations for advice and protection, so far as we can extend the latter".[5]

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* See pp. 84-86.

Jackson discovered from these various activities that the only friendly tribes in his district were the Elgeyo and Njemps. The remainder were generally indifferent to his presence but sometimes exhibited impatience at his pretensions to control their customary pursuits. There was a chronically recurrent pattern of raid and counter-raid amongst the tribes themselves: the Njemps were raided by the Kamasia, Suk and Arab traders; the Suk by the Naivasha Masai; and the Elgeyo by the Kamasia, Suk and Nandi. Jackson, who did not view inter-tribal raiding in the same serious light as Hobley, took what action he could to lessen its incidence and severity. He offered (apparently without success) to arrange a meeting between the Masai and Suk, and persuaded two unnamed Nandi to visit Elgeyo in order to make blood-brotherhood with some of the chiefs.* Despite the activities of raiding bands, Jackson also discovered towards the end of 1896 that there were strong bonds uniting the Kalenjin peoples, which might lead them to organise a combination against the government.[6]

Jackson's appointment to Ravine had restricted Hobley's jurisdiction to Kavirondo, so that he was able to concentrate on consolidating the gains achieved there by the government in 1895, and on extending the scope and effectiveness of his personal ascendancy over the tribes around Mumias. The understanding with Mumia brought benefits to the Wanga and their allies, and provided Hobley with a nucleus of friendly tribes from which government influence could be extended. The enemies of the Wanga (the Kitosh, Kikelelwa and Ugenya) had felt the force of British arms, while the Kabras had escaped the same fate by making peace with the administration. Coastal traders and Uasin Gishu mercenaries, who had encouraged raiding by stimulating intertribal animosities, lost much of their pernicious influence when they were seen to be no match for Mumia's new ally.* Although Hobley was granted jurisdiction in February 1895 over the country extending in the south to Kitoto's and in the west to Ravine, he had visited neither of these places nor got in touch with the Nandi. He was too busy securing his position at Mumias, pacifying the Kavirondo tribes near the Uganda Road and organising food supplies for the Protectorate caravans, to put these major issues at risk by undertaking lengthy tours of doubtful usefulness.

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* See p. 217. Cf. Martin's fears in December 1894 and after West's murder, pp. 79-97.

When Bagge was posted to Mumias in November 1895, Hobley was able to leave the station and tour his district. These excursions were much more successful than those undertaken by Jackson, who was breaking newer ground among much less amenable people. Hobley completed the pacification of the Ugenya and their more distant Nilotic relations, the Nilo-Hamitic Elgon tribes, as well as the Maragoli, Kakamega and Bunyore Baluyia. The blood-brotherhood procedure was adopted in most cases and similar ceremonies were conducted as a means of reconciling feuding tribes. By helping his allies to resist attacks from their intransigent neighbours, and by swift police action against troublesome elements, Hobley demonstrated to the Kavirondo that British Protection was no mere fiction.† Similar measures were undertaken on a much more limited scale by Macallister from Port Victoria.[7] Hobley's achievements were secured with much the same establishment as Jackson commanded in Mau. The staff allocated to the two Kavirondo stations consisted of four civil assistants, one doctor, eight subordinates and eighty porters. Berkeley had hoped to post a Sudanese company commanded by a military officer to Mumias and Port Victoria, but no officer was available and the half company placed at Hobley's disposal was made up entirely of reservists.‡

Hobley's rapid progress in bringing the Kavirondo under control was brought about by measures that went far beyond the terms of his brief. Instead of adhering to the injunction to "interfere as little as possible in local affairs", Hobley took the initiative and extended his jurisdiction to tribes occupying territory some distance from Mumias and the Uganda Road. He interfered directly in tribal politics by acting as peacemaker between hostile sections, and by making the chiefs responsible for arresting offenders against the general peace. Hobley's detailed reports containing observations on his aims and methods were, nevertheless, received in Entebbe without criticism and often without comment. The general tenor of these accounts was that the extension of government influence necessarily involved district officers more and more deeply in the political affairs of their districts. His immediate aim was to stop inter-tribal raiding based on long-standing feuds, and perpetuated by warriors eager to obtain cattle in order to prove their manhood or to obtain wives. Raiding not only encouraged the formation of temporary alliances with coastal traders and Uasin Gishu Masai mercenaries, but also created a desire for guns. Fortunately Hobley began the work of pacification before firearms became common in Eastern Uganda. Some weapons had been obtained from caravan deserters, coastal traders, Company officials and Nandi raiders, but very few reached the district from the west, so that the numbers held by the Kavirondo were insignificant compared with the huge quantities which the Baganda and Banyoro acquired through German East Africa.[8]

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* See Chapters 4, 5. Hobley expelled the Swahili traders from Mumias in March 1895.

† Hobley persuaded two Kalenjin leaders (Kimangichi, the Lago chief, and a Sebei chief's son) to go with him to Mumias "to realise the permanency of our occupation".

‡ Hobley, Macallister (1st class); Bagge (2nd class); the 3rd class post was not filled after Malek went to Kampala on 14 November, 1895; Dr. Mackinnon until 11 June, 1896.

Hobley recognised that outside the Wanga confederacy he had to deal with a collection of sub-tribes, none of which was led by a traditional chief with authority to negotiate on his people's behalf, and to see that government orders were obeyed by his warriors. The prospects were not encouraging, but Hobley went to great lengths to find or create chiefs, from among the leaders of the dominant clans, who were then built up and bound to the government by self-interest and prestige. By handing out presents to his nominees, giving them government cattle to herd and calling them into Mumias, Hobley let it be seen that his chosen leaders enjoyed the recognition and friendship of the governing power. As a result of his investigations into tribal structure, Hobley was aware that his influence was built on somewhat flimsy foundations.* But he was nonetheless convinced that much could be done through the chiefs to check lawless practices, providing pressure was applied gradually and help given judiciously to his creations. The chiefs were encouraged to bring their complaints against other tribes and their law suits to Mumias for investigation and settlement. Weekly meetings of chiefs were instituted in April 1896 but these were discontinued after a while, owing to Hobley's other commitments, his frequent absences from Mumias and the distances the participants had to travel. While the procedure was in operation, chiefs and other representatives attended from Wanga, Kitosh, Kitoto's, Ugenya, Lago and the Uasin Gishu Masai.

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* Hobley was an amateur anthropologist of considerable distinction.

Hobley realised that control could only become fully effective when more stations were opened, and when the government could demonstrate, by putting an end to Nandi and Masai depredations, that British protection was preferable to the unsettled conditions that had existed before his arrival at Mumias.* He was particularly exercised over Nandi raids on Elgon and Kitoto's, as he considered these areas had been granted protection by the Company treaties.[9] But it is not clear whether this was so in law, and whether Berkeley agreed with Hobley's protestation that "these incidents reduce the protection of Her Majesty's Government to a fiction and seriously interfere with the influence of the Administration". Hobley's hopes for additional stations were not fulfilled in 1896, however, and the only post established in Kavirondo during the year was located at Kakamega to facilitate the purchase of food for Sclater's men and the Nandi garrison. The government also failed to protect the Elgon and Kitoto people from frequent Nandi raids, and North Kitosh from a pillaging party of 500 Naivasha Masai.† Despite the devastation caused during the expeditions in 1895, Hobley organised food markets in several places, where supplies were bought for local and caravan use, as well as for Jackson's stations at Guasa Masa, Ravine and Kipture.‡ By the end of 1896 the western marches of Nandi were ringed with tribes which undoubtedly enjoyed British protection, so that any resurgence of raiding activities in this region would force the protecting power to take retaliatory measures against the raiders. In the meantime, Berkeley was able to claim in his handing over report that Hobley had established a firm administration from Elgon to the Lake, and that protection had been afforded to friendly tribes against those which remained hostile. Much of this work had been accomplished before a Protectorate was declared over the countries east of Buganda on 30 June 1896, a pronouncement which legalised Hobley's methods of extending control among previously unprotected tribes. This belated proclamation was promulgated largely because of the unsatisfactory position revealed by the *Imperatrix v. Juma and Urzee* case. The announcement had been delayed because the *de facto* situation gave no cause for concern, and Salisbury was unwilling to encourage parliamentary strictures on his expansionist policy, or to jeopardise relations with other colonial powers.[10]

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* See p. 78-79.

† See p. 204. Berkeley-Hobley, 9 December, 1895, ESA, A/5/1 had proposed making Kikelelwa the main station for Kavirondo with Mumias as a subsidiary post.

‡ Hobley bought food from Wanga, Marama, Marach, Kisa, Kakamega, Kabras, Bukhayo, Samia, Kitoto's and Gem.

Having increased the establishment in the Eastern Province, Berkeley further strengthened its administration by setting up another station on the Uganda Road between the existing centres of influence at Ravine and Fort Smith. Shortly after Major Smith returned from leave, he accompanied Jackson to Naivasha in March 1896 to build a station near the road camp which Sclater had established there in the previous month. Naivasha was not only an important caravan road junction but also a cattle watering centre for the Rift Valley Masai.* The main functions of the new station were to protect the Uganda Road caravans, including the EAP food convoys to Ravine, and to strengthen the understanding which had been reached with the Masai after the Kedong massacre. These objectives were considered sufficiently important for Berkeley to post a 1st class assistant to carry them out. Major Smith's posting to Naivasha brought the number of senior officers in the Eastern Province up to four, so that only George Wilson and Sitwell were available for duties elsewhere in the Protectorate.† As far as the transport service was concerned Smith succeeded in his task; caravans were not molested and the Kikuyu began to come forward again as porters, so that supplies were delivered without difficulty to Ravine. Although the Masai honoured their undertaking not to interfere with caravans, Smith was unable to persuade them to change their way of life in other respects. The result was that Hardinge's officers frequently complained that Smith did not assert his authority and prevent the Naivasha Masai from joining the Ngong sections for raids in the EAP and against Sendeyu.* Both administrations were agreed, however, that nothing more than persuasion could be used to prevent Masai incursions into districts away from the Uganda Road: Jackson considered that a punitive force would require a mounted wing for following the warriors up; and Ainsworth merely looked forward to the time when the Protectorates would be in a position to deal effectively with the Masai and other nomad tribes.[11]

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* See p. 199. See Chapters 2 and 3.

† The others were Jackson (Ravine), Hobley (Mumias), Macallister (Port Victoria).

The lines of communication were further strengthened, on the new alignment taken by Sclater's cart road, by the garrisoned food post at Kakamega, and the removal of Guasa Masa to Kipture in July 1896.† Although Berkeley was sympathetic to Jackson and Hobley's requests for more stations, he was unable to provide either the money or men to build and man them. The Elgon station, which Colvile was about to establish in December 1894 when the project was abandoned because of his illness, and which Hobley had sited in January 1896, was not proceeded with; and the Kitoto's post, which Hobley had advocated after the Nandi expedition, was left in abeyance, although a small garrison was left at the chief's village during the food buying season. Berkeley was likewise unable to accede to Jackson's pleas for posts at Njemps and Lumbwa. The Commissioner's curb on his subordinates' enthusiasm for more stations was inevitable in the circumstances. It was also in accord with the Foreign Office view that fresh entanglements should be avoided and extensions of jurisdiction deferred until the railway was completed.[12]

Berkeley's intention to develop the Eastern Province had only been partially fulfilled when he left Kampala on 20 December 1896. But the province had been held and the framework upon which a more positive policy could be built had been strengthened. The Mau stations were beginning to have some influence in their immediate vicinity, but only Hobley had increased his authority to any extent and secured the co-operation of the majority of the tribes in his district. The Mumias administration, alone, had moved from the stage of uneasy coexistence with the local tribes to a position of generally acknowledged political supremacy.[13] But even Hobley had failed to persuade the chiefs to turn out their people for regular employment, or to accept responsibility for the actions of tribesmen not of the "chiefly" clan. Kikelelwa, Ugenya and Wanga volunteers had carried building materials to Mumias early in 1896, and a few Wanyala porters had been recruited by Macallister for the Port Victoria-Mumias section, but the Kavirondo as a whole persisted in their refusal to carry loads. This reluctance to co-operate with the government in this important particular was disappointing, as several of the EAP tribes undertook regular transport work, and Trader Gemmill had engaged hundreds of Baganda and Basoga porters for his Mombasa caravans.

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* The Masai were raiding to recoup their losses from rinderpest. Lenana rejected Sendeyu's overtures for a joint raid, but he was often powerless to prevent raids by his own people.

† See pp. 203-210.

Much remained to be done before the tribes in the Eastern Province would be ready to put the final seal on their recognition of British sovereignty, by accepting taxation as a *quid pro quo* for protection. Berkeley admitted that the introduction of taxation was premature and that the district administration was not strong enough to organise and enforce collection. He also warned that the imposition of taxes would prejudice the elimination of inter-tribal raiding, the encouragement of trade, and the people's growing confidence in the government.[14] Moreover, it was not certain that the forces at Berkeley's disposal could guarantee protection to the tribes that had submitted to the government. The Foreign Office shelved the chief items in Ternan's military reorganisation scheme, which envisaged a permanent establishment of two companies in the Mau District and one company divided between Busoga and Kavirondo. Some of the less expensive items, including the provision of greatcoats on Cunningham's recommendations, were approved, but the Foreign Office decreed that the force in Uganda should be confined "to what is strictly essential for the safety of the Protectorate", until supply and reinforcement had been facilitated by the completion of the railway.[15]

References

1. Berkeley-FO, 30 July, 1895, FOCP, 6805/50. Approx. mileages: Kedong to Sio R. 286; Fort Smith to Ravine 136; Ravine to Mumias 134; Mumias to Port Victoria 32.

2. Berkeley-FO, 14 November, 1895, FOCP, 6827/222 (Estimates 1896/1897).
3. Anderson's minute on Berkeley-FO, 13 November, 1895, FO2/93, FOCP, 6827/221; Berkeley-Jackson, 13 November, 1895, ESA, A/5/1.
4. Berkeley-FO, 12 December, 1896, FOCP, 6951/115; RSD. The Elkakimor refused to return stock looted from the Masai settlement at Ravine and to pay compensation to the family of a murdered Uasin Gishu.
5. Jackson-Com, 27 July, 1896, 28/30 October, 1896, ESA, A/4/5, A/4/6; Berkeley-Jackson, 26 November, 1896, ESA, A/5/2; RSD.
6. Jackson-Com, 6 October, 1896, FOCP, 6951/34; RSD.
7. Hobley and Macallister-Com, in ESA, A/4/4-6. Hobley-Com, 5 February, 1896, ESA, A/4/4.
8. The Nandi exchange rate was one cow for a gun; Africa 15 (1904), p. 7.
9. Hobley-Com, 8 January, 1896, ESA, A/4/4; 3 April, 1896, 1 May, 1896, ESA, A/4/5; 22 September, 1896, ESA, A/4/6.
10. Berkeley-FO, 26 January, 1897, FOCP, 6964/47. *London Gazette*, 3 July, 1896; *ZG*, 8 July, 1896. Thomas, *UJ*, 7 (1939), p. 70; *ZG*, 8 April, 1896, 10 February, 1897. FO-Berkeley, 4 November, 1895, FOCP, 6805/107.
11. Jackson-Com, 24 February, 1897, ESA, A/4/7; Ainsworth-Craufurd, 13 June, 1899, FO2/197.
12. The Ankole post was also shelved for similar reasons. Hill's minute on Hardinge-FO, 8 November, 1895, FO, 107/38. Guasa Masa and Naivasha were on the Uganda Road and Macdonald's alignment for the railway; the Elgon, Kitoto's, Njemps and Lumbwa posts were not. Hill opposed the Kitui station until November 1897, and Hall's proposal for a post at Mbirri (Fort Hall) in 1896 was deferred until the railway was through Kikuyu in 1900; Mungeam, *op. cit.*, pp. 33, 43.
13. For Hobley's methods and achievements see Hobley, *Kenya from Chartered Company*, Lonsdale, *op. cit.*, Chapter 3. Were, *op. cit.*, Low Anatomy of Administrative Origins; *EAISR*, January 1958; The British and Uganda, 1862-1900 (unpublished D. Phil. thesis, Oxford, 1957).
14. Berkeley-FO, 31 October, 1896, FOCP, 6951/32. The Treasury recommended taxation to reduce the grant-in-aid; Treasury-FO, 27 April, 1896, FOCP, 6849/102.
15. Berkeley-FO, 2 and 7 April, 1896, FOCP, 6861/20/22; FO-WO, 30 July, 1896, FOCP, 6861/84; Cunningham-FO, FOCP, 6913/91; see p. 156.

9

SCLATER'S ROAD

The Nandi expedition, the Masai settlement and Hobley's pacification of Kavirondo created a suitable climate for beginning the Protectorate's first major development project in the Eastern Province—the construction of a cart road linking Mombasa with Port Victoria. This was designed to speed and improve communications between the coast and Kampala, and to lessen the government's dependence on the German route for supplying the needs of Buganda and the western territories. Much needed goods and arms which Macdonald, Colvile and Jackson had ordered between 1893 and 1895 were delayed by lack of transport, and many of them still awaited carriers at Mombasa or road stations in the EAP. It was obvious that Uganda could not be serviced by the wasteful, slow and inhumane system of head porterage or by pack donkeys and camels. The supply of professional porters had begun to dry up after the Zanzibar proclamation in September 1891,[*] and at the beginning of 1896 the Uganda Railway was diverting men from caravan employment by offering wages above the current porter rate.[1] Although porters were readily obtainable in Busoga and west of the Nile, and the Taita, Kamba and Kikuyu had been persuaded to enlist in local caravans, none of the officials in the Eastern Province had had much success with porter recruitment. A few adventurous Baganda and Basoga had journeyed to the coast in missionary and other caravans, but neither they nor the EAP tribes would enlist as porters for the arduous and dreaded Ravine-Mumias section. The result was that transport in the Eastern Province was dependent on Swahili and Nyamwezi professionals. The Kedong massacre had put a temporary stop to Kikuyu caravans to Ravine, and the activities of the Nandi warriors had increased even the most experienced porters' reluctance to engage for the Mau crossing. Experiments with animals had not produced the results expected from them: Smith, Mackenzie and Co. suffered heavy losses among beasts driven beyond Kibwezi, while donkeys created supply, equipment and management problems that were incommensurate with the loads they carried.

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[*] Subjects of the Sultan were prohibited from engaging as "porters for service beyond his Highness's dominions".

Some means had to be found of taking up larger quantities of goods than could be carried by men or pack animals, and of reducing transport charges to Buganda below the ruling figure of £300 per ton. Although goods taken up by the longer German route cost only £160 per ton, the Tanganyika caravans were troubled by famine and disease, and their loads were liable to damage during the lake crossing. Freight charges had to be met from the grant-in-aid and reduced the amount of money available for other purposes. A cardinal feature of the proposed transport system was the carriage and erection of ships for use on the Lake, but experiments with the first loads of the steamship *William Mackinnon* had proved disappointing. The heavy, unwieldly cases could not be manhandled by porters and some form of mechanical transport would have to be devised for the purpose.

The idea of an ox-cart road from Mombasa to the Lake had been mooted in the days of the Company whose president, Sir William Mackinnon, initiated the project in 1889 by financing the construction of 200 miles of track from the coast to Kibwezi mission. When work was stopped shortly after Mackinnon's death in 1893, George Wilson had completed 110 miles of the "Mackinnon Road", and Hall had constructed 31 miles of track from Fort Smith towards Machakos. Members of the Uganda Commission and others had pressed for this work to be carried on, and Colvile advocated the continuance of the Company's scheme as an essential part of government policy. He persuaded the Foreign Office in 1895 to complete the Mackinnon Road, and to continue the twelve feet wide cart track to Port Victoria roughly on the line chosen for the Uganda Railway. Money was found to finance the project from the capital vote of £44,000 which Parliament had sanctioned in 1894 for the administration of Uganda. Owing to delays in ordering and transporting the vessels intended for service on Lakes Victoria and Albert, the capital account showed considerable savings on the £39,000 allocated to this head. It was proposed to use part of these savings to augment the £5,000, which the

Departmental Committee of April 1894 had recommended for experimental animal transport and station buildings.[2]

The War Office was asked in May 1895 to release Capt. B. L. Sclater, R.E., who had had road building experience under Sir Harry Johnston in British Central Africa, to undertake the task with the assistance of Lieut. G. E. Smith and four sapper NCO's, who were granted an eight months' secondment from their corps.[3] When Smith reached Zanzibar at the beginning of June 1895, he was unable to recruit the 350 Swahilis needed for the project, and his chief found the position no easier when he arrived at Mombasa at the end of the month. The Sultan's prohibition on porter recruitment was waived, however, and a hundred Zanzibaris were engaged to make up the deficiency. As there were no transport animals at the coast, Smith proceeded upcountry while Sclater waited at Mombasa for carts, animals and a hundred experienced Indian roadmakers from Karachi. The main party left the coast on 25 October 1895 and in the meantime the advanced party had established its base at Muani. Smith's coastal labourers were supplemented by 200 Kamba supplied by Ainsworth, and by the end of the year roadhead was approaching Fort Smith. Hundreds of Kamba worked outside their country as far as the Kedong, and a few continued to serve until the road was completed. The Kikuyu around Fort Smith also assisted the engineers but the Guru-Guru section proved troublesome. Smith made blood-brotherhood with the leaders, however, and their people supplied his Kedong camp with large quantities of food.[4] But none of the Kikuyu labourers could be persuaded to work in the Rift Valley because of the Kedong massacre. The effects of the massacre, and the despatch of some of his men to support Ainsworth against Kamba malcontents, delayed Sclater's arrival at Naivasha until February 1896. As a result of these delays and other difficulties, Sclater realised that his estimate of £8,500 would be insufficient and that the road would not be through to Port Victoria by the appointed day, 31 March 1896. He accordingly applied for an additional allocation of £600 a month for the financial year beginning in April 1896. Sclater explained that progress through the Rift Valley depended on the reactions of the Masai, and that there were many natural obstacles to be overcome west of Ravine in country where "the natives are in a state of constant warfare with passing caravans". The Treasury reluctantly agreed to the increased charges, after

Foreign Office representations that the completion of the road was of "paramount importance".

Berkeley saw in the road project an opportunity to strengthen the Eastern Province administration without depleting the meagre resources provided under the grant-in-aid. He proposed that Sclater should site and build Guasa Masa and Naivasha stations, and that this expenditure, together with contingent charges for medical services, should be debited to the road account. The Foreign Office approved his request, but the Treasury insisted that the cost of additional medical staff should be met from the annual grant and not from the special account.[5] The Commissioner was optimistic about the long term advantages which the road would bring to the Protectorate. Improved transport facilities would encourage traders to set up stores at government centres, so that private enterprise, upon which Berkeley set much store, could perform some of the functions which distracted district officers from more important duties. An increase in the number of traders would facilitate the introduction of specie and thus reduce the administration's demands for trade goods, which created burdensome problems of transport and accounting. The employment of carts would speed the arrival of the steamer and steam launches, and encourage the Lake Victoria transit trade. It was also anticipated that these improvements would stimulate the export of local produce, especially from Mumias, which Berkeley regarded as the second most important trading centre in the Protectorate.[6]

As far as the Eastern Province was concerned, the Commissioner was confident that Sclater's Road would further his task of reorganisation and development. Goods and food could be moved more speedily and regularly to the road stations, and more satisfactory arrangements could be made to overcome the chronic food scarcity at the Ravine headquarters. The project also promised considerable benefits in the political field. The establishment would be strengthened by the presence of a resident transport staff, and the centres of influence increased by the construction of intermediate staging posts. The people of the Eastern Province would be confronted with visible evidence of the permanent nature of the government's occupation of the country.[7] This evidence would be in the novel form of a wide road carrying regular vehicular traffic, in contradistinction to the narrow paths used by infrequent trading caravans. Moreover, better supply arrangements would enable garrisons and escorts to be strengthened, and would facilitate the assembly and servicing of larger forces for punitive operations.* Finally, the amount of money expended on the undertaking, and the increased value of the capital goods at risk in the Province, implied that more money and forces would be allocated to safeguard the government's assets. Greater resources at the command of the local officers would, in turn, lead to the extension of effective political control, as the cheapest and most efficacious method of protecting government property from molestation. With these considerations in mind, Berkeley had no doubt that the completion of the road would help to make the Province a more promising part of the Protectorate, instead of being merely a stretch of country that had to be traversed on the way to Buganda.†

Work on the road had begun before Berkeley assumed office as Commissioner, but shortly after his arrival in Uganda the projected Nandi expedition presented an opportunity for the reconnaissance of a more direct alignment than that based on the railway survey report. Cunningham was accordingly instructed to carry out the first survey of Nandi, and to report on the possibilities of shortening the cart road by eliminating the long detour across the foodless wastes of the Uasin Gishu Plateau. The Commissioner hoped that a more southerly line ending at the Kavirondo Gulf would prove advantageous when steamers were plying on the Lake, even though the railway surveyors had rejected this route as unsuitable for their purposes.

Cunningham explored a great part of Nandi during the expedition and Vandeleur surveyed the country between Tindiret and Ravine. From Mt. Endubo Cunningham gazed eastwards over country extending to within twenty miles of the area investigated by the railway survey. The terrain did not look difficult, and he was assured by his Masai guides that a fair road, without steep ascents or descents, existed between Lake Nakuru and the head of the Nyando Valley. The column encountered no serious obstacles to its passage down to the Nyando Valley, so Cunningham forecast that a direct route could be opened up between Ravine and the Kavirondo Gulf. He also suggested that a survey from Nakuru to

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* See p. 119 for the FO's views on the strategic value of the project and Anderson's conclusion "We *must* get on with the road".

† Buganda could have been supplied by regular, well-armed caravans, having little communication with the people other than those living near the staging posts.

Lake Victoria might prove that a road could be engineered between the two places.* Both of the possible new routes would be much shorter than the caravan track or Sclater's alignment, and reduce the time spent by caravans in foodless country.[8]

When Cunningham returned to Entebbe he reported on three possible ways of shortening the recognised caravan route across the Uasin Gishu Plateau from Ravine to Mumias which took twelve days' marching, ten of them through foodless country. The first passed due west of Ravine for two days across the Mau Plateau before dropping 2,800 ft. to the Sagane Valley, where it followed down the course of the river and across the plain for four days to Kitoto's, and then turned north-west for six days to reach Mumias. This route also took twelve days but only six of the marches were through foodless country. The descent to the Sagane was a serious obstacle, but Cunningham thought that improvements could be made to the track which his column had pioneered. Although there were a number of Nandi living in the valley, he thought the area they cultivated was insufficient to feed caravans. If a post were established on the Sagane to control the Nandi, the garrison would consume all the surplus produce and no food would be left for other purposes. The second possibility was a road from Subugo, north-west of Ravine, through Nandi and Kakamega to Mumias. The only obstacle on this route was the dense Nandi Forest, but travelling time was reduced by three days and food was procurable after Nandi was reached, two days from Ravine. From Kabaren, on the western marches of Nandi, to Mumias, the country was thickly populated and food plentiful. In order to protect this route, Nandi station would have to be moved from Guasa Masa to a point on the new road, a measure which Cunningham had previously advocated on political and military grounds. The third possibility of a direct road from Nakuru to the Kavirondo Gulf was dismissed, because it would be more costly to construct than the others and would take longer to complete. Cunningham stressed the necessity for speed in improving the road and shortening its length through foodless country, so that caravans could gain immediate benefits from Sclater's work. He warned that an elaborate high road would not achieve this object, as such an undertaking could scarcely be finished much before the arrival of the railway.[9]

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* See Chapter 6 for Cunningham's route. The Nakuru-Kavirondo Gulf route was the one Lugard failed to find in 1891; see p. 67.

Berkeley conceded that the direct Nakuru-Kavirondo Gulf route would gain in importance when a steamer was plying on the Lake, but he opposed altering Sclater's route over Mau, as this would mean subverting all existing transport arrangements and abandoning Ravine station. He saw no advantages in the Ravine-Kavirondo Gulf-Mumias suggestion, as a station at Sendege's, or elsewhere in the Sagane-Nyando region, would leave a long stretch of road unprotected between the new station and Naivasha, The adoption of this route would, moreover, necessitate surrendering supervision over districts to the north and east, "which, there can be little doubt, will in time be the field of active enterprise". The Commissioner decided that the line through Nandi and Kakamega was the route of choice. And he supported in principle the proposed move of Guasa Masa to a food producing area on the new route, as a means of getting into closer touch with the Nandi and of safeguarding Sclater's working parties.* Berkeley was averse to taking precipitate action in the matter, however, and he arranged for Cunningham to discuss the problem with Sclater. Jackson was deputed to ascertain the views of the Nandi about the construction of a road through their country, as the Commissioner acknowledged that a final decision on the alignment would be dependent on developments in the Nandi situation.[10] Cunningham also told Foaker to mention the road when the peace emissaries returned to Guasa Masa, as he felt that the Nandi would be "suspicious of our intentions for some time".† When Cunningham met Sclater at Naivasha in March 1896, Vandeleur's expedition map was studied and a decision was taken to proceed with the Nandi-Kakamega alignment.

Sclater began work on the Eastern Province section of the road from his Naivasha base camp in February 1896. Jackson and Berkeley had previously made some local arrangements to assist the engineer in his task. Transport of the *William Mackinnon* was suspended, although only 220 of its 3,000 loads had reached their destination, and a large number of the steamer porters were switched to road work. Hobley and Martin were directed to collect food for the several hundred men in the construction parties, and to keep them supplied throughout their stay in the Province. Hobley complied with Jackson's order, but Martin could only offer storage space at Ravine and the prospect of small amounts of food if trade goods were provided for its purchase. His own supplies were so precarious that Martin thought it safer while Sclater's men were working near Ravine for them to be provisioned from Fort Smith and Mumias. Martin was also asked to recruit between two and five hundred Kamasia for road work but he had to report that this was "utterly impossible".[11]

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* See p. 208. The Sagane post might have restrained the Kamelilo who proved troublesome from 1897 onwards.

† See p. 168.

Sclater found there was a severe famine in the Rift Valley, but the Naivasha Masai were friendly and anxious to honour the settlement that had been made after the Kedong massacre. He apologised for implicating himself in political matters by making friends with Lenana, with whom he discussed the formation of agricultural settlements around Naivasha. He also suggested that employment as cart drivers would enable the Masai to put their understanding and management of animals to good use. Nothing came of these representations, but the Masai hired some of their donkeys to Smith to carry food loads from his Kedong camp to Naivasha. Sclater also received a certain amount of help from the Masai, who proved no obstacle to the progress of the road. The road was open to Naivasha at the end of March 1896, when Smith's arrival enabled Sclater to investigate the remainder of the route to Port Victoria. He had no personal knowledge of the country farther west, but he nevertheless estimated that the work could be completed in six to nine months. When he discussed the possibility of realigning the route with Cunningham and Vandeleur, Sclater suggested that the road should leave the Mau caravan track at the Molo River so as to avoid Ravine. But Cunningham objected to this proposal on the grounds that Berkeley would be unwilling to meet the cost of transferring the district headquarters to a new site. Jackson was asked by the Commandant to provide escorts for the road party from the Mau garrisons, although two months earlier Cunningham had promised additional troops from Buganda for this purpose and to cover the formation of the new Nandi station.[12]

Messengers were sent to the Nandi from Ravine on 13 March 1896 to call them in for discussions about the cart road. The request was apparently ignored, as the only Nandi visitors to Ravine in March and April were two men who brought in four donkeys to sell. Sclater arrived at Ravine with five carts on 4 April 1896 to inspect Martin's new alignment for the Ravine crossing, and then left for his base camp at the Molo River. Martin had told him there were no serious obstacles as far as Kipture, which Sclater hoped to reach by the middle of June. He was unable to estimate the rate of progress from Kipture to Mumias, owing to the number of rivers and forests in this section, but he thought that a dry weather road to Port Victoria could be completed by October 1896.[13]

Foaker arrived at Ravine from Guasa Masa on 13 May 1896 and two days later he left with Sclater for Nandi. After a slow march to allow Sclater to survey the country, a temporary camp was pitched at Kibote, a few miles north-west of Teito, to serve as Sclater's headquarters until the road alignment had been settled. The engineer thought the road would either run at the foot of Kibote or a few miles to the north of the temporary camp. Foaker went back to Guasa Masa and on his return Sclater began a more detailed reconnaissance of the line from Nandi to Mumias. During these investigations, Sclater marched to Kakamega and descended the south escarpment to the Kano Plains. He discovered practicable alignments on both routes, but noted that all the food for his gangs would have to be carried up from Fort Smith until Kavirondo was reached. On 17 June 1896, six days after Sclater had returned to Ravine and reported all was well in Nandi, the up mail was sent for the first time by the new route for the cart road. Before leaving Ravine with Jackson on 26 June 1896 to meet Berkeley at Nandi, Sclater estimated that the road could be made to Port Victoria by the Nandi-Kakamega route in three months, but claimed that a much shorter and easier route could be found to the Lake at the Kavirondo Gulf. This alternative alignment, which would entail side-cutting for five miles down the South Nandi escarpment, could be completed in a month.

Berkeley arrived at the temporary Nandi station on 4 July 1896 by the old caravan route through Mumias and Guasa Masa. Sclater put his case to the Commissioner for abandoning the Kakamega alignment in favour of the Kavirondo Gulf route, which he argued was preferable on the grounds of distance, economy and speed. He pointed out that goods would be delivered at the Kavirondo Gulf more quickly than at Port Victoria, and that the engineering problem of bridging the Nzoia would be avoided.[14] The Commissioner admitted the soundness of Sclater's arguments from the engineering and financial aspects, if the sole object of the road was to connect Buganda with the coast as quickly and cheaply as possible. Berkeley thought this was not the case, however, and accordingly opposed the new proposal on the grounds that the "road should also be made the utmost use of to develop the commercial activity and trade of our most promising districts". He feared that the development of Mumias as the trading centre for Kavirondo and the northern territories would be prejudiced, if the station was isolated from the main artery of communications. The formation of a terminal station on the Kavirondo Gulf would also necessitate additional expenditure for maintaining two establishments on the eastern shores of the Lake, as Port Victoria could not be abandoned in favour of a new station much farther to the east.* Moreover, the Kavirondo Gulf route "would be far less beneficial to the Nandi district, a most admirably fertile country, far superior to that lying along the east shore of the lake". Berkeley conceded that an outlet on the Kavirondo Gulf would be useful for mails and special supplies, which could be transported to Buganda by the sailing boat, and the steam launch that was nearing completion on the south end of the Lake. These vessels, even with the assistance of a flotilla of canoes, would however be incapable of moving the bulk of the loads which Sclater's carts would deposit on the Kavirondo Gulf. Goods would be blocked at the proposed station, since they would not be accompanied by porters and no local carriers could be recruited to take them on. A reliable lake transport system would be impracticable until the *William Mackinnon* was commissioned, an event which the Commissioner thought to be unlikely for at least 18 months.[15] Until such a service was inaugurated, government and traders' loads would have to complete their journey by the old caravan route, with the result that Sclater's Road beyond Ravine would fall into disuse. Berkeley considered it illogical to link the road with the railway line (as the latter would not reach the Lake for three or more years) when what was needed was some method of providing immediate assistance to trade and traffic.[16]

Berkeley wrote most enthusiastically about the potentialities of the Nandi district to support his advocacy of the Kipture-Kakamega-Mumias route:

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* When Port Ugowe station was established in 1899, after the realignment of the railway, Port Victoria was abandoned.

> What I saw of the Nandi country (and as I went and returned by different routes this was not inconsiderable) fully bears out the best accounts I have yet heard of it. The district is admirably fertile, well wooded, well watered, and possesses pasture lands covered with thick, rich grass, such as is rarely seen in any other part of these territories. The natives are to all appearances most friendly and anxious to cement the best relations with us. They grow, with scarcely any effort, large quantities of millet and other grain and readily bring them into camp for sale. The general level of the country averaging about 6,000 feet, the climate is healthy and cold, and the district itself would seem to offer very considerable attractions for European settlement as communications improve, and there are large tracts of unoccupied land well suited for this purpose. Meanwhile the friendly attitude of the natives already permits of caravans passing through the country without danger, and they are thus already relieved of the great disadvantages that used to attend the journey by the former foodless and circuitous route round the district.*

The above considerations caused Berkeley to override Sclater's engineering and financial objections, and the Commissioner took it upon himself to sanction the Nandi-Kakamega alignment. Although Sclater had been entrusted with wide discretionary powers by the Foreign Office, he accepted the Commissioner's ruling.[17] It was agreed that the Nzoia bridge should be deferred and the crossing made by warping two punts across the river with a wire rope. Berkeley hoped that district officers would be able to persuade Kavirondo labourers to work on the easy section between Mumias and Port Victoria, and anticipated that the road would be finished by January 1897. Hobley thought the Kavirondo would work on the road near their homes, and regarded the project as a good opportunity for making them accustomed to regular employment. Hobley's expectations were not fulfilled, however, and the Kavirondo did little to help Sclater apart from cutting and carting timber for bridges and the Nzoia ferry.† Lieut. Smith attributed their reluctance to work to a lack of inducement to earn wages as they did not wear clothes.[18]

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* See p. 9. Neither of Berkeley's routes took him to the more populated parts of Nandi. The Nandi district included the unoccupied Uasin Gishu Plateau.

† The Kavirondo sold Sclater food and oxen.

Berkeley and Sclater travelled together on a west and south-westerly route from Nandi to Mumias, where they arrived on 18 July 1896. On the return journey Sclater set up a buying post at Kakamega, near the Isukha River, to supply food for his Nandi camps. He suggested that the road should be kept open by using his carts to take up the *William Mackinnon* and other government consignments. Sclater realised that the small number of waggons, which Smith, Mackenzie and Co. proposed using on the road, would be insufficient to keep it free from grass and regenerating bush. Berkeley recommended the proposal as (on Sclater's figures) it showed a considerable saving to the overtaxed Uganda account. The scheme was approved by the Foreign Office, but it had to be suspended after Sclater's death from blackwater in July 1897.*

After three months' work, including the cutting of forest and scrub and the bridging of the River Nganiat, the road was opened to Kipture on 20 October 1896. The track beyond Nandi Station had already been cleared for porters, but a great deal of thick forest had to be felled before the road was suitable for wheeled traffic. While the road party was working in Nandi, the labourers helped Bagge to construct and fortify Kipture station.† When Lieut. Smith arrived there in November 1896, he mapped the road and travelled some distance into Nandi to set up survey beacons on several hills, including Tabolwa, Kabiyet and Koyo. Sclater drove the first carts to Port Victoria on 31 December 1896, and shortly afterwards he left for the coast with the bulk of his men and stores. Four months later, Smith, and the party which had been completing the bridges and the Nzoia ferry, passed through Kipture on their way to Mombasa—and Sclater's Road was finished.[19]

The cart road through Nandi kept to the watershed between the Kipkarren and Yala river systems, roughly on the line that was followed later by the Lessos-Kapsabet-Kiptuiya-Kakamega motor road.‡ The section from Ravine to Lessos was 37 miles long, with two intermediate camps, Mianzini ("Bamboos") at mile 11 and Daraja ("Bridge") at mile 27. The road on this section passed though dense forest alternating with grassy uplands, and rose to a height of over 9,000 feet. The first camp in Nandi (about 505 miles from Mombasa) was located on the western slopes of Lessos Hill (Kongoni), where fuel was plentiful and good water was obtainable from an opening in the side of the hill. From Lessos to Kipture, a distance of fourteen miles, the road proceeded almost due west through undulating country, with forest patches and thorn trees scattered among grass growing waist high. Eight miles from Lessos the Nganiat River had been bridged, but several other streams were avoided by following the watershed between the headwaters of the Choimin-Mogong to the east and the Kingwal-Kimondi to the west. Although the road left the extensive Ngonyek and associated swamps to the north, the flat section through Emdin and Nduroto was heavy going for carts during the rains. It was four miles from Kipture before small patches of cultivation and scattered houses became visible from the road. The next section of eleven and a half miles entered thick forest a short distance beyond Kapsabet, and after crossing the Kimondi by a bridge, continued through more forest to Sclater's camp on a hillside overlooking more open country.* Most of this stretch was indifferent going owing to the stumps and roots that had been left in the road. Another march of eleven and a half miles to Mtoni (River) Camp began the 1,200 feet descent from the western escarpment, through undulating grasslands and dense forest, to a clearing near a stream. The forest ended a mile and a half from this camp, and the open, inhabited district of Kakamega was entered. The Mawe (Rock) Camp, nine miles from Mtoni, was the first place after leaving Fort Smith (210 miles and seventeen marches to the east) where caravans could buy supplies from the local people. This was the place where Sclater set up his food depot to supply the gangs based on Nandi Station, thirty-two miles away. Two more marches through food producing country took the road through to Mumias, 571 miles from Mombasa.[20]

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* Smith, Mackenzie and Co.'s contract for the steamer transport was suspended so that Sclater's Road could proceed with greater speed.

† See p. 212.

‡ The alignment from Ravine was followed by later roads.

The Nandi section of Sclater's Road was only some thirty miles in length. About half of this was in uninhabited country, much of which was thick forest. The portions which ran through country where there were scattered houses and a little cultivation were occupied by offshoot sections of the major *pororosiek* of Kaptalam, Koilegei, Kaptumois and Tepingot, and the minor forest-dwelling branches of the Kimngoror, Cheptol and Kakimno. The road entered Nandi through the north-eastern fringe of permanently occupied territory and, in its passage westwards to Kiptuiya, cut off the small area of inhabited country in the north from the more thickly populated southern homelands. It did not bring travellers into contact with the Nandi to any great extent, and was unlikely, therefore, to open up the country in the way that Berkeley had confidently prophesied when he decided against the Kavirondo Gulf route. If Sclater had won his point, the road down the south escarpment to the Gulf would have passed through more populated, food producing territory, and brought the administration into closer touch with the militant escarpment sections. It would, moreover, have made it difficult for the government to continue to disregard Kitoto's persistent requests for protection against Nandi and Lumbwa raiders. The presence of troops in a more centrally situated station overlooking the Nyando Valley might have deterred the warriors from attacking the Luo on the Kano Plains, as well as making clear the government's intention to remain permanently and unassailably in command of the country.[21]

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* Probably Kiptuiya or Kapkangani.

While the construction gangs worked on the Nandi section, no attacks were made on the labourers or their camps, and caravans passed without hindrance along the cart road and the old caravan track. Sclater's party mustered over 500 men, a considerable proportion of whom acted as armed guards for the working gangs. Discipline was excellent and Sclater took great pains not to antagonise the local inhabitants. As a result of his conciliatory attitude, the only losses suffered by the road party in the Eastern Province were two porters, who were murdered by the Mironge section of the Kakamega.[22] If the Nandi did nothing to hinder the progress of the road, they did little to help. They took no part in its construction, refused to sell their oxen to draw Sclater's carts, and made only occasional and trivial contributions towards the enormous quantities of food needed for his men. Cunningham and Berkeley's optimistic expectation that the road would encourage the Nandi to provide a badly-needed and convenient addition to the Province's food supplies proved unfounded, and Sclater had perforce to supply his needs by donkey convoys from Kakamega.[23] Although Lieut. Smith observed that their cattle were the largest he had seen in East Africa, the Nandi had never harnessed them for draught purposes, and must have been astonished to see oxen used for such menial tasks.[24] The Nandi apparently adopted an attitude of feigned indifference to Sclater's operations, and gave the government no pretext for ordering the evacuation of houses near the road, as had been done in the case of the Rift Valley Masai after the Kedong massacre. Such a demand would probably have led to a renewal of hostilities, but it can be assumed, from Nandi reactions to similar circumstances in later years, that many families moved away from the road of their own volition.

Although Sclater's Road did not fulfil all of Berkeley's expectations as far as relations with the Nandi were concerned, it did make a valuable contribution towards easing the burden of supplying the road stations and Buganda. Many transport problems remained unsolved, but the cart road shortened the distance from the coast to the Lake and speeded the movement of greater quantities of goods than could have been brought up by head loads. Private enterprise began to take more interest in the Masai route, and in establishing depots at roadside stations. By the time the road was completed, Smith, Mackenzie and Co. and Boustead, Ridley and Co. had established or applied for stores at many of the EAP stations, and at Ravine, Mumias, Port Victoria and Kampala. Cart transport was essentially a temporary expedient until the railway could take its place, but the cost of Sclater's Road was justified by the benefits derived from its occupation over the four years of its useful life.[25] Moreover, the road proved useful in forwarding imperial interests on two occasions—for Macdonald's Juba expedition in 1897 and during the Uganda Relief operations after the Sudanese mutiny.

References

1. See Lugard, *op. cit.*, i, 188, 441-8; ii, 654-5.
2. Colvile-FO, 12 April, 1895, FOCP, 6717/55; FO-Johnston, 11 April, 1900, FO2/295. Matson, The Mackinnon Roads, *KWN*, 14 April, 1961; the government bought the road in September 1896, for £3,431.
3. Johnston: *British Central Africa*, Chapter IV. Smith had served in East Africa with the Anglo-German frontier commission in 1893. Cpls. Ellis, Clarke; L/Cpls. Brodie, Simmons.
4. G. E. Smith, *JRGS*, XIV (1899), p. 273.
5. Berkeley-FO, 30 July, 1895; FO-Berkeley, 4 November, 1895; Treas-FO, 12 November, 1895; FOCP, 6805/50/107/119.
6. Berkeley-FO, 30 July, 1895, 19 April, 1896, FOCP, 6805/50, 6861/25. Smith, Mackenzie and Co.'s efforts to stock their Mumias store had been frustrated by transport difficulties and the disturbed state of the

caravan road between Ravine and Mumias; 20 December, 1895, ESA, A/6/1.

7. "The majority of Africans around the (EAP) forts failed to realize the permanent nature of the British occupation"; Mungeam, *op. cit.*, p. 45. Hill, 14 May, 1901, FOCP, 7514; Osogo, *Nabongo Mumia*, pp. 12, 19, 20.
8. Berkeley-FO, 6 September, 1895, 21 December, 1895, FOCP, 6805/249, 6827/289.
9. Cunningham-Com, 31 January, 1896, ESA, A/4/4; Berkeley-FO, 8 February, 1896, FOCP, 6849/55.
10. Berkeley-FO, 8 February, 1896, 3 March, 1896, FOCP, 6849/55/84. Berkeley-Sclater, 17 February, 1896, ESA, A/7/1.
11. Jackson-Martin, 11 June, 1895, ESA, A/5/1; Martin-Com, 16 August, 1895, ESA, A/4/2.
12. Sclater-Hill, 20 December, 1895, 9 February, 1896, 11 March, 1896, FOCP, 6827/227, 6849/57, FO2/114; Cunningham-Com, 16 March, 1896, ESA, A/4/5.
13. Sclater-Cave, 24 June, 1896, FOCP, 6861/189; RSD
14. Sclater-Com, 12 July, 1896, Berkeley-FO, 18 July, 1896, FOCP, 6913/1/3. Sclater thought the railway might follow the Molo River-Nyando Valley route. RSD.
15. The steam launch, *Kenia I*, was wrecked soon after launching at Nassa on 28 August, 1896. The *William Mackinnon* was commissioned in November 1900. Cf. Eliot on the railway route, Africa 6 (1903), p. 24.
16. Cunningham had questioned the Uasin Gishu alignment chosen by the survey party, but O'Callaghan (executive member of the URC) argued "it would be detrimental to the future prosperity of the line to avoid the populous and fertile districts of Nandi and Mumias". 16 October, 1896, FO2/112. Berkeley-FO, 18 July, 1896, FOCP, 6913/3. The railway reached the Kavirondo Gulf in December, 1901.
17. Hardinge-FO, 4 July, 1895, FOCP, 6761/80. The URC supported Berkeley's decision on 16 October, 1896, and the FO on 27 October, 1896.
18. Hobley-Com, 25 September, 1895, 1 June, 1896, ESA, A/4/2, A/4/5. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 278.
19. Maps in Smith, *op. cit.*, and the British Museum.
20. See Hobart's log of his up journey May 1897, in ESA, A/4/8, 15 July, 1897. A portion of the cart road runs up the hill on the Kapsabet golf course roughly parallel to the Kaimosi Road.
21. See Lonsdale, *op. cit.*, Chapter 3 for the effect on Luo leadership of withholding protection from Kitoto.
22. Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 274, 278. Hobley-Com, 7 March, 1897, Grant-Com, 3 April, 1897, ESA, A/4/7, A/4/8. When a Smith, Mackenzie and Co. porter shot a man in Kakamega, Hobley rescued Sclater's men from an ugly situation by punishing the culprit and compensating the wounded man with an ox.
23. There are no entries for food payments in NCB but a few presents were given for unspecified reasons, and four small payments for local labour. Transactions might be recorded in Sclater's accounts, however, as Jackson noted "the Nandi market had been somewhat spoiled by Sclater", ESA, A/4/6, 5 October, 1896.
24. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 276. Oxen were first harnessed by the Nandi after the Great War; Huxley, *A New Earth*, p. 78.
25. Approx. mileages to Kampala: Njemps route 800; Uasin Gishu route 730; Sclater's Road 680. The by-passing of Machakos and the Nandi alignment were the chief deviations on Sclater's Road. Sclater costed the work at approx. £17,000, almost double the original estimate. None of the cost was met by the EAP.

10

KIPTURE

The proposal to abandon Guasa Masa and to establish a new post in a more thickly populated part of Nandi was first canvassed by Cunningham, at the end of the first phase of the 1895 expedition. Although he hoped that such a post would help complete the pacification of the tribe, he appreciated that the proposal was contingent on the realignment of Sclater's Road, which the post would be designed and sited to protect.* The Assistant Commissioner suggested that a line could be found through Nandi to Kakamega and Mumias, and that the Guasa Masa fort should be transferred to the neighbourhood of Kipture, some twenty-five miles to the south. This area recommended itself to Cunningham as being in undulating country, where he had found a large number of houses and well-stocked granaries during the expedition.[1] Berkeley supported the proposal which could be implemented easily providing the Nandi were friendly, and which promised a solution to the food supply problem for the new station and probably for Ravine as well. The Commissioner came to no definite conclusion on the matter, however, as he was unable to form an opinion about the effect on the Nandi of establishing a station in their midst, or on what degree of opposition Sclater might encounter while making the road. He instructed Cunningham to discuss the proposal with Sclater, after getting the latest news from Mumias, Guasa Masa and Ravine about the attitude of the Nandi. Berkeley returned to the issue on 3 March 1896, when he reported Foaker's interview with the Nandi peace emissaries and their promise to send food for the Guasa Masa garrison.[2] The Commissioner did not anticipate that enough food would be forthcoming from the food producing areas of South Nandi to lessen Guasa Masa's dependence on Kabras and Mumias, but he was confident that a new station in the south could be victualled without the need for expensive food convoys from outside the district.*

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* See p. 144.

Cunningham discussed the realignment of the road with Sclater at Naivasha in March 1896, and recommended that if the Ravine-Nandi-Kakamega route was adopted Guasa Masa station should be moved to the neighbourhood of Kipture. Cunningham hoped that by the time Sclater had completed his investigations, Foaker and Jackson would have got in touch with the Nandi and sounded them about a station in their country. The decision on whether Guasa Masa should be abandoned in favour of Kipture was left to Sclater and was dependent on two factors: the attitude of the Nandi and the final alignment for the road.[3] The second factor implied that the new station was to be sited not for reasons of administrative convenience, nor as an aid to the pacification of the Nandi, but as a base camp for Sclater's operations and for protecting caravans using the cart road. Thus, the new post was intended (like Guasa Masa) as a link in the chain of communications between the coast and Buganda, rather than a centre for the control and development of the Nandi District. Although Berkeley and Cunningham emphasised that Jackson and Foaker should ascertain Nandi reactions to the move from Guasa Masa, neither of the district officers apparently succeeded in carrying out his instructions.† Jackson was pre-occupied with the Masai question after the Kedong massacre and with strengthening his position at Ravine; and Foaker was tied down at Guasa Masa, so that he could only discuss the move with those Nandi who chose to visit his station.[4]

Foaker and Sclater left Ravine for Nandi on 15 May 1896. The latter was given some Swahilis and an escort of fifteen Sudanese from the Ravine garrison, and Foaker was accompanied by the thirty-six Sudanese and Swahilis who had travelled with him from Guasa Masa, and a Masai interpreter, Mwina Gije, from the Ravine staff.‡ The party mustered thirty-eight guns and took with it eight heifer calves to exchange in Nandi for donkeys, presumably for food convoy duties. After forming a temporary camp at Kibote, Foaker returned to Guasa Masa while Sclater stayed behind to continue his road reconnaissances.* The Nandi were suffering from a food shortage, which had been caused partly by drought and partly by the crop losses and agricultural disruption resulting from Cunningham's expedition. But the people near the camp were friendly and declared they had no objection to the station or road. Foaker returned to Kibote towards the end of the month with the bulk of the stores from Guasa Masa, where a Sudanese officer and fourteen men were left to protect the fort and livestock. Foaker stayed in camp while Sclater continued his examination of the country before returning to Ravine on 11 June 1896, where he confirmed Foaker's report about the friendliness of the Nandi and the scarcity of food. Two days later clothing for fifty-six askari was sent from Ravine for the Nandi garrison, together with a selection of trade goods for wages or local food purchases.[5]

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* See p. 202.

† See pp. 128, 198. Berkeley anticipated official policy in this regard: "It is not the wish of His Majesty's Government to force their way amongst tribes who are hostile".

‡ The interpreter possibly understood Nandi or Kamasia, but he might have been sent because of the common misapprehension that Nandi and Masai were the same language.

On 17 June 1896, the new route was opened when the mail for Kampala was sent through Nandi. With the reception and forwarding of this mail, the temporary camp at Kibote began to operate as a staging post on the Uganda Road, and the caravan track was superseded by the Nandi-Kakamega route. Shortly afterwards, Walter Mayes arrived at Mumias at the head of a caravan of Smith, Mackenzie and Co. to inaugurate the Nandi route for trading parties. Stanley Tomkins, Hobley's newly appointed assistant, travelled to Mumias through Nandi at the end of June 1896 and was, thus, the first government official to use the shortened route. Foaker's departure from Guasa Masa depleted its garrison to such an extent that it was impossible for the station to provide escorts along the old caravan track. The fort was accordingly evacuated shortly after Foaker's installation at Kibote, and the Kabras buying post upon which Guasa Masa depended for its food supplies was abandoned.

When Berkeley, Jackson and Sclater met at Kibote on 4 July 1896, a final decision was taken on the realignment of the Uganda Road, and the contingent proposal for a new station in Nandi. Sclater's arguments in favour of the Kavirondo Gulf route, which envisaged a station near the escarpment edge, were overruled by the Commissioner, and Kipture was selected as the site for the district headquarters.[6] Berkeley hoped that as the Nandi grew accustomed to having an official permanently stationed in their midst, and to seeing caravans pass regularly through their country, they would cease to harbour resentment towards the government. They would then eventually settle down as hostile tribes had generally done under similar circumstances in other parts of the Protectorate. Guasa Masa had failed to achieve its purpose in this respect owing to its geographical position. Little contact had been made with the Nandi after the peace emissaries' visit, and Berkeley realised that the original district station could never rival Mumias, or even Ravine, as a centre of administrative influence. The realignment of the road was, therefore, of great moment in implementing the Commissioner's plans for the extension of government control to the Nandi. If Sclater had not disregarded his original instructions, by agreeing to abandon the old caravan track and the railway survey route, Berkeley would have been forced to retain the staging post at Guasa Masa as the district station, despite its proven unsuitability as an administrative centre. Such a centre could only have exercised a nominal control over the populated parts of Nandi, and would have confirmed the people's belief that the invasion in 1895 was nothing more than a raiding expedition. The retention of Guasa Masa would, moreover, have compelled Berkeley to "surrender supervision" over the more promising parts of Nandi, a contingency which he had hoped to avoid by disallowing Cunningham's suggestion for a station in the Nyando Valley.*

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* Kibote was probably Kapsigak Hill, hence the references to Kamsigak Fort

The Commissioner had neither the men nor the money to maintain two stations in Nandi, one to protect the Uganda Road, the other to expedite the pacification of the tribe and to initiate administrative control. Berkeley had been unable to make provisions for the stations off the road which Jackson and Hobley had advocated; and one of the disadvantages resulting from the acceptance of Sclater's Kavirondo Gulf route was that it would entail expenditure on a third station in Kavirondo.† Kipture seemed to fit the requirements of the situation, but it was nonetheless chosen primarily because it was suitably sited in relation to the Protectorate's reorganised transport service. It was in some respects fortuitous that the new station also gave Berkeley the opportunity to begin the administration of the Nandi District. In this matter, as in so many others, the Commissioner did not command sufficient resources to initiate administratively desirable schemes, unless they had a direct bearing on the Protectorate's cardinal object in the Eastern Province—the control of the Uganda Road.

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* See p. 198.
† See pp. 189-201.

The new station was sited on top of a ridge, from which the immediate neighbourhood could be covered by the garrison's guns and the surrounding countryside kept under observation. The perimeter walls of the fort were surrounded by a ditch ten feet deep, and formed a rectangle with sides of 140 and 75 yards, broken by a projection 20 yards square at the north-west corner. The fortifications reminded the Nandi of the similar constructions which they had successfully stormed when raiding in Kavirondo, and they accordingly used their word for these fortified villages, *irimet*, to describe the Kipture station. The defences, which included raised stands for Maxim guns, were far more formidable than the hastily contrived stockade at Guasa Masa, and more in keeping with the requirements of a permanent post.[7]

Although the Nandi displayed no opposition to the formation of the station, none of the officials was optimistic enough to expect their help in its construction. The task was undertaken by Sudanese troops, Swahili station hands from Guasa Masa and Ravine, and Sclater's road party. Wages were paid in September 1896 to labourers from Kakamega and Kitoto's who may have been employed on construction work, but it was not until the following December that similar payments were made to any Nandi.[8] When work began on the fort in July 1896 Foaker's staff was evidently not very numerous. Berkeley had transferred one reserve company to the active list and had drafted it in April from Buganda to strengthen the garrison in Mau District, "in order to provide more fully for the security of the new station, and for escorts to accompany the mail and other parties (and perhaps, quite at first, of caravans themselves unless fully armed), until such times as our friendly relations with the Nandi shall be so well established as to ensure safety along the road through their country".[9] With two companies (I and VI) in Mau, possibly the whole of I Company (about 112 men) was stationed at Kipture, but it is more probable that Foaker was only allocated half a company for the defence of the station. No military officer was posted to Kipture, so the duties of local commandant of the Uganda Rifles were performed by the district officer. Foaker apparently had no more station hands at Kipture than at Guasa Masa, and the forty Lendu porters were probably returned to Buganda when the original station and the Kabras food depot were abandoned.*

Foaker left Kipture on home leave after beginning the construction of the fort, and he was replaced in August 1896 by Bagge, who was relieved at Mumias by Tomkins. This arrangement was made because Berkeley thought the Nandi post required an experienced officer, and could not be entrusted to an untried recruit.† The new incumbent was kept fully occupied completing the station, arranging for its food supply, and superintending the numerous caravans which began to pass regularly through Kipture.‡ Berkeley was unable to supply him with a clerk, and the Uganda Rifles detachment at Kipture was only large enough for garrison and escort duties, so that no spare men were available to accompany Bagge on tours in the district. As he was not sufficiently friendly with the Nandi to persuade the warriors to form an escorting levy force, the district officer had no choice but to remain in the fort. The only recorded journeys that were undertaken off the Uganda Road during Bagge's tenure of office were made by Sclater on road reconnaissances, Lieut. Smith on mapping surveys, and by Hobley, who led the first civilian party to make an investigation of the route up the south escarpment from Kitoto's.[10] Hobley was accompanied by sixty-eight Sudanese soldiers, twenty-three Swahilis and possibly a number of Wanga and Masai allies. During the course of the journey in September 1896, friendly relations were established with a Nyangori chief and the party received a cordial reception at Kitoto's where Hobley hoped to meet Bagge. The latter was not there, however, and during the climb up the escarpment along the course of the River Orobo, Hobley received a message to say that Bagge awaited him at Kipture. When the party camped at the top, the Kapchepkendi under Chief Raptindat and the Kaptalam came in to see Hobley, who gave one of the chiefs

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* See pp. 129, 210. The Lendu probably found Nandi uncongenial.

† Bagge arrived at Kampala, 31 March, 1891; served the Company in Uganda until invalided home in December 1892; returned to Kampala February 1895 as 2nd class assistant and served in Buganda and Busoga; transferred to Mumias November 1895. Foaker joined the Company on 10 October, 1889; caravan leader, railway survey 1891-92 and Portal's Commission 1893-94; returned to Kampala January 1895 as 2nd class assistant and served in Bunyoro and Busoga before the 1895 Nandi expedition.

‡ See Chapter 9.

½ lb. of iron chain as a return present for a sheep. After staying only one night at Kipture, where Bagge was "very busy", Hobley returned with Michael Moses over much the same route to Kitoto's without incident.*

Bagge's communications with the Nandi were largely confined to the sections in the vicinity of the fort, from whom he seemingly learnt very little about the country, the people and their tribal organisation. The only information on these subjects recorded in 1896 was contained in Hobley's reports. He thought the Surongai Hills might prove suitable for coffee; and noted that Nandi bartering parties were obtaining increased quantities of grain from East Kavirondo, and that there were good prospects for opening up a profitable ivory market in Nandi. He discovered that Masai and Nandi were distinct languages and that the Elgon and Nandi tribes belonged to the same ethnic group.[11] Hobley's findings did not amount to much, especially in comparison with the mass of information which he had collected about the tribes in his own district. Bagge's failure to study the Nandi was a serious omission, but even more significant was the fact that their raiding activities were reported, not by the district officer at Kipture, but by officials in other districts. Hobley and Jackson sent these reports to Bagge but they were apparently not investigated by him.

There is indeed no record that any letters were addressed by Bagge either to his superior officer at Ravine or the Commissioner. It must be presumed, therefore, that no reports were submitted, or that their contents were too unimportant for Jackson to incorporate items from them in his own despatches to the Commissioner.† The only information about the Nandi emanating from Kipture during this period is contained in the Station Cash Book. In addition to some payments for local labour in December 1896 and to five Nandi porters in the following month, presents were given on three occasions to Nandi chiefs, all of whom lived close to the fort.[12] Bagge possibly found difficulty in getting into effective communication with the Nandi leaders owing to the language barrier. His Masai interpreter may have understood Nandi and there were probably some Masai refugees in the district who were bi-lingual. Communication through the medium of the tribe's traditional enemies was not, however, a very satisfactory basis upon which to build better relations with a people, who had no reason to seek the friendship of an alien official living in their midst. It was probably because of Bagge's inability to communicate directly with the Nandi that Latongwa, the leader of the Koilegei section near Kipture who was himself of Uasin Gishu descent, managed to secure a standing with the government incommensurate with his position in the tribe.

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* The first mention of these two *pororosiek* in official records. Hobley called the camp at the top of the escarpment "Bagge's Camp", so presumably Bagge had visited the area.

† Cf. Foaker's silence at Guasa Masa, p. 169.

The language difficulty might nevertheless have been overcome, if Bagge had been endowed with Hobley's initiative or had shared the latter's interest in ethnography and linguistics. Bagge undoubtedly matured considerably in later years, but when he served as a newcomer under the Company in Uganda in 1891, Lugard had been severely critical of his subordinate's attitude and conduct.

> He seems a useless kind of man, helpless with no initiative, and very little "go" or nous and besides to be constantly ailing. It would not do to leave such a man in the very far interior, in a station where trouble might arise, or war, and where the character and efficiency of the first European resident would be the estimate which the natives would form of all the British. Such first impressions are very strong, and the position which the first resident secures for himself (with what deference, respect and fear he can command), is what will pertain to all his successors.[13]

Lugard's censorious assessment of 1891 may not have been valid in 1896, but Bagge did little during his stay at Kipture to increase his personal prestige or to convince the Nandi of the government's concern for their welfare. The passive role played by Bagge in 1896 set the pattern for his successors, whose unenterprising conduct was regarded by Jackson as being responsible in part for the troubles in 1900.[14]

Cunningham and Berkeley's optimistic forecasts that Kipture would be self-supporting in the matter of food were quickly dispelled. Drought and the after effects of the 1895 expedition had increased the severity of the annual scarcity that usually occurred before the harvest, so that few Nandi had surplus grain to sell to the station.* The Nandi never produced foodstuffs surplus to their needs to sell to others, but often had to buy grain from their Bantu neighbours. Sclater had soon realised during his first visit to Nandi that food was not as plentiful as he had been led to expect, and he had set up a buying post at Kakamega and organised donkey convoys to transport his requirements to Kipture. Although he probably bought small quantities of grain from the Nandi after the harvest had been reaped in 1896, Sclater remained almost entirely dependent on Kakamega and Kitoto's for his food supplies. Bagge had also to rely on these arrangements to feed the Kipture garrison. He made no efforts to set up buying posts in the cultivated areas south-west of Kipture, and could not persuade the Nandi near the station to supply him with food until March 1897.*

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* See p. 15 for customary usage in these circumstances.

Although he adopted a negative attitude towards the Nandi, Bagge nevertheless fulfilled the most important objectives of his mission: the erection of the new station, the completion of Sclater's Road and the safe passage of caravans along it. The Nandi were recovering from the effect of the expedition, and were not actively hostile even if they were not markedly friendly. Bagge gave them no cause to nurture their resentment by interfering in tribal affairs, or by calling on them to perform distasteful duties. The warriors were not required to leave the vicinity of the road or to hand over captured guns and other booty; and Bagge also avoided taking action to punish, or even to investigate, Nandi raids against the Luo, Elgeyo and Elgon tribes. Berkeley had tacitly acknowledged that the government was powerless to prevent such raids except in the immediate neighbourhood of the Mumias and Ravine stations. From his long experience in Africa, the Commissioner probably anticipated a recrudescence of raiding activities after the punitive expedition, so that the Nandi could restore their morale and recoup their losses in livestock. So long as the raids were not directed against people to whom the government had given categorical assurances of protection, Berkeley was prepared to treat them with the same latitude which he and Hardinge had found it politic to exercise in the case of similarly provocative activities on the part of the Masai.† The Commissioner went farther, and even seemed reluctant to countenance the extension of British protection to tribes, such as those on Elgon and the Kano Plains, who suffered most from Nandi incursions.

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* See Chapter 9; NCB.

† See pp. 179-189.

He was not anxious to rush the issue, but was of the opinion that "the raiding and counter-raiding among the tribes . . . need not be considered as a serious matter, and will, doubtless, gradually cease as the influence of the Administration extends throughout the (Mau) district".[15]

Shortly after the close of the Nandi expedition, the Swahili leader of a Smith, Mackenzie and Co.'s caravan reported that a band of Nandi warriors had twice attacked his party on the Uasin Gishu caravan track. The incidents took place early in January 1896 at Kampi ya Swiga and near the escarpment. Both attacks were, however, foiled owing to the vigilance of the caravan's sentries.* For the return journey to Mumias, the trading party was issued at Ravine with a hundred rounds of ammunition for use against the Nandi, "who intend attacking caravans". After enquiring into these incidents at Guasa Masa, Cunningham concluded that the warriors who were seen by the Swahili headman in Nandi and Kamasia had no hostile intentions towards caravans. This opinion conflicted with the statement made by Salim bin Suliman, the experienced leader of the caravan in question, but his alleged assailants may have been on a hunting expedition, or fugitives returning to Nandi after the withdrawal of Cunningham's forces. Nothing more was done in the matter and when Pordage passed over the same route later in the month, he reported that the Nandi had not only stopped raiding caravans but had also avoided the neighbourhood of the road for several weeks.[16] But Hobley discovered that a large Nandi war party had been driven off when attacking the Sebei in March, and that the warriors continued to harry Kitoto's people at frequent intervals.[17]

When Jackson toured Elgeyo in August 1896 he took two Nandi with him, as he hoped to investigate a number of complaints about a series of Nandi raids in that district. After listening for three days to accounts of the raiders' misdeeds, Jackson induced the Elgeyo chiefs to make blood-brotherhood with the two Nandi visitors. This ceremony, which was not binding traditionally on either party, was reported to Berkeley with satisfaction, but it evidently had little real significance.[18] Jackson did not think it worth while to record the names or status of the participants, and he probably had no illusions about its effect on Nandi-Elgeyo relations.* When Hobley visited Kitoto in September 1896, the old chief complained that a number of his people's cattle had recently been looted by the Kapsile Nandi, who had descended on the Luo villages from the top of the south escarpment about eighteen miles from Kipture. Hobley declared that he was specially anxious to afford protection to Kitoto, who was "a good ally of the government", against these repeated incursions into his territory. This plea for action in support of Kitoto was made the text for a general disquisition on inter-tribal raiding in relation to British protection:

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* Swiga, possibly Twiga (giraffe); and either the Nandi west escarpment or the ascent from Ravine.

> It is necessary at all cost to repress the pernicious system of inter-tribal raiding, the curse of this district for so many centuries. If this is not done, the tribes faithful in their allegiance to us will fall away, and will feel that we are either powerless to intervene or indifferent about redressing their wrongs. I am desirous for even the most outlying tribes to feel in a vivid manner the protection we guarantee to afford to the adherents of law and order. They must be made to understand that small parties must be allowed to travel without molestation and, if they are interfered with, that the arm of the government is far reaching. Until inter-tribal fighting and raiding ceases, all real progress is impossible.

Bagge promised to investigate Hobley's complaint about the Kapsile, although the alleged offenders occupied broken, mountainous country through which Cunningham's 400 soldiers had been forced to fight their way. No investigation was made, but Bagge could scarcely be blamed for not risking his meagre forces in such difficult country so far from his station and Sclater's Road.[19]

Thus, the new station with a resident officer and garrison, and Sclater's Road failed to stop the Nandi from raiding at will as they had done in the past. As Bagge had insufficient means to control the sections out of gunshot of his fort, he considered it inexpedient to interfere with the warriors' long established freedom of action against enemy tribes. Hobley's pleas for firmer measures went unheeded by Bagge, who refused to dissipate his slender resources by engaging in operations, which were not directly connected with his principal task of ensuring the safety of the Uganda Road.

The Nandi were content to restrict their activities for the time being to their customary pursuits. Even small caravans were allowed to pass unmolested, although several of them were poorly escorted and a few of them were accompanied by large numbers of livestock. The government's apparent imprudence in omitting to take more adequate measures to safeguard parties on the Ravine-Mumias section arose either from the lack of manpower for stronger escorts, or from Jackson and Bagge's belief that the Nandi intended to honour the peace emissaries' pledges to allow caravans to pass unhindered through the district. Many of the caravans mustered fewer than forty men and a dozen guns, while mail parties never consisted of more than six men and not all of these were armed. Port Victoria despatched seventy oxen to Ravine in November 1896 for Sclater's *William Mackinnon* transport scheme, and 186 were sent from Mumias in the following month. Sclater's ox-drawn carts were working in Nandi from July onwards, and Smith, Mackenzie and Co. were running regular monthly waggon convoys to Ravine. Despite these invitations to pillage, the only caravan which may have suffered at the hands of the Nandi, after the peace emissaries visited Guasa Masa, was the German scientific party under Schoeller, which was robbed by marauders below the south-west escarpment in November.[20] Caravan leaders continued to take special precautions especially at night, when passing from Ravine to Mumias, but several travellers reported that no Nandi were seen on this formerly perilous section.

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* See p. 99.

The Nandi ignored both Bagge and Sclater and allowed them to carry on with their tasks without opposition. As neither official interfered with the tribesmen nor made any demands upon them, the customary pattern of their lives was unbroken, especially in the areas away from the fort and road. There were, thus, two distinct and self-sufficient systems of government operating independently in Nandi at the same time. This situation was, in fact, similar to the state of affairs which Jackson had envisaged in February 1895, when he gave Hobley instructions regarding the policy to be pursued in Kavirondo.* Hobley at Mumias had nevertheless chosen to interpret his orders in a liberal fashion and so became the dominant influence in Kavirondo society, whereas Bagge at Kipture was content to let the Nandi alone so long as they did not threaten the station or interfere with caravans. Although this dual system of government implied that the Nandi were no longer the only claimants to supremacy in the Eastern Province, it caused no open show of resentment and hostility in 1896. Instead of trying to expel their rivals, the Nandi merely exhibited their dislike of their presence by moving away from the road and station and by refusing to visit Bagge at Kipture. What little help the government received from the Nandi came from the Koilegei sections near the fort, and even this was limited to the sale of small quantities of food and a solitary offer of short-term employment. Bagge had few opportunities to ingratiate himself with the chiefs by rewarding them for persuading their people to help the government: no Nandi were employed as messengers or on the garrison and station staffs, and no oxen were forthcoming for the *William Mackinnon* transport scheme.

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* See p. 86.

Kipture was an unpromising field for private traders because of the tribe's response to the government's presence, and the fact that the Nandi had little to sell and few wants to satisfy. Two small consignments of trade goods were delivered to the station by Mombasa firms, but the only trading activities that were carried out regularly at Kipture were conducted by Sudanese women, and by Jumbe Kimameta, who was encouraged by Bagge to open up the Nandi ivory market. Even the government's requirements of trade goods were nominal, as the troops and station staff had to be supplied with rations and not barter articles, owing to the scarcity of food in the local market. In contrast to other stations in the Eastern Province, no applications for land grants were received from trading companies or prospective settlers. A few Uasin Gishu Masai families from Ravine settled near Kipture in 1896, presumably as a result of Mrombi's visit and the employment of some of their fellow-tribesmen on the station staff.* The Nandi doubtless viewed their arrival with some misgivings, but a small Masai colony would not have caused the same resentment as the alienation of tribal lands to immigrant traders or settlers.

1896 was a year of uneasy peace during which the Nandi posed no immediate threat to the Protectorate's vital interests. Although the tribesmen had not been brought under control, their quiescence enabled Berkeley to strengthen the government's position in the

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* See pp. 209-223.

Eastern Province and to undertake some administrative reorganisation. Jackson only visited Nandi once during the year and was given time to strengthen his position at Ravine, and to turn his attention to the unadministered tribes in the rest of the Mau District. And in Kavirondo, Hobley was able to press on with pacification and administrative measures, without being distracted from his task by events in the neighbouring district. Sclater's cart road was completed without opposition and the transport service reorganised, so that arrangements could be made to carry the *William Mackinnon* and the steam-launch *Victoria* to the Lake. The Eastern Province was sufficiently settled for Gemmill to employ Basoga and Baganda porters to bring up government loads from the coast, and for trading firms to improve their transport departments and to supply more of the Protectorate's needs.

In Nandi a significant advance had been made by the transfer of the district headquarters to Kipture, which was nearer the chief centres of population than Guasa Masa and in a more promising terrain for agricultural development. But Sclater's reconnaissances had shown that Berkeley's hopes of an abundant food supply were as illusory as his forecast that the presence of an administrative officer in the centre of the country would cause the Nandi to come in and submit to the government. The people showed no disposition to come to terms with Bagge at Kipture, which had been sited on the north-eastern fringe of Nandi occupation owing to the exigencies of the transport system. The areas away from the fort remained unadministered, and nothing was done to stimulate the development which Berkeley had prophesied would occur after the country was opened up by Sclater's Road. None of the other suitable station sites on the Uganda Road would, however, have been more conveniently situated than Kipture for speeding the pacification of the Nandi. The slow progress that was made towards this end was, therefore, partly attributable to the requirements of the Protectorate's transport arrangements. Furthermore, once money and effort had been expended on Kipture, the government could not afford to move the station to a site off the road, in a more central position for bringing the tribe under control.[21] The occupation of Kipture contributed, thus, to the delay in pacifying the Nandi and the acceptance of British rule throughout the district.

1896 was in one important respect a year of lost opportunities.

Bagge failed to impress his personality on the Nandi, and to evoke the response to firm, just leadership which the people accorded, in later years, to officials who won their respect. Lugard had pointed out that the character and conduct of the first European to serve in a district were all important in establishing good relations between the government and people.* Many of the difficulties that subsequently arose with the Nandi possibly originated in Bagge's failure to make a favourable impression on the tribe in 1896. Moreover, he was followed by a succession of rather colourless officials, who performed their routine transport and station duties without making much headway in understanding the Nandi or earning their regard. It must be added in fairness to Bagge and his successors, however, that they may have been given verbal instructions by Berkeley to follow an expectant policy in their dealings with the Nandi. There is indeed some evidence that the Commissioner's temperament inclined him to favour such a policy, not only in Nandi but in the Protectorate as a whole. No written orders were issued when Bagge took over Kipture, so his actions were presumably to be guided by Berkeley's instructions to Jackson on the Mau District, of which Nandi formed part.† These advocated the initiation and maintenance of "friendly relations with the native tribes", and might be construed as implying that district officers were to avoid taking measures, which might endanger even such uneasy, but nevertheless predominantly peaceful, relations as those which Bagge had established with the Nandi.‡ If this were so, the Commissioner's failure to give Bagge the resources necessary for a more forward policy may have been prompted by the wish to avoid antagonising the Nandi, as much as by the absence of reserves from which additional resources could be found.[22]

At the end of 1896 the position was one of stalemate, with each side watching the other and waiting for the next move. Lieut. Smith summarised the situation when he wrote that the Nandi "do not much like being kept in order by an Englishman in the midst of them, and are not to be entirely trusted yet—at any rate for any distance from the caravan route".[23]

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* See p. 215.

† See p. 182.

‡ See Chapter 11.

References

1. Cunningham-Com, 10 December, 1895, ESA, A/34/1; 31 January, 1896, FOCP, 6849/55.
2. Berkeley-FO, 21 December, 1895, 8 February, 1896, 3 March, 1896, FOCP, 6827/289, 6849/55/184; Berkeley-Hobley, 25 February, 1896, ESA, A/5/2.
3. Cunningham-Com, 16 March, 1896, ESA, A/4/5.
4. Lansdowne-Eliot, 19 July, 1901, FO2/443.
5. RSD. Foaker-Com, 23 May, 1896, ESA, A/4/5.
6. A Kamasia chief and Mrombi, the Uasin Gishu headman, accompanied Jackson from Ravine. See p. 200. RSD; Berkeley-FO, 18 July, 1896, FOCP, 6913/3.
7. Matson and Sutton, *UJ*, 29 (1965), p. 169. Huntingford, following the Nandi Political Record Book, equates Kipture with Bushiri, the post established on the south escarpment in 1899.
8. NCB.
9. Berkeley-FO, 2 April, 1896, FOCP, 6861/20.
10. Smith, *op. cit.*, Hobley-Com, 13 July, 1899, ESA, A/4/18.
11. Hobley-Com, 1 June, 1896, 5 June, 1896, ESA, A/4/5. The Nandi and Elgon tribes denied the relationship.
12. NCB.
13. Perham, *Lugard's Diaries*, ii, 205. Hobley was often critical of his officers' lack of interest in tribal affairs; Hobley-Com, 9 March, 1900, ESA, A/4/26.
14. Jackson-Com, 20 November, 1900, ESA, A/8/1: "We know there is a white man at Kipture but we never see him". Bagge's recollections (KLC Evid. i, 478) "I had been part of the tour in Nandi country, where I built a fort. It was lovely country with rich grass, fresh streams and lots of cattle".
15. Berkeley-FO, 4 November, 1896, FOCP, 6951/34.
16. RSD 8-10 January, 1896; Cunningham-Com, 3 March, 1896, ESA, A/4/4. The Kamasia were also threatening caravans; Russell's Diary, 24 January, 1896.
17. Hobley-Com, 3 April, 1896, ESA, A/4/5. See p. 187 for his views on these raids.
18. Jackson-Com, 6 October, 1896, FOCP, 6951/34.
19. Hobley-Com, 22 September, 1896, ESA, A/4/6. See p. 153.
20. Kaiser in Report of the Zionist Commissioner 1905.
21. See Craufurd-FO, 9 December, 1896, FO, 107/61 for reduction in EAP estimates for 1897-98, and Salisbury's comment "going ahead much too fast"; Perham, *Lugard* i 614 for the scrapping of a costly reorganisation scheme in EAP (including the employment of Lugard as Assistant Commissioner). In 1899 Ternan refused to move the Buddu station because a bastion and magazine had been built at Masaka, although George Wilson urged that a more central station was required for a district, "which has long been a hotbed of rebellion and general lawlessness"; Wilson-Com, 28 February, 1899, BRA.
22. Berkeley-Jackson, 26 November, 1896, ESA, A/5/2; Berkeley-FO, 31 October, 1896, FOCP, 6951/32. Cf. Hardinge-FO, 24 March, 1896, FO. 107/50 Mungeam, *op. cit.*, p. 56.
23. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 277.

11

COMBINATION IN MAU

Towards the end of 1896 the tribes in the Mau District began to grow restless. During the year's respite from hostilities, the government had neither brought the tribes under control nor demonstrated the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the country away from the Uganda Road. While the warriors were watching to see what further action would be taken against them, there was a lull in inter-tribal raiding. But as it became evident that the district officers did not have the enterprise nor command the resources to intervene in tribal disputes, dormant rivalries revived and relations between the tribes reverted to their traditional pattern. The resumption of raiding did not directly threaten the security of the road and stations, but a return to unsettled conditions was liable sooner or later to endanger the Protectorate's vital interests, or to force the government to take action in support of protected sections who were menaced by raiding bands.

Among the sections to whom Jackson had accorded protection were the Uasin Gishu Masai settlers, who had been the only people to respond to his efforts to populate the country in the vicinity of Ravine. After the Elkakimor Kamasia had been punished in November 1896 for looting stock from the Uasin Gishu Masai, the offending section and some of their eastern neighbours had made peace with the government.* But the Lembus refused to settle near the fort and to accept Jackson's assurance of friendship. Some of their warriors sought refuge in Nandi and Elgeyo, and those who remained behind began a series of outrages against the Uasin Gishu Masai. The emnity between the two tribes had been exacerbated by the help which Jackson had received from the Masai in the Elkakimor operations, and by the advantage which the Uasin Gishu took of their privileged position to attack the Lembus. The victims of these raids evidently thought that Jackson would refuse to take their part against his allies, whose knowledge of the country in which they had settled had proved dangerous to the security of the Kamasia.

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* See p. 183.

Two Uasin Gishu settlers were killed by Lembus spearmen on 3 December 1896, and five days later fifty cattle were looted in a midnight raid from a Uasin Gishu herd only two miles from the fort. The second attack was carried out by over 200 Lembus, who killed six Uasin Gishu. On the night of the 10th warriors were seen prowling round the fort but no attack was launched against it. These incidents were not exceptional manifestations of inter-tribal hostility. But on the night of 23 December 1896 the Lembus challenged the government's authority by burning down the Uasin Gishu settlement at the foot of the hill below the fort. The manyatta was controlled by Mrombi, the headman recognised by the government, who lost most of his stock in the raid. Fifty-eight cattle and 500 sheep and goats were looted but a number of these were later recovered. Uasin Gishu losses amounted to two warriors killed, two women with babies burned to death and three warriors wounded. Out of the large number of Lembus and Nandi taking part in the raid, five of the former and one of the latter were killed. This audacious outrage could not be ignored, if government prestige was to be maintained and if the truculent Lembus and their Nandi allies were to be deterred from extending their activities to caravans on the Uganda Road.

Farther west, the Elgeyo remained "always most friendly" and continued to ask for protection from raids by their neighbours. They were unlikely to endanger the road on its new alignment, and had given no cause for punitive measures to be taken against them. But some of the Lembus dissidents had been given asylum by the Elgeyo after the Elkakimor expedition, and the Uasin Gishu told Jackson that the Elgeyo were in alliance with the Kamasia. The Lumbwa were also unlikely to threaten the Uganda Road, though they had attacked Swahili caravans using the southern route through their country. After the 1895 expedition the Nandi Laibon had taken refuge with the Lumbwa, who were also reported by Uasin Gishu informants to be in league with the hostile Lembus. Jackson realised, however, that punitive measures against the Lumbwa were beyond his resources, until the post which he had recommended was established in their country.

After the punitive patrol against the Elkakimor in November 1896, the Lembus brought in one Martini-Henry and three Snider rifles which they had bought from the Nandi. This was a reminder to the government that none of the arms looted from caravans and West's camp had been given up by the Nandi, despite the specific promise made to Jackson by the peace emissaries on 10 February 1896.* When the Lembus rejected Jackson's ultimatum requiring them to move to the vicinity of Ravine, some of their warriors went to Nandi, and when Mrombi's settlement was sacked the Lembus were helped by a large number of Nandi, one of whom was killed and another wounded. The wounded man and nine of the looted stock were subsequently seen in Nandi, but Teres† denied any knowledge of the attack, although he admitted to Bagge that "his people and the Lembus people were all one".[1] Teres was reported to be friendly when Macpherson visited Kipture in December 1896, and the chief's denial was not challenged at the time. But Jackson learnt at the end of March 1897 that the Nandi Laibon had sent medicine from Lumbwa three months previously to the Lembus warriors for the raid on the Uasin Gishu settlement.[2] Thus at the close of 1896, only the relatively small Lembus sections were behaving in an intransigent manner. The Elgeyo were peaceful; the Lumbwa remote and virtually unapproachable from Ravine; and the implication of the Nandi in an isolated Lembus raid was disquieting but not sufficient to create undue alarm.

This was the state of affairs when Berkeley passed through the Eastern Province in January 1897 on his way to the coast. Before leaving Entebbe, the Commissioner wrote with gratification of the peaceful, settled state of the Province, and had expatiated on the "development of friendly relations with food producing districts such as Nandi, formerly so hostile as to be impassable to caravans".[3] Although Berkeley was inclined to be unduly optimistic in his judgments, there was nothing in Jackson and Hobley's despatches to cause him to moderate his enthusiasm. During his journey from Port Victoria, the Commissioner discussed the situation with Hobley at Mumias, Bagge at Nandi and Jackson at Ravine. Berkeley and Jackson left Ravine on 19 January 1897 for Naivasha, where the Commissioner signed the handing-over report which he had presumably completed during his journey. The report expressed his satisfaction about the pacification of the Nandi, the formation of a station in the centre of their country, and the friendly relations existing between the tribe and the administration. He acknowledged the need for a station among the Lumbwa, whom he described as "if not openly hostile to the administration, to be of truculent character, and would not hesitate to attack and rob small, ill-armed caravans". The Ravine tribes were stated to be generally friendly, but he noted that Jackson thought an expedition might be necessary against a Kamasia section for attacking the Elkakimor, who had recently become firm allies of the government. The Commissioner was satisfied that such minor difficulties that might arise near Ravine would be "satisfactorily disposed of", and confident that "to this result the great experience of Mr. Jackson in dealing with native tribes must powerfully contribute". Moreover, Berkeley did not anticipate that the more powerful tribes such as the Nandi and Lumbwa would be likely to assist the Kamasia. Finally, while admitting that progress in establishing full administrative control would be a slow process compared with other districts, the Commissioner was gratified that the district stations and the Uganda Road remained quite unmolested.[4]

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* See p. 168.

† Teres was "chief" of the Kapchepkendi south of Kipture. See p. 261.

Berkeley's report was a fairly accurate assessment of the position as it was when he left Ravine. He conceded that a small, localised expedition might be required to punish the Lembus, but he did not envisage that similar measures might be necessary against other tribes, and was obviously unaware that the Nandi Laibon was alleged to be planning a tribal-wide conspiracy against the government. Berkeley evidently did not see the situation as one of exceptional gravity, and it must be assumed that this view was shared at the time by his district officers. Jackson in particular had ample time to declare his misgivings, but he apparently only discussed with the Commissioner the probable need to punish the Lembus. It must be assumed, therefore, that Jackson considered either that other exceptional measures were unnecessary to maintain law and order, or that Berkeley would not be receptive to suggestions for an active policy of pacification. The Commissioner was naturally reluctant to anticipate difficulties on the eve of his departure, but even so there appeared to be no reason to doubt that the sort of minor problems that were bound to arise could not be dealt with locally by Jackson. This was in fact the view which Berkeley maintained in England after Ternan had decided on a punitive expedition. He declared the trouble with the Kamasia was quite unimportant and would speedily be settled. While admitting that the tribesmen had been raiding and were restless, Berkeley insisted that this was one of the small inconveniences which must be expected when outlying tribes came more and more under British influence. These troubles arose, moreover, not so much from dissatisfaction with British rule, as from the protection which the government gave to friendly tribes from the raiding activities of their hostile neighbours.[5]

The Commissioner made no arrangements before leaving to reinforce the Mau garrisons so that punitive measures could be undertaken, nor did he provide extra men to strengthen the dangerously small escorts provided for mail and other parties. Berkeley's views on the seriousness of the restlessness reported among one section of the Kamasia were evidently shared by station officials at Ravine and Kipture, since scarcely any additional precautions were taken at either station as a result of the Lembus attacks. Extra men were sent from Ravine to escort a mob of cattle to Nandi on 8 December 1896, and two days later Lieut. Smith was warned by messenger not to travel on ahead of his party. Eighteen soldiers from the Kipture detachment arrived on the 26th at Ravine, where a thorn fence and a new cattle enclosure were under construction.* But precautions such as these hardly suggested that a serious situation was developing.

On 18 January 1897, however, an event took place in Nandi which altered the situation to a much greater extent than its intrinsic significance would seem to warrant. Four Sudanese soldiers carrying local mail from Kipture to Ravine were attacked about nine in the evening at their camp in the Lessos area. One man and a small girl were killed, the corporal in charge was reported missing and the mail bag was stolen. The corporal later returned to Kipture without his arms, and a detachment from Ravine discovered a rifle bayonet on the road, and the partly burnt Kipture accounts in the camp where the attack took place. Bagge sent news of the raid with an escort of fifteen Sudanese to Ravine, where Uasin Gishu runners were sent off post haste to catch up with Jackson and Berkeley. The messengers returned to Ravine on 26 January 1897, with orders from Jackson that no parties were to proceed to Nandi unless they were escorted by at least ten rifles. The attack on the mail party was the first hostile act by the Nandi against the government since the expedition, and also the first to occur on Sclater's Road. Jackson took what action he could within the limits of his resources, but he did not consider the situation had deteriorated to such an extent that his presence was required at district headquarters.* Berkeley, who received news of the outrage before he signed his handing-over report, evidently regarded the attack as an isolated incident, and not as a prelude to the resumption of general hostilities that would threaten the safety of the road. He did not consider it sufficiently important to warrant inclusion in his report, in which he had claimed that the Nandi had been pacified and the road made secure.

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* RSD. There were 50 soldiers at Ravine, 50 at Kipture and 25 at Naivasha. Thirty from Nandi took part in the Elkakimor patrol in November 1896.

Bagge also sent an account of the attack to Entebbe, which Ternan received just as he was leaving for a tour of Buddu. "News had come from Bagge that the Kamassia and Wanandi tribes were again giving trouble, and had surprised and murdered a party of our people on the road, and had carried off their arms, ammunition, and stores". Ternan decided the Mau garrisons were too weak to take effective reprisals so he made preliminary dispositions, before leaving for Buddu on 31 January, 1897, to assemble "a punitive force of some strength". Ternan also asked for a full report from Jackson on the security situation in Mau. This request probably gave Jackson the first intimation that Ternan, the professional soldier, was more inclined to take forceful action when breaches of the peace occurred than Berkeley, the consular official turned administrator.[6]

Meanwhile a second incident had occurred in Mau. When thirty Sudanese, who had been sent from Ravine to escort Sclater's road party, were within one march of the station, they were attacked about mid-day on 23 January 1897 by a large band of warriors. The raiders were repulsed after losing one man killed and several wounded. The Sudanese did not follow up their routed assailants for fear of an ambush, but a Martini-Henry rifle was captured and this turned out to be the one lost by the mail party in the Lessos incident. The dead warrior was identified from his shield and spear as an Elgeyo. On the basis of this information, Jackson deduced that the participants in both the raids on Sclater's Road were Elgeyo, and that the attacks had been carried out by the same party.* On the day of the second incident, a Sudanese boy was wounded, while drawing water, by a poisoned arrow from a Lembus marauder. The attackers ran off when the alarm was given, and a water picket was posted at the river near the Sudanese camp at Ravine. About the same time a Dorobo tracker, Teriko, reported that the Kamasia had murdered his wife and mother while they were gathering honey in the forest. The Ravine officials were unable to help Teriko, as the Kamasia had not visited the station for several days, but the Dorobo rescued his wife from a house in the forest while her custodians were asleep. He subsequently told Jackson that his wife had been detained because the Kamasia did not wish it to be known that they were moving food into their large forest granaries and making fresh arrow poison.[7]

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* RSD. Jackson returned to Ravine on 13 February, 1897 from Fort Smith, where discussions were held about Naivasha Masai raids in the EAP.

Before Jackson returned to Ravine, a large CMS caravan of fifteen missionaries including three ladies passed through the district. They were escorted into Ravine on 26 January 1897, and proceeded to Kipture two days later with Capt. C. E. Bagnall, the prospective Nandi district officer, and an escort of twenty-one Sudanese. Strict watch was kept along the road and in camp at night but no incidents occurred, although warriors were seen watching the caravan from the bush near the road. Kipture was reached on 31 March 1897 and the following day services were held in English, Luganda and Swahili. A few Nandi were seen at the fort but they refused to eat the food the missionaries offered them. Two members of the party urged that Nandi should be included in the area which the CMS should attempt to evangelise within the next three years.[8]

Ternan returned to Entebbe from Buddu on 13 February 1897. The following day he notified the Foreign Office of the steps he proposed taking to deal with the unsettled conditions in the Mau District. A Company of Uganda Rifles had been drafted from Bunyoro to bring the Mau complement up to three companies, in order to strengthen the road escorts and to impress the inhabitants. Ternan did not refer directly to the punitive operations which he had already decided to embark on. He merely passed on the gist of Jackson's report that there was inter-tribal conflict among certain Kamasia sections, and that some small government parties had been attacked on the road. Ternan surmised that the raids had been made to obtain guns, an object which the raiders had in fact achieved in one instance.[9] Ternan's aim in sending this evasive despatch was presumably to advise that some action might be needed, without giving the Foreign Office the chance to forbid it before he had completed the lengthy process of assembling the punitive force.

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* Jackson later implicated the "Sigisi" Nandi in both incidents; see p. 245.

Soon after Jackson's return to Ravine from seeing Berkeley off, peace negotiations were concluded with four Kamasia sections, who reiterated their wish for better relations with the fort and their lack of sympathy for the pretensions of the Lembus. Jackson exhorted them not to interfere with their rebellious neighbours nor to accompany them on their raids. The Elkakimor elders claimed the Lembus had sent a cattle bribe to the Lumbwa to induce them to combine for a daylight raid on the Ravine station cattle or a night attack on the fort. The emissaries declared that other Kamasia sections had not joined in the Lembus raids, but insisted that the raiders had been roused into action by Uasin Gishu Masai looters. Despite these mitigating circumstances, ample incriminating evidence had been collected against the Lembus by 24 February 1897 for Jackson to seek retribution for their hostile acts, and also to exculpate other Kamasia sections from anti-government intentions.[10]

Jackson sent his assessment of the Mau situation to Ternan only three weeks after he had parted from Berkeley at Fort Smith. During this interim period events had caused Jackson to alter his opinion about the scope of the measures that were needed to put an end to the unsettled conditions in Mau. Jackson recited the calendar of recent hostile acts in his district, and forwarded a summary of events since the Elkakimor expedition. Although he was aware of the antipathy between the Lembus and the Uasin Gishu Masai, he was at a loss to understand the attitude of the former, as they had declared themselves well satisfied with the action which Jackson had take in the past to investigate their complaints. Jackson feared that the slaughter of five soldiers, "in one place and with comparative ease", during the Elkakimor operations had lessened the tribesmen's dread of the Sudanese, and caused the Kamasia to think that the government forces were unable to pursue their foes into the forested hills. He had nevertheless hoped that the Lembus would remain quiet in the mountains, and content themselves with picking off a stray Uasin Gishu when occasion offered.* Jackson's equanimity had been disturbed, however, by the Sclater's Road incidents, both of which he attributed to Elgeyo who had been incited by their Lembus neighbours to challenge the government.†

The Lembus' intention to widen the front against the government received some confirmation from reports that stock presents had been sent to persuade the Nandi and Lumbwa to join the Lembus in their hostile activities. Jackson was ignorant of the outcome of these overtures but he knew the Nandi had helped the Lembus in the attack on the Uasin Gishu settlement. Moreover, he was disturbed about "the equally unsatisfactory state of parts of Nandi", and by recent raids into Kitoto's territory by Nandi and Lumbwa warriors. Bagge was asked to report on these matters, and Jackson stressed the embarrassment caused by the Kitoto's raids as they had seriously affected the food supply for the Kipture garrison. Jackson was apparently making the most of the reports of Nandi unrest, and there is no evidence that Kitoto's supplied more than a small proportion of Kipture's needs. Indeed as recently as October 1896, Jackson had stated that Nandi was entirely dependent on convoys from "Teriki" (presumably Kakamega) for its food supplies, and had asked for five donkey men in the 1897-98 estimates to keep the service going.[11]

Jackson was convinced that the hostile attitude of the dissident sections would worsen if punishment were delayed, as procrastination would be regarded as weakness on the government's part. He emphasised that punitive action must be designed to ensure complete success, and that half-measures would be valueless. In order to achieve this object, Jackson realised that troops would have to be sent from other districts. Settled conditions could not be restored by negotiation, as his experiences at Ravine had shown that the so-called chiefs were not powerful enough to guarantee the obedience of their followers. Thus, fifteen months after he had been enjoined to enlist their support in the processes of government, Jackson had to admit that the chiefs had no authority to negotiate on behalf of their people and were, in fact, chiefs only in name. Although he acknowledged it was unfortunate that the entire tribe should be penalised for the misdeeds of one of its sections, Jackson was satisfied there was no alternative, since the explanations that had been made repeatedly to the Kamasia, Elgeyo, Nandi and Lumbwa leaders had not resulted in the cessation of hostilities against the government and its allies.*

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* The Lembus had killed and wounded several Uasin Gishu women.

† The so-called Elgeyo were probably Kamasia or a mixture of both tribes.

Jackson reinforced his argument by outlining the practical difficulties he had faced in implementing his principal task of ensuring ing the safe and swift passage of caravans and mail along the Uganda Road. Since no party could proceed without an escort of fifteen rifles, caravan movements depended on his ability to provide escorts of that strength from the fifty men in the Ravine garrison. Even if a party carried a few guns, Jackson still had to supply fifteen men so that the return journey could be made in safety. Although all his Sniders had been issued to Swahili porters, who were employed as sentries in order to release Sudanese for escort duties, caravans were often delayed for long periods at Ravine. Moreover, Ternan's proposal to draft another company to Mau for escort duties would not solve the problem. Owing to the absence of local food supplies at Ravine, together with the difficulties which Major Smith was experiencing in supplying the station from Naivasha, the extra troops could not be accommodated at Ravine where they were needed, but would have to be stationed at Kipture where Bagge had sufficient for his needs. Although traffic along the road was almost at a standstill, Smith, Mackenzie and Co.'s Cape waggons had already left the coast and would soon be working on a regular schedule from Fort Smith to Mumias. If these convoys were held up at Ravine while escorts were assembled, they would become an additional burden on the station's uncertain food supplies. Dowse, the firm's agent at Ravine, had been forced to evacuate his compound across the river and to retire into the fort, as it was unsafe for the few men he could employ—and feed —to go into the forests to cut timber.

Jackson urged speed upon Ternan because it was rumoured that Lenana was about to move south from Ngong to Matapatu, and was trying to persuade the Naivasha Masai to accompany him. If this rumour proved correct, it would be difficult to recruit a powerful force of Masai auxiliaries for operations in Mau. Without the assistance of experienced, swift-moving rustlers like the Naivasha Masai, Jackson had learned from the Elkakimor operations that it was doubtful if the Sudanese could capture enough livestock to force the Mau dissidents to submit.*

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* There is little evidence that explanations were made to leaders of standing or, indeed, to sections other than those near Ravine and Kipture; "repeatedly" appears to be an exaggeration.

Thus, if Ternan had in fact asked for a case to be made out for punitive operations, he must have been overjoyed when he received Jackson's reply to his request for a situation report. An officer of Jackson's seniority and authority had pressed not merely for the urgent and thorough punishment of those sections who were known to be hostile to the government, but for decisive punitive measures against all the Mau tribes.

Although the situation had deteriorated since Berkeley's visit in the previous month, Jackson's change of mind must be considered against a background of a series of complex interacting factors. He had chafed for a long time under his invidious position in Mau, and the inconclusive results of his efforts to strengthen the government's hold over the district. His main achievement had been in connection with the holding operation of securing the safety of his station and the Uganda Road. But even in this humdrum task, his authority had been challenged by the sacking of the Uasin Gishu settlement and the attacks on government road parties. Moreover, his efforts in other fields had met with little success. He had been forced to concede that he was unable to prevent the Naivasha Masai from raiding in the EAP. Similarly in his dealings with the Lumbwa, Jackson could have gained little satisfaction from uttering threats which he knew he was powerless to carry out. Nearer home, and all the more galling in consequence, his attempts to conciliate the Kamasia had met with many setbacks, which Jackson attributed to the machinations of their one-eyed Uasin Gishu Laibon. After several of his efforts had been foiled by this practitioner, Jackson ruefully admitted that "he had more power and authority over them than I had".[12] When Jackson looked like coming to an understanding with the Lembus after the Elkakimor operations, he was understandably incensed when the tribesmen declared they could not trust his word.† The Kamasia were found to have no chiefs with whom Jackson could effectively treat, while he lacked the power to depose what chiefs there were in order to replace them with his own nominees. The result was that the only support he had managed to enlist in the neighbourhood of the station was provided by the small colony of Uasin Gishu Masai. Jackson had, therefore, to rely on these immigrants more than he wished, as he was fully aware of their propensities for plundering and fomenting discord, which had provoked the emnity of the Kamasia. The latter had often shown their dislike for Jackson's allies by attacking the Uasin Gishu near the fort. Furthermore, inter-tribal raiding persisted throughout the Mau District. Jackson tried to minimize the seriousness of these symptoms of unsettled conditions, but his judgment was probably affected by his inability to control their causes.[13] The fact remains that, since taking charge of the Mau District in December 1895, Jackson had failed to establish his authority or to become the dominant power in the district, even in the immediate neighbourhood of the fort. The series of hostile incidents that occurred from November 1896 onwards rendered his position more irksome than ever, and whittled away whatever prestige he had built up during the previous year.

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* Masai were used for the first time against the Kalenjin in Elkakimor, where the Sudanese proved cumbersome and vulnerable in the difficult terrain. See p. 183.

† See pp. 189, 226.

The precariousness of Jackson's position was emphasised by the scarcity of the information which he gathered about events in the district, and the suspect nature of many of the reports he received. Although he was helped on occasions by Dorobo trackers, he was usually dependent on rumours brought in by the Uasin Gishu Masai, a source upon which he knew he could place little reliance. Scraps of intelligence were sometimes disclosed by Kamasia visitors to the fort, but his informants were naturally inclined to absolve their own people from responsibility and to incriminate their neighbours. As his knowledge of district happenings was confined to these partial and restricted sources, Jackson was anxious lest a serious situation might arise without warning. He was too busy with routine duties to travel about the district with any regularity, and he lacked the resources for such excursions even if he could have spared the time. In all his undertakings he had, moreover, to take into consideration the precariousness of his food supply. The absence of local sources of grain and his dependence on Naivasha for his requirements limited his garrison to the numbers required for station and escort duties. And this in turn restricted his opportunities for touring the distant parts of the district, and precluded the manning of outposts in the areas which he managed to visit.* At the other stations in his district, Major Smith at Naivasha functioned more as a transport than a district officer, while Bagge's position at Kipture was almost identical to Jackson's at Ravine. The unrewarding irksomeness of the task confronting all the Mau officials contrasted forcibly with the positive measures which Hobley was undertaking to establish his personal supremacy over the Kavirondo, and to extend his authority throughout his district.

Although he apparently did not stress this point in his discussions with Berkeley, Jackson held definite views about the speed, scope and thoroughness of measures for establishing government control. He was confident that inter-tribal raiding would cease only after some of the more aggressive tribes had been soundly punished, and that the failure to obtain redress for government losses would be construed as a sign of weakness and fear.† When he discussed the genesis of the 1897 expeditions many years after the event, Jackson declared "he was a firm believer in the principle that it was better and more merciful to hit hard and get it over, when it was deemed necessary to hit at all".[14] This principle was invoked by Jackson when he pressed for action against the tribes who had flouted his authority without suffering any unpleasant consequences. The incidents which occurred after the one-day patrol against the Elkakimor in November 1896 demonstrated that reprisals on this scale were valueless against the Mau tribes, although similar operations had proved profitable in Kavirondo. It was clear that the small force of Sudanese from the Ravine and Kipture garrisons with a supporting band of Uasin Gishu and Naivasha Masai could not hope to make a lasting impression on the Kalenjin warriors. For an expedition in Mau to be assured of a successful outcome, troops, porters and food would have to be requisitioned from other parts of the Protectorate.

Jackson probably gathered from the Acting Commissioner's request for a situation report that Ternan would be sympathetically inclined to the use of military means for restoring government prestige, and to taking the initiative against known and potential enemies.* Jackson was cognisant of Berkeley's views on gradual, and if possible bloodless, pacification, and understood that the Commissioner would never have sanctioned action on such a scale as Jackson considered it expedient to recommend to Ternan. The remainder of the Protectorate was quiet and Jackson evidently saw in Ternan's assumption of command an opportunity for effective military action in Mau, providing a sufficiently convincing case could be made out to justify the Acting Commissioner's intervention. Thus, Berkeley's departure came at an opportune time. Moreover, if Ternan accepted the district officer's assessment of the situation, decisive measures could be taken to strengthen Jackson's position at Ravine and to conquer the Kalenjin tribes, before the Masai moved away to the south and the railway surveyors entered the district.

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* The Kamasia refused to sell food and Jackson had to postpone a visit to Njemps because he had no food for the journey.

† See pp. 65, 373.

Jackson adopted a different approach in his dealings respectively with Berkeley and with Ternan. The reason for this difference can possibly be found in Jackson's character. His record as an intrepid hunter showed that his personal bravery could not be called in question, and he was universally liked and respected. He was nevertheless considered by some of his colleagues as "not being a strong man", and Colvile considered him unsuitable for promotion to Acting Commissioner on this account.[15] Jackson apparently did not try to modify Berkeley's assessment of the seriousness of the situation in Mau in January 1897, but, within a month of the Commissioner's departure, Jackson provided the information which Ternan needed to justify the action he proposed taking to deal with the same problem. It seems that Jackson only came out unreservedly in favour of thorough and extensive punitive operations, after he received the letter which Ternan had written on 28 January 1897. Ternan possibly indicated in this despatch, or in a personal letter, that he was anxious to be given grounds to justify the measures which he had, in fact, decided on after receiving Bagge's report on the Sclater's Road attacks. These submissions seem to be supported by the timing of the various communications between headquarters and the stations in Mau.[16] If they are valid, they explain Jackson's rapid change of mind and his ready compliance with the wishes of the Acting Commissioner.

On 15 March 1897 Jackson's report (24 February, 1897) was sent to the Foreign Office by Ternan, who outlined his plans for securing a settlement with the Mau tribes and for safeguarding the Uganda Road. After observing that Jackson "anticipates further troubles with the tribes in his district", Ternan continued that Jackson "was inclined to consider that, under any circumstances, it will be necessary to organise a punitive expedition against the Kamasia and Elgeyo tribes, in order to keep the road open, and I agree with him in thinking that, in all probability, this course will have to be taken". The Acting Commissioner detailed the plans he had made to supply Ravine with food, and to strengthen the forces available for operations in Mau, if an expedition became unavoidable. These included the withdrawal of three companies from Buganda and Bunyoro for duty at Mumias "as a precautionary measure". Because this major redistribution of the Protectorate army seriously depleted the Bunyoro garrisons, Ternan proposed to enlist Baganda to man the three Bunyoro posts that were affected by the move, and to recruit an additional company of Sudanese if the Bunyoro commander considered this advisable. Despite the evasive wording of the despatch, Ternan knew the Foreign Office would realise that such drastic steps implied that he intended to mount a full-scale punitive expedition, without attempting to restore law and order by localised police operations. He knew, too, that the despatch would not reach London in time for the Foreign Office to question the necessity and expediency of his proposals. The despatch arrived in Downing Street on 29 May 1897, eight days after the expeditionary force invaded Kamasia. The Foreign Office signified its approval a week later, after Hill had minuted that "this proves that the Uganda Protectorate can ill spare men for Major Macdonald* and that we must do our best to replace them", and Salisbury had expressed concurrence with Hill's assessment.[17]

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* See p. 229.

Before sending the despatch to London, Ternan notified Jackson of the arrangements for the expedition and asked Jackson to meet him at Kipture to discuss them. The Acting Commissioner did not, however, feel constrained to inform the Foreign Office of his impending departure from the seat of government.[18] Had he done so, the Foreign Office would have been left in no doubt that Ternan had decided on a major campaign under his personal command. Ternan, like Berkeley, was well aware of the views of the African Department officials on such enterprises, as well as their frequent reiteration of the need for patience and their abhorrence of military adventures, unless they were forced on the government by attacks on the protectorates' vital interests.[19] But Ternan also knew that punitive expeditions were condoned in London, providing they were initiated on the responsibility of the local authorities and carried out without serious setbacks. Ternan was apparently satisfied, therefore, that the force he was leading into Mau would be strong enough to achieve its purpose, without attracting criticism from the Foreign Office.

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* See Chapter 13.

Ternan not only prevaricated about his intentions concerning the expedition against the Kamasia and Elgeyo, but also omitted to refer to the projected operations against other tribes in Jackson's district. He had evidence of general restlessness among the Nandi, and of their implication in anti-government activities for which no redress had been obtained. He did not, however, notify the Foreign Office of his intention to punish the tribe, although he had apparently decided to do so as a result of Bagge's unfavourable account of their continuing intransigence. This was probably because the Kamasia and Elgeyo were thought to be small tribes who were not expected to offer much resistance to disciplined riflemen, whereas the Nandi had demonstrated they were capable of holding their own against considerable government forces.

Ternan was undoubtedly influenced in his decision by Jackson's arguments that decisive action was necessary to settle the disturbed Mau districts and to safeguard the lines of communication to Uganda. The opportunity seemed a propitious one because Bunyoro, which had tied down the bulk of the Protectorate's forces for many years, was quiet. It was largely because of the government's pre-occupation with Kabarega in the past that the pacification of the Eastern Province had been deferred, apart from the inconclusive attempt to conquer the Nandi in 1895. The only other tribes who were likely to threaten the general peace were the Baganda, who were collaborating with the government, and the Masai, who were settling down harmoniously with Major Smith at Naivasha if not with their neighbours.[20] Although Macdonald's expedition was being discussed in London at the time, Ternan had received no official intimation of the government's proposals. He may, however, have had an inkling of what was afoot, and this would have strengthened his resolve to proceed against the Mau tribes, before his hands were tied by commitments connected with Macdonald's movements. Ternan undoubtedly realised in any case, from Berkeley's views on such matters, that when the Commissioner returned from leave there would be little opportunity for military adventures in the Eastern Province, unless a serious and sustained threat to the Uganda Road developed. The Acting Commissioner was, moreover, on friendly terms with officials at the Foreign Office, and knew that Jackson was highly regarded by Sir Clement Hill, who could consequently be expected to give favourable consideration to recommendations made in similar terms by both of the senior Protectorate officials.*

Despite the intrinsic validity of much of what Jackson had urged, the suspicion is raised that Ternan was glad of the opportunity to undertake a campaign in Mau, and anxious lest his plans should be frustrated by Foreign Office misgivings about the reasons for the projected operations. The speed with which he acted after receiving Bagge's report, the expedients he adopted to keep the Foreign Office in the dark for as long as he could about the scope of his proposals and, possibly, the hints he gave to Jackson to provide circumstantial support for his proceedings, all point to the probability that Ternan wanted to prevent any interference with his plans. His desire for active service was probably influenced by the fact that his professional association with the Uganda Rifles had brought him no distinction. After a long and eventful career in India, Afghanistan, Egypt and Suakin, Ternan had seen little action since his arrival in Uganda in February 1895. Although he had been stationed in Bunyoro and had been on a patrol up the Nile to Dufile, he had only been engaged in a few minor skirmishes in this formerly turbulent region. When he took over Bunyoro in August 1895 and when he replaced Cunningham as Commandant of the Uganda Rifles in February 1896, no opportunities presented themselves for the exercise of his capacity for command. This must have been galling to Ternan, who had devoted a great deal of time to planning the expansion and reorganisation of the Protectorate army. He was understandably eager, therefore, to find an opportunity for military occupation both to gain distinction for himself, and to prove that his plans for the costly expansion of the Uganda Rifles were justified.[21] Furthermore, when Ternan became Acting Commissioner he found routine office work at Entebbe uncongenial and his relations with the Baganda leaders exasperating. This caused the desk-bound soldier to minute district reports with peevish comments, and to behave petulantly to the mission-trained Baganda, whose scriptural language he particularly abhorred. These considerations made Ternan anxious to get away from the unaccustomed burdens of administrative office, and to welcome active service in Mau. Moreover, Ternan shared the hopes of many of his fellow officers that an opportunity would be found for a trial of strength with the two most formidable warrior tribes in the Protectorate, the Banyoro and Nandi. No incidents had occurred during his service in Bunyoro to warrant a major campaign, but the events of 1897 gave him the chance to pit his professional ability and experience against the Nandi.

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* A former gentleman-hunter from the squirearchy, Jackson was one of the few officials for whom Hill evinced any regard. His frequent personal letters to Hill contained criticisms of the conduct of affairs in Uganda and reflections on the character and conduct of his superiors and colleagues. Hill's support for Ternan was particularly evident when Johnston was in Uganda.

Meanwhile in Nandi all was quiet. The station cash book for March 1897 recorded the purchase of food from the Nandi for the first time, and also that a present was given to Latongwa, the spokesman of the Koilegei section near the fort. The two events were probably connected with the opening of a market at the gates of the fort. Since the food came from the harvest gathered six months previously and the first planted since the expedition, this was an encouraging sign, as there were prospects that more might be forthcoming from the recently planted crop when the Nandi realised there was a market for their surplus grain. It was all the more welcome as VII Company arrived at Kipture during the month, and increased the number of mouths to be fed by over a hundred men and a crowd of families and followers. Captain C. E. Bagnall, who had taken over the station from Bagge on 9 March 1897, took advantage of this increase in strength to one and a half companies to visit Kitoto's. He discovered that the Luo had threatened to burn down the government food store at the chief's village, presumably because they had been given no protection against frequent Nandi, Lumbwa and Kach raids, which had forced them to desert their gardens and take to the bush.*

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* Bagnall was probably a militia officer without campaign experience; appointed 7 July, 1896 as 2nd class assistant; arrived Kampala December 1896. See pp. 213, 313 for Berkeley's views on an experienced officer for Nandi. The depot may have been established by Bagge. Kach was south of Kitoto's; see p. 214.

Before handing over, Bagge submitted a report on the Nandi situation to Jackson, which the two men discussed when Bagge passed through Ravine on the way to the coast. As a result of Bagge's representation, Jackson informed Ternan on 12 March 1897 that he was "more than ever convinced that certain sections of the Nandi and Lumbwa are incorrigible and that no threats or persuasion will induce them to alter their ways and give up raiding, in spite of frequent warnings by Foaker, Bagge and myself during a period of 14 months". After referring to their persistent raids on the friendly Kavirondo, who expected protection from the government and provided food for the Nandi garrison, Jackson concluded: "I would venture to urge the expediency of dealing with all these people at the same time as the Lembus and Elgeyo are dealt with, and in such a manner as will ensure a lasting effect on them".* Ternan sent Jackson's report to London on 15 April 1897, when he informed the Foreign Office that he thought it desirable for Jackson to meet him at Nandi at the end of the month, "to discuss with him the situation in his district, and to decide on the course to pursue". Ternan observed that no government parties had been attacked on the road since Jackson's despatch, and attributed this to the stronger escorts which had been made possible by the drafting of reinforcements. After concurring with Berkeley's dictum that the government's first duty was to protect the road, Ternan declared that "the time has not come when tribes living in the vicinity of the road can be coerced into keeping peace among themselves". He added that his aim was not to attempt to accomplish this, but merely to inflict necessary punishment on those "attacking our parties and endangering food supplies".[22]

All was quiet at Ravine throughout March 1897, and it seemed as if Ternan's prompt action in sending reinforcements and strengthening escorts had cowed the Lembus and their allies. On 16 March 1897 five Uasin Gishu captured five head of cattle, which were being driven along the Nandi road from Ravine by a party of Lembus warriors. The animals were identified as part of the loot seized on 23 December 1896 from the Uasin Gishu encampment. During peace talks with the Elkakimor a week later, Jackson learned that three of the beasts were being driven to Lumbwa as a present to the Nandi Laibon. The gift was presumably either an acknowledgement for the medicine given to the warriors participating in the raid on the Uasin Gishu settlement, or presents to the Laibon for medicine for further operations. On 1 April 1897 the letter (dated 14 March, 1897) notifying Ternan's intention to launch a punitive expedition against the Mau tribes reached Jackson at Ravine. The next day a message was sent to J. P. Wilson, who had succeeded Major Smith at Naivasha, asking for food and ammunition. A fortnight later a party of Naivasha Masai came to Ravine to ask if their services would be required in the expedition against the Kamasia. Thus the projected operations were an open secret shortly after Jackson received Ternan's confirmation. This may have been partly responsible for the arrival of the Elkakimor and two other Kamasia sections at Ravine on 22 April 1897, when they were told to come back on "the tenth day of the moon". Jackson was apparently unwilling to treat with them until he had heard Ternan's views on the country over which the expedition would work, or the possibility of using friendly Kamasia against the Lembus. Jackson's delaying tactics are difficult to understand since all the sections in question had already made their peace with the government. He may, however, have been reluctant to confirm the previous arrangements in case Ternan intended to punish all the Kamasia for past misdeeds.*

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* Ternan had asked Jackson on 14 March, 1897 to meet him at Kipture; see p. 238. Bagge's report has not been found but he evidently had no fresh evidence implicating the Nandi in previous incidents, and was presumably ignorant of a Laibon-inspired conspiracy.

Preparations for the expedition continued throughout the month, and Jackson left Ravine on 27 April 1897 to discuss the operations with Ternan at Kipture. While Jackson was away making his second visit to Nandi since he assumed charge of Mau in December 1895, the Elkakimor and three other Kamasia sections arrived at Ravine on 10 May 1897, in accordance with the instructions given them on their previous visit. This time they were told to return a week later as Jackson particularly wanted to see them. This rebuff and the preparations going on at the fort apparently dismayed the emissaries, who failed to turn up for the postponed appointment.*

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* R.S.D. The Elkakimor made peace after the November patrol and in February and March; the others in November and February. See pp. 160, 231. The Masai had been reluctant to accept Jackson's invitation to fight the Elkakimor in November 1896 because "they did not know Jackson" Russell's Diary 10 November, 1896.

After discussing the problem with the Acting Commissioner at Kipture, Jackson was asked to write a report on the situation and to table his recommendations for dealing with it. This procedure was common practice before punitive measures were undertaken. A catalogue of offences was drawn up so that the Foreign Secretary, who usually received it long after punishment had been inflicted, had a brief from which to answer questions as to the necessity and rightness of the course pursued. Such a proceeding was particularly necessary in this instance, in order to justify the extensive operations which Ternan had already decided upon before the catalogue was drawn up. After admitting that the restlessness was confined to certain sections only, Jackson expressed regret that the attitude of the tribes had not improved. He continued:

> I have carefully investigated, as far as possible, the reasons for their restlessness and it appears the great cause of the trouble is the hostile attitude assumed by the Chief Lybon, or medicine-man, against the Government. This man, who has apparently enormous influence over various surrounding tribes, has declared against the government, and is now busying himself in exhorting the tribes to expel the English. From reliable native information received, I find he is endeavouring to bring about a combined movement against the Administration, and numerous minor pieces of information clearly indicate that combined hostile action against us will undoubtedly begin on the cessation of the present rainy season. The Lybon has lately taken to sending insolent and defiant messages to the Fort, and the fact that no action has hitherto been taken against him has a very bad effect in the eyes of the natives, who say we are afraid of him. I have used every effort to conciliate the tribes and have exercised the greatest forbearance in dealing with them, and at their own request have even gone so far as to make blood-brotherhood with many of them; but the ignorance of the people is so extreme that it is impossible to convey to such savages that the occupation of the country is not harmful to them. The chiefs look upon the presence of white men as likely to cause loss of prestige, and they are of opinion that, if they combine, they would be able to block the road and compel us to

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* RSD. Jackson's previous visit was in July 1896, see p. 210. Jackson presumably thought he would be back at Ravine by 10 May, 1897 from the journey he made to Kipture on 27 April, 1897.

> evacuate this part of the country. The Lybon has lately caused a report to be spread throughout the tribes that even the Kamasia unaided had defeated a force of troops and had captured the fort at Ravine. This, of course, is readily believed by the natives. I would, therefore strongly urge that in order to prevent trouble on a large scale and of a most serious nature in the future, immediate steps should be taken to prove the power of the Government to maintain order along the road and protect its food supply, which . . . is a matter of the greatest importance to us, otherwise the situation will become intolerable.*

After this general assessment of the situation, Jackson went on to specify the "people who are really a danger to the peace generally, and to the road in particular": the Lembus, the Elgeyo, their immediate neighbours to the north, and the Sigisi section of the Nandi, "all of whom had been implicated in the two attacks against the Sudanese on Sclater's Road in January". Jackson also recommended that the Lumbwa and Kach should be punished for their raids on the Kano Plains, which had made Kitoto's people refugees in their own country. Jackson painted a much more alarming picture in this report of the dangers facing the extension, or even the continuance, of government control in his district. His previous despatches had been concerned only with isolated outrages by small parties of warriors from a few hostile sections, but now he uncovered an organised, multi-tribal combination. This conspiracy, which was allegedly instigated and directed by a little known but seemingly powerful supernatural agency, was being contrived not merely to harass the government but to drive it from the country. The possibility of such a combination being formed more than cancelled out the tentative signs of a desire for better relations, which the Nandi and Kamasia had shown in the previous two months. It also quashed any hope that the security of the road could be assured for any length of time solely by the provision of garrison reinforcements and stronger escorts. The rumoured forecast that hostilities would commence after the end of the rains, in four or five months' time, convinced Jackson that decisive action had to be taken immediately, in order to prevent the Laibon's emissaries from completing their work and the combination gaining in strength. Moreover, Jackson knew it would be impossible to keep four extra companies in the Eastern Province until the end of the rains, and inconvenient to recall them once they had returned to their distant stations.

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* Jackson-Com, 4 May, 1897, FOCP, 7018/4. Although the Nandi and Lumbwa had joined forces to clear the Masai from the Nyando Valley (see pp. 25-26), the inclusion of the Kamasia and Elgeyo in the projected alliance demonstrates how the Laibon could take the initiative in political matters to make innovations and to persuade the Nandi and Kamasia to change their customary attitudes towards the Elgeyo, whom both tribes had raided in the past. The Laibon's role as an innovator was exhibited even more significantly in 1900, when he persuaded the Nandi to attempt to form an alliance with their traditional enemies, the Luo and Baluyia.

Everything in Jackson's assessment pointed to the inevitability of swift and thorough action against all the tribes in his district. His recommendations were, however, based entirely on "reliable native information". Some of his informants may have been Kamasia but it is unlikely that any of them were Nandi or Lumbwa. The majority were Uasin Gishu Masai who were known to be at odds with their neighbours. It would nevertheless have been unwise for Jackson to have rejected their disclosures, and to have refrained from advocating military measures to forestall the rumoured conspiracy on this account. This scarcity of information and the formulation of policy on intelligence from unreliable sources were disadvantages suffered by all district officers. But they were particularly evident in Mau, where the tribes had shown little disposition to co-operate with the government, and where there were no "friendlies", appointed chiefs or government agents. District officers had neither the time nor the resources to move freely among sections living any distance from the road stations, or to gather information at first hand from the people under their charge. Jackson had no alternative, therefore, but to rely on Uasin Gishu informants for his final appreciation of the situation. Their reports were known to be coloured by self-interest and their inherent love of intrigue, but they had to be accepted at face value. Unfortunately Jackson, Bagge and Bagnall could not check the accuracy of the information they received against tribal sources, or compare it with knowledge they had themselves acquired.

If district officers knew little of what went on in their districts, they knew even less about the activities of the laibons and the part they played in organising opposition to the government. Although some information about the existence and powers of the Nandi Laibon was obtained during the 1895 expedition, he was not mentioned in official reports for a year or more after his flight to Lumbwa. Bagge presumably had no knowledge of the

Laibon's activities or none that called for comment. Jackson did not hear of the part played by the Laibon in the sacking of the Uasin Gishu settlement until three months after the raid had taken place. When Jackson described in considerable detail the genesis of the Mau conspiracy, he was evidently unable to substantiate the allegation that the Laibon had "declared against the government", or even to produce satisfactory evidence about the "insolent and defiant messages" which had been sent to the fort. Although the Kalenjin, and especially certain sections of the Nandi, were extremely credulous in matters relating to the Laibon, the rumours about the defeat of the Sudanese and the capture of Ravine would soon have been proved false in an area in which there was freedom of movement among kindred tribes. The inclusion of these items in Jackson's catalogue suggests that he was prepared to accept questionable evidence from doubtful sources, and confirms that he was unable to check the accuracy of rumours.

Jackson's readiness to accept allegations which supported his plea for military action, and the prejudiced and doubtfully accurate sources from which he derived his information about the Laibon's conspiracy do not, however, rule out the possibility that such a conspiracy had in fact been mooted. Similarly hostile alliances had often been feared elsewhere in East Africa by officials, who were keenly alive to the dangers they ran on this account and the inadequacy of the forces available for quelling generalised revolts.[23] With only small and often untried garrisons to defend their isolated posts, district officers were separated by scores of miles from their nearest colleagues and any hope of ready assistance. Solitary officials were understandably watchful for signs of tribal alliances, and sometimes their anxiety on this score led them to detect conspiracies without adequate cause. As a means of countering the possibility of secret, hostile combinations, openly friendly relations between tribes were not discouraged but actively promoted. In furtherance of this policy, Jackson tried to bring about a better understanding among most of the tribes in his district, and Hobley usually extended the scope of peace negotiations with a particular tribe to include a public declaration of amity towards its neighbours.* But secretly concerted tribal alliances to harass or expel the government had to be broken up, and to this extent a policy of divide and rule was followed.

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* Jackson took Kamasia and Uasin Gishu leaders to Nandi in June 1896, and two Nandi to make peace with the Elgeyo in August 1896; see pp. 217-223.

Conditions in Mau were particularly favourable to the formation of an alliance against the government. The several tribes were closely connected by ethnic, social, economic and other ties, and had adopted much the same attitude of hostility or indifference towards the alien rulers. Although inter-tribal raiding occurred from time to time, relations between the Kalenjin were generally better than those found among other tribes in the British sphere. Sectional rivalries had weakened the military power of the Masai, and an alliance between them and the Kikuyu was unthinkable because of differences of race and character; the Kamba and Kikuyu were traditional enemies; and in Kavirondo, racial affinities among sections of the both the Nilotic and Bantu groups had not prevented feuding and internecine conflicts. Whatever anxieties district officers may have had of alliances among these tribes, there was in fact little likelihood of this taking place under the direction of a leader acceptable to all parties. The two men who might have acted in this capacity, Lenana and Mumia, had both become allies of the government, and had increased their personal importance without putting their traditional status at risk.* Although several of these numerically stronger tribes had felt the force of British arms and been overawed by the firepower of disciplined riflemen, the Kalenjin remained uncowed after their encounters with government troops. The Nandi and Kamasia had proved brave fighters and dangerous to tackle in their difficult terrain. They had, moreover, seen that the attempts of the Sudanese to rustle their stock were easily circumvented. Since the Nandi on their own had frustrated the efforts of Cunningham's expeditionary force, a concerted rising of all their kinsmen would strain the Protectorate's resources to the uttermost. If the rumours of a rebellion by the Kalenjin tribes, under the direction of the Laibon and strengthened by the supernatural sanctions at his command, were founded on fact, Jackson had every reason to fear the outcome and to strike before the enemy was ready to take the initiative.

The day after Jackson made his circumstantial report, Ternan sent it with his own comments to the Foreign Office. After noting that the restlessness affected only certain sections of the tribes mentioned in Jackson's report, Ternan stressed the necessity for breaking up the Laibon's conspiracy. He went on "in order to keep the respect of those natives who are still outwardly friendly to us it is, in my opinion, essential that some measures should now be taken to show them that our endeavour to maintain peace is not, as is commonly supposed, and openly stated by them, the result of weakness. To allow this idea to spread further would be likely to lead to unfortunate results. Under these circumstances, I have now decided to take action against the tribes who are openly hostile to us". In his conclusion Ternan returned to the conspiracy: "I do not anticipate any very serious opposition, as the tribes will not have had time, it is hoped, to act in combination". When the despatch arrived in London on 3 July 1897, Hill minuted: "a matter in which we must trust our local authorities".[24]

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* Policy towards Lenana was influenced by the fear that he might form a coalition. Anxiety was felt before 1895 that Mumia might organise a Bantu confederation or strengthen his understanding with Arab traders and Uasin Gishu mercenaries.

Thus, with Jackson's ready assistance, the Acting Commissioner had made out his case. All that now remained for Ternan to do was to carry out the punitive operations which he had decided on more than three months previously.

References

1. Jackson-Com, 24 February, 1897, FOCP, 6964/84.
2. Information from the Elkakimor, RSD, 24 March, 1897. Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 296, says the raid was instigated by the Uasin Gishu Laibon of the southern Kamasia; see p. 225.
3. Berkeley-FO, 2 November, 1896, ESA, A/34/2 (Trade and Industry Report).
4. Berkeley-FO, 26 January, 1897, FOCP, 6964/47; acknowledged, without mention of the Mau situation or the projected operations, by FO-Berkeley, 2 June, 1897, FOCP, 6964/95.
5. Interview given to Reuter's quoted in *ZG*, 8 September, 1897. Berkeley did not refer to operations against other tribes in the Mau District.
6. The exaggerated account is from Ternan, *op. cit.*, p. 274, which was written in 1930 and contains a number of errors. Bagge's report is not in ESA. Jackson-Com, 24 February, 1897 (FOCP, 6964/84), acknowledges Ternan's letter dated 28 January, 1897, which has not been found.
7. RSD. Jackson, *op. cit.*, pp. 302-303; Jackson-Com, 24 February, 1897, 4 May 1897, FOCP, 6964/84, 7018/4.
8. RSD. Cook, *Uganda Memories;* Pierpoint, *In Uganda for Christ;* Baskerville's Diary; Roscoe, *In Central Africa for Christ*, p. 16. Possibly

the first church services held in Nandi proper. Pilkington travelled alone through Nandi on his bicycle. The first CMS evangelists went to Nandi in 1909.

9. Ternan-FO, 14 February, 1897, FO2/133; WOID minute "attacks on isolated parties must be prevented". Jackson's report has not been found. Some of the extra troops were probably stationed at Mumias.
10. RSD.
11. Jackson-Com, 24 February, 1897, FOCP, 6964/84, 5 October, 1896, ESA, A/4/6. Bagge's report has not been found. NCB has no entry before April 1897 for food bought from Kitoto's and none for Kakamega purchases.
12. RSD; Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 296; Jackson-Com, 24 February, 1897, ESA, A/4/7.
13. Jackson-Com, 6 October, 1896, ESA, A/4/6, FOCP, 6951/34.
14. Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 297.
15. Colvile-FO, 26 April, 1895, FOCP, 6717/95. Berkeley-Anderson, 25 July, 1896, (*Royal Commonwealth Society Library Notes* 99) for Jackson's "agitation" when he was left in charge in December 1894 and his admission that he was "perfectly miserable". Thruston, *op. cit.*, p. 29. G. Wilson-Lugard, 7 April, 1899, (Lugard Papers). The CO considered him unsuited for promotion as he lacked organising ability and driving power; Sadler-CO, 25 April, 1906, 26 March, 1909, CO, 533/13/58.
16. Bagge's report was written c. 18 January, 1897, and prompted Ternan's letter (28 January, 1897) to Jackson which reached Ravine 13 February, 1897. In the meantime, Jackson's report, mentioned in Ternan-FO, 14 February, 1897, was probably handed to the runners who carried news of the road attack to Jackson at Kariandus. The runners returned to Ravine on 26 January, 1897 and Jackson's report was presumably sent on with the up mail that left on 30 January, 1897, and reached Entebbe on 12 February, 1897. Thus, Ternan's letter (28 January, 1897), and Jackson's report crossed on the road. Ternan's letter was seen by Jackson at Ravine on 13 February, 1897, and the latter asked for punitive measures on 24 February, 1897. This long despatch left Ravine 27 February, 1897 and provided the information for Ternan-FO, 15 March, 1897. Jackson's Kariandus report has not been found, but from Ternan-FO, 14 February, 1897, it was probably merely a factual account of the road attack. The report was not enclosed in Ternan's despatch, whereas Jackson's later reports were sent in full to London. RSD; Ternan, *op. cit.*, pp. 274-284. See p. 227.
17. Ternan-FO, 15 March, 1897 (received on 29 May, 1897), FOCP, 6964/84; FO-Ternan 4 June, 1897, FOCP, 6964/99, FO2/133.
18. Ternan-Jackson 14 March, 1897, ESA, A/5/3. Hanlon considered the disorders of 1897 were caused by Entebbe being left without a responsible official for most of the year; 28 October, 1897 (*ZG*, 16 March, 1898).
19. Cf. Hill's minute to Hardinge-Hill (pte) 25 April, 1897, FO, 107/77 asking for action against the Ogaden Somalis: "The policy is right, but we *must* have patience in Africa"; and FO-Hardinge 29 October, 1897, FO 107/74 forbidding punitive operations "without the most urgent necessity"
20. Ternan, Jackson and the EAP agreed that coercion of the Masai was to be avoided. Ternan-Jackson 14 March, 1897, ESA, A/5/3; Ternan *op. cit.*, p. 251. Unlike the Nandi, the Masai were not raiding near the road or attacking people who supplied food to the government.
21. Ternan-Com, 4 April, 1896, FOCP, 6861/22. Hall's comment "all these military chaps are busy trying to earn medals and DSO's" referred specifically to Ternan, but it was a typical district officer's view on the military; Hall's letter 18 May, 1897.

22. Ternan-FO, 15 April, 1897, FOCP, 7018/1. Ternan, *op. cit.,* p. 284 states Jackson "rather expected an attack on his post". This is not in Jackson's report but might have been in a private letter.
23. Rumours of combinations occur frequently in Uganda and EAP district reports; for GEA, see Stahl, *op. cit.,* p. 75. N. A. Wilson was told of a projected combination among the Basoga chiefs in July 1897 to drive Europeans out of the country; N. A. Wilson-Com, 12 September, 1897, ESA, A/4/8; G. Wilson-FO, 5 October, 1897, FOCP, 7024/23.
24. Ternan-FO, 5 May, 1897, FOCP, 7018/4, FO2/133.

12

THE SECOND NANDI EXPEDITION

Having quickly made up his mind that punitive measures against the Mau tribes were justified, and having assured himself that peaceful conditions prevailed elsewhere in the Protectorate, Ternan lost no time in setting in motion the long and involved process of assembling the field force and providing for its supply and maintenance. Before leaving for Buddu on 31 January 1897, he had requisitioned troops from Bunyoro and Kampala to reinforce the garrisons at Kipture, Ravine and Naivasha.* When he returned to Entebbe on 13 February 1897, Ternan despatched VII Company from Bunyoro and thus increased the forces under Jackson's command to two and a quarter companies, so that larger escorts could be provided between Ravine and Mumias. After receiving Jackson's despatch of 24 February 1897, Ternan sent three companies to Mumias, where he proposed to establish a base that could be supplied with food bought from the Kavirondo. The new contingents brought the number of troops stationed in the Eastern Province up to four companies above the normal establishment. This was the size of the force which Jackson had urged would be necessary for a two-pronged offensive. Orders were sent at the same time to stock up Ravine with food, where Ternan proposed to establish the forward base for the expedition.[1] The Acting Commissioner was handicapped while making these arrangements by sickness among the staff at Entebbe and Kampala, and the absence of his staff officer, Capt. Madocks, who had assumed civil charge at Kampala during George Wilson's illness.†

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* Garrison strengths: Kipture 50 men (1 Coy.); Ravine 50 (VI Coy.); Naivasha 25 (VI Coy.).

† Pordage and Racey were also sick. The seven other officials at Kampala and Entebbe were specialist appointments and two 3rd Class assistants.

Before leaving Entebbe on 20 April 1897, Ternan outlined the objectives he hoped to achieve in Mau. He had no intention of attempting general pacification measures throughout the district, nor of seeking to prevent inter-tribal hostilities. Punishment was to be limited to those sections who had attacked government parties, and whose raiding activities endangered station food supplies. The operations were not to be prolonged, so that the troops could return to their stations as quickly as possible. But the campaign would be prosecuted with such thoroughness as to obviate the inconvenience of collecting the troops again for some time. After discussing the problem with Jackson at Kipture in May, Ternan widened the scope of the expedition's objectives to include the smashing of the combination against the government, in order to diminish the Laibon's pernicious influence over the tribes. If these measures were successful, Ternan considered they would be sufficient to bolster the morale of friendly sections and re-establish government prestige. This restatement of aims evidently envisaged operations of much greater magnitude than the discriminative punishment of offending sections, with the object of preventing a repetition of their hostile activities and of deterring others from imitating their truculent conduct. There was some confusion in Ternan's correspondence with Jackson and London regarding the sections and tribes to be punished and the extent of country to be invaded. In his final despatch of 5 May 1897, however, Ternan declared his intention of proceeding against "the Kamassia, Elgeyu and a section of the Nandi" in order to keep the road open, and of making the Lumbwa and Kach stop their raids against the food producers around Kitoto's. The expedition's timetable was to enter Kamasia and Elgeyo, then "to move to Nandi and move first against the Lybon", and finally to invade Lumbwa and Kach.[2]

The force assembled by Ternan was considerable. The officers included the Acting Commissioner and Commandant of the Uganda Rifles, Capt. Madocks (his staff officer), Jackson (the senior civil assistant in the Protectorate and OC Mau), Grant (OC Kavirondo), Capt. Bagnall (OC Nandi), Boyle (Ternan's secretary), de Silva (the clerk at Ravine), and Drs. Mackinnon (Buganda) and Macpherson (Ravine). In addition to this predominantly civilian contingent, Ternan hoped that Lieuts. Molony and Feilding, who were on their way from the coast, would arrive at Ravine in time to take part.* In order to free Grant and Bagnall from station duties during the expedition, Malek was moved from Kampala to Luba's, N. A. Wilson from Luba's to Mumias and Tomkins from Mumias to Kipture. When he reached Nandi, Ternan persuaded S. W. Ormsby, who was in charge of a trading caravan of Boustead, Ridley and Co., to join the expedition as a volunteer, so that Bagnall could be relieved of his duties as transport officer to take charge of a company of troops. In the event, Madocks did not join the field force and Molony, who had been mauled by a lion on the way up, only appeared in time to take part in the Nandi operations, but Foaker took charge of the fort when he arrived at Ravine on 27 May 1897.† The officers taking part in the expedition represented about a third of the Europeans in the Protectorate service, and, departmentally, accounted for half the military strength, a fifth of the civil staff and half the medical establishment. In all, the number of officials employed in the Eastern Province during the operations amounted to nearly half the total in the Protectorate at the time. Ternan, Jackson, Grant and both doctors had had operational experience in East Africa, but only Dr. Mackinnon had seen active service against the Nandi.

The troop requisitions for the Mau operations severely dislocated the garrisoning arrangements for the rest of the Protectorate. VII Company had been hurried from Bunyoro to Nandi in March 1897, and the Sudanese garrisons were withdrawn from Masindi, Hoima and Nakabimba and depleted at Kampala, so that details from II, IV and IX Companies could be moved to the provisional base at Mumias. Altogether an army nominally numbering some 550 men was mustered for the Mau campaign. Most of the companies were well below strength, however, so the total engaged numbered between 450 and 500 men, two-thirds of whom had to be marched or transhipped to the Eastern Province. The force that eventually took part in active operations, or performed garrison duties at Kipture and Ravine, represented more than a third of the total soldiers in the Protectorate. They were taken from six of the eleven infantry companies on the active list, and drawn from eight of the fourteen stations garrisoned by Uganda Rifles detachments.[3] The force was slightly larger than Cunningham's in 1895 and was, thus, the most formidable army yet mustered by the government east of the Nile. Three of the companies (I, IV and IX) had taken part in the 1895 operations and were, therefore, aware of the difficulties which the expedition was likely to face in the difficult Nandi country. In order to maintain the government's authority in the districts patrolled by troops from the evacuated Bunyoro forts, Ternan enlisted a number of Baganda gunmen and authorised the raising of a new company from the Bunyoro Sudanese.*

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* See p. 116 for Grant's previous experience; and Ternan, *op. cit.*, p. 225 for Ternan's commendation. Dr. Mackinnon's leave was postponed because of the campaign.

† Foaker was accompanied by his wife, the first "official" lady to enter the Protectorate.

The majority of the troops had to march over four hundred miles to their destination in Mau, an operation of considerable magnitude which took some time to complete. The Sudanese, who were poorly paid, short of clothes and often on the move, were beginning to resent the treatment they received in comparison with their fellow-countrymen in the neighbouring British and German protectorates. The Mau garrisons were six months in arrears with their pay, and Jackson had been faced with an open mutiny over a ration dispute with VI Company at Ravine in March 1897. The troops' morale was further depressed by Ternan's order that women would not be allowed beyond Luba's, and that the soldiers were to limit their loads to the carrying capacity of one boy each. Ternan had no intention of repeating Cunningham's mistake of allowing crowds of followers to retard the movements of the columns. The troops were better armed than in the 1895 expedition, as a large number were equipped with the new Martini-Henry rifles and the remainder with Sniders in place of the old Remingtons. Ammunition was supplied mainly from Buganda and Busoga, but sixty loads were carried to Ravine by Smith, Mackenzie and Co. and Gemmill in response to the request sent to J. P. Wilson at Naivasha. Ternan relied for additional support in the initial operations on two Maxims, but for the Kach invasion he ordered Madocks to bring up a Hotchkiss gun from Kampala.†

Ternan made no provision for the employment of auxiliaries, although Jackson had stressed the expediency of beginning operations before the Masai warriors moved away to the south. Jackson called attention to this omission in Ternan's plans, however, and reported that the Naivasha Masai Laibon had been ordered to hold 500 warriors in readiness in case Ternan decided to use them. A runner was sent from Port Victoria to confirm that the Masai would be needed. News of the expedition had reached Naivasha in the meantime and a party of warriors arrived at Ravine* to ask if their services would be required.[4] Ternan noted in his final despatch that "a party of about 600 Masai will be used as scouts and to capture, if possible, distant herds of cattle. The loss of cattle is the most serious blow that can be inflicted on the tribes, and cannot be accomplished by regular troops owing to the great distances that have to be covered". The account in his memoirs is slightly different: "the Masai, who had a chronic feud with the Kamassia, were to be used to follow up the herds driven down to the plains by the expedition's progress through the mountains, as the regular forces were not large enough to act simultaneously in the mountains and plains".[5] Four hundred Naivasha Masai spearmen commanded by Laigulishu arrived at Ravine on 17 May 1897, and then proceeded to Kipture where the leaders were interviewed by Ternan, who confirmed Jackson's arrangements promising the Masai two-fifths of all the stock taken in the expedition. Ternan and Jackson apparently held different views on the value of auxiliary spearmen: the former had omitted them from his plan and criticised them after the expedition; whereas the latter, with the lessons of the 1895 Nandi expedition, and the successful use of Masai levies against the Elkakimor in November 1896 before him, evidently regarded the irregulars as equally as important as the Sudanese.[6] The Uasin Gishu were not mentioned in any of the accounts but they almost certainly formed part of the expedition.

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* Most of the troops were absent from their stations for four months.

† The Hotchkiss fired a three-pounder shell; it was cumbersome for mountain warfare but suited to the Kano Plains and the demolition of fortified positions like the Kach stone-walled villages; see p. 70 and Gorges, *JRGS*, 16 (1900), pp. 85-86.

Ternan was better served than Cunningham in the important matter of porters. A hundred Swahilis were withdrawn from stations in Buganda, Busoga and Kavirondo for work with the fighting columns. They were armed, as far as supplies permitted, with Sniders or Remingtons and ten rounds of ammunition. The Basoga chiefs recruited a large number of porters to stock Ravine with food, but when they reached Mumias many of them refused to travel through Nandi to their destination. When 600 deserted during the night and returned home, Ternan succeeded in securing the services of hundreds of Kavirondo porters to take their place. This was the first occasion on which large numbers of the latter had turned out for this type of work, and the first time they had carried loads through the country of their inveterate enemies. Their readiness to volunteer was attributed by Ternan solely to the fact that "they could not resist the sight of the beads"; but their employment is also a tribute to the trust which Hobley had fostered in the government's good intentions.[7] Ternan was also fortunate in having a few donkeys and in securing the help of the 150 porters in Ormsby's caravan, which was at Kipture awaiting an escort. Sixty-four of these professional carriers served with the field force, thus allowing some of the soldiers to be unencumbered on the march. Ternan's transport and commissariat arrangements necessitated the employment of hundreds of non-combatants, in order to service a large expedition which was invading areas where local supplies could not be guaranteed.

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* See p. 243.

The timing of the campaign was dependent not only on the weeks taken by the troops to march to the rendezvous, but also on the speed with which food could be accumulated at Ravine and Kipture to feed them throughout their stay in the Mau District. The importance of adequate victualling arrangements had been brought home to Ternan at the outset, when a company of reinforcements had to be accommodated at Kipture as Jackson could not feed them at Ravine. The headquarters station for the Mau District was dependent on Naivasha and Fort Smith for its food supplies, but both collecting stations were forced to restrict their purchases owing to a shortage of trade goods, which had arisen because of difficulties in recruiting porters at the coast.[8] When Ternan realised that Naivasha and Fort Smith could not be relied on to supply food for the field force, he arranged for consignments to be sent from Busoga and Kavirondo.* Before this could be done Luba's and Mumias had to be stocked with trade goods. Supplies were sent from Entebbe on 14 March 1897, and two months later twenty-five loads of cloth were shipped to Mumias to be held as a reserve only to “be used at the Commissioner’s discretion”.[*] Both Luba’s and Mumias were directed to buy and transport 500 loads of food to Kipture, and Ternan suggested Smith, Mackenzie and Co. might help in meeting this demand. Brown and Mayes, the firm’s manager and transport agent respectively, accordingly left Mumias for Ravine on 29 April 1897 with 400 loads of food which Tomkins had bought from the Kavirondo. Luba’s and Mumias (with help from Port Victoria and Kitosh) found most of their initial quota, while Grant subsequently took 1,051 loads of food to Kipture, nearly all of which came from Kavirondo. J. P. Wilson maintained a regular donkey service from Naivasha which provided a hundred loads of foodstuffs every month for Ravine. Altogether the amount of food transported during the period of preparation before the expedition totalled nearly 3,000 loads, or approximately 90 tons. In addition to supplies of bagged food, animals had to be collected and transported: Grant arrived at Kipture with over a hundred cattle and a mob of small stock; and Jackson brought thirty-two bulls to Ravine when he returned from Kipture on 20 May 1897. The only noteworthy item in the medical field was the despatch of 150 blankets to Kipture. This was a totally inadequate provision in view of the sufferings of the troops in 1895,[†] but Ternan glossed over the deficiency by noting that every man would be issued with a blanket when the estimates for 1897-98 were approved.[9]

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* See p. 233. Jackson wanted ammunition for his stations so that game could be shot to vary the garrisons' diet of flour and beans. Gemmill's application for a plot at Naivasha was rejected because of transport and food problems.

When preparations were well advanced and the troops were marching towards Mau, Ternan, Boyle and twelve Sudanese left Entebbe in the steam-launch *Ruwenzori* on 20 April 1897. The party then proceeded on foot from Port Victoria through Mumias to Kipture, where Jackson awaited the Acting Commissioner’s arrival.[10] It was here that Ternan first heard of the Laibon’s conspiracy. But even if Ternan had learned instead that the offending tribes had expressed a willingness to co-operate with the government, it is questionable whether, after all the energy expended on preparations for the campaign and the dislocation they had caused throughout the Protectorate, Ternan would have countenanced disbanding the expedition without striking a blow.[§] This was, moreover, the first major enterprise which Ternan had commanded in East Africa. He had given considerable thought to assembling the force, providing for its supply, and formulating elaborate plans and orders of text book quality for the conduct of the campaign. When the expedition left Kipture for Ravine in the middle of May 1897 to begin the Kamasia operations, command of the Nandi station was entrusted to Tomkins, who was assisted by a Sudanese officer and seventy-five men.

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[*] Uganda received a large part of its trade goods through GEA. Trade goods worth Rs. 2,110 were sent from Mumias to Kipture in May.

[†] See p. 156.

[‡] Ternan was the first officer to use a powered vessel for military purposes.

[§] Cf. Jackson’s conduct towards the friendly Kamasia sections, p. 243.

The expedition arrived at Ravine on 20 May 1897. Ternan noted on the march the depressing effect which the cold nights had on the naked Masai, and even on the Sudanese, nearly all of whom had spent most of their service in hot, low-lying areas. No time was lost in completing the final arrangements for the expedition, as Ternan was anxious to take advantage of the full moon, in order to lessen the chances of night attacks by the Kamasia. Forty men, twenty-five of whom were unfit for field service, were detailed for garrison duties, the up mail was detained at Ravine, and Dowse agreed to take charge of the station until Foaker arrived to relieve him. Ternan's plan was to work through the country with two columns following different routes. There was no question of surprising the Kamasia, but orders were issued to prevent the column from being ambushed by day and exposed to flights of poisoned arrows at night. The regular troops were to force the enemy to drive their cattle down to the plains, where they could be rounded up by the more mobile Masai auxiliaries. As the Sudanese were heavily laden and the porters carried 120 loads of food, equivalent to ten days' supply, the driving columns would be unable to move rapidly through the difficult mountain country. The marching rate was also slowed down by the fifty bullocks and ten milch cows that accompanied Ternan's column. Ternan decided that only short marches could be attempted, even though the chances of encountering the Kamasia warriors or capturing many of their cattle were negligible if the columns "crept and crawled along".[11]

The two columns commanded respectively by Grant and Ternan were roughly equivalent in strength and consisted of five Europeans, 220 soldiers, 150 porters, 200 Masai spearmen and a Maxim. Grant left Ravine on 21 May 1897, crossed the river and proceeded northwards for two days to the Lembus Hills, and then turned north-east to work through the northern slopes of the Kamasia

Mountains. The term "Elgeyo", which was applied to this column, was a misnomer, as Grant did not cross the Nesoi (Nabkoi) River. Ternan left the following day, crossed the ravine and marched slowly eastwards along the southern slopes of the mountains inhabited by the Lembus, Elkakimor and Kamaruswo sections. The column then turned north and camped on a hill described by the Masai as being "the middle of Kamasia country". From this camp Ternan proceeded south-east and marched down to the plains, where he had previously despatched the Masai auxiliaries to seek out the Kamasia cattle. The two columns met on the plains at Songero on 4 June 1897 as planned, and then returned at a much faster pace by different routes to the base at Ravine, which Ternan reached on the 6th and Grant the day after. It is evident from Ternan's sketch map that the punitive operations were not restricted to the intransigent Lembus, but were extended to the Elkakimor (Kagemor), Gebin (Gaben), Kamaruswo (Kamarusu) and Dorois (Torois) as well. These four sections had previously made their peace with Ravine, but had been treated in an equivocal manner by Jackson shortly before the expedition.*

Ternan failed to get into communication with the tribal leaders, and neither column succeeded in forcing the enemy to stand and fight. Forest ambushes manned by bowmen and a few tip and run attacks on stragglers caused only eleven government casualties, two of them fatal. Ternan estimated that fifty Kamasia were killed in the open and many others in the forests. But the conditions were unsuitable for the Maxims and prevented accurate aiming by both riflemen and archers, so losses on both sides were small. The Sudanese burned a number of huts and destroyed several of the concealed food granaries, after ransacking them of their contents to provide food for the expedition. They had, therefore, demonstrated to the Kamasia that their mountain fastnesses were vulnerable, and corrected the false impression created by the Sudanese losses in the Elkakimor operations. A few women were taken prisoner, and Ternan estimated that the 307 cattle and 8,000 sheep and goats that were captured accounted for fifteen per cent of the Kamasia herds. He considered this punishment was sufficient and decided to call off the expedition. This decision was influenced to some extent by the strenuousness of the campaign in the difficult terrain under adverse climatic conditions, and by the inconvenience caused by the captured stock. Ternan was also probably disillusioned about the fitness of the regulars for operations of this nature as well as with the ability of the auxiliaries to capture large quantities of cattle. The troops and mercenaries were operating in uncongenial conditions: the Sudanese were experienced in "set piece" operations such as pitched battles and assaults on fixed positions; and the Masai were unaccustomed to fighting in forested mountainous country. When Ternan returned to Ravine to organise the Nandi expedition, he found that Molony and the Foakers had arrived but none of the enemy chiefs had come in. The women prisoners were sent home with a message to their menfolk that if they wanted peace, responsible leaders should come to the fort and make their submission. Ternan could not wait for a reply to this summons and he left the station officials to make peace with the Kamasia when they came in.[12]

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* See p. 243.

The Acting Commissioner had to spend a few days at Ravine attending to Protectorate business. The up mail, which had been detained for twenty days, was sent on to Kipture together with Gemmill and his caravan of government loads. After the captured stock had been allocated to the troops and mercenaries, Ternan turned his attention to the Nandi. The day before the field force had left Kipture on 16 May 1897, Teres, who was described by Ternan as "one of the principal Nandi chiefs . . . who has always been hostile to us", came into the fort and said he wanted peace. His submission was thought to have been influenced by alarm at the large body of troops assembled at Kipture, but Ternan and his local advisers were unable to gauge the effect it might have on the other chiefs and the Laibon. As there was no time for an investigation at that juncture, Teres was made prisoner and taken off with the field force to Ravine. When Ternan included news of this development as a tail-piece to the report on the Kamasia campaign, he observed that military measures might not be necessary in Nandi, if other chiefs followed Teres' example. Ternan proposed in this event merely to fine those chiefs who had been hostile to the government. Possibly with the intention of allowing other chiefs time to make their submission, Ternan altered his plans and decided to move first into Lumbwa and then into Nandi.[13] This intention was not carried out, however, as the operations against the Laibon which Ternan called the "Lumbwa expedition" took place entirely in Nandi country. This misconception evidently arose because of the ignorance of Bagnall's informants, who thought that the place where the Laibon was reported to be was in Lumbwa. Ternan's perpetuation of the error is inexplicable, however, as he had a copy of Vandeleur's map, which showed Nandi villages well to the south of the Mitete Valley, but he may have been misled by Jackson's references to the Sigisi section of the Nandi. Moreover the confusion on this matter raises the question whether the Laibon fled to Lumbwa after the 1895 expedition or took refuge in the Mitete Valley, where Ternan tried to capture him in 1897.*

For the campaign against the Nandi, Ternan planned a night march which was timed to bring troops within striking distance of the Laibon's village before the alarm could be raised and the stock driven off. Grant's men joined Ternan's column to form a force of over 500 rifles for the operation, because everything turned on the element of surprise and a second column might have reduced the chances of achieving this object. Moreover, the Uasin Gishu Masai knew of only one path leading from Ravine through the forest to the Kamelilo valleys, so a two-pronged attack could not be mounted from that direction. It would have taken time to organise a second column from Kipture, and his experiences in Kamasia possibly made Ternan dubious about the merits of such a manoeuvre: the element of surprise would have been lost, the Nandi would have moved their stock out of reach of the Masai levies; and the force would have entered a deserted country, with only the prospect of destroying houses and the food supplies left in the granaries. If a surprise attack by a single column miscarried, on the other hand, the troops would still be able to damage dwellings and food supplies. The column's objective was the Kamelilo Valley, about twenty miles south-east of Kipture, "where the Lybon is said to have his headquarters".[14] As no map was made of the expedition's progress, it is not easy to follow its course but it seems certain that the Kamelilo Valley was Mitete. Ternan's objective was to reach the head of the valley before daybreak, so the troops could rush the villages at dawn and prevent the cattle from being taken out of their night enclosures and driven into the dense Tindiret forests.

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* The Sigisi section may have been the Kipsigis, or Lumbwa.

Ternan reorganised his forces, leaving forty-eight men with Foaker to guard Ravine together with twenty men to take the mail through to Nandi when it arrived from the coast. The Sudanese and Swahilis in the field force were all issued with five days' rations, and fifty-four loads of reserve supplies were carried by porters. In addition to rifle, a hundred rounds of ammunition and greatcoat, every soldier, other than those in the advance and rear guards, carried his own load. This arrangement was not conducive to a speedy rate of progress on the difficult night march through the forest. The expedition left Ravine on 11 June 1897 and camped the following day south of Sclater's Road near Lake Narasha.[15] At 9.30 that evening the field force moved off in single file through the Mau Forest on a track, which the Uasin Gishu Masai said was in good condition. Steady progress was made at first but in a short while Ternan discovered the track was so overgrown that it was difficult to follow although the night was light. Finally the track petered out and the troops had to use their bayonets to hack a way through tangled undergrowth and cut a path round fallen trees. The night was cold and the men became wet and dispirited through wading across the small swamps that were encountered in every fold of the ground. The advance guard reached the top of the ascent at two o'clock, when a halt was called to allow the baggage and rear guard to close up, and to rest the men who had been chosen for the dawn attack. When the march was resumed, the descent proved more troublesome than the ascent. The heavily laden Sudanese struggled on manfully but when open ground was reached at the edge of the forest, it was seven o'clock, the sun had risen and it was too late for the planned surprise.

Ternan had planned that Grant, Mackinnon and the men of II, IV and IX Companies would be in position to storm the Laibon's village at five o'clock, but his calculations were upset owing to faulty intelligence concerning the difficulties of the route rather than the distance the column had to travel. After a strenuous night's exertion, Ternan had the mortification of looking down into the Mitete Valley, where people could be seen moving about round their houses, near which herds of cattle were quietly grazing. To this extent the surprise was complete, but as soon as the column began to move it was detected by scouts posted in lookouts on the hilltops a thousand feet above the valley. The warriors manning the outposts alerted the people below by warning shouts, and Ternan watched while the cattle were quickly marshalled and driven up the hillsides into the forest, where they disappeared from view. He realised that his hopes of capturing large numbers of stock in a short time had been frustrated, so that the troops would be committed to the time-consuming task of combing the recesses of the forests in search of cattle. It must have been a depressing moment for the Acting Commissioner: his imaginatively conceived and arduously executed design had just failed; and failure meant that the operations would be as unspectacular and inconclusive as those recently carried out in Kamasia. Ternan made two blunders in planning the campaign: he omitted to make a reconnaissance of the route recommended by the Uasin Gishu Masai; and he encumbered his fighting men with excessive baggage. As a result of these mistakes, the troops took nine hours to cover the nine miles between Narasha and the head of the Mitete Valley, or two hours longer than Ternan had estimated. The errors were entirely of his own making, but he may have been misled by Vandeleur's map, which suggested that the forest ended four miles beyond Lake Narasha.

The column wound its way down to the deserted valley, where camp was pitched and the force rested after the soldiers' and porters' exhausting exertions of the previous night. A number of sheep and goats were seized during the descent but in the valley all the cattle had been evacuated and the houses abandoned.[16] A few warriors remained hidden in the long grass, however, and fired arrows at men collecting wood round the camp, killing two of them. The next day the deserted village close to the camp was burnt and the expedition moved five miles down the valley to a place near the Laibon's village. The Laibon had fled to Lumbwa and his stock had been dispersed, so Ternan had to be content with burning the village and commandeering the food left in its granaries.* Grant led a large patrol into the hills east of the camp in search of cattle. He was away three days, during which time he captured two Nandi and collected a mob of small stock but only a few cattle. The herds were found to be hidden in thick forest which could only be entered by men crawling on all fours. When Grant's patrol returned to camp, Jackson led a similar expedition to sweep the hills on the south side of the valley. He rejoined the main party a week later with 49 cattle and 800 sheep and goats, which was all he captured in the extensive area flushed by his patrol. Ternan moved camp a few miles farther west on the 17th near the lower end of the valley. No opposition was made to these moves and the camp was far too strong to be stormed, but Ternan conceded: "the enemy did not let us have it all our own way, and were quick to take any opportunity offered; each foraging party had a few casualties, and on the 19th the Wanandi managed to surprise an armed party of Swahili who were collecting wood near the camp and killed five of them".[17]

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* 50 men were employed to empty the Laibon's granaries; see p. 30.

Letters from Tomkins at Kipture reached Ternan at this camp. They were brought through by "friendly natives" according to Ternan's report, but by a party of Sudanese according to his memoirs. Tomkins reported that large numbers of Nandi warriors were alleged to be mustering in order to attack Ternan's column in force. There was also news from Madocks of the repulse of the Congo mutineers' attack on the Salt Lake post, and of rumoured moves by Baganda chiefs to plan an insurrection. Tomkins' warning evidently carried little weight with Ternan, who omitted it from his report and did not allow it to influence his decision to withdraw nearly all the troops from Nandi. Madocks' news convinced the Acting Commissioner that he had been away from Entebbe long enough, and the sooner the troops returned to Buganda the better. He decided, therefore, "to abandon any further punitive measures for the present", and added "I am in hopes that the losses suffered by the Kamassia and by the Nandi will have the effect of bringing these people to think it desirable to get on friendly terms with the Administration". Ternan thought it politic to scrap his plan to follow up the Laibon to his Lumbwa retreat, and to abandon the projected invasion of Lumbwa and Kach.[18]

Camp was moved on the twentieth to Kamwentowe, where the Nandi were more friendly than in the Mitete Valley, so that Ternan prohibited the burning of houses and granaries. A circumstantial account is given in Ternan's memoirs of the surrender of an unnamed Nandi chief who came in and begged for peace on 21 June 1897. This was "a most opportune incident" in view of the decision to abandon the expedition, and Ternan was able to record that peace was made "after many protestations of loyalty by the chief, and promises of good conduct in the future". This timely submission was not mentioned, however, either in the field force diary or in the official account of the operations written two days later. Grant left with II Company for Kipture on 21 June 1897 under orders to proceed to Mumias by way of Kitoto's. This route was probably chosen, after the Lumbwa and Kach operations were abandoned, in order to show the flag on the Kano Plains and to reassure Kitoto.* Before the rest of the field force began the long march back to Kipture, probably on the route followed by Cunningham in 1895, Ternan "was able to interview a few natives on the 22nd at Kamivento, and I explained to them that the government had no hostile intentions against them, provided they would keep quiet; and I also informed them that chiefs who wished to be friendly should visit the fort and keep in communication with the Officer in charge. I also explained that the chiefs should quite understand that any attempt on their part to drive us out of the country could only result in their own discomfiture".[19]

When the field force arrived at Kipture on 22 June 1897, Ternan received reassuring news from George Wilson about the Baganda rising mentioned by Madocks. The Acting Commissioner had to deal with a large Foreign Office mail, including the first official intimation of Macdonald's expedition, to arrange for the dispersal of the field force, and to assess the results achieved by the army he had led into Mau. The Nandi operations had followed much the same course as the Kamasia campaign, so there was little for Ternan to dilate upon in his report. Government casualties had been slight—one Sudanese and five Swahilis killed and two Sudanese and one Masai wounded—whereas "Nandi losses were probably somewhat larger but owing to their declining to come to close quarters in any numbers, their losses were not heavy". The 137 head of cattle and 1,500 sheep and goats which had been rounded up were unlikely to overtax the capacity of the large enclosure, which Bagnall had built at Kipture in anticipation of large quantities of loot. Grant's patrol had captured two prisoners, a number of houses had been burnt and a great deal of food confiscated or destroyed. Despite this unimpressive catalogue, Ternan surprisingly omitted to describe the submission of the solitary Nandi chief, with whom he claimed to have established friendly relations, especially as such incidents were well received in London. As it was, all the Foreign Office learned from Ternan was that he had quitted Mau without forcing either the Nandi or Kamasia to make peace, and that he hoped the losses inflicted by his large force would, in time, have salutary results on the tribes he had planned to conquer, "in such a manner as will ensure a lasting effect on them".[20] These hopes were similar to Berkeley and Cunningham's after the 1895 expedition, and proved equally illusory.* The expedition's limited success was not, however, lost on the Foreign Office. When the official report was acknowledged, comment was restricted to an expression of the Foreign Secretary's satisfaction on reading the work of the officers engaged in the operations, and Ternan's despatch was not published in the *London Gazette*. It was commonly held in East Africa, too, that the expedition's task remained uncompleted, and that Ternan's untimely withdrawal would necessitate further punitive measures by his successors.[21]

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* It is not clear whether Grant took this longer route.

Ternan apparently had no desire to become embroiled with other sections of the Nandi, and no plans to punish the *pororosiek* near Sclater's Road and the western sections on the south Nandi escarpment. The raids carried out by the Kapsile and their neighbours against the Luo on the Kano Plains were, in fact, ignored in official despatches from April onwards, and the attacks around Kitoto's were conveniently attributed to the Lumbwa and Kach. Ternan presumably did not intend in the first instance to undertake more extensive operations in Nandi, or to risk his troops in the escarpment area in order to safeguard the Kipture food supply. He may, nevertheless, have hoped to plan generalised pacification measures against the Nandi after the operations in Lumbwa and Kach were concluded. If this were so, the return to Nandi would have been contingent on the time taken to carry out the original plan and the results it achieved. The results of the expedition must, therefore, be considered in relation to the limited scope of its original objectives. Ternan's incursion into the Mitete Valley was planned to capture or discredit the Laibon, and to punish the "Sigisi" section who had been incriminated in the attacks on the Uganda Road. The Laibon had escaped with his cattle, but some of his property was confiscated or destroyed when the "Sigisi" country was devastated. But the three weeks spent in Kamasia, the unrewarding plodding from camp to camp, the failure to make contact with the enemy and to get them to stand, the small number of casualties inflicted and the amount of stock captured in Kamasia and the Mitete Valley probably convinced Ternan that the expeditionary force was not strong enough to make a lasting impression on the Nandi and to force the entire tribe into submission.[22]

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* See Chapter 6.

No dramatic successes were achieved in Kamasia, but the tribe had been taught that their livestock, mountain villages and secret granaries were vulnerable to attacks by troops from the district station. The Kamasia had not been subdued, but their first major encounter with government forces made them ponder the advantages to be gained from continued opposition to British rule. Although they continued to regard the government with suspicion and to ignore its representative at Ravine, the Kamasia gave very little trouble after the expedition. The lessons learned in the 1897 operations did not, however, have a settling effect on the warriors immediately after the field force withdrew. While Ternan was in Nandi, a party of Kamasia descended on the stores, which Smith, Mackenzie and Co. and Boustead, Ridley and Co. had recently completed on the other side of the river a short distance from the fort, and burned them to the ground. The attack was carried out by Lembus and Nandi warriors who got away without loss. Despite this gesture of defiance, emissaries came in shortly afterwards to inform Foaker that all the Kamasia sections visited by the expedition wanted to make peace, so one of Ternan's objectives had been achieved. The punishment meted out to the Kamasia, which probably also influenced the future conduct of the neighbouring sections of the Elgeyo and Suk, evidently persuaded the tribal elders that combined action under the Nandi Laibon could not guarantee them freedom from government interference. After the 1897 expedition, the Kamasia not only began to co-operate with the administration but also to stand apart from their Nandi kinsmen and, three years later, to provide volunteers to fight on the government side against their former allies.[23]

It is impossible to judge whether Ternan's operations broke up the alleged conspiracy, since the troops moved in before the time chosen by the conspirators to begin hostilities. There were no signs of a centrally directed resistance movement while the expedition was in Mau, but this does not prove that the conspiracy existed only in the imagination of Jackson's informants. The Laibon was undoubtedly kept informed of the build up of government forces at Kipture and Ravine, and this may have caused him to defer the arrangements for the conspiracy until circumstances were more propitious. Although he was taken by surprise when the troops irrupted into the Mitete Valley from the Mau Forest, any loss of prestige resulting from his failure to forecast this novel and disquieting event would have been offset by the fact that he had escaped for the second time from the government forces with all his stock.* Ternan's stratagem had shown that the Kamelilo valleys were vulnerable from the north, however, and had caused a considerable amount of damage to the property of the Sigisi and the Laibon. But the warriors had not been defeated in battle or their spirits humbled. The retaliatory action taken by the Nandi was nevertheless less sustained and successful than in 1895, so that the operations possibly raised government prestige to some extent in the neighbourhood of the operational area. The campaign results were not, however, calculated to prove a deterrent to sections living nearer the Uganda Road or overlooking the Kano Plains. When Ternan visited Kitoto on 30 June 1967, the old chief "was very friendly and delighted that his ancient enemy, the Wanandi, had been brought to book".[24] This statement was understandable in the circumstances, but Kitoto would have been much more gratified if the escarpment sections had been dealt with instead of those in the distant Kamelilo Valley, and if Lumbwa and Kach had been invaded in accordance with Ternan's original plan. Other tribes like the Elgeyo, Njemps and Eastern Kavirondo, who suffered from Nandi and Kamasia depredations, were doubtless strengthened in their faith in the government's power to afford them protection, when they saw or heard of the size of the army which could be mustered to deal with malefactors. This show of strength apparently impressed some of the Nandi living near Kipture and the Uganda Road, as Teres' submission was allegedly caused by his alarm at this evidence of the government's resolve and might.† Teres' example was not followed by any of his colleagues, however, and the Kamelilo operations did not make the Uganda Road much safer for small parties than it had been when Jackson asked for reprisals against the sections incriminated in the January incidents. Well-armed caravans continued to pass unmolested, but small parties and mailmen still had to be accompanied by strong escorts drawn from the Ravine and Kipture garrisons. As Ternan had disbanded the expedition before peace was made, the campaign had only been partially successful. Two of the five offending tribes had received some punishment, and the will of the Kamasia to resist the government had been weakened. But these results were hardly commensurate with the tremendous efforts that had been made and the dislocation they had caused in the remainder of the Protectorate.

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* See p. 159.
† See p. 261.

Some of the most important consequences of the expedition affected Uganda more than Eastern Province. Ternan's protracted absence from Entebbe, the long distance separating the Acting Commissioner and a large part of the Protectorate army from the capital, and the weakening of the garrisons in Bunyoro and Buganda were not lost on Kabaka Mwanga. Although on the surface all had been quiet in Buganda for many months, Mwanga was smarting under the fine which Berkeley had levied on him in December 1896 for smuggling, and there were other dissident factions at work.[25] It was scarcely coincidental, therefore, that Mwanga chose to flee from Mengo and to raise his standard in Buganda and Buddu while Ternan was thought to be in the Mau District, 250 miles to the east.[26] Similarly in Bunyoro, the reduction in the number of regulars under Thruston's command deprived him of the means for attacking Kabarega and of preventing the rebel leader from interfering with friendly chiefs.[27] Concentration of the Protectorate forces in any of the provinces inevitably resulted in weakness elsewhere, and created conditions which encouraged active hostility by irreconcilable elements. These eventualities always had to be borne in mind when punitive expeditions were contemplated, and the expediency of forceful action in any part of the Protectorate had to be assessed against the background of potential repercussions elsewhere. When Ternan planned the Mau campaign, he was satisfied that troops could be withdrawn from Buganda and Bunyoro without fear of a break-down in law and order in these districts. His satisfaction was, however, founded on faulty intelligence, and his absence in Mau undoubtedly affected the timing of the outbreak that led to the defeat and deposition of Mwanga.

The Mau operations also had an indirect bearing on the attitude adopted by the Nandi and Kamasia during the Sudanese mutiny later in the year.* The mass defection of the Protectorate army, which began in the Eastern Province in September 1897, took place only three months after Ternan's invasion of Kamasia and Nandi. Both tribes were recovering from the effects of the recent demonstration of military might, and one of them was pondering on the expediency of persisting in further resistance to British rule. If the mutiny had broken out at a different time, the Nandi and Kamasia might have been more inclined to take advantage of the government's embarrassment, and the Sudanese might have tried to persuade the Kalenjin to join them in an anti-government coalition. Had such a coalition been formed, or had the Kalenjin decided to operate on their own against the government, the task of subduing the mutineers and keeping open the lines of communication for reinforcements from the coast would have been made immeasurably more difficult. Events in the past had not been conducive to the formation of friendly relations between the Nandi and Sudanese, and these had not been improved by the "nasty time" experienced by the Sudanese in the recent operations.[28] In the event the Nandi did not seize the opportunity to harass the administration during the mutiny, and their restraint can be attributed in some measure to the effects of Ternan's campaign. The Mau operations had another fortunate effect on the government's ability to vanquish the mutineers. The Kavirondo, who had been persuaded to enlist as porters for the first time during the operations, were recruited in large numbers to carry loads for the reinforcements that were sent up for the Uganda Relief Force in 1898.

Ternan's expedition was similar in many particulars to Cunningham's invasion of Nandi two years before. The number of troops employed was roughly the same and, in both cases, the bulk of the reinforcements were drawn from Bunyoro. Neither commander had been able to operate simultaneously on two fronts, and both had suffered from the lack of information and reliable guides. The Nandi had as little difficulty in 1897 as in 1895 in avoiding frontal engagements, and contented themselves with taking what toll they could of the enemy by guerilla methods. Neither Cunningham nor Ternan succeeded in communicating profitably with tribal leaders, and both expeditions were withdrawn before victory had been gained and peace imposed.

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* See Chapter 13.

The many fields in which Ternan's arrangements were superior to Cunningham's reflect the progress made by the administration and the readiness of officials to profit from experience. The number of officers was increased considerably and the most senior of the local assistants accompanied the field force; large bands of spearmen mercenaries were engaged, more porters were employed and the number of followers controlled. Supplies were easier and enormous quantities of food were obtained from districts which were settling down after successful punitive operations; transport was facilitated by Sclater's Road, Kavirondo porters carried food loads through the dreaded Nandi country to Ravine, and Ternan had the advantage of a steam-launch to provide rapid means of communication and supply between Entebbe and the operational base. Medical arrangements were much more satisfactory, and Dr. Macpherson's discovery of the strychnine treatment for poisoned arrow wounds caused bewilderment among the enemy and raised the morale of the troops.[29] The blankets that were supplied to the expedition were, however, insufficient in number and unsatisfactory in quality, with the result that many of the participants suffered from respiratory affections and the cold during the operations, which were undertaken in the middle of the heavy rains.

Ternan had the advantage when planning his movements of knowing where he intended to attack and the most promising route to take, so his troops were spared the exploratory marching and counter-marching which Cunningham's men were called upon to perform. There was no alternative in 1895 other than a general sweep through the country, but Ternan was able to concentrate his forces against the Laibon and the Sigisi section. The ill-starred descent into the Mitete Valley had shown that the Nandi could be taken unawares at the start of an invasion, but their warning system was sufficiently alert and effective to prevent any further exploitation of the element of surprise. Ternan operated in Nandi for a much shorter time than Cunningham, with the result that casualties on both sides were less numerous, fewer prisoners were taken and a smaller quantity of stock was confiscated. As far as the infliction of casualties was concerned, Ternan was at a disadvantage compared with his predecessor, because the Nandi had profited from the lesson they had received during their first encounter with the government forces, and did not repeat the mistakes they had made at Kimondi and Kapkobis in 1895.* Had Ternan's campaign continued for a longer term or had the country been re-entered after the projected invasion of Lumbwa and Kach, greater losses might have been inflicted on the Nandi and more of their houses and food supplies destroyed. It is doubtful, however, whether the expedition was sufficiently powerful to force the Nandi to abandon their hostile attitude for a policy of co-operation and friendship with the government.

Before Ternan left Kipture on 28 June 1897 to meet the steam-launch on the Kavirondo Gulf, he ordered the disbandment of the field force and the swift return of the constituent companies to their bases. Although he had received reassuring news about the situation in Buganda, Ternan decided that his presence at Entebbe was more important than his remaining with the troops in Mau for operations that showed little promise of producing a lasting settlement. The prospects of surprising the Lumbwa and capturing the Laibon in their country were not encouraging after Ternan's experience in Nandi. Moreover, he had probably concluded, from his first professional acquaintance with the Kalenjin, that they could not be conquered by point to point marching by one or two columns, and that further operations would have to be deferred until sufficient troops could be spared for a multi-pronged offensive. Ternan's decision may also have been influenced by the knowledge that the Sudanese were becoming increasingly disgruntled over being separated from their families, the hardships of the campaign, the distribution of loot and the shortage of food.[30] In view of Tomkins' report that the Nandi were massing in force to avenge the invasion of their country, it was surprising that so large a proportion of the expeditionary force was returned to stations beyond the Nile. This rumour, which may have been discredited while Ternan was at Kipture, evidently did not carry much weight with the Acting Commissioner in the context of the unnamed chief's request for peace in the Mitete Valley, the interview with the Nandi at Kamwentowe and Teres' submission. The rapid dispersal of the expedition proved a fortunate decision, however, as it upset Mwanga's calculations concerning the time that would elapse before the troops could take part in operations against him in Buganda.

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* See pp. 143-144.

The possibility of trouble in Buganda compelled Ternan to change the dispositions, which had been made before the expedition began, for garrisoning the road stations after it had been successfully concluded. The original proposals were for Ravine and Kipture to be allocated one full company each, and for a third company to be shared between Mumias and Naivasha.[31] This establishment was planned to consolidate the gains achieved by the expedition and to provide adequate escorts on the Uganda Road. But under the modified arrangements only VI Company was left to garrison the three Mau stations, so the district establishment reverted to what it had been before Ternan considered it politic to send reinforcements from Bunyoro in March 1897. These changes were dictated by military considerations, but the decision was probably influenced by the difficulties of supplying food over a long period for 250 men with their families and followers. When he arrived at Entebbe, Ternan intended to increase the Mau forces to one and a half companies by transferring the half company at Mumias to Kipture.* This could not be done, however, until Mumias was relieved by troops from Luba's and the latter station was manned by a detachment from Kampala.[32]

There were some encouraging signs before Ternan left Kipture that peace terms could be imposed by the local officials without much delay. Only one Nandi chief had made peace during the expedition but Ternan had exhorted other leaders to come in to Kipture, and Teres had submitted and was detained at Ravine. Messages had been sent by women prisoners to the Kamasia chiefs commanding their attendance at Ravine, and representatives from several sections came in on 16 June 1897 and asked for peace. Foaker sent them back to bring in their chiefs so that negotiations could take place. The following day the Lembus fired the two trading stores at Ravine but on 3 July 1897 two women came in and asked for peace. They, too, were sent back by Jackson to bring in men of importance. The Kamasia and Lembus brought a present of two bulls to Ravine on the 9th, but apparently peace was not made on this occasion. The next party of Kamasia emissaries arrived at Ravine on 18 August 1897, but Jackson was away at the time so they were rationed and told to return after seven days in order to meet him. The Kamasia came for the last time on the 31st and were again told to return with some of their leading elders. Thus when the mutiny broke out on 23 September 1897, general peace with the Kamasia had not been concluded. Jackson was understandably reluctant to treat with men of straw, but he later confessed that he refused to discuss peace terms with the emissaries or anyone else until they had given up their one-eyed Laibon. The Kamasia eventually murdered the Laibon after getting him drunk but this was presumably some time after the mutiny.[33]

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* These orders were presumably not implemented, see p. 280.

The Nandi apparently made no effort to seek peace with Bagnall at Kipture, and the government did not entrust Teres with the task of explaining the benefits of a peaceful solution and the futility of further resistance. Five Nandi arrived at Ravine on 20 August 1897 and were possibly peace emissaries. They were told to wait until Jackson returned to the station but they evidently declined to do so.[34] Thus, the formidable army which the Acting Commissioner and Commandant had led against the Nandi failed to conquer them in battle or to persuade them to sue for peace.

References

1. Ternan-Madocks, 14 March, 1897, BRA.
2. Ternan-FO, 15 April, 1897, 5 May, 1897, FOCP, 7018/1/4.
3. Troops were also drawn from Luba's and Mumias. Pulteney-FO, 15 June, 1897, FO2/135 shows 1,334 men on the active list and 224 on reserve, i.e. 170 and 224 respectively understrength on the 1897-98 estimates. Nakabimba was abandoned as a garrison station.
4. RSD. Jackson-Com, 3 April, 1897, Ternan-Jackson, 22 April, 1897, ESA, A/4/8, A/5/3.
5. Ternan-FO, 5 May, 1897, FOCP, 7018/4 Ternan, *op. cit.*, p. 288.
6. RSD. Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 329. Stock rewards promised to the Masai vary: Ternan 20 May, 1897, ESA, A/5/3 (a half); Ternan, *op. cit.*, p. 288 (a third). Ternan-FO, 7 June, 1897, FOCP, 7018/54.
7. Ternan, *op. cit.*, p. 287. The Basoga may have been deterred by the experiences of their colleagues who had been employed by Gemmill.
8. For Fort Smith and the Kikuyu boycott of the Naivasha market, see Hall's Letters.
9. Mackinnon-Com, Ternan-FO, 7 June, 1897, FOCP, 7018/54.
10. The *Ruwenzori*, which was operated and part-owned by Boustead, Ridley and Co., made her maiden voyage in December 1896; Thomas, *UJ*, (1961), p. 53.
11. Plans and orders in ESA, A/27/17. Ternan's column averaged five and a half miles a day. Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 297.
12. Accounts of the expedition: ESA, A/27/17; Ternan-FO, 7 June, 1897, FOCP, 7018/54, FO2/133 (map); Ternan, *op. cit.*, Chapter 28; Moyse-

Bartlett, *op. cit.*, p. 68; *ZG*, 1 September, 1897; Jackson, *op. cit.*, pp. 297, 331; RSD, *Evening News*, 13 November, 1897. The Kamasia probably had more cattle than Ternan's estimate suggests.

13. Ternan-FO, 7 June, 1897, FOCP, 7018/54. Teres apparently remained in prison for eight months; Jackson-Com, 19 June, 1898, ESA, A/4/11.
14. Ternan-FO, 23 June, 1897, FOCP, 7018/89. The Kamelilo *pororiet* occupied a large part of the Tindiret area. With the armed Swahilis, the riflemen numbered about 600.
15. The departure date from Ravine varies: 10 June, 1897, (RSD); 11th (Ternan, *op. cit.*, p. 295, Ternan-FO, 23 June, 1897, FOCP, 7018/89); 12th (ESA, A/27/17). The Nandi presumably thought the force would continue along Sclater's Road to Kipture.
16. Ternan, *op. cit.*, p. 297 for a description of the valley.
17. Ternan, *op. cit.*, p. 298.
18. Ternan, *op. cit.*, pp. 298-99. Tomkins would hardly have entrusted important letters to friendly Nandi, but a few Nandi or Uasin Gishu must have guided the Sudanese. See Gray, *UJ*, 17 (1953), p. 21 for the Congo mutineers.
19. Ternan-FO, 23 June 1897, FOCP, 7018/89. The men Ternan talked to were probably Kakipoch from the country visited by Jackson's patrol. Kamwentowe (Kamivento) is the same place as Kabarer which Cunningham visited on 19 November, 1895; see p. 145.
20. Ternan-Wilson, 24 June, 1897, ESA, A/5/3; Ternan-FO, 25 June, 1897, FOCP, 7018/90. Bagnall-Com, 1 April, 1900, FO2/299.
21. e.g. Thruston, *op. cit.*, p. 25; FO-Ternan, 6 September, 1897, FOCP, 7018/120. FO83/1796.
22. Accounts of the Nandi expedition: Ternan-FO, 23 June, 1897, FOCP, 7018/89; Ternan, *op. cit.*, Chapter 29; ESA, A/27/17; RSD; *ZG*, 1 September, 1897. Ternan, *op. cit.*, Chapters 28-30 provides an illuminating commentary on the contrasts between warfare against the Kalenjin and the western Bantu, in such matters as the number of troops and auxiliaries, tactics, weapons, casualties, stock captures and enemy forces.
23. Foaker-Com, 17 June, 1897, ESA, A/4/8; RSD. See pp. 314-347.
24. Ternan, *op. cit.*, p. 299.
25. Berkeley-FO, 14 December, 1896, FOCP, 6951/116; the fine was 3,500 lb. of ivory worth about £1,000. Berkeley's reforms had curtailed some of the Kabaka's powers. Thruston, *op. cit.*, p. 287. "There existed throughout the Protectorate a wide-spread and deep hostility to the English rule. This does not appear to have been realised by the authorities, though well-known to all intimately acquainted with the natives." (Writer of The Sequel.)
26. Ternan reached Entebbe on 9 July, 1897, three days after Mwanga's flight. Ternan, *op. cit.*, p. 300. "I have had cause for very grave anxiety during the present year when all the forces were withdrawn to Mau and Buddu"; G. Wilson-FO, 9 November, 1897, FOCP, 7024/26.
27. Thruston, *op. cit.*, p. 291. See pp. 251-278 for the situation in Busoga.
28. Hanlon-Cardinal Vaughan, 28 October, 1897, *ZG*, 16 March, 1898.
29. Report (30 July, 1898) on an analysis of the poison in FO2/162 and FOCP, 7110. Doubts were raised about the value and safety of Macpherson's treatment; Capt. Haig (IMS) banned the use of strychnine in the 1900 Nandi expedition: FOCP, 7690/150.
30. Grant-Com, 20 October, 1897, ESA, A/4/9; Hanlon-Vaughan, 28 October, 1897, *ZG*, 16 March, 1898. The mutineers' letter to Mbogo might refer, see p. 282. Austin's Diary, 18 April, 1898.
31. Ternan's Field Force orders 9 June, 1897, ESA, A/27/17.
32. Ternan-Jackson, 25 June, 1897, Africa 2 (1898) C. 8718. N. Wilson-Com, 12 and 18 September, 1897, ESA, A/4/9.

33. RSD. Jackson told Ternan (ESA, A/4/9, 10 August, 1897) that peace was granted to Lembus, Elkakimor and Kamasia representatives at Ravine on 4 August, 1897, but this is not recorded in RSD. The visits that were made after 4 August, 1897, suggest that, if an agreement was reached on that date, it did not extend to all the Kamasia. The sections who came in for peace support the presumption that people, who had made peace before the expedition, were punished. Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 297. See pp. 243-260.

13

THE SUDANESE MUTINY

When Ternan left Kipture on 28 June 1897 to return to Entebbe, he was anxious to review the situation in Buganda, to assess the extent of the rumoured disaffection in Busoga and to arrange for the Protectorate's contribution to the Macdonald expedition. George Wilson was alarmed about the activities of a number of Basoga chiefs, including Mutanda (Wakoli's son), and the disorders resulting from the forcible propagation of the Muslim faith. There was, moreover, a possibility of collusion between the Basoga dissidents and Kabarega.[1]

The Macdonald expedition, which was ostensibly organised to explore the sources of the River Juba and to demarcate the Anglo-Italian boundary, was in reality part of Salisbury's strategy of keeping the Nile Valley free from French, Italian and Abyssinian interlopers. As a major imperialist undertaking, it had to be given priority over the day to day commitments of the Uganda administration.[2] Ternan was directed to provide two military officers, 300 Sudanese troops, 300 porters and vast quantities of ammunition, food and livestock. This enormous contribution from Uganda resources was to be sent to Ravine before 10 September 1897, the date on which Macdonald hoped to arrive in Mau with the main body of the expedition. Recent events, including the threatened dislocation of the transport system by the Nandi and Kamasia, and the possibility of combined hostilities by the Kalenjin tribes, had demonstrated that any weakening of the Protectorate forces might jeopardise the security of Uganda and its communications with the coast. The Foreign Office agreed, therefore, that warriors should be recruited locally to replace the 300 Sudanese regulars, and that two officers should be appointed to take over the duties of those seconded to Macdonald.[3]

Ternan had to make dispositions affecting all parts of the Protectorate in order to fulfil his obligations towards the Macdonald expedition. Because of geographical reasons, the time factor, and the fact that a large proportion of the government forces and war material had been concentrated in Mau for the recent operations, he was forced to levy a very substantial contribution from the Eastern Province. Ternan accordingly ordered Jackson to stockpile food at Njemps, to supply livestock (including sheep taken in the Mau campaign), and to earmark 48,000 rounds of ammunition from the supplies which had been delivered for the Kamasia-Nandi operations. Only half of the 160 Swahilis serving in Mau were to be retained for mail and station duties, and the remainder were to be allocated to Macdonald. Mumias was to provide much of the food required for the expedition and, if possible, to transport it to Njemps by Kavirondo porters. "As no food was available at Nandi", Hall was asked to supply 1,000 loads from Fort Smith, and Grant was ordered to arrange for a similar amount to be sent from Busoga.[4]

Before Ternan left Kipture, most of the troops engaged in the Mau operations had been ordered back to their stations to deter troublesome elements in Buganda and to be at hand should punitive measures prove necessary. Although he realised the Mau districts were far from settled as a result of the recent campaign, the situation in Buganda compelled Ternan to alter his dispositions for strengthening the garrisons and so prevent the disruption of the Protectorate's communications.* As a result of these measures, the Nandi and Kamasia districts were left with fewer than a hundred soldiers and a similar number of Swahili porters. Ternan had, however, made a belated effort to raise the morale of the Mau garrisons, which had been lowered by the lack of clothing suitable for service and campaigning in cold, mountainous districts, and by arrears of pay. Their clothing requirements were to be met from loads which were on their way from the coast, and the accountant was ordered to send 200 loads of *amerikani* and Bombay cloth from Entebbe so that the troops could be paid up to date.† The cloth was to be shipped to Port Victoria, where

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* See p. 274.

† See pp. 255-273. Ternan had been reluctant to send cloth from Buganda, where it was often in short supply, as it was unnecessarily expensive to bring it up through GEA and then to send it down to Mau.

Ternan hoped it could be forwarded by Kavirondo porters, or by the 200 Baganda whom George Wilson was to recruit for the Macdonald expedition.

When Ternan arrived at Entebbe on 9 July 1897 he learned that Mwanga, who had decamped from Mengo four days previously, was planning a tribal rebellion against British rule. Urgent messages were sent off to hasten the arrival of the troops who were marching from Kipture, and other reinforcements were ordered to proceed by land and steam-launch from the Eastern Province and Busoga.* Runners were despatched with instructions for the withdrawal of the whole of the Mumias garrison, and for Jackson and Bagnall to take details from IV and IX Companies from Ravine and Kipture to Port Victoria for transhipment to the rendezvous at the Katonga River. Mumias was to be garrisoned by porters and Tomkins was to take charge of Kavirondo while Grant was absent on the Buganda operations. Jackson and Bagnall did not go to Port Victoria though the men from IV and IX Companies apparently marched from Mau as ordered.† Less than a week after his return from Kipture, Ternan marched out of Kampala with the Buddu expedition, in which I, II, VII and details from III and IV Companies took part. The rebels were defeated at Kabawoko (20 July) and Marongo (28 July), so that Ternan and the army recovered some of the self-confidence they had lost during the inconclusive operations against the Mau archers and spearmen.[5] Grant and Lieut. Hobart were left in Buddu to form a station at Masaka, Mwanga was deposed and his infant son, Daudi Chua, proclaimed Kabaka in his stead on 14 August 1897. Mwanga's defection also caused considerable restlessness in Busoga, where a number of chiefs felt "the opportunity had arrived to eradicate European influence". N. A. Wilson asked Mumias for help to depose the ringleaders, as the twenty-nine soldiers and seventy-nine raw recruits at Luba's were unable to capture Mutanda and to demonstrate to the friendly chiefs that the government had the power to support them against the dissident faction.[6]

The operations against Mwanga were concluded in time for some of the participants to be sent to Ravine for Macdonald's escort. Ternan, who was suffering from a liver complaint and the after-effects of a wound, was invalided home on 19 August 1897, so Thruston left Bunyoro to take command of the troops and Jackson became Acting Commissioner for the second time in his career.[7]

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* See p. 270 for Mwanga's miscalculation in this regard.

† Ternan-Road Stations 11 July, 1897, ESA, A/5/3. IX Company left for Kipture on 19 July, 1897, but is not mentioned in accounts of the Buddu campaign. Bagnall was at Ravine on 21 July, 1897, with the two Baganda chiefs. Mukwenda and Kaima, see p. 283. See p. 274 for the plan to transfer the Mumias garrison to Kipture.

While Ternan was saving Buganda from a repetition of the chaotic conditions which occurred during the early days of the Company, the Eastern Province fortunately remained quiet. This state of affairs, which was brought about in part by the Mau operations, must have gratified Ternan and dispelled the anxiety which he might otherwise have felt about leaving the province before completing the subjugation of the Nandi and Kamasia. The return to settled conditions was particularly opportune as the Ravine, Kipture and Mumias garrisons had been depleted to a dangerous degree and, with the exception of Jackson, all the district officers were either junior in rank or lacking in local experience.* When Jackson was summoned to Entebbe to take over from Ternan, Martin resumed charge of Ravine when he returned from leave. Jackson's departure was, however, delayed as Ternan wished him to remain at Ravine until Macdonald had left for the Juba. The district officers concentrated their efforts on ensuring the safe passage of the Uganda Road caravans, and on purchasing and transporting food for Macdonald. Hundreds of Kavirondo porters were employed on this work, but the caravans could not be properly supervised and 40 men died in one trip over the cold, mountain crossing of Mau.[8] This generated such a dislike of the Nandi-Ravine section that Kavirondo refused to enlist for the journey, and were reluctant to volunteer for other assignments for fear of being switched to Ravine, so that Basoga had to be called in to help. The preparations were, however, completed without the Nandi or their allies attacking the badly organised and poorly armed caravans, or the numerous runners who carried messages between stations.

The officials at Ravine and Kipture were anxious to negotiate peace terms with the Kamasia and Nandi. The Kamasia made several tentative advances but the response from the Nandi was disappointing.* Bagnall's position at Kipture was an anxious one on many accounts. The Nandi had not been beaten, the troops had been withdrawn and he had no means of discovering whether the rumoured tribal revolt was likely to take place or not. If it did, Bagnall and the few trained men under his command would have found it difficult to defend Kipture against a determined and sustained onslaught. His only hope of rapid reinforcement was from a detachment of the over-stretched half-company at Ravine, which would take four days to march to Kipture through country lending itself to guerilla tactics. No help could be expected from Mumias where the garrison consisted of Swahili station hands and twenty reservists. Bagnall had no opportunities for getting into communication with Nandi leaders any distance from the fort, because half of his meagre force was usually engaged on escort duties on the Uganda Road, while some of the remainder guarded the food depots at Kitoto's and Kapkolei and accompanied donkey convoys between these posts and Kipture. The Kapkolei depot on the south escarpment was a promising pioneer venture, since it was situated in a thickly populated area over which the district officer had hitherto exercised no influence.†

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* Contrast the position in 1895, see p. 135. The 1897 establishment was 1st class (Jackson, Ravine); 2nd class (J. P. Wilson, Naivasha; Bagnall, Kipture); 3rd class (Tomkins, Mumias; Fowler, Port Victoria). Apart from Wilson, all were comparative newcomers.

After the withdrawal of the expedition, the Nandi reverted to their previous practice of not interfering with the government so long as the government refrained from interfering with them. Bagnall made no demands on the people to provide food for Macdonald or for porters to transport it. The Nandi were not called upon to sell their cattle or donkeys for the Juba expedition, and the warriors were not considered suitable candidates for the vacancies in the Protectorate forces after 300 Sudanese had been handed over to Macdonald. In July 1897 some unnamed Nandi chiefs were given presents, which may have been rewards for services rendered or food supplied; on the other hand, they may have been offered as inducements for the opening of peace negotiations, or in recognition of the recipients' neutrality during the Nandi expedition. These gifts may have been the cattle referred to in the mutineers' cryptic letter to the Baganda Muslim leader, Mbogo: "Afterwards when they went to Nandi, Macdonald and Jackson collected all the natives. He gave the Nandi seven cattle from the cattle we were tired of working for and which we had brought;

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* See pp. 274-275.

† Later the site of Bushiri Post. See p. 214 for Bagge's Camp in this area.

by this action we were the losers".[9] No similar rewards had been made to Nandi leaders for three or four months, so there was evidently some improvement in their relations with the fort. The fact that no advantage was taken of Bagnall's visibly weak position, and their acceptance of the Kapkolei food buying post also indicated that, although the Nandi were not anxious to enter into peace negotiations with him, they were equally disinclined to seek out a fresh quarrel.

Bagnall was kept fully occupied with routine tasks and in complying with standing orders and financial regulations. During his period of office at Kipture from March to November 1897, the district officer was absent from his station on several occasions: he had visited Kitoto's in March and had possibly set up the food post at Kapkolei; during May and June he served with the Mau expedition; and in July he had escorted Mukwenda and Kaima to Ravine.* He had been relieved by Tomkins during the Mau campaign, but on the other occasions Kipture was left without a European official. Bagnall had asked several times for a clerk to cope with the clerical work involved in running the station and servicing the caravans passing through Kipture. These applications had been refused, so that probably the only literate subordinate resident at the fort when Bagnall was away was the Indian compounder, Khudda Bux. Payments made with a variety of trade goods for food purchases at Kipture, Kapkolei, Kitoto's and possibly Kakamega had to be accounted for, as well as pay and ration issues for the garrison, station staff and mailmen. A tally had also to be kept of the food and trade goods taken by caravans, Sclater's road party and the convoys carrying food to Ravine for the Mau operations and Macdonald's expedition. Bagnall's book-keeping worries were further increased by the arrival of VII Company in March 1897, the concentration of troops at Kipture for the Mau campaign, the return of the Sudanese to their stations in June, the arrival of Macdonald's escort of three companies and, after the mutiny, the passage of reinforcements and stores for the Uganda Relief Force.

Financial details connected with these activities were entered in the station cash book and many of them in the stores ledger. Although some of the items were recorded in rupees, annas and pice, trade goods were the currency used for most of the transactions. These articles, which were received on occasions from Ravine but more frequently from Smith, Mackenzie and Co. at Mumias, included a great variety of items, all of which had different market and book values. The largest proportion was made up of several types of cloth and beads, but these staple items were supplemented by iron and brass wire, cowries, iron chain and thread. Losses occurred during transit and in store, and when issues were made by illiterate subordinates incapable of accurate recording. Goods eaten by white ants or stolen from the store had to be written off, and calculations made to adjust the quantity of articles received from Ravine, where the scales were differently calibrated from those at Kipture. With all these transactions to cope with and all these hazards to guard against, it was hardly surprising that Bagnall, who had no experience of accountancy, found great difficulty in balancing the books every month. At the end of July 1897 he gave up the struggle and stopped entering up the cash book.* His anxiety on this account, his manifold duties as a station official and transport agent and his many absences from Kipture left Bagnall with little time for the administration of the district, or for making much impression on the people he was supposed to govern.

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* See pp. 241, 280.

Ternan and Moffat passed through Kipture on the way to the coast on 1 September 1897, with a detachment of VII Company which was to form the advanced party of Macdonald's escort. Ternan must have been relieved by the conduct of the Nandi since the Mau operations, especially as he had doubted in June 1897 whether half a company would be sufficient to maintain order in the district. He had, moreover, found considerable difficulty in recruiting Baganda to replace the Sudanese who had been detailed for the Juba expedition. After having had recourse to "compulsory volunteering", he had finally been forced to enlist young boys to bring the companies up to strength.[10] During the next three weeks several parties from IV, VII and IX Companies passed through Nandi on their way to the rendezvous wih Macdonald. The Nandi probably wondered if they were to be visited again by a punitive force, as the troops had been preceded, like their comrades four months earlier, by huge caravans of Basoga and Kavirondo porters carrying food to Ravine. The Sudanese marched through Nandi in detachments led by native officers and indulged in some plundering along the road.[11] After Macdonald and Jackson arrived at Ngare Nyuki, one march east of Ravine, on 16 September 1897, it was agreed that only seventy-three of the hundred Swahilis mustered at Ravine for the expedition would be needed. As a result of this decision, Jackson sent Bagnall fifty-six Swahilis, so that the detachment of IV Company under Jardin Effendi, which had been detained at Kipture until they were relieved by Bilal Effendi and sections of IX Company, could proceed to the rendezvous with Macdonald. As IX Company was also detailed for the Juba expedition, Nandi was evidently considered to be sufficiently under control to be safely entrusted to the Swahilis forming the recently augmented station staff. Jackson and Macdonald also arranged for Dr. Macpherson to join the expedition in place of Surgeon-Captain McLoughlin, who had been left at Fort Smith suffering from dysentery. This meant that Eastern Province was left without a doctor, and that there would only be two medical practitioners in the administered parts of the Protectorate until Moffat arrived back from the coast.*

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* He was subsequently surcharged with a discrepancy of Rs. 4,030 (about half a year's pay) but after many representations this was written off, and more than half of it charged to mutiny expenses. Bagnall-Com, 1 April, 1900, FO2/299, Hewetson, *UJ*, 16 (1952), p. 30.

On 23 September 1897, two days after Austin had left Ngare Nyuki with I Column for Njemps, and a day after II Column had left under protest for the north with Norman Macdonald, the escort of the main party of the Juba expedition refused to obey orders, and set in train the events leading up to the outbreak of the Sudanese mutiny, Among the many grievances laid before Jackson by the mutineers' leaders were the low rates of pay, the failure of the commissariat and transport services to supply clothing and trade goods regularly, and the long periods which some of the companies had spent away from their stations on expeditions involving many hardships and long marches. All three companies detailed for Macdonald's escort had fought against the Mau tribes in May-June 1897, and had then marched back to Buddu for the campaign against Mwanga in July.† Although morale had been raised by a slight increase in pay and by their victories in Buddu, the troops were dispirited by their previous experiences in operations east of the Nile, and embittered by the drastic action which Ternan had taken to restore discipline after the Mau and Buddu campaigns.* The Nubian officers realised their men were the only trained soldiers in the country and that, without them, the administration would be forced to rely on Swahilis, whom the Sudanese dismissed as women, or the Baganda and Basoga, whom they despised. The only warrior tribes who had held their own against the Sudanese were the Kalenjin, but there was little likelihood of the Nandi and their kinsmen serving under a government which had failed to conquer them. Finally, the Sudanese resented the treatment they received from some of their European officers, who served with them for short periods, could not speak their language and took little interest in their welfare.†

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* Drs. Cook at the CMS Hospital, Kampala and Ansorge in Bunyoro. On his periodic visits to Kipture, Dr. Macpherson was concerned only with government staff; he may have treated a few Nandi near the fort.

† IV and IX Companies had also fought in the 1895 Nandi expedition.

When Jackson and Macdonald arrived at Ravine after the Sudanese refused to march from Ngare Nyuki, a letter was sent to Bagnall informing him of what had happened. The following night two Uasin Gishu Masai runners slipped out of Ravine to warn Bagnall that the mutineers had refused to parley. On 25 September 1897 Jackson sent two loyal Sudanese to meet Jardin and his detachment of IV Company, who were presumed to be on the road between Kipture and Ravine. The messengers returned the following day as they had failed to meet the detachment, but news was brought in that the two Masai bearing the second warning letter to Bagnall had met Jardin, who had retraced his steps to Kipture with them. By the morning of the 27th the mutineers, after finally rejecting Jackson's attempts to arrive at an accommodation with them, marched off from Ravine in the direction of Nandi. IV and IX Companies were joined during the march to Kipture by their comrades from VII Company, who had deserted from Austin's column at Njemps on the night of the 26th.‡ Shortly after the Sudanese had departed, instructions were sent to Bagnall on the course of action he was to pursue if they approached Kipture, and directing him to warn Mumias, Port Victoria and Luba's. He was also presumably informed of the route which Jackson and Macdonald intended to follow in their attempt to prevent the mutineers from reaching Luba's, where there was a considerable Sudanese garrison and a large settlement of ex-soldiers and reservists. When Bagnall first received news of the mutiny he probably sent messages to Tomkins and George Wilson, as Mumias was in a state of readiness when the rebels arrived there on 7 October 1897, and news of their defection had reached Kampala two days previously.*

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* The pay increase was from Rs. 5 to Rs. 7 a month; EAP and GEA rates were Rs. 15 and 26; Swahili porters usually earned Rs. 10-12 a month. Hanlon, *ZG*, 16 March, 1898. Ternan demoted some officers and NCO's; he refuted this charge in Ternan-Com, 26 March, 1899, FOCP, 7401/120. Many people in East Africa thought Ternan was mainly responsible for the mutiny; Eliot-FO, 31 October, 1901, FO2/450. Austin's Diary, 18 April, 1898.

† Cf. the relations between Kipture officials and the Nandi, see pp. 214-222.

‡ The dates are taken from RSD; these differ from those in other accounts and official reports, which state the mutineers left Ravine on 24 or 25 September, 1897.

Jackson's instructions to Bagnall were that the mutineers were not to be engaged by his Swahilis, or by any loyal Sudanese who might be at the fort when the mutineers arrived. But if the 200 rebels attacked the fort Bagnall was to defend it with all the means at his command. His chief consideration was, however, to prevent the mutineers from passing the fort and proceeding towards Mumias and the Nile. In order to carry out this part of his orders Bagnall was told to enlist the support of the Nandi. Jackson presumably thought Bagnall would be able to explain to the Nandi near the fort that the Sudanese were no longer to be regarded as government agents, but rebels whose passage was to be resisted at the district officer's behest. Even if the warrior leaders accepted Bagnall's explanation, they had sufficient experience of the Sudanese to know that it would have been madness for spearmen to tackle so large a body of disciplined riflemen in the open, undulating country surrounding Kipture station. Moreover, although the Nandi had many reasons for hating the Sudanese, they had no cause to risk their lives in order to help Bagnall. Only harm could come to the Nandi from detaining the Sudanese, who would be forced to obtain food by looting the granaries of the local people. Jackson's orders to Bagnall for dealing with stragglers or small parties of rebels were more specific but probably equally impracticable to implement. Rank and file who came in were to be disarmed and placed under open arrest while their cases were submitted to Jackson for adjudication; and sergeants and officers were to be kept under close arrest until a court martial could be summoned. Bagnall was also advised that, if extreme measures proved necessary among the Kipture garrison and these measures were likely to cause disaffection, he was to try and gain time by prolonging discussions with his men and to report to Jackson at Mumias.[12]

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* Tomkins reported the news, which he had received from "native sources" to Kampala on 30 September, 1897, ESA, A/34/3.

Bagnall was never given the opportunity of trying to implement Jackson's orders. When Jardin returned to Kipture on 25 September 1897, he satisfied Bagnall as to his loyalty and was admitted to the fort. Bagnall was evidently convinced of Jardin's sincerity because the latter had turned back on hearing of the events at Ravine, instead of marching on to join his rebellious comrades. Bagnall probably thought that with Jardin's fifty-five men the station garrison would be strong enough to meet any eventuality, with or without the help of the presumably loyal Sudanese under Bilal and Suliman, who were approaching Kipture from the west and might be persuaded to stay at Nandi with Jardin. News of Jardin's action got through to Jackson at Ravine, together with rumours that Bilal and Suliman had likewise placed their contingents under Bagnall's orders. On the day after his arrival at Kipture, however, Jardin took possession of the fort and made Bagnall a prisoner in his own station. The coup was carried out without bloodshed and possibly without the knowledge of the local Nandi. Bagnall had no reason to doubt Jardin's good faith and was taken unawares by his treacherous action. Resistance was, moreover, impossible, as the garrison of fifty Swahilis, who were armed with Remingtons and reload ammunition of doubtful quality, would have been massacred needlessly by the well-armed Sudanese. The position at Kipture was vastly different from that at Mumias, where Tomkins called on the assistance of Smith, Mackenzie and Co's agent, Walter Mayes, with his seventy armed porters, and persuaded Mumia to muster 1,000 spearmen in defence of the fort.[13] The fifty-eight men under Bilal and Suliman were either present at Kipture when Jardin seized the fort, or arrived shortly afterwards and threw in their lot with their rebellious comrades. Jardin was apparently playing a waiting game and was not prepared to take further independent action until he could confer with Mabruk, when the main body of the mutineers passed through Kipture on the way to the Nile. Bagnall was not tied up but he was subjected to a number of indignities, which probably began after Mabruk and the Ravine mutineers had been welcomed into the fort by

Jardin: "he was placed under arrest and sat all day on his verandah, with an armed Sudanese standing on his right and left . . . while every now and then small boys would collect and jeer at him, signifying by their actions that he would have his throat cut—a galling ordeal for any officer!"[14]

Despite his loss of command, Bagnall contrived to send a message to Jackson confirming Mabruk's unopposed entry into Kipture.[15] The mutineers did little damage to the station buildings, but looted the stores of all the ammunition and confiscated a quantity of beads and flour. Before leaving Kipture for Mumias about 2 October 1897, Jardin demanded IV Company's pay and crime sheets. Bagnall had no choice but to comply, but he added a note to the effect that Jardin's men were rebels and should not be paid. Bagnall claimed more than two years after the event that the mutineers controlled the fort for four days. It is difficult, however, to reconcile the confused chronology, and to understand why the mutineers stayed at Kipture after the stores had been ransacked. When they eventually left to seek help from their comrades in the west, Bagnall and his Swahilis were left alone at Kipture, defenceless but unharmed. They were fortunate in having encountered the mutineers at the beginning of the rising and in falling into Jardin's hands.[16] As soon as he was free again, Bagnall despatched messengers to Ravine with a letter for Jackson and presumably a request for ammunition. He may also have sent runners to Mumias, as the defection of the Kipture Sudanese and the looting of the station were known in Kampala on 16 October 1897.

Mabruk marched along Sclater's Road and arrived at Mumias on 7 October 1897. During the journey the mutineers undoubtedly pillaged whenever the opportunity occurred of doing so without danger or delay. It is questionable, however, whether the Nandi suffered much from these depredations, which were alleged to have caused many casualties, the looting and destruction of roadside villages and the rustling of large numbers of livestock.[17] Only fifteen miles of Nandi territory were traversed by the rebels and camp was pitched for only one night just beyond the western limits of the Nandi Forest. Much of the route lay through unoccupied country and forest, in which the dwellings of the sparse and mainly goat-owning sections of the Nandi were difficult to locate. The Sudanese knew, moreover, that foraging in the Nandi Forest was both difficult and dangerous, so they were unlikely to take unnecessary risks while the food which had been obtained at Kipture lasted out. The rebels had also learned that searching for Nandi cattle in the dense undergrowth was a lengthy and often profitless process. The animals had undoubtedly been hidden and the granaries emptied when the Nandi heard of the return of the Sudanese to Kipture, in case this marked the beginning of fresh government measures to pacify the country. The Nandi knew, moreover, of the spread of rinderpest in Masailand so their stock would have been moved away from Sclater's Road to avoid exposure to infection.* The Kavirondo, on the other hand, suffered considerably at the hands of the Sudanese, whose activities were naturally thought to have been encouraged or condoned by the administration. One of the Kakamega chiefs rose against the government and instituted a series of reprisal raids along the Uganda Road, which continued for several months after the mutineers had left the country. The Sudanese, in revenge for the murder of three looters, crowded 100 Kakamega into a hut and set fire to it, but no retaliatory action on this scale was reported in Nandi.[18] Although they also thought the Sudanese were acting on government orders, the Nandi apparently kept the strong party of riflemen under surveillance but avoided any direct encounters with them.

Rumours of a general rising in Nandi and Kavirondo quickly spread, however, to Buganda and Fort Smith. This was not surprising because the road was blocked, communications were poorer even than usual, and Jackson and Macdonald were not in touch with events in Nandi and Kavirondo or with any of the road stations. The alarm persisted for several weeks, but by the end of November Hardinge was able to report that the road was open to Kipture, the Nandi and Kamasia were "so far friendly" and that "on this side of Usoga there is very little fear at present of the natives rising *en masse* or interrupting our communications with Uganda". Hubbard, who had been detained at Fort Smith for several weeks, informed the CMS in London that he would soon be able to proceed westwards with an escort from Ravine. He added "the Kavirondo will probably be pacified quickly, not so the

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* Jackson-CO, 15 August, 1906, CO, 533/16, infers the Nandi were advised to take this action. The mutineers were the second invaders to enter Nandi from the east, see pp. 31, 263.

Nandi. They love war and will probably keep the thing going as long as they can from the sheer love of fighting".[19]

Hubbard's remarks, which were founded on the legend that was beginning to surround the tribe, were not true. The Nandi did not rise against the government but returned to their normal way of life, after the Sudanese had left the country. That they did so strengthens the presumption that they suffered little from the Sudanese during the march to Mumias. Had the Nandi seized the opportunity for paying off old scores, they could have embarrassed Bagnall and his small Swahili garrison at Kipture, stopped the food convoys from the outlying buying posts and deprived him of the means of communicating with Ravine and Mumias. Instead of harassing Bagnall in this way, the Nandi seemingly watched events during the mutiny and the passage of reinforcements for the relief operations with indifference. This might indicate either that the warriors had been cowed by Ternan's expedition, and intimidated by the frequent troop movements after the mutiny, or that they had no desire to take issue with the government unless they were provoked. The latter proposition is supported by the fact that the hostilities in 1895 were caused by the Guasa Masa murders, and that the less serious misdemeanours attributed to them before Ternan's expedition were probably reprisals for looting by Sudanese road parties. The failure of the Nandi to take advantage of the government's weakness during the mutiny nevertheless emphasised that their military genius lay in the field of tactics rather than strategy.[20] The only tribal activity that may have been influenced by the mutiny and the breakdown of district administration was the intensification of raiding operations against the Kavirondo and Elgon tribes. The "protected" Kitosh, Tiriki and Kabras suffered particularly from these visitations but the government was powerless to intervene. The Masai were also raiding in order to recoup their rinderpest losses. Hardinge visited Lenana at Ngong to discuss these raids and a rumoured alliance between the two brother Laibons, but no similar approach was made either to the Nandi chiefs or Kipchomber.[21]

Jackson and Macdonald marched westwards along the old caravan track in order to cut the mutineers off before they could join their colleagues in Kavirondo and Busoga. This stratagem entailed a much longer march on a path which had not been in regular use for more than a year, but it was thought that the mutineers' progress would be hastened if they knew they were being followed on Sclater's Road. It was also hoped that Bagnall and the Nandi might be able to hold the Sudanese up, or even to prevent them from passing beyond Kipture. Jackson's party, with the main body of Macdonald's expedition and an armed Swahili detachment from the station staff, did not get away from Ravine until 28 September 1897. Norman Macdonald and Bright had to remain at the station with their men, as the loyalty of the half company garrisoning Ravine was uncertain. Two days after the pursuit column moved off, Macdonald informed the Foreign Office of his reasons for the temporary abandonment of the Juba expedition, and his plans for resuming the march to the north when the mutiny was settled. Jackson also sent off a report containing the news that plans to contain the mutineers at Kipture had failed. These despatches, which did not reach London until 15 November 1897, were the first detailed accounts received at the Foreign Office concerning the extent of the mutiny, though Hardinge had telegraphed a summary of their contents on 18 October 1897.[22] The march over the old caravan route across the Uasin Gishu Plateau to Guasa Masa and Mumias took longer than Jackson anticipated. The track was overgrown and difficult to follow, a path had to be cut through the forests and two rivers needing bridging. The caravan only averaged 13 miles a day and when it arrived at a place 18 miles east of Mumias, Jackson learned that the station was besieged by the mutineers. After refusing to listen to Jackson's emissaries, the rebels left Mumias with their numbers swollen by their comrades from the garrison and the residents of the Sudanese colony, and their food sacks filled with grain from the store. Tomkins and Mayes joined Jackson's party, which left Mumias on 11 October 1897 on the chase that ended with the investment of Luba's fort. Jackson's bid to cut off the mutineers had failed and the subsequent events of the mutiny took place outside the Eastern Province .

Bagnall was ignorant of Jackson's discomfiture as no news reached Kipture after the departure of the Sudanese until letters arrived from Macdonald early in November. These contained an account of the engagement and casualties on Luba's Hill on 19 October 1897, and instructions for Bagnall to close Kipture and proceed to the front.* Hardinge was on his way up to make arrangements for reinforcing the Mau garrisons in order to protect the Uganda Road. The Machakos garrison had been sent to Naivasha to replace the men of VI Company, who were disarmed and escorted to Machakos by Cpl. Simmons. Martin dissuaded Hardinge from disarming their comrades at Ravine, but the Swahili contingent was strengthened so that it outnumbered the half company of Sudanese. Hardinge returned to the coast from Ravine without making arrangements to send reinforcements to Bagnall at Kipture or to replace him when he went to the front.[23] Meanwhile, the Nandi district officer was in a perilous position: his garrison was small, unreliable and poorly armed, so that the station's food supply and communications with Ravine and Mumias depended on the forbearance of the Nandi. Bagnall was, in fact, as much a prisoner in his fort as he had been after Jardin's defection, and when Capts. McLoughlin and Meldon passed through to the front, Bagnall had to admit that "he did not know the state of the road ahead". Early in November the situation had improved, however, and he was able to reassure Hall at Fort Smith that "the Uganda Road is now open and there is now no immediate prospect of an attack, such as I feared might be made by the Nandi, Kamasia or other turbulent natives either on Ravine or Nandi station".[24]

Macdonald's requisition for reinforcements from Mau reached Ravine on 8 November 1897. Cpl. Brodie, whose seventy waggon drivers had been doing guard duties at the fort as the loyalty of the Sudanese garrison remained in doubt, was ordered to take up the station's ammunition reserves to the front in his carts.† Brodie left Ravine on 12 November 1897 to take on Bagnall from Kipture. Before leaving Kipture on 18 November 1897 with some of the Swahilis and Khudda Bux, Bagnall buried the stores and handed the station over to an askari named Bushiri.‡ Bagnall's party arrived at Luba's on 7 December 1897 and took part in the subsequent operations against the mutineers.

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*RSD. 22 Kavirondo and one askari brought the letters. Both the former Mau officers were wounded: Jackson so severely that George Wilson had to take over as Acting Commissioner, and Dr. Macpherson slightly. Lieut. Feilding was killed.

† Cpls. Brodie and Simmons worked on Sclater's transport scheme after the completion of the road.

‡ Bushiri was presumably a "Swahili". When the stores were dug up on 11 February, 1898, they were valued at Rs. 1470; of this amount food and trade goods worth only Rs. 109 were written off.

After Bagnall's withdrawal with a large part of the Swahili garrison, and the burial of the station stores, Kipture ceased to function either as a district headquarters or a reception and forwarding depot for the Uganda Transport. It became simply a camping site on the Uganda Road, which provided unusual amenities in the form of resident caretakers and a few semi-permanent buildings. Five months after the Mau expedition was disbanded, the only European officials left in the Eastern Province were Martin at Ravine and J. P. Wilson at Naivasha. A Eurasian clerk named Moody took over Mumias from Tomkins, and Fowler placed his Swahili servant, Abel Smith, in charge of Port Victoria when he followed Tomkins to Luba's in October. Thus the exigencies of the situation in Busoga and Buganda forced the government to reduce the scope and effectiveness of its control over the Eastern Province to what it had been in 1895. This reduction was not made possible because the tribes throughout the region had been pacified, but because the parties using the Uganda Road were large, well organised bodies of troops, who could look after themselves and provide protection for private caravans travelling in convoy with them. All pretensions to administrative supervision were abandoned as well as measures aimed at discouraging inter-tribal hostilities.

The virtual abandonment of the region, which must have puzzled the Nandi and their neighbours, gave rise to very few incidents symptomatic of a return to the unsettled conditions which existed when British occupation began. This can be attributed partly to the steadying effect of the caravans of military reinforcements which used Sclater's Road at frequent intervals. But it was also some tribute to the progress made by the administration that the immunity from attack enjoyed by well-armed caravans was extended to small parties and mail runners, and that inter-tribal raiding was not resumed on an extensive scale. Although several observers were disturbed lest the mutiny should reveal the weakness of the white man, only the Kakamega took advantage of this weakness to harass caravans in the Eastern Province, and tribal raiding was confined to the irrepressible Nandi and Masai. This state of affairs was particularly fortunate for Bushiri, who sat with his attenuated garrison at Kipture in the midst of a notoriously bellicose and unco-operative tribe. He had no powerful ally like Mumia to befriend him, and his only communication with the outside world was through messengers from Ravine, and runners from Mumias, who made regular journeys to Kipture under Chief Odera's direction. The Nandi around the fort may have sold Bushiri enough food for his needs, but as the convoy service from Kapkolei and Kitoto's was suspended, he was probably dependent on passing caravans for most of his supplies. On 14 December 1897 a party of Nandi arrived at Ravine with the news that Bushiri had committed suicide at Kipture. This report was confirmed by Spears, who was engaged on cart transport based on Ravine, but no details were given as to the cause of the tragedy. Thereafter Kipture did not figure in accounts of the mutiny operations, except as a camping place for troop reinforcements.[25]

The army mutiny, which had little influence on contemporary relations between the government and the Nandi, had some important effects on the rest of the Protectorate. The Macdonald expedition was postponed and the assembly of the *William Mackinnon* delayed; the practical and strategic benefits of Sclater's cart road and the railway were vindicated, and Salisbury ordered the temporary telegraph line to be pushed on with all speed ahead of the railway to Fort Smith; and it was seen that the lines of communication and the peaceful condition of the road districts had to be assured against future hostilities, not only to keep Uganda supplied but also to safeguard a key area in Salisbury's Nile strategy.[26] The mutiny produced conditions that encouraged Mwanga to persist in his attempts to recover his kingdom, and enabled Kabarega to make his last bid for independence. The relief operations emphasised that Uganda's security was dependent to a considerable degree on the co-operation of its eastern neighbour, and encouraged a greater degree of consultation between the two administrations on matters of common concern. The EAP supplied reinforcements for the Uganda Relief Force and district stations, and its officials at the coast and road stations were engaged in procuring porters, acting as transport officers and supplying food for the mutiny operations.*

The mutiny came at an opportune time for Ternan to press the Foreign Office in London to implement his reorganisation scheme for the armed forces, including a permanent Indian contingent and an increase in officers, African troops and contingent services.* The Foreign Office was also convinced that more money would have to be allocated for the expansion and improvement of the Uganda Transport.[27] The Treasury approved an ambitious and costly scheme, which Berkeley and Gedge had been asked to draw up in order to end the frequent shortages of arms, food, trade goods and stores, which had crippled the administration and placed the Protectorate in peril.† As a corollary to the acceptance of this scheme, it was evident that more attention would need to be paid to the administration of the road districts, and to relations with the tribes in the Eastern Province. The mutiny had other repercussions in Uganda on transport arrangements. The value of ships in military and servicing operations had been proved, and large numbers of porters had been recruited for the first time from tribes who had previously been reluctant to engage in this form of work, or had refused to travel far from their own districts. The requirements of armies in the field provided an opening for private traders and transporters, whose activities could profitably be continued under peaceful conditions. Dr. Mackinnon and Ternan convinced the Foreign Office that additional funds were needed for the expansion of the medical services, and for increasing the number of doctors from four to twelve. The Treasury, which had previously cavilled over the smallest item of expenditure, accepted all these heavy increases in the Uganda vote partly because the Chancellor of the Exchequer had a budget surplus of over three million pounds, and partly because the government was becoming increasingly sensitive to adverse Parliamentary and public criticism of the conduct of Uganda affairs.‡

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* Some common services were created in 1895-96 and consultations had taken place on boundaries, raiding, transport, disease, etc.

Many of the changes that were made as a result of the mutiny had considerable influence on the later history of the Nandi. The immediate effect, however, was negligible. The withdrawal from Kipture must have puzzled the Nandi and made them wonder whether the government's occupation of their country was as permanent as it had appeared to be. The constant movement of troops possibly made them realise, on the other hand, that the construction of Sclater's Road would prevent them from freeing themselves from hostile intruders. During the mutiny and its aftermath the Nandi nevertheless remained neutral. They gave no help to the Sudanese such as the mutineers received from their co-religionists and others elsewhere in Uganda. The Nandi, Kamasia and Kavirondo had suffered from punitive operations undertaken with Sudanese troops, and from plundering by inadequately supervised patrols, so they had no inducement to seek an alliance with their former foes. Sudanese women traded occasionally with the people near Ravine and Kipture but no effort was made to proselytise the Nandi or Kamasia, and to encourage the formation of Muslim colonies similar to those at Kitoto's and Mumias.* It was fortunate for the government that the first encounters between the Nandi and the adherents of a faith, which had originated among pastoralists and had spread widely among peoples with similar backgrounds and attitudes to the Kalenjin, had been with coastal traders. These atypical followers of Islam had made enemies of the Nandi and were ejected from the country.[28] The second group of Muslims to enter Nandi consisted of Sudanese troops, who, too, were not pastoralists but instruments of an invading power. They had antagonised the Nandi by their participation in punitive operations, and by their conduct when patrolling or foraging under their own commanders.† Although the government forces had suffered some losses in Nandi, the overweening self-importance which the Sudanese had acquired, largely through their comparatively easy successes in the countries west of the Nile and in Kavirondo, caused them to despise the Nandi spearmen as ineffective *Washenzi* (savages). It was not likely, therefore, that an accommodation could be reached between the Nandi and the Sudanese. On the other hand, the defection of the Sudanese gave no cause for hoping that the Nandi could be induced to change their attitude towards the government. The tribesmen gave no help during the mutiny period similar to that provided by Mumia, the Basoga and Baganda, the Uasin Gishu Masai mail runners, and the various tribes in both protectorates who volunteered as porters. The only act performed by the Nandi which indicated some degree of interest in the contemporary scene was the journey to Ravine to report Bushiri's death. Apart from this instance, the Nandi continued the normal tenor of their ways, aloof and unperturbed but doubtless watchful and prepared.[29]

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* The proposals met with a cool reception in 1896, see p. 190. Ternan, *op. cit.*, Chapter 31.

† See p. 119 for FO comments in 1895.

‡ This criticism was one of the reasons for the appointment of a Special Commissioner in 1899.

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* See Chapter 2. Islam made little headway among cattle-owning tribes of the East African Plateau.

† Examples of looting are numerous in official reports but many cases would not have reached the ears of district officers.

References

1. Wilson-FO, 5 October, 1897, FOCP, 7024/23.
2. Barber, *UJ*, 28 (1964), p. 1; Matson, *UJ*, 29 (1965), p. 98; Robinson and Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians*, Chapter 12; Sanderson, *England, Europe and the Upper Nile;* FOCP, 6964; 6970, 7167, 7232, 7593; FO2/136/144/158/174/175; FO 27/3368.
3. Ternan-FO, 25 June, 1897, FOCP, 7018/90; Macdonald-FO, 24 May, 1897, FOCP, 6964/79.
4. Ternan-Jackson, 25 June, 1897; Ternan-Grant, 27 June, 1897, ESA, A/5/3. Ternan-Hall, 25 June, 1897, ESA, A/7/1.
5. Ternan, *op. cit.*, Chapter 30, I, II, IV and VII Companies were in the Mau operations.
6. N. Wilson-Com, September-October 1897, ESA, A/4/9; G. Wilson-FO, 5 October, 1897, FOCP, 7024/23. Mutanda continued to give trouble until he was deposed in August 1900.
7. Lord Stanmore claimed there had been eight commissioners in three years: *Hansard*, 31 March, 1898, LV 1444-64. The *Africa Review*, (19 October, 1900) stated that Uganda had "suffered" more than most parts of the Empire "by constant change of its chief officials". Hill's apologia, 14 May, 1901, FOCP, 7514.
8. Hobley-Com, 14 July, 1898, ESA, A/4/11.
9. Letter dated October 1897, FO2/134, Africa 2 (1898), p. 46; NCB. See p. 276.
10. Ternan-Hardinge, 13 July, 1897, FO2/133; Ternan-FO, 25 June, 1897, FOCP, 7018/90.
11. Austin, *op. cit.*, p. 302; Hanlon, *ZG*, 16 March, 1898.
12. Jackson-Wilson, 25 September, 1897, ESA, A/27/17 (received in Kampala, 12 October, 1897).
13. Hobley, *Chartered Company*, p. 102; his Early History of Kavirondo (KA) written without notes in 1911 has 2,000. Smith, Mackenzie and Co. secured a 21 years' lease on a two acre site at Kipture in June 1897, but had been unable to spare a man to build a store; Collinson-Com, 3 June, 1897, ESA, A/4/8.
14. Hobley, *Chartered Company*, p. 101; Thruston, *op. cit.*, p. 302.
15. Jackson-FO, (from Elgorini Camp, three days from Ravine and c. 30 miles from Kipture), 1 October, 1897, FOCP, 7032/73.
16. Bagnall-Com, 25 January, 1900, ESA, A/4/25, 1 April, 1900, FO2/299. KLC Evid. i 242. 3,000 rounds of ammunition were taken according to Cook's Diary, 23 October, 1897, (*C. M. Intelligencer*, February 1898) and WOID, FO2/161, but 80,000 in Cook, *UJ*, 1 (1934), p. 92. Jackson-FO, 1 October, 1897, FOCP, 7032/73.
17. If some of the mutineers' 400 cattle were driven to Luba's from Nandi or Kavirondo they would have slowed down the march; Hanlon, *ZG*, 16 March, 1898.
18. Hardinge-FO, 7 November, 1897, 19 November, 1897, FOCP, 7032/143, 7024/30; Hobley-Com, 3 August, 1898, ESA, A/4/12.
19. Hardinge-FO, 19 November, 1897, 29 November, 1897, FOCP, 7024/30, 7032/127. He had feared the Nandi and Kamasia would attack Ravine

and Kipture; Hardinge-FO, 11 November, 1897, FOCP, 7032/144, Africa 2 (1898). *C. M. Intelligencer*, February, 1898, (28 November, 1897), CMS Archives, 7 November, 1897.

20. Cf. Eliot's relief that the Nandi failed to realise the strategic possibilities of their attacks on the telegraph and railway. Eliot-FO, 9 April, 1902, FOCP, 7953/91; Eliot, *op. cit.*, p. 214.
21. Hobley-Com, 24 August, 1900, ESA, A/18/1. Hardinge-FO, 2 November, 1897, FOCP, 7032/142; 18 November, 1897, FOCP, 7024/29.
22. Macdonald-FO, 29 September, 1897, FOCP, 7032/143 (from Walegeyon River Camp, 26 miles from Ravine). Jackson-FO, 1 October, 1897, FOCP, 7032/73. Russell's Diary, 15 October, 1897. Cave-FO, 18 October, 1897, FOCP, 7032/37.
23. Hardinge's first visit to Uganda and the western parts of the EAP. The journey began before the mutiny. See FO-Hardinge, 8 November, 1895, FO, 107/52.
24. In Hardinge-FO, 11 November, 1897, FOCP, 7032/144, Africa 2 (1898). RSD.
25. RSD. Mumias Cash Book, November 1897.
26. The telegraph reached Fort Smith on 13 June, 1898 and was then continued to the Lake and Kampala. For Salisbury's attitude on local problems when they conflicted with broader policy concepts like the Juba expedition, see FO2/158 (Hill's minute 8 February, 1898) "Uganda is only an interlude". Matson, *UJ*, 29 (1965).
27. FOCP, 7032/152, 16 December, 1897.
28. See Trimingham, *Islam in East Africa*. It was the policy of Arab traders "to avoid proselytizing, which would lead to comparative equality"; Burton, *op. cit.*, p. 343.
29. Accounts of the mutiny in published works are legion; probably the best is Austin, *op. cit.* Official documents are in PRO files, FOCP, ESA, Africa 2 (1898) and 10 (1898), etc.

14

THE RE-OPENING OF KIPTURE

The army mutiny and its aftermath compelled the administration to concentrate its resources on the same priorities as those which had engrossed Lugard in the days of the Company, and the pioneer Protectorate officials: the security of the Uganda kingdoms and the lines of communication between the coast and the Lake. The territories east of the Nile, in which some degree of administrative control had been established by Hobley in Kavirondo and, to a lesser extent, by Grant in Busoga and Jackson in Mau, reverted in the autumn of 1897 to the "intervening country", which had to be passed through quickly on the way to Kampala. As a result of this switch of emphasis, the Eastern Province was treated in much the same way as it had been when Hobley took charge of Kavirondo in February 1895, and before the Nandi attacks forced the government to make its first attempt to bring the tribe under control. Less than six months after a considerable proportion of the Protectorate's civil and military strength had been concentrated in Mau for operations against the Kalenjin, the district stations in the Eastern Province had re-assumed their original role of staging posts on the Uganda Road. The district officers hurried off to Luba's and the garrisons were reduced to such an extent that they were unable to have any deterrent effect on tribal activities, and were barely strong enough to ensure the safety of the forts they guarded. The handful of armed Swahili porters under Eurasian or African leaders, to whom the road stations were entrusted, acted more as camp caretakers than garrisons, and were unable to leave their forts, except to detach a few men on occasions to strengthen mail parties or to boost the morale of small caravans.*

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* Swahilis garrisoned Port Victoria and Naivasha (10 each) and Kipture and Mumias (25 each). Ravine had 58 Sudanese of VI Company; Martyr-Com, 11 June, 1898, ESA, A/4/11. See p. 115.

Every caravan leader was made responsible for the safety of his charge, and acted independently of garrisons at the road stations between Fort Smith and Kampala. He was also required by standing orders to carry enough food for his men on the sixteen days' foodless stretch between Kikuyu and Kavirondo, as no food was procurable at Kipture and only occasionally at Naivasha and Ravine. This return to the state of affairs which had existed in the days before the Protectorate necessitated an embargo on small parties, and the adoption of the Company's practice of organising well-armed caravans, large enough to carry their own food and to discourage molestation. Small parties were detained at Fort Smith, Mumias and other roadside stations until they could be taken on with larger caravans. This resulted in costly and exasperating delays and the depletion of station food reserves. Conditions had changed in one respect, however, since the pioneer days as the route no longer skirted the Nandi country. The events of 1895 had shown that small parties on the old caravan route provided vulnerable targets for the Nandi warriors; it was common prudence, therefore, to ensure that caravans passing along Sclater's Road and nearer the Nandi homelands were strong enough to deter raiders. Despite the unsettled conditions resulting from the Mau operations, the assembly of the Juba expedition and the looting activities of the mutineers, caravans encountered no opposition other than the reprisals which the Kakamega were provoked into by the actions of the Sudanese.* Troops, ammunition and supplies passed rapidly through the Eastern Province, and their progress was not delayed by punitive measures against tribes near the Uganda Road. The Nandi, who were the greatest potential threat to the caravans, did nothing to impede their progress. The tribesmen were apparently content to accept, throughout this crucial period for British supremacy, that their country was subject to a divided but well-defined control: the government held the station and the road, when it was in use; and the tribal authorities continued to govern the rest of the country.

Jackson and Macdonald quickly realised the mutiny could not be contained by local forces. A request was accordingly made at the end of September 1897 for the immediate despatch of the Indian contingent serving in the EAP. After the engagement at

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* See p. 290.

Luba's the following month, George Wilson asked for five companies of Indian troops to put down the mutiny, and to deal with the disaffection which he feared might arise in Busoga and other districts as a result of the defection of the Sudanese. Hardinge decided to send Capt. E. G. Harrison to the front with a Swahili company from Machakos, and to move up Lieut. A. Wake with a half-company in support. The Foreign Office approved these moves and overrode the objections of Cave, the Acting Consul-General in Zanzibar, to the despatch of the EAP Indian contingent. These dispositions were calculated to give urgent assistance to Uganda, until the regiment which the Foreign Office had asked for could be shipped to Mombasa from India, and sent up country to relieve the EAP troops. Officials at the coast tried to obtain porters to accompany the Indians beyond railhead but could only enlist two hundred. It was decided, therefore, that some of the Swahilis from the recently recruited Uganda companies should act as porters, until they could be issued at Kampala with arms recovered from the mutineers. Meanwhile in Uganda all the Protectorate's resources were mobilised against the mutineers: Macdonald recalled his columns from Sebei and Mau; Bagnall and Brodie were summoned to Luba's; and Uganda officers and escorts on the road were ordered to hasten forward.

Harrison brought up the first trained reinforcements to strengthen the troops investing Luba's. He left Hardinge at Ravine on 19 November 1897 with a hundred Swahilis, and reached Luba's twelve days later after a record dash through Nandi, Kavirondo and Busoga. He was quickly followed by 200 Sikhs of the EAP Indian contingent under Capt. Barratt and Lieut. Scott, and a half-company of Swahilis under Wake.* 27 Bombay (Baluchi) Light Infantry landed at Mombasa on 12 December 1897, where five of the six companies entrained for railhead at Ndi. They marched up to Uganda at intervals during the next six months, as soon as transport arrangements could be made to send them forward. Major C. Price hurried ahead of the main party and passed through Nandi in February 1898, about a fortnight in front of Major C. Martyr with the first of the Swahili companies of the

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* Hatch was disturbed about a replacement for the contingent owing to frontier operations in India, but a wing of 4th Bombay Rifles was sent to the EAP. The camels, which Barratt took to Mumias, were probably the first seen in Nandi, though warriors raiding in Karamoja may have seen some; FO2/665.

Uganda Rifles.* The remaining Uganda companies, which had been recruited from Swahilis and Somalis under Ternan's reorganisation scheme, were held up at Ndi and Fort Smith and did not begin to cross Mau until July 1898. Altogether a score of officers, hundreds of other ranks and thousands of porters passed through Nandi during this period.† Before the last of the 27 BLI and Uganda Rifles reached their destination, the EAP contingents had begun the long march back to railhead and their garrison stations. Nearly all the caravans used Sclater's Road and camped at Kipture, but at least one party took the old caravan track through Guasa Masa.[1] Owing to the breakdown of the transport system, the 400 Sikhs and Punjabi Muslims, who had been recruited by Major J. Evatt in India to replace the disaffected Sudanese, were diverted to the Ogaden expedition in July 1898 and did not pass through Nandi until the end of the year.[2]

The soldiers marched rapidly in disciplined units of company strength under European officers. They were well able to take care of themselves on the march by day and in their camps at night. The troops also provided escorts for large numbers of porters carrying ammunition, supplies and food. The contingents were not, therefore, dependent on the tribes on the section between Fort Smith and Mumias in any way, so the caravans passed through without having any dealings with the people living near the road. Strict discipline was maintained to prevent straggling, looting and interference with women. As a result of these precautions the troops met with no opposition on the road. The passage of so many soldiers must have caused the Nandi some bewilderment and anxiety, since experience had taught them that such movements were usually the prelude to punitive operations. The tribesmen probably withdrew from the neighbourhood of Sclater's Road but kept constant watch on the caravans. The scouts were doubtless impressed with the discipline of the troops and the soldierly bearing of the Sikhs. This was the first time the warriors had seen large bodies of Indian soldiers, and the impression they created possibly influenced the tactics employed by the Nandi when they fought against

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* Martyr's Swahili company was made up of "scratch men", who were locked in the Mombasa Fort and escorted to the railway station by sepoys to prevent desertions; they were dubbed "the noble army of martyrs"; A. S. Cooper, "Recollections of a Railway Official" (Rhodes House).

† Indians 800; Somalis and Swahilis 850; Sudanese 50; total 1,700. Barratt and Price had a few Masai; some companies had over 500 porters.

Evatt's sepoys in the 1900 expedition.[3] The troop movements also demonstrated that Nandi could be attacked from the coast as well as from the west. The full significance of this novel factor was probably not appreciated at the time, however, although it gave substance to Kimnyole's warning that the country would be overrun by enemies from the east.* The transport of reinforcements from the coast was expedited by the railway, which thus foreshadowed the role it was to play in later expeditions against the Nandi. The cost of the relief operations was considerable, and convinced the Foreign Office that the Protectorate army needed to be strengthened so that similar eventualities could be dealt with locally, and without recourse to the costly expedient of shipping a regiment from India.[4]

The mutiny revealed that the Protectorate's Achilles' heel was its dependence on Sudanese troops for the maintenance of law and order. The revelation came at a time when officials were striving to convince the Foreign Office that the military arrangements, which had largely been inherited from the Company, were inadequate to cope with the Protectorate's needs as more and more outlying districts came under control. Only a few months earlier, Ternan had been unable to concentrate enough men to subdue the Nandi and their kinsmen in Mau, and he had been hard-pressed to put down Mwanga's rebellion and to comply with Macdonald's demands. Salisbury gave Ternan a sympathetic hearing in London, and an expanded version of the proposals which had been submitted to Berkeley in October 1896 was approved. A recruiting, training and stores depot was established in Mombasa, 23 additional officers were appointed, 17 British NCO's were seconded for gun crew and training duties, 700 Swahilis and Somalis were recruited to supplement the loyal Sudanese companies, and 400 sepoys were engaged to stiffen the local troops. Maxim and "artillery" resources were strengthened, better arrangements were made for troop transport, and pay increases were awarded all round.[5] Events had shown that these reforms were necessary both to maintain law and order, and to complete the pacification of those areas which had failed to respond to Berkeley's expectant treatment, or which the government had been unable to occupy owing to shortage of staff and supporting forces.

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* See p. 31.

The build up of the military arm had some less fortunate repercussions on the civil administration and its policies. Ternan's reforms led to petty bickerings between civil and military personnel, quarrels between officers from the British and Indian armies, and upset the balance between the number of staff employed on civil and military duties. Owing to the background and training of the military officers, this disparity inevitably resulted in more emphasis being placed on pacification than administration. Moreover, the vastly increased cost of the armed forces compelled the British Government to prune applications for additional district officers, to oppose requests for more administrative stations and to restrict development expenditure. The continuing shortage of district officers was offset to some extent by placing army officers in civil and military command of districts. Although this expedient worked well enough in some cases it had one disadvantage: the incumbent naturally considered his military duties were more important than his civil functions, and he tended to regard minor misdemeanours as a challenge to his authority.[6] Finally, as every officer and company put extra burdens on the transport system, this diverted a great deal of its resources from civilian to military supplies. Under the new arrangements, the Transport Department could, on the other hand, budget and provide for a definite, general increase in traffic, which was preferable to the state of near chaos resulting from the sudden and unforeseen demands of the Indian regiment. Although the proposed Indian contingent of the Uganda Rifles would have to be supplied with special food from the coast, the additional Swahili companies could be victualled with food produced in the country and transported by local porters.

The British Government also sanctioned considerable increases in one field of civil administration by bringing the number of doctors up to twelve, and by providing additional medical supplies for their use.[7] This trebling of the establishment was necessary to treat staff and caravans at district stations, and to reduce invalidism among officers and men. It was not designed to make skilled treatment available to the people, as this was restricted to government servants, missionaries, traders and possibly a few favoured friendlies. This provision added a further strain to the transport system, and reduced the funds allocated to administrative staff and other purposes.

The maintenance and extension of British rule depended on the long life-line extending 700 miles from Mombasa to Kampala. Caravans had to be organised to take up men and supplies, and arrangements made to ensure their rapid and safe passage along the Uganda Road. Caravans and canoes distributed loads to the stations in the interior, and transported food to garrisons like Kipture, Ravine and Naivasha where supplies could not be bought from the local people. Large sums of money had been expended on experiments which had improved the transport arrangements inherited from the Company, but extra staff, better supervision, more staging posts, the embryonic lake "flotilla" and the introduction of wheeled transport on Sclater's Road had been unable to meet the routine demands of the Protectorate. Even with the help of European firms and Indian merchants, the use of the Tanganyika route and the services of hundreds of Basoga and Baganda canoemen, it had been found impossible to transport the men, ammunition, stores, medical supplies, trade goods, specie, equipment and food needed to maintain Uganda's services. The inadequacies of the system had limited the Commissioner's ability to bring recalcitrant tribes under control, and was patently incapable of meeting the extraordinary demands made upon it by the Uganda Relief Force. The Treasury had no alternative, therefore, but to accept the vastly increased expenditure envisaged by Berkeley and Gedge's reorganisation scheme.[8] These proposals included the formation of an independent Transport Service under the direction of Dr. Mackinnon, who was supported by administrative staff at the Mombasa base, and by a veterinary surgeon, three ASC officers and a few locally recruited officers in the field. Jackson, who had returned to duty after recovering from the severe wound he had received at Luba's, was pronounced medically unfit to continue as Acting Commissioner, so he was posted to Mau to take charge of transport arrangements and food supplies over the most difficult section between Fort Smith and the Lake. To the east of Jackson's command, the railway was being pushed forward through the tsetse fly country, an abortive attempt was made to use traction engines, and EAP officials were mobilised to help with the feeding and transport of Uganda reinforcements. Outside agencies were also encouraged to supplement official resources. Coastal firms, private contractors, an Italian company based on Mombasa and a German firm operating from Mwanza were granted government contracts, and some assistance was received from the German authorities.*

Every practicable or potentially effective method of transport was tried. Experience had shown that the head porterage system could not cope with Uganda's needs as the load requirements increased, and the number of professionals declined or porters were attracted by more lucrative and popular forms of employment elsewhere. Animal transport and the railway had not, however, reached the stage where this expensive and wasteful form of carriage could be dispensed with. Through the efforts of district officers in both Protectorates enormous numbers of porters were recruited for the Uganda relief operations. These men only worked as a rule on the section of the road near their homes, so that it was difficult to persuade porters to engage for the through journey, and almost impossible to secure volunteers for the Fort Smith-Mumias stretch. Nearly every tribe near the Uganda Road provided its quota: coastal tribes, Taita, Kamba, Kikuyu, Kamasia, Nilotic and Bantu Kavirondo, Basoga, Baganda and even a few Masai and Uasin Gishu, who volunteered for specialist services. Methods of recruitment differed in the various districts: in Buganda it was done under *babaka* from the Regents and in most other districts through friendly chiefs. Hobley undertook recruiting campaigns in Kavirondo and made a promise to provide food and porters a condition for the granting of protection. The government hoped that porters would only be needed where rail or wheeled transport was impracticable, but recourse had to be made to head carriage on many sections either independently of, or in conjunction with, more advanced methods.

Sclater had demonstrated the practical value of ox transport and Smith, Mackenzie and Co. had pioneered the use of waggons on a commercial basis. The Foreign Office allocated funds for the purchase of carts, harness and accessories, and local officials built waggons to supplement deliveries from the Woolwich Ordnance factory. Drivers were recruited from various countries, and oxen from Buganda, Busoga, Kavirondo, Nandi and the EAP were trained to work alongside animals shipped from India. Unfortunately cattle disease decimated the oxen, restriction orders curtailed their movements and, for long periods, put a stop to this form of transport, which it had been hoped would solve Uganda's supply difficulties and keep open Sclater's Road. Other forms of animal transport were tried: camels, pack and draught donkeys and mules, but all suffered from sickness, climatic conditions, inconsiderate driving, lack of trained supervision, and their unsuitability for the terrain and the tasks they were called upon to perform.* It soon became apparent, moreover, that Sclater's Road was not passable for carts in all weathers especially over Mau and through the Nandi forests. The plans to keep the road open by regular cart convoys, and to improve its condition while it was being worked, were rendered ineffective by Sclater's death and the suspension of waggon transport through cattle disease. Several schemes were put forward to repair the road and some localised patching operations were undertaken, but at the end of 1898 the work was taken out of the district officers' hands and entrusted to the railway.

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* Railhead December 1897 was at Ndi (mile 121) and a year later at Sultan Hamoud (246). Lorenzetti (Italian) and Köther and Sixdorf (German).

Transport on the Lake was largely confined to an armada of canoes, supplemented by the steam-launches *Ruwenzori* and *Victoria,* two small steel sailing boats and a few German and Arab owned dhows.[9] A succession of setbacks had delayed the transport of the *William Mackinnon,* but towards the end of 1898 responsibility for delivering the steamer was undertaken by the railway, which also organised a party to survey the Lake and investigate harbourages. Escorted runners carried the mail with considerable regularity considering the unsettled state of the country, and local messengers forwarded special and inter-district messages. The Commissioner was brought into closer touch with London and Mombasa by the temporary telegraph, which the railway engineers continued from Fort Smith towards Ravine at the end of 1898.†

Despite his attempts to overcome a series of setbacks, Dr. Mackinnon had to admit in September 1898 that the combined efforts of his organisation and the private agencies had failed to meet the challenge, so that the Protectorate's needs could not be met in the foreseeable future. These requirements amounted to about

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* Drivers came from India, Cyprus, the Cape and from Swahili staff; mules from Cyprus, Somaliland and India. The Masai refused to sell donkeys and Turkana could not be tapped because of its inaccessibility; a proposal to use elephants was not followed up.

† The telegraph reached Naivasha 20 February, 1899 and Ravine 6 April, 1899.

2,700 loads a month, 1,800 of which were needed to maintain the Indian regiment.* Thus throughout 1898 a large part of Uganda's resources was concentrated on setting up a transport system, which would enable policy decisions to be taken without fear that their implementation would be delayed by problems of supply. This consummation was not, however, achieved for a variety of reasons. European trading firms, which had failed to keep Uganda supplied under Berkeley's private enterprise scheme in 1896, found their difficulties had not decreased in 1898. Lorenzetti was unable to honour his contract to deliver 1,500 loads a month owing to stock losses, the inability of his camels to negotiate Mau and unsettled conditions between Ravine and Kipture. Smith, Mackenzie and Co. closed their chain of stores from Fort Smith to Kampala, and quit the transport business which they had pioneered in the days of the Company. The problems created by these setbacks were increased by the EAP's decision to discontinue recruiting porters for the Uganda Government in June 1898. Mackinnon's difficulties became insoluble when cattle disease swept through East Africa from Uganda to the coast. First rinderpest, then pleuro-pneumonia killed off trained oxen belonging to transport contractors and the government, while heavy mortality was caused among horses and mules by tsetse fly and horse sickness.† During this exasperating period the transport department was, however, fortunate that its experiments and plans were tried out without arousing opposition among the tribesmen along the Uganda Road. Had this been otherwise, the Commissioner would have been forced to divert even more of his resources from his principle objectives: the defeat of the mutineers, the struggle with Mwanga, the resumption of Macdonald's expedition and Martyr's advance down the Nile.

Closely connected with the intractable transport problem was the equally vital one of food supplies. Troop and other caravans had to be provisioned on the road, and food transported to the stations in Mau. Even where station staff and local troops could subsist off country produce, vast quantities of special foodstuffs had to be imported for the sepoys. In order to lighten the burden on the transport system, horticulturalist Alexander Whyte was sent out to boost local production and to investigate the cultivation of Indian crops. Along the Uganda Road east of the Sio River, caravans were dependent on food supplies bought by district officers at Machakos, Fort Smith and Mumias. But at the two EAP stations, where supplies were curtailed by the demands of contractors and the railway, the markets were almost closed by drought, famine and smallpox towards the end of 1898. In the vicinity of Mumias demand far outran supply, so that Tomkins and Hobley had to send parties long distances from the station to buy food. The Kavirondo were exhorted to increase production and induced to carry their produce into Mumias or to subsidiary collecting posts. Hobley was, however, faced with a dilemma by these measures: the choice between maintaining the supply of porters or excusing the Kavirondo from transport work when their presence in the fields was demanded by the agricultural calendar.[10] Collecting posts were set up at Mianzini to provision Naivasha, at Kakamega, Samia and Kitoto's to supplement Mumias and Nandi supplies, and at Sebei for the Juba expedition. Parties brought in food from nearly all the Kavirondo tribes, as well as small amounts from the Elgeyo and Kamasia. Some of the posts and parties were commanded by Europeans but the majority had to be left to station staff and Swahili or Somali troops.

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* G. D. Smith, who had only Rs. 45,000 worth of trade goods in store, estimated that Rs. 30,000 worth were needed every month for the troops at Entebbe at the new rates of pay (Rs. 20 p.m. for privates). He pleaded for specie to be imported to pay the troops; 6 May, 1898, 28 May, 1898, ESA, A/4/11. At the end of 1897 only Rs. 54,000 of specie had been imported; Berkeley-FO, 26 August, 1898, FOCP, 7159/66. Martyr complained that his men were in need of boots, clothing, etc. Martyr-Com, 31 May, 1898, ESA, A/4/11. See p. 350 for 27 BLI.

† By June 1898 almost all the government draught oxen had died.

Considerable sums were paid for local food purchases and porters' wages, but a large proportion of the enormous expenditure on supplies and transport did not increase prosperity within the Protectorate. A great deal of the grant-in-aid was swallowed up by importers and coastal firms, as well as by private contractors who generally employed foreign porters and often used the German route. Moreover, although an attempt was made in some districts to reduce expenditure by developing local resources, nothing was done in this direction outside Kavirondo in the Eastern Province.

At the end of 1898 the government's freedom of action in Mau continued to be restricted, and the pacification of the district could not be contemplated until food had been collected and transported to Ravine or Kipture. It was fortunate that while the Commissioner and his staff were fully occupied throughout

1898 with imperial commitments, military operations and transport problems, the Eastern Province remained generally peaceful. There was no urgency, therefore, about completing the task, which Cunningham began in 1895 and Ternan continued in 1897, of bringing the Kalenjin under control. Kipture was left without a district officer for a time, and after the station was reopened in February 1898 the government eschewed a policy of active administration. As long as the Nandi remained quiet, provocative measures were carefully avoided with the result that 1898 was largely a period of stalemate in relations between the government and the tribe.

After Bagnall left Kipture in November 1897, communication with the Swahili garrison was maintained by Odera's men from Mumias and Masai runners from Ravine. The "Nandi headman" arrived at Ravine on 23 January 1898 with a party of Nandi bearing despatches from Capt. Woodward about the reported move of the mutineers towards Mumias and Ravine. Sudanese spies were rumoured to be watching the road as far as Nandi, so Dr. Macpherson and Cpl. Brodie were sent to Mumias to strengthen the garrison and to prevent the mutineers from passing beyond Kavirondo. These urgent despatches were presumably entrusted to a Nandi chief, Kutunga, who received a present at Mumias for undertaking the mission.* The party which brought the letters to Ravine left on 24 January 1898 to return to Nandi, and four days later three Nandi carried messages to Kipture for transmission to Mumias. Woodward's anxiety over the mutineers' movement towards Nandi proved unfounded but, after the Sudanese from Luba's crossed the Nile into Buganda, George Wilson decided to strengthen the government's hold over the Eastern Province. He noted that the administration of Busoga and Kavirondo had been resumed to some extent, and claimed that the measures taken by Hardinge at Naivasha and Ravine in November 1897 had ensured the uninterrupted working of the transport system from Fort Smith to Ravine. Wilson hoped to reopen the Nandi station shortly in order to complete the lines of communication east of the Nile, but did not refer to a resumption of administration in the district.[11] Bagnall was ordered on 14 February 1898 to hand over Luba's to Grant and to re-assume charge of Nandi, providing Jackson considered this course of action was practicable. If Jackson felt the time was inopportune for raising the status of Kipture from a camping ground to a staging post, Bagnall was to render general assistance in reorganising transport in the Eastern Province. Bagnall left Luba's by canoe on the 23rd but did not proceed beyond Kavirondo. He was detained at Mumias, presumably after news had been received of Hobley's return to the coast from Kedong to supervise Uganda transport operations in the EAP.[12]

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* RSD does not name the headman nor specify whether he was a station or tribal headman. Mumias Cash Book calls Kutunga "Chief of WaNandi".

Tomkins, who had been drafted from the besieging force at Luba's on 3 January 1898 to re-assume control of Kavirondo, left Mumias with sixteen labourers early in February to help Jackson reopen Kipture, and to repair any damage which the buildings had suffered while the Swahili headman was in charge. The stores Bagnall had buried were dug up and trade goods were sent from Ravine to replenish the station stocks. Jackson stayed at Kipture until the 19th, when he left for Ravine after seeing Major Price and the first contingent of the 27 BLI through Nandi. The response of the Nandi when the station reopened suggested they were ready to adopt a more co-operative attitude towards the government. Food was purchased from Latongwa, Tarop, Cabarno and Kiparop; and presents were made to the vendors as well as to tribesmen who brought in three oxen that Spears had lost. Another encouraging event was the visit paid by about fifty Nandi on 20 February 1898 to Ravine with presents of food, honey and goats. Jackson had taken thirty cattle to Ravine from Kipture and reported that "the natives of Mau appear to be readily falling in with the scheme for securing cattle for transport purposes". Jackson must have been relieved by the way the Nandi had accepted a return to pre-mutiny conditions, and gratified that he could leave Tomkins at Kipture with only a small detachment of armed Swahilis. Jackson evidently felt that no opposition was to be expected from the Nandi, since messages between Ravine and Kipture were carried by runners operating in pairs, a risk that would not have been taken if there had been any likelihood of Nandi hostility to the reoccupation of the station.[13]

Before leaving Kampala for the Eastern Province on 24 January 1898, Jackson had drawn up a scheme for the transport of men and goods from Mumias to Buganda. Loads were to be carried by Baganda selected by *saza* chiefs, 1,000 Basoga recruited by Luba, and a similar number of Kavirondo and Swahilis who were to be supplied by Mumia and his fellow chiefs. Comparable arrangements were impracticable in the Mau districts, where Jackson proposed using ox waggons on Sclater's Road.[14] Unfortunately by the time Berkeley arrived at Kipture from England on 17 March 1898, 200 out of the 250 oxen in his caravan had died of rinderpest. Cpl. Simmons had also lost 270 transport department oxen between Naivasha and Kipture, so Jackson had to revise his plans. Sixty donkeys, which had been held at Mumias pending the resumption of Macdonald's expedition, were commandeered and handed over to Spears, who operated a shuttle service from Kakamega which dumped supplies for station consumption and reinforcement caravans at Ravine and Kipture.[15]

No more food was obtained from the Nandi after the purchases at Kipture and the produce gifts to Ravine in February 1898. This was not surprising, however, as grain from the September harvest would be getting scarce by March. Kipture and Ravine were once again dependent on outside sources, and only small quantities were available at both stations to replenish the bags of caravans whose food ran short between Fort Smith and Mumias. Moreover, the introduction of rinderpest doubtless caused the Nandi to avoid Kipture and the vicinity of the road, and discouraged the sale of any more of their dwindling food supplies to the people who had brought the dreaded cattle plague into the district. Once again the acceptance of a cart road through the district had proved a mixed blessing to the tribe. But as a result of the rapid removal of their stock from the channel of infection, Nandi losses were small and confined to animals near the station and road. The Uasin Gishu Masai around Ravine suffered severely and the Naivasha Masai losses were so great it was feared that the warriors would resume raiding in order to replace the stricken herds. Both the Nandi and Kamasia heeded the government's advice and isolated their stock, but the warning came too late for the Naivasha Masai, as the outbreak originated in their herds and was carried along the road by transport department oxen.[16]

The serious situation created by the outbreak delayed Berkeley at Kipture for a week. When he arrived at Mumias on 31 March 1898, he decided that Tomkins should return to Kavirondo from Nandi and that Bagge, who was returning from leave in the Commissioner's caravan, should retrace his steps and take charge of his former district. The establishment at Kipture was to be further strengthened by a newly appointed third class assistant, G. F. Bathurst, who left Ravine on 14 April 1898 to join Bagge. Bathurst's caravans consisted of 149 Kamasia warriors whose services Martin had enlisted for the journey. The sight of their kinsmen stooping to perform menial tasks, which were considered suitable only for the despised agricultural tribes, must have shocked the Nandi. This operation demonstrated a gratifying change from the Kamasia's former attitude of suspicious indifference, and represented the administration's first success in persuading the Kalenjin to act as porters. It also confirmed that the Kamasia, who had previously brought one of Lord Delamere's bulls into Ravine and had warned Martin of the presence of European and Arab caravans in the north of the district, wished to forget the past and to co-operate with the government. Their willingness to engage as porters was all the more welcome as it came at a time when local carriers for the Mau section were badly needed to replace the stricken oxen. If Martin was optimistic that the appearance of the Kamasia porters at Kipture would induce the Nandi to follow the example of their kinsmen, however, he was sadly mistaken.[17]

Shortly after Tomkins arrived back at Mumias on 17 April 1898, he reported that the Nandi-Mumias road was unsafe for small caravans "because of the truculence of the natives". Five Swahili messengers had been murdered and Spire, who was in charge of Mumias while Tomkins was at Kipture, reported that some of the South Kavirondo tribes were also giving trouble. As Tomkins thought this state of affairs had come about because no officer had been round the Kavirondo District for some time, he proposed making a tour of inspection in company with the next Indian contingent to arrive at Mumias, so that the transgressors could be punished.[18] Bagge had no similar plans in Nandi, though he was in a much more favourable position to tour the district in order to get to know the chiefs and people than he had been in 1896. Not only was there a resident assistant at Kipture but Jackson, who had been instructed by the Foreign Office not to confine himself solely to transport matters, often used the station as his headquarters.

By the middle of May 1898 only nine beasts from the station herd at Kipture had survived the rinderpest outbreak. As Spears had also lost nearly all his oxen, he was sent back to the coast and his transport section was disbanded. Although trade goods had been sent to Kipture from Mumias to purchase Nandi oxen for the transport department, no transactions could take place until the danger of infection had passed. The Nandi refused to exchange their cattle for trade goods but insisted on receiving female stock, which could only be brought from Kavirondo and Buganda when rinderpest had disappeared.[19] The condition of Sclater's Road from Ravine to Mumias had deteriorated during the rainy season to such an extent, that one of the transport officers warned Mackinnon that if repairs were not undertaken urgently there would soon be no road left. Jackson had assigned this task to Spears but the project was abandoned as no tools were available for the work. The heavy ox waggons had been withdrawn because of rinderpest casualties but Lieut. T. P. Johnson, who had set up his transport headquarters at Kipture, moved a number of loads by convoys of light carts drawn by mules. An increasing volume of goods was also being transported through Nandi by private contractors, who travelled in small parties with donkeys. Johnson likewise found the disease-free donkeys a boon and used them to supplement the mule carts and to bring food to Kipture from Kakamega.[20]

The donkey contractors' caravans, which could not be provided with escorts from the small garrisons at Ravine and Kipture, were not molested by the Nandi or Kamasia. The government evidently thought the danger from road attacks had passed, since the half company of Sudanese at Ravine was replaced by twenty-five Swahilis and transferred to Kavirondo, in order to relieve the twenty-five armed porters forming the Mumias garrison.[*] The Kamasia continued to co-operate with Martin and not only provided forty men to bring Hobley's caravan into Ravine, but also mustered over two hundred warriors to carry VI Company's stores and rations to Kipture. Payments were made in May 1898 to Nandi mail runners at Kipture and also to Nandi women who volunteered for local labour. The latter, who probably mudded buildings or brought in poles and grass, were presumably recruited by Latongwa who received a present during the month.[21] Thus at the end of May 1898, events at Ravine and Kipture seemed to justify the administration's optimistic assessment of the security situation in the Mau districts.

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[*] Half of the men from Ravine (VI Company) went to Kampala, where Martyr was concentrating the Sudanese for the Mruli expedition. See p. 337.

References

1. Macdonald ordered Lieut. Malcolm to take mails by the old route in December 1897. Troop movements in FOCP, FO2, RSD, Austin, *op. cit.*, Moyse-Bartlett, *op. cit.*, Jenkins *History of the 4th KAR*.
2. Moyse-Bartlett, *op. cit.*, p. 113. Salisbury feared the Somali war would jeopardise the major aim of gaining control of the Upper Nile; see FO, 107/100/104.
3. Earlier parties containing Indians: railway survey 1891-92 (41); Sclater's Road 1896 (100 coolies); Juba expedition 1897 (31 Sikhs); the first recorded Indian trading caravan was in June 1898.
4. The railway carried 28,779 troops and porters, 1,241 transport animals and 2,468 tons of stores, Hill, *op. cit.*, p. 189. 27 BLI cost £78,000 p.a. with rations, more than one and a half times the grant-in-aid for 1896-97. The mutiny cost £250,000, Wallis *Handbook of Uganda,* Chapter 18.
5. Berkeley-FO, 31 October, 1896, FOCP, 6951/32; Ternan, *op. cit.*, Chapter 31; Ternan-FO, 30 November, 1897, FOCP, 7032/107. The establishment was 6 Sudanese companies (700 men) and 6 Swahili/Somali companies. Owing to a breakdown in communications, two extra companies of the former were retained at a cost of £8,000 p.a. Coles-Com, 31 August, 1898, Berkeley-Coles 29 August, 1898, ESA, A/4/12; Berkeley-FO, 10 December, 1898, FO2/157.
6. e.g. Gorges at Naivasha (1897-98) and Cooper at Kipture (1899). Doctors sometimes took charge of districts. There were 25 civil officers in the estimates for 1897-98 and 1898-99 compared with 11 and 34 military officers. Military expenditure in the 1897-98 estimates rose from £23,525 out of a total of £64,957 to £77,083 out of a total of £161,394 in 1898-99. The use of soldiers in a dual capacity was part of Hardinge's "frontier" policy; FOCP, 7400/19/50, 7401/10. When Lieut. Hobart was in civil charge of Buddu, he was told that "his military duties must come first". Berkeley-Hobart, 8 November, 1898, ESA, A/5/4; Berkeley-FO, 28 November, 1898, FOCP, 7400/132.
7. FOCP, December, 1897, 7032/135/161/237.
8. Berkeley and Gedge-FO, 16 December, 1897; Treasury-FO, 24 December, 1897, FOCP, 7032/152/179.
9. Shipping facilities proved inadequate and several caravans continued overland to Kampala. Berkeley-FO, 6 October, 1898, FOCP, 7159/105. Pordage's dhow *St. George* was destroyed by the mutineers, who also put the *Victoria* out of commission for several months.
10. Tomkins received indents in one month for 500 loads of food for Kampala and 500 for Macdonald; and for 3,300 porters for 27 BLI, Macdonald and food convoys. (13 May, 1898, ESA, A/4/10.) Kavirondo flour was also taken on Martyr's Nile expedition; G. Wilson-Lugard, 7 October, 1898 (Lugard Papers). Mumias and Luba's were ordered to establish new food depots to supply the Indians; Berkeley-Tomkins/Grant, 10 May, 1898, ESA, A/5/4.
11. Wilson-FO, 3 February, 1898, FOCP, 7024/43. See p. 293.
12. Wilson-Bagnall, 14 February, 1898, ESA, A/5/4. Hobley was returning from leave.
13. RSD. NCB. Wilson-FO, 25 February, 1898, FOCP, 7024/86, See p. 293.
14. Jackson-Com, 22 January, 1898, ESA, A/4/10.
15. Hardinge-FO, 13 April, 1898, Stordy-Mackinnon, 25 April, 1898, FOCP, 7024/27B, 7090/35.
16. Jackson-Com, 12 May, 1898, ESA, A/4/11; all but 41 government oxen in the Mau District died.
17. RSD. Huxley, *White Man's Country,* Chapters 2 and 3. Martin paid the Kamasia Rs. 4 in trade goods for the round trip; Jackson thought this excessive.

18. Tomkins-Com, 25 April, 1898, ESA, A/4/10.
19. Jackson-Com, 12 May, 1898, A/4/11.
20. Lieut. C. C. Macdonald-Mackinnon, 22 May, 1898, FOCP, 7090/35. Walsh, Dowse, Bartlett, Scott, Kitchin, Gemmill, Gibbons, Smith and Vincent, Wallace, Boyce, O. Smith were some of the private contractors. There were some coastal traders and a few Indians; Martin and Maj. Smith ran private caravans.
21. RSD. NCB.

15

STALEMATE

The sense of security created by the absence of hostile activities, since the reopening of the Nandi station, had been strengthened by the willingness of the sections around Kipture to increase their dealings with the officials at the fort. Two small incidents occurred in June 1898, however, which indicated that hopes of a peaceful settlement of the Nandi question might be illusory. When Jackson enquired into these incidents, he was as convinced as he had been in 1897 that the Nandi would never be pacified and the safe passage of caravans assured, until the whole tribe had been thoroughly defeated in the field and made to plead for an unconditional settlement. Dr. Macpherson arrived at Ravine on 9 June 1898, with news that a Masai boy had been murdered two days previously on the road about a mile west of Lessos. The victim was a government servant who had been loaned by Martin to an Indian contractor, who was carrying rations to Kipture. On the return journey to Ravine, the boy and the four goats he was driving had lagged behind the caravan when he was murdered. Macpherson alleged that the outrage had been committed by two Nandi, but Jackson admitted after his enquiry that the identity of the murderers could not be established, though he surmised that the Nandi had attacked the boy in order to steal the goats. Mayes had heard nothing about the murder, although when it occurred he was camping at Lessos with a large caravan of Kavirondo, some of whom may have killed the boy and eaten the goats. A reward of four cows was offered for information about the murder, and Martin was instructed to stop all small parties from proceeding from Ravine unless they were accompanied by at least ten riflemen. In order to meet this unexpected need for escorts, Jackson requested Col. Broome, OC of the 27 BLI who was detained at Ravine awaiting porters, to detach a half company of his troops for service between that station and Kipture. The second incident occurred on 30 June 1898, when one of the Basoga porters, whom Gemmill had enlisted to transport Broome to Kampala, died 300 yards from Kipture fort. The dead man was robust in body and there was no indication of the cause of death.[1]

Three days after Jackson's report on the Lessos murder, the results of his enquiry into the situation in Nandi were forwarded to Berkeley. He reported that Teres, who had been imprisoned at Ravine for eight months after his detention in May 1897 before the Kamasia expedition, had celebrated his return to his people by sending a large body of warriors to raid the Kavirondo near Mt. Elgon.* The raiders returned from their mission with a quantity of looted stock, whereupon Teres decamped with most of his people to Lumbwa in order to avoid government reprisals. Jackson conjectured that Teres had subsequently felt it safe to return to Nandi, when he heard the Sudanese had deserted the government and the administration was powerless to punish him. Jackson commented "this act of open defiance, followed closely by the boy's murder, coupled with an open threat to attack the Uasin Gishu Masai settlement close to this station and caravans on the road, points to the murder having been done by his people". This deduction was reminiscent of the reasoning employed by Jackson when he sought to identify the perpetrators of the outrages which preceded Ternan's expedition in June 1897.† Teres' assessment of the government's impotency was allegedly confirmed by the views expressed by the Laibon when Teres visited him in Lumbwa. Jackson concluded that Kipchomber, "the chief Laibon who lives in Lumbwa for his personal safety", had found it easy to persuade his visitor to fall in with his views, since neither Cunningham nor Ternan's expeditions had operated near Teres' country.

Jackson did not, however, specify the source of his knowledge about the refugee Laibon's views, nor was any evidence produced to substantiate the "open threat" to caravans and the Uasin Gishu Masai. Some information may have been gleaned from the Kipture elders, but Jackson's statements were probably based on intelligence from the station interpreter and the Uasin Gishu Masai.

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* See p. 261. Jackson-Com, 19 June, 1898, ESA, A/4/11.

† See Ch. 11. The first reference to the Uasin Gishu settlement, the inhabitants of which presumably came from the Ravine colony.

The government's ignorance concerning the activities of the Nandi was emphasised by the fact that the Kavirondo raid was mentioned for the first time in Jackson's report, although it evidently took place some while before. No reasons were advanced to justify Teres' imprisonment, which was an extraordinary proceeding warranting some explanation. Teres, who had come into Kipture of his own accord in May 1897 to ask for peace, had not been implicated by any reputable witnesses in the incidents preceding Ternan's expedition. His gesture was regarded at the time of his submission as a favourable omen by the Acting Commissioner, but Teres was apparently forgotten in the bustle of the Kamasia and Nandi operations, followed by the rapid change of plan which Ternan was forced to make owing to the situation in Buganda. During the chaos created by the mutiny and its aftermath, Teres was left to lie in prison at Ravine, where he had been taken for safe-keeping presumably until he could take part in the general peace negotiations, which Ternan expected to be the outcome of the Nandi operations. Deportation for political reasons was not unknown elsewhere in the Protectorate, but the treatment meted out to Teres contrasted significantly with the policy followed in similar circumstances in Kavirondo. Hobley encouraged recalcitrant chiefs to come into Mumias or to participate in peacemaking ceremonies during his district tours. When chiefs expressed a desire for peaceful relations with the administration, their submissions were accepted without question even when Hobley was doubtful whether their protestations of loyalty and good behaviour would be honoured. In no instances were troublesome chiefs confined to prison after they had acknowledged Hobley's authority. Judging from Teres' actions after his release from prison, he evidently considered he had been wronged without cause. Moreover, the punishment he received possibly caused other leaders to remain aloof from the fort, and to avoid the risk of imprisonment by submitting voluntarily to the government.

After describing the serious situation that had arisen in Nandi, Jackson warned that it could only be dealt with by a force consisting of at least three companies of Swahilis, stiffened by a half company of Sudanese and supported by a large body of Masai levies. He suggested the three Uganda companies that were held up at Fort Smith by the transport block might be assigned to the operations, provided the troops were not required urgently in

Buganda or elsewhere. Jackson estimated that the operations would take from four to six weeks to complete, as it would be necessary to follow Teres and his people into Lumbwa, where they were likely to seek refuge for themselves and their stock. Jackson deprecated any action which might be construed as a raid: a quick dash into the disaffected area and a hurried withdrawal resembled too closely the tactics perfected by the Nandi warriors to force them to submit to some form of permanent control. Before Jackson's report reached Entebbe, Major Martyr, who had taken over command of the Uganda army from Macdonald on 3 May 1898, decided to strengthen the road station garrisons, by posting sections from the three companies at Fort Smith to Naivasha, Ravine, Kipture, Mumias, Port Victoria and Luba's. Before these moves could be completed, the Kipture garrison of twenty-five Swahilis was reinforced by a half company of fifty Somalis, but the experienced Sudanese half company at Mumias was withdrawn to Kampala. Even when Martyr's dispositions were carried out, the forces stationed in the Eastern Province would consist entirely of partly-trained recruits, who were unlikely to be more successful in punitive operations against the Nandi than Cunningham and Ternan had been with seasoned troops.[2]

When Jackson prepared his plans for the campaign against Teres, he had to make arrangements to ensure the food supplies for the hundreds of men who would be needed to augment the local garrisons. During the return journey from Mumias with Bagge in April 1898, Jackson persuaded the Kakamega chiefs to allow Spears to build a collecting post, where the beans that were grown in abundance by their people could be bought. The project prospered and Spears transported over three hundred loads to Kipture where a food reserve was being built up. Unfortunately the people living between the collecting post and Kipture murdered a number of Basoga porters and threatened to burn down the food store. No reliance could be placed, therefore, on this source of supply to provide enough food for a punitive expedition. Naivasha and Ravine were also unable to help, and when Jackson asked for three companies to be distributed between these stations and Kipture, Major Smith opposed the suggestion on the grounds that garrisons of this size could not be fed. As a step towards overcoming this problem, Jackson recommended Spears' application for a land grant at Kakamega, so that he could grow grain and beans for the Mau stations and buy produce from the Kakamega. This venture, which could have no bearing on the immediate problem, seemed so promising that Jackson gave Spears a contract to bring up trade goods from the coast in order to earn capital for the Kakamega enterprise. When Spears departed for the coast, his donkey teams were dispersed and Kipture was once again dependent on Kakamega porters for the bulk of its food supply.[3]

By the middle of June 1898 rinderpest had died out between Ravine and Nandi. This was fortunate as Johnson had found that mules were unsatisfactory on the Mau gradients, and that oxen were essential for this section. He asked for female animals to be sent to Kipture to exchange for oxen at the customary rate of two bulls or bullocks for one cow or heifer. He also suggested that cows which had been herded out with chiefs should be called in for the purpose. These loan cattle would presumably come from Kavirondo, where Hobley used this method of binding chiefs to the government, as the practice had not been adopted in Nandi. Jackson seconded these requests, as he had been informed by Latongwa that the Nandi were ready to exchange oxen for female stock now that the cattle plague had died down.[4]

Jackson described Latongwa as "the principal Nandi chief (who) lives near this station". This misconception as to Latongwa's position illustrated how little had been learned about the Nandi by the district officers who had served at Kipture since 1896. Scarcely any knowledge had been acquired concerning the identity and relative status of the senior and most influential leaders of the *pororosiek*, whereas Hobley had already realised he could not administer much of Kavirondo through the so-called chiefs, but had to gain the co-operation of clan and section leaders.* Latongwa came from a Uasin Gishu Masai family and was renowned among the Nandi for his wealth in sheep. He happened to live near the fort at Kipture and this factor, together with his ability to communicate with the station officials through the Uasin Gishu Masai in the fort and nearby colony, caused Jackson and his subordinates to accord to Latongwa a position in Nandi society to which he had no legitimate claim. This was largely due to the fact that in matters of chiefship, the government was influenced by the Uganda kingdoms and was, consequently, anxious to find or create chiefs who could carry out similar functions to those undertaken by the Kabaka, or even Mumia.* Kipture officials were readily disposed to think that in Latongwa they had found a leader who was more co-operative than his colleagues, and a spokesman who could act as principal chief of the tribe. He had helped the government from time to time by providing runners, food and labour, and his assistance had been rewarded on five occasions with gifts from the station store. Latongwa's personal status was that of a Kipkoimet junior elder, so he would have been about fifty years old in 1898. His standing in the tribe was probably that of leader of the north-eastern branch of the Koilegei *pororiet*, but it may have been little more than that of a former war leader, *kiruogindet* (Judge), or even a *kokwet* elder of the section living near Kipture station. Because he was a foreigner, Latongwa may have been pushed forward by the more influential, traditional Nandi elders to keep in touch with the government, so that they could be saved the trouble of having any connection with the station officials. Even if Latongwa were in any sense of the word a chief, he was merely the head of a branch of one of the smaller and more recently constituted *pororosiek*, and unequivocably not the "principal chief of the Nandi".†

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* Hobley changed his methods when he found the chiefs could not carry out his wishes (e.g. in providing labour, food and porters and arresting wrongdoers) except among their own clansmen. See Lonsdale, *op. cit.*, Chapter 3.

Jackson's request for cattle for exchange purposes implied either that he did not expect troops to be provided for an expedition, or that any operations which Berkeley sanctioned would be confined to the punishment of Teres and not extended to secure the submission of the entire tribe. While Jackson waited for the Commissioner's reactions to the request for reinforcements, a large part of the Kipture garrison was sent to Kavirondo, so that there were insufficient troops left in Mau even to provide escorts for a special Foreign Office despatch for Macdonald. Moreover, Berkeley instructed all the road stations on 16 June 1898 to begin stock-piling food for the return journey of the 27 BLI to the coast.* This demand would severely tax the resources of the Mau districts and make it impossible for Jackson to accumulate enough food at Kipture for operations against Teres.

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* Berkeley tried unsuccessfully to create a Kabaka in Busoga; Tucker, *op. cit.*, ii 211.

† The practice of putting up men of straw, often of foreign extraction, bedevilled administrators in Nandi for many years. Cf. Ainsworth "The Administration naturally gives all encouragement to any strong individuality and does what it can to increase his power so long as he is loyal". Cd. 2740 (1950), p. 33. See Hall's letters for the creation of a powerful chief (Kinyanjui) out of a man with no traditional authority.

The situation in other parts of the Protectorate was also giving rise to some anxiety. Macdonald left Kampala on 3 June 1898 to resume his interrupted march to the Juba, and the provision of men and food for the expedition had placed a considerable strain on the country's resources at a time when fighting had broken out again in Bunyoro. In order to contain the new threat in the west, Berkeley withdrew 130 sepoys and a number of Sudanese from Macdonald's escort, and thus prejudiced the success of the expedition which Salisbury had initiated as part of his Nile Valley policy.† Moreover, when Hobley took over Kavirondo from Tomkins on 16 May 1898, he found the district had been in an unsettled state during his absence. The people had been disturbed by the mutiny, the Kakamega had become aggressive and several inter-tribal raids had occurred among the Luo.‡ Similar conditions existed in South Kavirondo, and also around Port Victoria, which had been without a European official until Foaker was posted there in June 1898. Furthermore, the EAP was meeting with setbacks in the Ogaden campaign, which prompted Hardinge to ask for Uganda troops after the reverse near Lake Wama. The Foreign Office was evidently anxious about the situation in the neighbouring protectorate, as Hardinge was told "you must on no account do anything to expose the tranquillity in Uganda to any risk, and the Uganda Rifles must proceed to Uganda as soon as the Transport Department is able to move them."[5] Berkeley was unlikely in these circumstances to comply with Jackson's demands for troop reinforcements, especially as the situation in Nandi, outside the area under Teres' influence, gave no cause for alarm. The Koilegei had agreed to co-operate over cattle exchanges, presents were given to Latongwa and Torori in return for their help, and Jumbe Kimameta's small caravan had traded in the district without incident.

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* Berkeley-Road Stations, 16 June, 1898, ESA, A/7; the return was delayed until March 1899 as Evatt's men had been diverted to the Ogaden campaign; see p. 366.

† Macdonald was given only 72 Sudanese and one officer (Pereira) from the Uganda Rifles. His force was too small to fulfil its task.

‡ Gem and their neighbours (April); Sakwa and Sembo (May); Lego raids (May).

Berkeley decided after reading Jackson's report to visit Busoga, Kavirondo and Nandi, in order to investigate the disquiet existing in these districts and to discuss administrative readjustments. He observed: "this (disquiet) is perhaps not altogether surprising after recent events, nor do these reports indicate anything that might be called really serious".[6] Before Jackson received notice of the Commissioner's intentions, a Musoga porter had died in mysterious circumstances on 30 June 1898.* Three days later a Uasin Gishu woman was killed in a particularly brutal manner on a footpath half a mile from Kipture. The victim's head had been crushed by a club and her entrails taken out with a spear or *sime*.† Although there was no evidence that the Nandi were responsible for this uncharacteristic outrage, the Uasin Gishu settlers and Latongwa told Jackson she may have been killed because she was coming in to report on Teres' activities. That evening Jackson and Bagge had a long talk with Latongwa, who claimed that even the friendly chiefs were losing control over their people, owing to the demoralising effect which Teres' acts were having on the tribe. Latongwa's views on Teres' conduct represented the first overt criticism of one Nandi leader by another. Although Latongwa's disclosure did not amount to a promise of help against Teres, Jackson was probably heartened to find that it might be possible in time to break the hitherto impregnable tribal solidarity of the Nandi. If the rift between the friendly and hostile sections could be widened, conditions in Nandi would become similar to those which Hobley had exploited so profitably in Kavirondo. In any case Latongwa's frankness confirmed his desire to be friends with the government, and possibly indicated that he was prepared to take advantage of his position in order to strengthen his pretensions to secure recognition as the leader of the tribe.

Jackson warned Berkeley that outrages were likely to increase until the Nandi had been thoroughly punished.[7] A warning was also sent to Ravine that the road was unsafe, and that small parties were to be detained until they could combine to form a caravan strong enough to discourage attacks on the way to Kipture. Runners were sent from Ravine to advise parties on the road to join up before entering Nandi; and arms were issued to an Italian camel caravan, for which Martin could not provide escorts as seventy-three of his station staff were absent in Nandi.* None of the caravans was molested, however, Kavirondo food porters continued to reach Kipture in safety, and eight men from Jumbe Kimameta's trading party marched to Ravine from their base in Nandi without incident. This immunity from attack may have been caused by the three large military convoys which passed through the district in July 1898. One of these consisted of the first company of Uganda Rifles to enter Nandi from the east since Martyr brought up a hundred Swahilis in March. This caravan, which escorted Johnson's cart convoy, was commanded by Capt. H. F. Fisher, who went on to Mumias with half the troops, and Lieut. R. J. Anderson, who stayed at Kipture with the remainder. The other two caravans were made up of Sikhs from the EAP contingent, who were marching back to their base. The movement of troops across Nandi from west to east possibly deterred the warriors from engaging in hostile activities, as troops who had passed in that direction in the past had usually returned to Nandi for punitive operations.† The peaceful conduct of the Nandi might indicate on the other hand that there was no active opposition to the government, or that such hostility as existed was localised and of little account. Some of the sections were in fact co-operating with the district officers, and two of the chiefs received presents for their help in July 1898.

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* See p. 319.

† The Nandi were not notorious for brutality towards women. The victim may have been from the Kipture settlement or resident in Teres' district. *Sime* a short sword.

Anderson's half company strengthened Jackson's position, but not enough to allow him to punish Teres. Moreover, as Fisher was ordered to proceed to Mumias, the Commandant was evidently not prepared at that juncture to concentrate troops at Kipture for an expedition on the scale recommended by Jackson. In order to prevent district officers from burdening the army with fresh commitments, Martyr decreed that the Uganda Rifles could not be used on the initiative of local officials. This order was made as a result of Hobley's attempt to detain troops, during their passage through Mumias to Kampala, for a punitive patrol in Kakamega. It was particularly important for the Commandant to control and limit military operations, since Berkeley had asked Broome to stop three companies of the 27 BLI from proceeding on their journey to Uganda. This request was made ostensibly because "our really serious difficulties are practically over", but the Commissioner was also concerned about feeding the additional companies.[8] In the circumstances Jackson had no alternative but to shelve his plans for a Nandi expedition. He proceeded to Ravine on 19 July 1898 for discussions with Major Smith, to whom he was shortly to hand over command of the Mau districts.

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* RSD. The caravan under Juani left with 700 loads of Indian rations on 14 July, 1898; the camels could not negotiate the Mau crossing, so he returned to Ravine in disarray.

† Harrison's Swahilis had proceeded to the coast in June 1898.

Hobley chose to ignore Martyr's instructions regarding the use of troops without the Commandant's permission, however, and he persuaded Capt. Fisher to accompany an expedition to punish the Kakamega for the outrages they had committed on the Uganda Road since the mutiny. The Kakamega had also closed the road to Kitoto's, which Hobley was anxious to reopen because the food procurable from Mumias and Port Victoria was insufficient to meet the demands of Uganda caravans. This was particularly inconvenient as the Nandi had closed the road from Kitoto's to Kipture, so that government parties were denied all access to the Kano Plains granary.[9] The Kakamega had also made Sclater's Road insecure right up to the Nandi border, and had threatened to withhold their produce from the food store which had been set up in their district to supply Kipture. Although they had some justification for their hostile behaviour,* the Kakamega received no support from their neighbours and were quickly subdued. Formal peace was concluded in a large assembly, which included representatives from neighbouring tribes, and many guns were surrendered. Hobley thus achieved his object with little difficulty and few casualties. The Mumias garrison and Fisher's half company were assisted by 250 Kavirondo and 150 Masai irregulars.[10] The rapidity and success of this operation emphasised the different problems facing the district officers at Mumias and Kipture. The Kakamega patrol was undertaken by about 110 regular soldiers with the help of friendlies, and the fighting was over in three days. Moreover, Hobley was confident that the operational area could be localised, and that there was no danger of his intervention resulting in a general combination against the government. At the same time that

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* The Kakamega had suffered from the mutineers, from petty thieving and interference with their women by caravan porters, and probably from the arbitrary conduct of the Swahili soldiers at the food store.

Hobley was restoring tranquillity to the Uganda Road west of Nandi, Jackson was requesting 400 men for operations lasting more than a month in order to secure the same result between Ravine and Kipture.

Hobley introduced a topic on 12 July 1898, which was to exercise the minds of administrators and soldiers for several years: the location of the civil and military headquarters for the Eastern Province. Hobley suggested the Kavirondo station should be transferred to the neighbourhood of the Kakamega food store, and that the existing district headquarters at Mumias should be retained merely as a garrisoned sub-station. Among other factors in favour of this proposal, Hobley observed that Kakamega was well placed strategically for expeditions against the Nandi, and that its proximity to their country would check their raids against the Tiriki and other protected tribes in Eastern Kavirondo. Moreover the new headquarters would not suffer from the disadvantage associated with a station inside Nandi, which would have to be supplied with food from Kakamega.* These arguments were repeated and enlarged upon by other officers in the ensuing months, but Berkeley, who had suggested moving Hobley from Mumias to Kikelelwa in December 1895, refused to be swayed by them.[11] Hobley evidently felt that his pacification policy had succeeded to such an extent in the past twenty months that he was no longer dependent on the Wanga alliance, but was free to set up his headquarters anywhere in the district without endangering the security of his base. The stress he placed on the advantages of the Kakamega site, in connection with the pacification of the Nandi, showed he appreciated that the settlement of this unconquered tribe was becoming the most urgent problem facing the government in the Eastern Province.

No incidents occurred in Nandi in August 1898. Teres' people and other sections who might have been tempted to harass the government were probably deterred from doing so by the increase in the garrison strength at Kipture, the passage of troops along the Uganda Road, and by the absence of some of the warriors, who were herding cattle on grazing grounds far away from Sclater's

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* Other reasons were: abundant cheap food (demand had forced Mumias prices up); check on Kakamega caravan attacks; timber for fuel and buildings (timber for miles around Mumias was used up); higher altitude and healthier climate; vacant land for soldiers' families to settle and cultivate.

Road in order to avoid losses from cattle disease. Most of the warriors were engaged elsewhere, however, as a large army was sent to Sebei on an expedition which carried out the massacre at the Arrtak cave. The Nandi surprised the Sebei and heaped up brushwood at the mouth of the cave, which is now known as Muguso, "the grave", and burned or suffocated the inhabitants. One of the victims was a prophet, Arap Koburrkwoin, who had fruitlessly warned his people to guard against impending disaster. The massacre incensed the Nandi Laibon, who told the warriors their function was to capture cattle and not to slaughter large numbers of people.*

Jackson and Smith spent five days at Kipture in August 1898 on a handing-over visit. The Nandi rising which Jackson feared had not occurred, but no advantage was taken of this during the handing-over process to strengthen the more co-operative relations, which had been established in the previous month with the people living near the fort. There were apparently no discussions between the Nandi leaders and the new incumbent, and no presents were made to any members of the tribe. No food was bought from the Nandi and the station continued to be dependent on supplies produced and transported by Kavirondo. Strict escort measures and arrangements for night guards at camps between Ravine and Kipture were maintained, so that the Nandi were given no opportunity to attack small parties or to pick off stragglers. Three consignments of trade goods were despatched to Kipture from Ravine, but no female stock was sent to Bagge to test the sincerity of Latongwa's promises about cattle exchanges.

The most important event in August 1898 was the arrival of the first railway party to cross the Mau. This was a composite caravan under J. W. Blackett, the engineer in charge of forward surveys, with a lake survey detachment headed by Commander B. Whitehouse, the Chief Engineer's brother. Blackett was charged with investigating alternative possibilities to the Kipkarren-Nzoia Valley route surveyed by Macdonald in 1892. Blackett had the assistance of the survey tracings and Vandeleur's Nandi expedition map to aid him in his task, as well as notes by Lieut. G. E. Smith, who had looked over parts of the Nyando Valley from hills on the

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* B. Whitehouse met only one Nandi on the road between Ravine and Kipture. For a circumstantial account of the Arrtak incident from Sebei sources, see Weatherby, *UJ*, 26 (1962), p. 206. See pp. 64, 358.

Nandi escarpment during the Sclater's Road survey. Smith's maps had not been completed but he made representations on the Nyando route to the Chief Engineer, who agreed that a saving of as much as a hundred miles might be made, if a practicable line could be found from Nakuru to the Kavirondo Gulf. This was the route which Sir G. Molesworth had advocated in 1891 but which had not been surveyed, because of ignorance of the topography of Nandi and anxiety about the reactions of the warriors. During the Nandi expedition in 1895, Cunningham had reported that a shorter route for the railway might be found from Nakuru to the Kavirondo Gulf, but when Sclater had favoured a line from the Molo River to the Nyando in 1896, O'Callaghan had opposed any alteration which would by-pass the populous and fertile districts of Nandi and Mumias.*

The Railway Committee nevertheless instructed Whitehouse on 5 November 1897 to make a reconnaissance of the Nyando route. He was advised to organise a strong party and to consult with the Protectorate officials on measures for its protection. This advice was presumably tendered because of Ternan's failure to subdue the Mau tribes and the fear of a Nandi rising after the mutiny. Blackett had previously visited Ravine in January 1898 to discuss problems of trade goods and food supplies. Martin thought that a little food might be obtainable in Nandi, and recommended that the party should consist of at least 200 men as some opposition might be expected during the survey. Blackett decided, therefore, to arm fifty of the porters so they could assist his fifty soldiers in case of need. But when the survey party left Kilindini in June 1898, the Chief Engineer detailed only fifteen railway police as escort, after he had been assured by the Uganda Government that the Nandi were quiet and the caravan could safely proceed with an escort of that size.[12]

Commander Whitehouse arrived at Ravine on 1 August 1898 with a steel boat, the *Vice-Admiral*, which he intended to use on the lake survey. When his small caravan left for Kipture the following day, Major Smith loaned Whitehouse three rifles and advised him to keep close to Mohamed Bux's donkey caravan. This advice was not heeded owing to the slow progress made by the donkeys, but Whitehouse reported the road was unsafe for small parties beyond Sclater's store camp (one march from Ravine), and should not be attempted by parties having fewer than ten rifles. When Whitehouse arrived at Kipture, where he found three civil and two military officers, he stored the boat loads inside the fort and returned to Ravine. Although Whitehouse noted that the Nandi had threatened to attack Kipture and that many murders had occurred recently in the district, the only incidents he cited were those concerned with the Masai boy and the Uasin Gishu woman.* He made a few small purchases with small white beads and heavy brass wire in Nandi, but warned the Chief Engineer that food in quantity was not procurable locally, apart from that supplied from the Kakamega food post to Ravine and Kipture. As a result of these representations, subsequent railway caravans carried food with them from Fort Smith, or drew their supplies from a reserve of rice which was sent up to Ravine from the coast.

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* Chapters 3, 6, 9; Sclater-Com, 12 July, 1896, FOCP, 6913/1.

Blackett and Dr. Brock joined Whitehouse at Ravine on 17 August 1898 and two days later their combined caravans left for Kipture, Kitoto's and the Kavirondo Gulf. After noting inaccuracies concerning "Ugowe Bay" on Stanley and Hobley's maps, the party marched eastwards up the Nyando Valley on 1 September 1898, towards a wooded hill (now known as Mt. Blackett) and then proceeded to the summit of Mau. Here Whitehouse left the caravan and returned to Ravine, while Blackett descended the eastern slopes to the Rift Valley plains. This exploratory venture proved the practicability of the shorter route for the railway and telegraph through the Nyando Valley, an achievement that had important effects on relations between the government and the Nandi, until the tribe was subdued in the 1905-1906 expedition and the south-eastern sections were moved away from the line to the reserve around Kabiyet. No communication was established with anybody during the march except a few Nandi. Blackett noted that the Nyando Valley east of Kitoto's was uninhabited, apart from occasional wandering bands of Dorobo hunters, until the Masai grazing grounds were reached around Lake Nakuru. Some cultivation was observed on the Nandi hills to the north of the valley, and Blackett thought that a small amount of food might be procured from this source for the survey, staking and construction parties. There were no signs of habitation to the south but several tracks leading from Nandi into Lumbwa were seen. As a result of his observations, Blackett advised the Chief Engineer that escorts of twenty soldiers would provide adequate protection for parties travelling along the new route.[13]

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* Bagge, Bathurst, Dr. Ayres, Lieuts. Anderson and Langton. See pp. 318-325.

While Blackett was investigating the Nyando Valley route, transport arrangements on the Uganda Road had deteriorated to an alarming extent. Mackinnon, who was on his way up country to investigate, reported that a transport block had been caused at Fort Smith, owing to the scarcity of food and the reluctance of contractors to work the Kikuyu-Kavirondo section. The rains had damaged the road over Mau so badly that Johnson's mule cart convoys were almost at a standstill.* Mule mortality was increasing and rinderpest lingered on as far as Ravine. Mackinnon had been informed, however, that it was safe to reintroduce oxen in Nandi and Kavirondo. He asked for animals to be sent from Buganda to haul the heavy waggons in these districts, as Jackson had prohibited the introduction of stock into Mau from the east. In order to lessen mortality among the mules, R. J. Stordy, the Transport Department veterinary surgeon, recommended that stables and grain stores should be erected at all staging posts between Nairobi and Mumias. He considered two riflemen would be sufficient to guard the stables east of Ravine, but that ten armed guards would be needed at every post between that station and Mumias, owing to the unsettled state of the country. He also suggested that a sick stable should be built at Kipture, where the climate was suitable, grain was available and water and clover were found in abundance.[14] These remedial measures would take time to implement; in the meanwhile companies of the Uganda Rifles and hundreds of loads of stores were delayed at Fort Smith and other road stations.

Major A. H. Coles, who had been appointed OC Road Military District, made some suggestions in August 1898 about the civil and military headquarters in his area, and the deployment of troops in the station garrisons. He recommended that headquarters for two companies should be located at Kipture, where a half company would be stationed, and that detachments of thirty men should be posted to Naivasha, Ravine, Kakamega, Mumias and Port Victoria. Like Hobley, he questioned whether Kakamega would not be a better site than Mumias for the Kavirondo headquarters. If the move to Kakamega, which was within easy striking distance of the "dangerous districts", were approved, it would be possible to muster two hundred men at short notice for punitive operations.*

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* Defects listed were roots, stumps, anthills, sloughs of mud, partially constructed drifts and unnecessarily sharp gradients.

Meanwhile a situation had arisen in the EAP which proved that Hardinge was in no better position than Berkeley to sanction action that might jeopardise communications on the Uganda Road. After Lenana's Kisongo Masai had been mauled by Sendeyu's Loita warriors, Lenana asked Ainsworth to sanction a counter-raid to chastise the aggressive Loita and to recoup the losses sustained by his people through rinderpest. Sanction was withheld, but Ainsworth was compelled to admit he was powerless to prevent the raid from taking place, and Hall agreed that operations against the Masai were out of the question owing to the difficult transport position. Lenana's warriors accordingly raided Sendeyu's followers, who were said to be roaming about in South Kavirondo in August 1898. Hardinge justified Ainsworth's inaction by pointing out that a Masai war could not be undertaken by the troops in Ukambani, and that military operations would interfere with the railway and the Uganda transport service. He considered it bad policy to prohibit such raids unless the prohibition could be backed by effective force. Moreover, as Lenana's warriors would operate some distance from the Uganda Road and would not interrupt communications, Hardinge observed that tribal affrays in unadministered territory were not bad things as far as the achievement of major government objectives was concerned.[15] Hall admitted "it has been my constant endeavour to keep them from joining forces, though Sendeyu has frequently sent messengers to Lenana to make overtures. . . . In my opinion, the more friction there is between them, the less trouble we shall have with the Masai as a tribe". Such divide and rule tactics were not, however, feasible among the Nandi, who were not addicted to inter-section squabbling.† Lenana's response to Ainsworth's exhortation confirmed that the EAP was powerless to exercise its writ any distance from the Uganda Road, and reluctant to create conditions that were liable to jeopardise the government's tenuous hold over its communications. The situation was similar in this respect to the problem facing Berkeley and Jackson in Nandi. But Lenana's application to Ainsworth, and his co-operation in enforcing the cattle quarantine regulations, contrasted significantly with Kipchomber's attitude towards Jackson and Bagge. The Nandi Laibon had made no effort to get into communication with Kipture, but was rumoured to be stirring up some of the warriors to attack caravans and sack the fort.

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* Coles-Com, 30 August, 1898, ESA, A/4/12; See p. 328. On 4 September, 1898, Lieut. Arbuthnot arrived at Ravine and Capt. Gorges went to Naivasha with a half company each. RSD.

† See p. 15. Hall-Hill (pte) 22 August, 1898, FO2/165 summarises EAP policy towards the Masai.

September 1898 passed without incident in Nandi. The security position had apparently improved as messages were sent on two occasions from Ravine to Kipture by pairs of Masai runners. All the Uganda companies had entered the Protectorate and most of the troops had reached their duty stations by the end of the month. Although the district was quiet, there were few signs that the Nandi were anxious to co-operate with the administration: no food was supplied and none of the chiefs received awards. Sixteen oxen were acquired for the Transport Department under the exchange arrangements, but further transactions were halted by an outbreak of pleuro-pneumonia, and Hobley's inability to supply more exchangeable female stock. Stordy was sent to Kipture to investigate the outbreak and reported that twenty-one animals with suspicious symptoms had been slaughtered. Only five of these were from the government herd so the remainder were presumably owned by station staff, Uasin Gishu or the Nandi. The provision of food for his augmented garrison also caused Bagge some anxiety, as purchases from Kakamega were limited to twelve loads because his stocks of trade goods were exhausted. Major Smith reminded Fort Smith and Mumias about "the urgency and grave necessity of their absolute enforcement of the notice that all up and down caravans must leave their stations with at least twenty-one days' food". Pleuro-pneumonia fortunately did not spread to the transport oxen, but Stordy prohibited the use of carts on the Ravine-Kipture section on 22 September 1898, owing to the impassable state of the road. As a result of this prohibition, the only supplies to reach Kipture were carried up by porters, pack donkeys and mules.[16]

Despite Bagge's difficulties in maintaining routine services, plans were prepared for a punitive expedition against the Nandi. Instructions for this to be done were presumably given by Major Smith, who recommended that the Nandi question should be solved by military action. The plans were drawn up by Capt. R. Cooper, who had recently arrived to command the troops in the Mau District.* He proposed that three companies should be assigned to the project, two of which would have to be provided by headquarters since only one company could be furnished by the Mau garrisons. He asked for at least one company of Sudanese, but was opposed to the employment of Indians owing to the impossibility of providing adequate transport for their needs. Two companies were to be based on Kipture to work as separate columns over an area extending thirty miles to south and south-east of the station. The third company was to march from Mumias to Kitoto's in order to prevent the Nandi and their stock from escaping down the escarpment to the Kano Plains. Cooper had evidently studied the reasons for Cunningham and Ternan's failure to defeat the Nandi by single column operations. It was, however, unlikely that a company based on Kitoto's could move up the steep and rugged upper Nyando Valley quickly enough to prevent the Nandi from seeking asylum in Lumbwa. The plan to block the retreat routes into Lumbwa, where Teres had taken refuge after the Kavirondo raid, together with the area over which the troops were to operate, indicated that the expedition was designed to punish Teres and his associates and not to force the rest of the tribe into submission. As the main escape route passed near present-day Fort Ternan, about 30 miles from Kitoto's and 1,200 feet above it, a hundred men, patrolling as a body or strung out in pickets to watch the numerous paths between Nandi and Lumbwa, could scarcely hope to stop the Nandi from getting across the valley between Kitoto's and the Mau. Every column was to be accompanied by 300 Masai, 600 of whom were to be provided through Ravine and the remainder from Mumias. Cooper failed to appreciate the size of the force needed for decisive operations against the Nandi, but this was not surprising as experienced men like Jackson and Smith were equally at fault in this regard. Cooper did, however, stress that the operations must continue for at least three months since this was the only way of ensuring permanent results. One hundred and eighty Swahili would be needed to transport the sixty loads of kit, tents and ammunition required for every company, but Cooper omitted to provide food carriers for the 1,400 troops, levies and porters. He evidently anticipated that the campaign would begin soon after the September harvest, so that the columns could live off the country.

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* Cooper left Ravine for Kipture on 24 August, 1898. Cooper-OC Troops 6 September, 1898, ESA, A/27/17; see p. 342 for the date of the plan. Jackson may have prompted the plan, parts of which reflect his views, (e.g. duration of the operations, use of Naivasha Masai); Jackson and Smith arrived at Ravine the day Cooper left, so they probably discussed the matter on the road.

Three days after Cooper had drawn up his elaborate plan for dealing with the Nandi, Lieut. Langton with fifty-seven Uganda Rifles and a small detachment of Kavirondo allies marched out of Mumias in company with Ngonga, the Lego chief, to punish a section of the latter's people for murdering a Swahili station employee during Tomkins' visit to recruit porters in July 1898. Ngonga had been ordered to arrest the culprits but pleaded he was powerless to do so. The chief, who was at Mumias and in the government's power at the time, was fined and sent away, This action was vastly different from the treatment accorded to Teres, who had voluntarily submitted at Kipture and was kept in prison for eight months for his pains. After his return to his people, Ngonga had been unable to arrest the murderers, so Hobley decided to take action against them himself. Lieut. Langton burned the culprits' villages and rounded up a number of cattle and a thousand head of small stock. Peace was then made with three chiefs who promised to provide the government with food and porters. The incipient disaffection was quickly quashed by a small, swift and localised operation, which also persuaded the neighbouring Luo of Gem to change their minds about meeting Hobley's demands for porters. Once again Hobley had demonstrated the small amount of force that was necessary to secure compliance with his demands, and the extent to which he was able, with the exercise of a little pressure, to gain the support of the Kavirondo chiefs even in operations against their own people.[17]

Hobley's personal ascendancy over the chiefs to whom he had accorded recognition was being increasingly accepted by the people. He was confident that the friendly relations between the Kavirondo and the government would enable him to initiate a carrier service capable of transporting 600 loads a month.[18] In order to reach this target, Hobley proposed calling on Kakamega porters, although this would mean that Bagge would have to find other means of transporting food from the Kakamega collecting post to Kipture.

It was not surprising that Hobley was concerned about his district's contribution to the maintenance of the Nandi station, and the inability of the Kipture officials to lessen their dependence on Kakamega food and Kavirondo porters. Hobley knew enough about his eastern neighbours to understand that they were not as amenable to persuasion or token demonstrations of force as the Kavirondo, but he was becoming openly sceptical about the uncooperative attitude of the Nandi, and obliquely critical of how little had been done to induce the tribe to take a greater share of the burden of supporting a station in their country. Hobley's impatience with the slow progress made in Nandi was increased by the fact that there were still a number of problems to be settled in Kavirondo. Two fresh difficulties arose in September 1898 at the northern and southern extremities of his huge district: one of Macdonald's officers, Lieut. Hanbury-Tracy was forced to punish the Sore on Mt. Elgon, and reports were received that the Germans were building a station at Shirati.[19] Moreover, Hobley was anxious to establish the posts at Kitoto's and on Elgon which he had been recommending for the past three years. But he understood that the realisation of his hopes in this regard would not be hastened by the government's failure to force the Nandi to provide for Kipture and its communications.

By the end of September 1898, the security situation in the Protectorate seemed on the surface to be more favourable for an expedition to force the Nandi to change their attitude towards the government than it had been for some time. The armed forces had been brought up to strength, the mutineers had been defeated and dispersed near Mruli on 3 August 1898 and order had been restored in Buddu, Koki and Ankole. In the Eastern Province, Hobley had punished two hostile sections and re-established government prestige among friendly chiefs and people. But although there were no major security problems requiring urgent attention, Berkeley's decision regarding the expediency and timing of a Nandi campaign continued to be governed by the capacity of the transport system to move men and materials into the district, and to keep the troops fed and supplied for the duration of the operations.

On 26 September 1898, Dr. Mackinnon informed the Commissioner that the transport system had failed. Since Sclater's Road could be repaired to an all-weather standard only if expensive metalling were carried out, Mackinnon recommended that carts should be abandoned. He considered the Mumias-Port Victoria section should be worked by porters, and that oxen on the Ravine to Mumias stretch should be replaced by pack donkeys and mules. Mackinnon proposed sending 500 donkeys to Nandi, half of which would work from Kipture to Ravine and the remainder westwards to Mumias.[20] Stordy's night stables were approved by the Director of Transport, who thought five riflemen would provide sufficient protection for staging posts in districts where the people were unreliable.*

Thus during his forthcoming visit to the Eastern Province, Berkeley had two different but related matters of importance to consider: Smith's report on the Nandi situation and Cooper's plans for punitive operations; and Mackinnon's analysis of the transport breakdown and his suggestions for resolving the traffic block at Fort Smith and Ravine. A subsidiary topic, the location of the various district headquarters, was closely connected with the two principal problems of pacification and transport. When he visited Nandi, Berkeley would see the remarkable change that had taken place at Kipture, which was the last road station to be reopened after the mutiny. The officials there had increased in six months from one to six and included representatives of the administrative, military, transport and medical branches. One of the newcomers was Dr. Copeland, the first medical officer to be stationed in Nandi, who arrived at Kipture on 9 September 1898, with instructions to build a hospital and dispensary.[21] The staff resident in Nandi outnumbered that in any other of the district stations, and the Commissioner had been urged to make Kipture the transport headquarters and military base for the Eastern Province. Thus although Ravine and Mumias continued to be important staging and district stations, it seemed towards the end of 1898 that Kipture might become the principal centre east of the Nile.

At the beginning of October 1898, the forward survey division of the railway prepared for an inspection of the Nyando route by the Chief Engineer and J. R. Baass, the Survey Superintendent. Commander Whitehouse left Ravine on 20 September 1898 with eighty-three men to take on the *Vice-Admiral* from Kipture to Port Victoria, while Blackett and Dr. Brock travelled over Macdonald's route in order to compare it with the new line from Nakuru to the Kavirondo Gulf. The Chief Engineer's party, which included Mrs. Whitehouse, left Ravine on 12 October 1898 and marched along Sclater's Road to join Commander Whitehouse and Blackett at Port Victoria eleven days later. The Commander piloted his brother George in the *Vice-Admiral* to the Kavirondo Gulf on the 31st, where they joined the rest of the party who had travelled overland from Port Victoria. After investigating the potentialities of a port at the head of the Gulf, B. Whitehouse sailed back to Port Victoria to begin the lake survey, while the Chief Engineer was conducted by Blackett over Mau to the Rift Valley on the route which the latter had pioneered in September.[22] The Chief Engineer confirmed Blackett's findings, the Nyando Valley route was approved by the London committee, and the security situation in Nandi became connected with the furtherance of a major imperial interest. The new route was much more vulnerable than Macdonald's line to attacks from the Nandi and Lumbwa, who would need to be dealt with circumspectly if hostilities were to be avoided, or firmly if peaceable measures failed.

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* See p. 332.

Although the Chief Engineer's visit to Kavirondo took place after Berkeley had concluded his Eastern Province visit, Blackett's discovery of the Nyando route was known to Major Smith, who presumably discussed its implications with the Commissioner at the Kakamega conference. Berkeley doubtless realised the effect which the switch from the Nzoia to the Nyando would have on relations with the Nandi, so that Smith, Cooper and Mackinnon's reports were probably reviewed in the light of their bearing on the rapid completion of the railway. Berkeley had intended to visit Kipture, but as George Wilson, who had been left in charge in Buganda, fell ill, the Commissioner proceeded no farther than Kakamega. Bagge was apparently not present when Berkeley met Smith and Mackinnon on 2 October 1898, but Cooper visited Mumias during the month and may have explained his plans to the Commissioner at Kakamega. The proceedings were hurriedly concluded by Berkeley, who wished to get back to Entebbe, where there was no senior official experienced in Buganda affairs to take command, and Smith returned to Kipture on the 6th with Mackinnon.[23]

Among the routine matters dealt with at Kakamega were the Mau estimates for 1899-1900. Berkeley agreed that greater freedom should be given to district officers to purchase food and trade goods locally, and to indent on the Mombasa coast agent for supplies instead of on the Entebbe storekeeper. Smith emphasised that Ravine and Kipture were dependent for their food requirements on donkey convoys from Naivasha and Kakamega. In normal circumstances adequate supplies were procurable from both places, whenever trade goods and donkeys were available, but for some time to come a hundred loads a month would have to be sent from Mumias to Kipture until the Naivasha market could be reopened.[24] Mackinnon had no difficulty in persuading Berkeley that the transport service between the Molo River and Kakamega could only be kept running by replacing heavy ox waggons by pack donkeys and mules. As urgent work was needed on the road even to make it passable for this form of transport, Berkeley authorised the engagement of gangs to undertake the repairs under a European supervisor. The Commissioner noted there were no porters working regularly on the Molo-Kakamega section: Kavirondo hated going farther east than Kakamega and could only occasionally be induced to travel to Kipture; the Kikuyu refused to engage for work beyond Ravine; and "the Nandi will take no hand in porterage".[25] There was a possibility that waggon transport might be resumed during the short dry season, but Berkeley had to accept that for most of the year the quantity of goods carried up through the British sphere would be limited by the number of pack animals that could be purchased locally or imported to work the Mau crossing, and the number of porters who could be persuaded to engage for this unpopular section.

Berkeley's anxiety about the transport breakdown was shared by Col. Broome, who feared that unless troop caravans were replenished at staging posts on the Uganda Road it would be impossible to prevent looting. His commissariat officer, Lieut. Vaughan, asked for Basoga porters to move food loads blocked at Ravine but Grant had rejected the request as impolitic. Vaughan suggested as a long term measure that he should go to India to buy 1,000 donkeys so that Broome's regiment could be assured of regular rations. Berkeley supported the proposal when he met Vaughan in Kavirondo, but Hill mistrusted Vaughan's arithmetic and the scheme was abandoned.[26]

The chief reason for the Commissioner's absence from Entebbe was, however, to investigate the causes and extent of the disquiet existing east of the Nile. His discussions with Grant and Hobley reassured him that the situation in Busoga and Kavirondo called for no special comment.* Smith's views about the need for stern action in Nandi were equally reassuring, since "certain minor disturbances, or rather individual inter-native outrages, . . . did not, he thought, so far call for a punitive expedition". Smith considered that "the road seemed safe for all parties and . . . there was no real trouble to apprehend", but he would report further to Berkeley at a later date. Smith's assessment of the situation evidently differed from that of his predecessor, though the new OC Mau had previously advocated punitive measures. This apparent change of mind suggests that the Commissioner may have been as successful in persuading Smith at the Kakamega conference to see the incidents in perspective, and against a background of broader considerations, as he had been when a similar situation was discussed with Jackson in 1897.† Although Berkeley was gratified to discover that Smith's views on the Nandi security situation were identical with his own, the Commissioner added: "should eventually some demonstration be required, it would be most convenient, I think, to execute it with a portion of the Indian contingent when it comes up. The movement of troops down the road at this moment, with transport resources almost strained to the uttermost would be very embarrassing, and I was glad, therefore, to learn that no special measures seemed necessary now". The reference to Evatt's Indians, who had been diverted to the Ogaden expedition in July 1898, implied that the conquest of the Nandi could be left in abeyance until the transport position improved, but could then be achieved by 400 sepoys.‡

On the day when Berkeley was reassuring the Foreign Office from Kakamega that there was no immediate need to send troops to Nandi, and to burden the transport system with the demands which a punitive force would make upon it, Smith sent messengers off post haste from Kipture advising the Commissioner that punitive measures were urgently needed against the tribe. Smith had learned on his return to Kipture of a series of incidents, and received a report from Bagge on the "generally hostile and unsettled feeling" existing between the Nandi and the station. Smith accordingly retracted the views he had expressed at Kakamega and declared that the hopes he had shared with Berkeley at the time had proved unfounded. Since the outrages reported by Jackson in June and July, Smith admitted there had been a lull in this form of hostility although the campaign which Jackson had called for had not been carried out. Indeed, the only positively hostile act committed by the Nandi during the past three months was the closure of the road to Kitoto's food store, and even this operation had only been partially successful. While Smith was away at Kakamega, however, a Masai boy was murdered close to the station. The day before Smith arrived back at Kipture, a government mule was killed on the roadside on 5 October 1898, and the same evening a Swahili was speared in the transport camp at the station. A local chief had arrested and brought in the alleged murderer of the Masai boy, and Smith presumed that the other two incidents were also the work of the Nandi. He had no grounds for the assumption, however, just as Bagge had been unable to confirm that the outrages reported by Jackson were perpetrated by Nandi, or to prove that they had been caused by anything but personal ill-will. Smith conceded that "the individual actions may not appear of a sufficiently serious nature to justify punitive measures on an organised scale", but he warned that such incidents would continue and increase unless they were checked. The recently appointed OC Mau then observed, as his predecessors had discovered several times since 1895, that the chiefs "appeared to have practically no power, seem either unable or unwilling to give information which may lead to identification of malefactors with any particular district or clan, and to the consequent taking of reprisals against any one locality". The government had no alternative, therefore, but to punish the entire tribe as discriminative action was impossible. Smith warned that any measures that were taken should be thorough in design and execution, because half-hearted operations by an inadequate force would merely stir up the district and endanger the road. He noted in conclusion that Capt. Cooper was writing to the OC Troops from the military standpoint.* Smith's sudden change of mind, which was even more dramatic than Jackson's altered attitude after Berkeley left for the coast in January 1897, suggests that he may have been swayed against his better judgement by the Commissioner's arguments at Kakamega.*

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* The Muslim threat and the incipient rebellion in Busoga had been averted through Mbogo's loyalty, Grant's return to the district and Kakungulu's help. See p. 278.

† See p. 227. Smith appears to have favoured an expedition in September 1898, see p. 335; but also see p. 342.

‡ Berkeley-FO, 6 October, 1898, FOCP, 7159/105; he ignored Cooper's views on the use of Indians; see p. 335.

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* Smith-Com, 6 October, 1898, ESA, A/4/13. See pp. 99, 232. This may have been the genesis of Cooper's plan, which was possibly wrongly dated 6 September, 1898, instead of 6 October, 1898, in ESA, A/27/17. See p. 335.

When Berkeley received Smith's despatch at Mumias he did not feel that its contents materially changed the situation, or justified the risks inherent in taking punitive action on the scale recommended by Cooper. Although the Commissioner was aware of the difficulty of proving complicity in outrages such as Smith had reported, he had to decide whether the evidence was sufficiently incriminating for him to sanction punitive measures and to justify his decision to the Foreign Office. Berkeley evidently determined in this case that an expedition, at such an inopportune moment, could not be approved as reprisals for incidents which were possibly not attributable to the Nandi at all. The Commissioner's decision was influenced by a number of considerations, some of which were only imperfectly understood by the Mau district officers. The sepoys of the Indian Regiment were feeling the strain of their ten months' service in East Africa, where they had been constantly on the march or engaged in campaigns under trying conditions in an enervating climate. For much of the time they had been denied their customary foodstuffs because of the breakdown in the transport services, and supplies of uniforms, boots and tents had taken a long time to come up from the coast. Col. Broome complained that the troops were so "saturated with fever" and weakened by action and exposure that only half the companies were fit for active service. Officers and men were, moreover, becoming disgruntled because of the higher pay and allowances which the Uganda Rifles enjoyed. Broome urged upon Berkeley the *vital necessity* of the swift arrival of Evatt's contingent so that the 27 BLI could be relieved.[27] The Commissioner acknowledged the truth of Broome's complaints, but could do nothing to remove the supply bottlenecks, to provide better wages and conditions for the dispirited sepoys, or to hasten Evatt's departure from the Ogaden campaign.

The Commissioner was also aware that Macdonald's expedition, and the column which Martyr had taken down the Nile, would probably lead to fresh military commitments in countries outside the Protectorate and long distances from the nearest government station. Both commanders were expected to establish forward posts, which would necessitate the drafting of troops for garrison duties and for patrolling lines of communication in unpacified areas. Berkeley had no control over the Juba expedition, but if the Foreign Office decided to implement whatever scheme Macdonald might recommend for controlling the tribes with whom he entered into treaty obligations, the burden would inevitably fall in the initial stages on the Protectorate. Although the Commissioner was left in some doubt concerning Macdonald's intentions to carry out Salisbury's original instructions, any responsibilities accepted in the northern territories would be bound to disorganise the existing administrative, military and transport arrangements, and decrease the number of troops available for service within the Protectorate.*

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* See p. 227.

Despite Macdonald's departure, the debilitated condition of the Indian Regiment, and unsettled conditions in Bunyoro and the Eastern Province, Berkeley initiated a venture which was designed to duplicate Salisbury's instructions to Macdonald, and to link Uganda with Kitchener's forces in the Sudan. On 7 August 1898 (the date on which Berkeley asked Broome to halt three of his companies before they arrived in the Protectorate), Martyr was given secret orders to take a column of Sudanese to Fashoda, to establish posts on the Nile and to make treaties with the chiefs.[28] While acknowledging he had no instructions for this extraordinary action, Berkeley was nevertheless prepared to take the responsibility for sending a large part of the Uganda army outside the Protectorate's borders. Owing to what Berkeley later charitably called a "misunderstanding", Martyr left Fajao on 3 September 1898 with twelve Europeans (including seven military officers), six companies of Sudanese and 500 Baganda porters. The Nile column consisted, therefore, of nearly half the local companies, and almost all the trained and experienced soldiers in the Uganda Rifles. When Martyr asked for reinforcements for the Indian and the Swahili company in Bunyoro, Berkeley ordered two of the "Nile reconnaissance" companies to return to garrison the Bunyoro posts. The Commissioner, who was becoming worried about the outcome of his uncharacteristically reckless action, pointed out that he not only had other commitments to meet but had also to justify "detailing without special instructions, a large force to operate outside the Protectorate". Berkeley evidently realised at the outset that he was taking a tremendous risk, as he submitted his plans for Martyr's expedition to Salisbury "with the utmost diffidence" in the hope "that it may, at least, not incur your disapproval".[29]

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* Berkeley thought Macdonald was not going beyond Lake Rudolf. Both commanders established five posts; Martyr's activities put a severe strain on the transport system. See p. 365 for WO comment.

The Commissioner was also disturbed by the dissensions that arose among his military advisers through his secret dealings with Martyr. Macdonald, who did not receive news of the Nile expedition until November 1898, complained of Martyr's conduct and Berkeley's duplicity in sending a second expedition to attempt the task which Macdonald had been commissioned to perform. Moreover, as Martyr's objectives were not disclosed to Col. Broome (who assumed command of the Uganda forces on 11 May 1898), when he arrived in Kampala two months later, the new Commandant countermanded his predecessor's dispositions for the Nile column and the withdrawal of Broome's sepoys from Bunyoro. Broome threatened to place Martyr under arrest for insubordination and to report him to the Commander-in-Chief in England. The strained relations between Berkeley, Macdonald, Martyr and Broome, and the widening rift between the Uganda and Indian contingents, caused uneasiness in East Africa and unfavourable comment in Parliament. The situation was particularly worrying to Berkeley, as both Macdonald and Broome sent their reports direct to the Foreign Office and War Office respectively.[30]

If the Nile gamble failed or Macdonald came to any harm, Berkeley would have enough explaining to do without having to justify an expedition against the Nandi on the grounds advanced by Smith. If, on the other hand, one or both of the expeditions succeeded in their tasks, the Protectorate would have to furnish garrisons in the treaty areas and patrols for an extended system of communications. It was not surprising, therefore, that Berkeley's reply to the demand for a punitive expedition against the Nandi merely advised Smith to exhort the chiefs to co-operate with the government, and to warn them that hostile acts by individuals or sections would result in severe punishment being meted out to the entire tribe.[31]

Smith proceeded to Ravine the day after his despatch to Berkeley was written, so it was left to Bagge to carry out the Commissioner's instructions. The purport of Berkeley's exhortation and warning was accordingly read to the elders at Kipture, a proceeding which Bagge thought "was understood by them". The elders were pleased about the tour of the district, which Berkeley suggested that Bagge should make, and considered it would prove advantageous and give their fellow-tribesmen away from the station a chance to see a government representative in person. In anticipation of the benefits to be derived from the tour and in view of the change he had noticed among the Nandi in the past ten days, Bagge suggested the projected expedition should be suspended, until he could report on the outcome of his first attempt to get into communication with the people in the outlying areas of the district. Bagge not only noted a general change in the Nandi attitude "from hostility to apparent friendship", but was able to instance particular examples to support his observations. Food was being brought into road camps, people near Kipture were returning to their homes and were bringing small amounts of food to the local market, cattle were being grazed again near Sclater's Road, and warriors had volunteered to take messages to Ravine and Mumias. The elders said they would try and discover the culprits responsible for the spearing of the Swahili, a promise which Bagge thought might be genuine since the murderer of the Masai boy had already been given up. Furthermore, when Capt. Cooper returned to Kipture from Mumias, he had found the Nandi along the road most friendly. In view of these encouraging signs of a change of heart among the people living near the station and road, Bagge determined to begin his tour on 4 November 1898. He proposed to cover the whole district, section by section, with only a small escort, so that the Nandi would be reassured about his peaceful intentions. Bagge evidently had no qualms about his safety but Berkeley, who had originated the proposal, was more cautious. He was reluctant to sanction the tour, unless the country was sufficiently peaceful for the journey to be undertaken without incident. The Commissioner was particularly anxious that nothing should be done to endanger the security position, to antagonise the Nandi and to necessitate assistance from outside the district.*

Smith also sent Bagge instructions stressing the pacific nature of the tour. The OC Mau was apparently less optimistic than his district officer about the extent to which conditions throughout the district could be gauged by the promises of a few friendlies. But apart from the incidents near Kipture, which were possibly "station" rather than "district" occurrences, Nandi remained quiet throughout October 1898. Small parties of Masai continued to deliver important despatches, presents were received by two chiefs, and several payments were made to Nandi for services rendered or goods supplied. Major Smith's warning about the tour was probably influenced by his preoccupation with problems connected with the precarious food supplies of the Mau stations, and the special efforts that would have to be made to feed a force large enough to operate successfully against the Nandi. He ordered Bagge to stop supplying food to the Transport Department, so that porters could bring back grain from Kipture to feed the Ravine garrison. Kakamega and Nandi could not produce the 12,000 lb. monthly to meet Kipture and Ravine's requirements, so Smith had to enforce the embargo on supplies to through caravans. This brought protests from Col. Broome who considered Smith's action tantamount to the abandonment of Ravine as a staging post. Ternan, who had evidently forgotten the difficulties he had experienced in feeding the 1897 expedition, recommended that headquarters of the 3rd Battalion should be located at Kipture, with detachments of company strength at the other two stations in Mau. Smith pointed out that food supplies were insufficient to cater for garrisons of this size, and urged that due weight should be given to district representations on such matters.[32] Smith made a few local improvements including the formation of a buying depot among the Mianzini Kikuyu, and the despatch of twenty-five donkeys to Kipture to strengthen the Kakamega food convoys. A few consignments were delivered by contractors, the Kamasia were persuaded to sell grain in much larger quantites than ever before and a small amount was obtained from the Elgeyo, but none could be procured at Njemps. Hobley was unable to supply much from Mumias as he had insufficient troops to send to outlying areas. The Kavirondo porters had, moreover, eaten a considerable part of their loads before they arrived at Ravine, where they had to be rationed for the return journey. In order to meet Smith's difficulties, Berkeley agreed that the Mau stations should purchase supplies from the Kikuyu through private contractors, and authorised district officers to pay more than the standard price if this proved necessary.[33]

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* Bagge-Com, 22 October, 1898, ESA, A/4/13. Bagge was in Nandi for eight months in 1896-97 and seven months in 1898. See p. 342.

Shortage of trade goods also adversely affected the food position in Mau and Kavirondo. Coles could only give the 68 Swahilis in the Kipture garrison half pay, and he was expecting a Somali detachment to bring the station strength up to 117 men. At Mumias, where stocks of cloth were almost exhausted, Hobley reported that if trade goods were not received within a few weeks the station staff could not be paid and transport would come to a standstill. When representations were made to headquarters, an Entebbe official minuted: "we must do our best at once, whatever that may amount to; Uganda Transport cannot help; must come from here". But supplies were also running short in Buganda, as the Tanganyika route had been closed for three months by drought and famine.[34]

The numerous difficulties experienced in maintaining day to day administration in the Eastern Province must have convinced Smith that Berkeley would only sanction effective measures against the Nandi, if hostility became dangerous and widespread enough to threaten Kipture or the Uganda Road. All hope of immediate action was shattered at the end of October 1898, when the half company at Mumias was transferred to Luba's because of a recrudescence of trouble in Bunyoro. Mwanga, Kabarega and the mutineers took advantage of Martyr's departure, and his withdrawal of all but one company of the 27 BLI from Bunyoro, to resume hostilities. After achieving an initial success by severely mauling Lieut. Hannyngton's patrol at Kitabu on 10 October 1898, the rebels irrupted into Buganda.* Rapid action was necessary to contain the threat to the Protectorate's security, and to allay the anxiety of the Baganda who "were depressed by the new invasion —which they cannot understand". G. Wilson sent for the half company at Luba's, called in a company of sepoys from Buddu and raised a company of Baganda. Snider ammunition was requisitioned for the 800 gunmen supplied by the Baganda Regents, and the Mau stations were ordered to send to Kampala the ammunition reserve which Cooper had allocated for the Nandi campaign.[35]

In 1897, Ternan's expedition was abandoned before it had completed its work, partly because of unsettled conditions in

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* The Mruli victory (see p. 337), in which 57 of the enemy were killed, did not crush the rebels as Martyr claimed; Macdonald-FO, 13 December, 1898, FOCP, 7400/156. Broome-Com, and FO, 17, 25 October, 1898, FOCP, 7400/87/86.

Buganda; and in 1898, punitive measures had to be deferred owing to transport difficulties, Martyr's move down the Nile and the fighting in Bunyoro.

References

1. RSD. Jackson-Com, 16 June, 1898, 4 July, 1898, ESA, A/4/11, A/4/12. The first note of Indian contractors on the Mau route; the need for a guide suggests this was the trader's first trip. Broome arrived at Ravine on 22 May, 1898, five months after the 27 BLI landed at Mombasa; he was detained at Ravine until 25 June, 1898.
2. Martyr-Com, 11 June, 1898, ESA, A/4/11. The road stations were held by 85 armed porters and the 58 Sudanese at Mumias; Martyr proposed posting 25 soldiers to Naivasha, Ravine, Port Victoria and Luba's and 50 to Kipture and Mumias. Ternan's reorganisation scheme envisaged three companies in the Road District, two in Mau and one in Kavirondo. Martyr and many other officers had a poor opinion of the fighting qualities of the Somalis and Swahilis.
3. Jackson-Com, 10 June, 1898, Smith-Com, 18 June, 1898, ESA, A/4/11. Jackson and Bagge went to Mumias with Berkeley.
4. Jackson-Com, 15 June, 1898, Johnson-Com, 15 June, 1898, ESA, A/4/11.
5. FO-Hardinge 22 July, 1898 (tele), FOCP, 7090/54. Moyse-Bartlett, *op. cit.*, p. 114. Hardinge was also concerned about attacks on railway parties; Milne-Lugard, 7 October, 1898 (Lugard Papers).
6. Berkeley-FO, 8 July, 1898, FOCP, 7400/83; the original miscarried and a duplicate was not received by the FO till 10 February, 1899. The Luba's food supply was threatened by disquiet in Busoga, which was caused by Baganda intimidation, Kakungulu's activities and Gemmill's treatment of his Basoga porters; Grant-Com, 4 July, 1898, ESA, A/4/11.
7. Jackson-Com, 4 July, 1898, ESA, A/4/12.
8. Martyr-Com, 15 June, 1898, ESA, A/4/11; Berkeley-FO, 8 July, 1898, FOCP, 7400/83; Berkeley-Broome, 7 July, 1898, ESA, A/5/4 pointing out the difficulties of feeding the five companies in Uganda, and that "if three more companies come we could scarcely cope".
9. Smith-Com, 6 October, 1898, ESA, A/4/13.
10. Hobley-Com, 3 August, 1898, ESA, A/4/12; Berkeley-FO, 22 August, 1898, FO2/156. The expedition would have taken place earlier if troops had been available and "Hobley knew that I should approve of his taking the first available opportunity to carry it out", to which Hill minuted "It is absolutely necessary to keep the Uganda routes open". Pordage and Capt. Dugmore's caravan also assisted, *ZG*, 7 September, 1898.
11. Hobley-Com, 12 July, 1898, Berkeley-Hobley, 9 December, 1895, ESA, A/4/11, A/5/1.
12. RSD. WP II. CO 614/4 (5 and 8 February, 1898. 17 June, 1898).
13. RSD CO 614/4; Whitehouse, *Scottish Geographical Magazine*, April 1902. The Dorobo were probably Nandi hunters living below the escarpment. Molesworth's report 28 March, 1899 (FO2/558): "The discovery of this new route speaks well for the zeal and ability of those concerned in it. It has entailed the exploration of an absolutely unknown country, bare of supplies, and traversed by no definite track."
14. Jackson-Com, 24 August, 1898, ESA, A/4/13. Mackinnon-FO, 14 August, 1898, 6 September, 1898, FOCP, 7090/198, 7159/24.
15. Hardinge-FO, 19 July, 1898, 19 August, 1898, FOCP, 7090/120/185.
16. RSD, NCB. Cf. Platt's Diary, 15 October, 1898, "no cows . . . fowls Rs. 4 each, sheep not to be bought, no vegetables or flour, *nothing*".

17. Hobley-Com, 20 September, 1898, ESA, A/4/13.
18. Even Eboni, the Uasin Gishu Masai chief, had collected porters; Mumias Cash Book, August 1898. Hobley-Com, 28 September, 1898, ESA, A/4/13.
19. Austin, *op. cit.*, Chapter 15, Macdonald, FO, 12 May, 1899, FOCP, 7401/97. Hobley-Com, 1 September, 1898, ESA, A/4/13, Lascelles-FO, 18 February, 1899, FOCP, 7400/159.
20. Mackinnon-Com, 26 September, 1898, FOCP, 7159/177.
21. Moffat-Copeland, 18 June, 1898, A/4/13. For Bagnall's comment on staff increases since 1897, see Bagnall-Com, 1 April, 1900, FO2/299.
22. RSD. CO 614/4; B. Whitehouse, *op. cit.*, and Diary; Mrs. Florence Whitehouse's Diary. The terminus was named Port Florence, at Baass' suggestion, on 31 October, 1898.
23. Berkeley-FO, 6 October, 1898, FOCP, 7159/105. Wilson had an operation for a liver abscess on 24 September, 1898, eight days after Berkeley left Entebbe. Tomkins (3rd class assistant) was OC Kampala. (Nsambya Diary.)
24. Smith-Com, 2 October, 1898, ESA, A/4/13. The Mianzini Kikuyu boycotted Naivasha in favour of itinerant railway and private food buyers; Smith-Com, 31 October, 1898, ESA, A/4/13.
25. Berkeley-Hill (pte.), 8 October, 1898, FO2/172. Kavirondo porters refused to carry Berkeley's loads to Kipture; Hobley-Com, 1 June, 1899, ESA, A/4/17.
26. Broome-Com, 8 October, 1898, Grant-Com, 13 September, 1898, ESA, A/4/13. Hill's minute to Berkeley 8 October, 1898, FO2/172.
27. The Indians received a little over half the Uganda Rifles pay of Rs. 20 p.m. Broome said his men were useless without boots and other necessaries. Broome-Com, 22 June, 1898, 15 August, 1898, 17 October, 1898, ESA, A/4/11, 12, 13. Berkeley-FO, 5 August, 1898, FOCP, 7159/16/17.
28. Kitchener's meeting with Marchand at Fashoda on 19 September, 1898, was not known in Uganda until early October; Robinson and Gallagher, *op. cit.*, Chapter 12; Berkeley-FO, 8 July, 1898, FOCP, 7400/84 (this miscarried; a duplicate reached London on 10 February, 1899).
29. FOCP, 7159, 7400; FO2/158/164/201/237/430; ESA, A/4/11-14, A/5/4, A/6/4; Gray: *UJ*, 16 (1952); Barber, *op. cit.;* Lugard Papers; Malcolm's Diary; *ZG*, 18 January, 1899, 17 May, 1899; Sykes: *Service and Sport on the Tropical Nile;* Tylden: *J Army Hist. Research*, 1955-56.
30. FO2/175, Milne-Lugard, 7 October, 1898, 1 January, 1899, (Lugard Papers); Malcolm's Diary; Hall's Letters, 25 April, 1899; *The Times*, 23 January, 1899. The Commandant reported to the WO during the mutiny operations until 21 January, 1899 (FOCP, 7401/7). Squabbles arose over rank and command until Ternan resumed charge on 2 November, 1898.
31. Bagge-Com, 22 October, 1898, referring to Berkeley's despatch, 13 October, 1898, which has not been found; ESA, A/4/13.
32. RSD. NCB. Bagge supplied the Transport Dept. with 6,622 lb. in October. Broome-Com, 8 October, 1898, Smith-Com, 29 October, 1898, ESA, A/4/13, A/4/14. Ternan passed through Mau on his return from leave in October 1898.
33. RSD. Smith-Com, 31 October, 1898, ESA, A/4/13. Kamasia supplied 3,700 lb. John Boyes was given a contract to supply Ravine and Naivasha; Boyes *King of the Wakikuyu* (1912), p. 96.
34. Coles-Com, 20 October, 1898, Hobley-Com, 29 October, 1898, ESA, A/4/13. Mackinnon-FO, 2 November, 1898, FO2/172.
35. RSD 29 October, 1898, 5 November, 1898; 30 loads of Martini-Henry ammunition were sent from Ravine on 12 November, 1898.

16

TWO POWERS IN NANDI

The abandonment of the plans for an expedition meant that any improvement in relations with the Nandi would have to be brought about by peaceful means. Bagge's tour of the district, which had been designed with this end in mind and could have been carried out without disrupting the day to day running of the station, was also apparently abandoned.* Although there were five Europeans at Kipture to support Bathurst, and Capt. Cooper had sufficient troops at his disposal, after providing a small escort for the touring party, to ensure the safety of the station, Bagge evidently decided the tour was not as free from risk as he had previously thought. Berkeley's caution on this account may have been construed by Bagge either as an indication that the Commissioner's enthusiasm for the project had moderated, or even as a direct prohibition.

Conditions in Uganda had changed since Berkeley was at Mumias early in October 1898: two large columns under Major Coles and Capt. F. J. Fowler had left Kampala by the end of the month to avenge the attack on Lieut. Hannyngton, to break up the active remnant of the mutineers and to discourage the followers of the rebel kings from resuming operations against the government. A considerable part of the army was engaged in this campaign and in Martyr's advance down the Nile, so district officers elsewhere in the Protectorate were constrained to avoid activities which might place further burdens on the armed forces. The Nandi elders, who were unaware of events in Western Uganda, must have pondered on Bagge's failure to undertake a journey on which he had seemed to place great store, and about which he had consulted the chiefs in the neighbourhood of the station. A favourable opportunity was seemingly lost for getting to know more about the district and for preparing the ground for better relations between the fort and the outlying sections. But Bagge's sudden optimism about the friendly disposition of the Nandi was based solely on what he had heard and seen near the fort. He had scarcely any information about the attitude of the majority of the people, who had held steadfastly aloof from any relations with the government. Even in Kavirondo, where tours were frequently undertaken, officials sometimes encountered suspicion and verbal hostility, though blows were seldom struck. In the much different circumstances existing in Nandi, Bagge had no means of gauging what the reactions would be to the first visit many of the Nandi had received from a district officer. The projected tour, which might have appeared to some of the Nandi an unwarranted invasion of their privacy, could have caused an incident of too serious a nature for the government to ignore. As retaliatory action in such a contingency would have to be delayed until troops could be released from their active roles in North-Western Uganda or rushed up from Jubaland, Bagge probably acted wisely in not attempting to carry out his plans. The gains to be anticipated from a series of visits to hitherto untouched and indifferent sections were doubtful; the embarrassment and inconvenience created by the need to redress any outrages which occurred during the tour were certain and obvious.

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* There is no record of Bagge's itinerary or of presents to chiefs in outlying areas. Hobley's suggestion that such a tour should be made in September 1899 (ESA, A/4/20), supports the view that Bagge's plans were cancelled.

As it was, November 1898 passed quietly. Presents were made to Latongwa and Torori, Kavirondo porters travelled unmolested from Kitoto's, Mumias and Kakamega, several special messages were safely carried by pairs of Masai runners between Ravine and Kipture, and Blackett, who was running out trial lines for the railway over Mau, organised commissariat caravans from the survey camps to his base at Ravine. Instead of making the first major attempt to break down Nandi suspicion and indifference, and to gain some reliable information on tribal structure and customs, Bagge was mainly engaged during the month on the more humdrum business of ensuring the food supply for his station and Ravine. In order to lighten the burden on Kipture, he recommended that the proposed headquarters of the 3rd Battalion should be located at Kakamega rather than in Nandi. He considered it would be impossible to supply food for more than half a company for any length of time at Kipture, with the result that a larger garrison would eventually have to be reduced (as it had been in the past when food reserves ran low) to the inconvenience and annoyance of all concerned. Even without the addition of a headquarters detachment, Bagge's resources were stretched to the uttermost. He was supplying seventy loads of food a month to Ravine without any assistance from Johnson's carts, which could only cope with government loads, animal fodder, and food for the transport staff. The station staff were occupied half the month carrying mails, donkeys had proved unsuitable in wet weather, and hired porters were difficult to get and uneconomic. Moreover, because of food shortages throughout Mau, a special concession had to be made for district officers to shoot game in the reserves which were established in November 1898 around Kipture, Ravine and Naivasha.[1]

The food supply for Nandi and Ravine was also of some concern to Hobley, since the bulk of it was supplied by producers in his district to a food store which was staffed by men over whom he had no control. Increased concentrations of staff, troops and transport men at Ravine and Kipture had depleted supplies in the neighbourhood of the Kakamega food post, with the result that the headman in charge of the depot was compelled to despatch small parties to outlying tribes in order to make good the deficiency. Little difficulty was experienced in buying food, which the producers were usually prepared to carry into the Kakamega depot. At the end of November 1898, however, a Somali soldier attached to the post and a Swahili porter from Kipture tried unsuccessfully to persuade some Kakamega to bring the food they had sold into the depot. Threats that their cattle would be seized made no impression on the vendors and, after an altercation, both government employees were speared by the incensed warriors. This successful resistance to the importunities of the inadequately supervised and poorly disciplined parties from the food depot encouraged several sections of the Kakamega and Maragoli to sink their differences, and emboldened them to take oaths to offer a combined front against further demands from the administration to recruit them for porterage or other forms of work. Their non-co-operation jeopardised the food supply for Kipture and Ravine, and Hobley feared that if it spread to other sections it would disrupt the transport arrangements which he had painstakingly organised throughout Kavirondo. As it was a cardinal point in his policy that retribution should be meted out quickly whenever government servants were attacked, and as the oathing ceremonies were a direct challenge to his personal ascendancy over the Kavirondo, Hobley took immediate action without reference to Entebbe.

Hobley left Mumias on 3 December 1898 with Capt. Delmé-Radcliffe's riflemen, who were later reinforced by Capt. Cooper and a small detachment from Kipture. Attempts to settle the dispute through Kivatsi, a loyal Kakamega chief, having failed, the expedition worked through the country in two columns for two days, during which time considerable damage was done and a small amount of stock was captured. Peace was concluded with the offending Kakamega and Maragoli, who returned the rifles lost in the affray, and promised to supply the government with labour on a rota system. Although they had no connection with the murders, Hobley summoned three Tiriki sections to the peace ceremonies, as some members of this tribe were allegedly hostile to the government. After Cooper returned to Kipture, ("his absence from that station causing considerable inconvenience"), Hobley exacted similar promises from the Mangali Banyore and then attacked their recalcitrant brethren on the Maragoli Hills. The latter declared from their rocky fastnesses that they wanted no intercourse with Europeans, and that before they would work they would fight. In a few hours the tribesmen decided to change their minds, the road to Kitoto's was reopened, and the nearby Kisumu Luo sent messengers offering to accept paid employment with the government. By this rapid, decisive action, Hobley safeguarded the food supplies for Kipture, and also strengthened his hold over sections capable of threatening the Uganda Road and the link with Kitoto's. When Hobley's report was received in Entebbe, Coles complained that sanction should have been sought before action was taken, and minuted "all this disturbance took place because one party of natives ordered another to carry food; don't you think refusal a little legitimate considering the *modus operandi?* I should think in future a white man might accompany these food parties whenever possible". This was a counsel of perfection which neither Hobley nor Bagge could implement.[2]

This satisfactory report on the pacification of the Kakamega and Maragoli ended with an admission that there remained a block of people on or near the escarpment overlooking the Kano Plains, with whom Hobley was not well acquainted. He also conceded that, apart from the inhabitants of the small area immediately under Kitoto's jurisdiction, the dense population on the plains bordering the Kavirondo Gulf had yet to acknowledge British suzerainty. Coles commented that it would be advisable, in view of the rerouting of the railway, for a better understanding to be established with the unadministered tribes, who had acquired a new importance because of their position near the railway line and terminus. Coles' suggestion was given added point later in December 1898, when two Uganda Riflemen on the Kipture establishment were murdered in the vicinity of the Gulf, in circumstances similar to those which had resulted in the recent operations against the Kakamega. The soldiers, who had been sent to recruit porters, were speared while looting fowls from Luo huts.* Hobley complained that the Nandi food-collecting posts at Kakamega and Kitoto's were manned by Africans from Kipture, who had a very free hand in their dealings and wandered round the neighbourhood of the stores without reference to Mumias.

This intrusion into Hobley's territory not only caused confusion in the minds of co-operative sections, but was liable to result in punitive measures to obtain reparation for the murder of government employees. On occasions, such as the recent Kakamega expedition, punitive measures were a useful means of furthering Hobley's pacification policy, but he did not want future relations in the Kitoto's area to be jeopardised by the arbitrary methods employed by the Kipture detachment. Since it was impossible to control either the tribesmen or the government staff on the Kano Plains from Mumias, Hobley recommended that the food post should be evacuated until a sub-station could be established there in accordance with the draft estimates for the next financial year. Moreover, restlessness over the failure of Kipture to provide for its own food requirements prompted Hobley to suggest that "if special efforts are made to develop a market in Nandi itself, I believe a sufficient supply would shortly be forthcoming for the needs of the Nandi station, and feel that the closer relationship induced by this development would be of incalculable service to the Nandi district". He concluded that "if this is *really* found to be impossible", then assistance from Kavirondo should be limited to the pacified tribes in the neighbourhood of the Kakamega post. Hobley's concern was understandable. Friendly tribes under his protection were being pressed to supply food and porters, in order to victual a station commanded by an officer who had consistently refrained from ordering the tribesmen under his charge to make any contribution towards the administration of their district. The loyal Kavirondo were, moreover, being harried by irresponsible agents operating miles from their headquarters and beyond the control of Hobley or their own officers. But should misconduct on the part of these agents lead to dispute and murder, it fell to Hobley's lot to avenge hostile acts against servants whose methods were far from being above suspicion.[3]

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* Hobley claimed later that the failure to punish the Luo concerned in the Kitoto's incident, "as our hands were tied somewhat at that time with regard to the punishment of native tribes", "encouraged the Uyoma and Semi to think they could commit outrages with impunity". Hobley-Com, 24 January, 1900, FOCP, 7405/6.

In November 1898 Ravine was asked for supplies of brass wire, cowries, white beads, Bombay cloth, iron chain and thin wire for the purchase of food, as Bagge reported that the Nandi market was good. This was a welcome development, though the presents made during the month indicated that supplies were apparently only procurable in the area immediately around the fort. The increased turn-over in the Nandi market did not, however, impress Col. Broome. He urged that Kipture should be abandoned unless there were political reasons for its retention, and recommended that the projected headquarters station should be located at Kakamega. He considered that Kipture had been badly sited on the extreme outskirts of Nandi in a "practically uninhabited, foodless country", and was only useful as a military post on the lines of communication; whereas Kakamega was the centre of a thickly populated area, and had an abundant food supply. The Commissioner temporised by forwarding Broome's remarks to Bagge with a request for his opinion as to whether it would be safe to withdraw all troops from Nandi.[4]

The railway authorities were also concerned about the food shortage in Nandi. The Chief Engineer noted the difficulty of feeding coolies if they were employed in the district on repairs to Sclater's Road. He pointed out that Blackett's survey gangs, which were approaching Mau, would have to be supplied by special convoys until they reached Kitoto's. Similar problems would have to be overcome when transport of the *William Mackinnon* was resumed by the railway.[5] Commander Whitehouse, after completing the survey of the Kavirondo Gulf, marched to Kitoto's on 24 December 1898, where he observed the unsettled conditions existing on the Kano Plains. While he was at Kitoto's food depot, three riflemen of the small detachment from Kipture were speared by Yamangora.* Whitehouse experienced some difficulty in getting enough food for his caravan, and it was probably this and his incipient sickness that caused him to proceed to the coast through Nandi rather than over Mau to Nakuru. He left Kitoto's on 30 December 1898 and marched to the foot of the Nandi escarpment where he camped by the Rangombe tributary of the Orobo. Climbing the escarpment by an easier path than the one he had taken for the descent five months earlier, he arrived at Kipture on 1 January 1899.

Meanwhile little of moment had happened at Kipture during December 1898. Payments were made to a number of Nandi warriors, who may have been standing by to accompany Bagge on his projected tour, but no reason was given for this extraordinary expenditure. Stordy's inoculations had checked the spread of pleuro-pneumonia, so that Johnson was able to use oxen on the road between Ravine and Nandi. Important messages continued to be carried without incident by Masai runners working in pairs, though it was considered necessary to provide arms for an Italian caravan to ensure its safe passage through Nandi. Bathurst had been prostrated by two attacks of fever within a month and was prevented from proceeding to Entebbe. J. P. Wilson arrived at Kipture from Naivasha on Christmas Day to take over from Bagge, who was transferred to Toro. A CMS party passed along Sclater's Road to Kampala; one of its members noted that food was plentiful in Nandi and commented on the "Banandi in their red blankets"—the first reference to the wearing of clothes brought up from the coast.[6] At the end of the month, Col. Evatt passed through with two companies of the Indian contingent, and instructions were received to stockpile rations and purchase goats for the return of the Indian regiment which Evatt was marching to relieve.[7]

After Bagge's tour was abandoned, the matters which engrossed the attention of Kipture officials in the last two months of 1898 had little connection with the Nandi. This state of affairs lent some support to Broome's assertion that Kipture was nothing more than a military post on the lines of communication. The Nandi for their part ignored the station and carried on with their normal dry-season raiding activities. The warriors apparently avoided the protected tribes on their southern and western borders and concentrated on the Elgon area. Some of these raids are remembered in the traditions of the Sebei, who claim they defeated the Nandi and avenged the massacre of Arrkak during this period.*

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* Whitehouse-CEUR, 1 February, 1899, CO, 614/6, FOCP, 7422/27. The Yamangora were possibly Nyangori. This is possibly the incident mentioned on p. 355. Whitehouse's report on the "raids" he witnessed caused the FO to seek an explanation for incidents which seemed "to show that the operations of these officials are open to misconstruction in the minds of those who should be acquainted with their true nature"; FO-Berkeley, 24 March, 1899, FOCP, 7400/215. Hobley's conduct was subsequently vindicated; Hobley-Com, 1 June, 1899, ESA, A/4/17, FO2/202, FOCP, 7422/57.

Thus the district continued to be governed by two authorities, both of which were occupied in furthering their separate interests. Despite the fact that the Protectorate's representative at Kipture was litle more than "a sultan within his own walls", the government maintained the fiction that Nandi was an administered district.[8] Hardinge, the professional diplomat, was more realistic in his approach to the Masai problem in the EAP. Instead of appointing a collector to administer the Masai district, he made Hinde the Political Agent for the Masailand Agency when it was created in December 1898. Hardinge appreciated the need for different methods in dealing with the Masai from those which had been used in Kikuyu and Ukambani. He looked upon Hinde's functions as political and diplomatic rather than administrative. Neither the Nandi nor the Masai had entered into treaty obligations with the government, but in one important particular the prospects of a peaceful settlement with the Masai were more hopeful than with the Nandi. For Hardinge found in Lenana a traditional leader who was disposed to co-operate with the British, and to use his authority to induce the Masai to tolerate the light rein which the government tried to keep on the warriors' activities. Hinde was ordered to keep in constant touch with Lenana, and advised that his appointment was not intended to supersede the Laibon's authority but to exercise friendly supervision over its use.[9] Berkeley was less fortunately placed in his relations with the Nandi. His officers had purported to administer the district since 1896, but none of them had reached an accommodation with authoritative tribal leaders or managed to get in touch with Lenana's counterpart, Kipchomber.

During January 1899 transport matters continued to take up most of the Kipture officials' time, so that little progress was made in improving relations with the Nandi. Many Masai runners were sent to Ravine in connection with the return of Macdonald's expedition, and presents were made to three Nandi chiefs. Arrangements were made for the return march of the 27 BLI, but the Nandi unlike other tribes along the road were not required to render any assistance to the passage of the 600 sepoys, and the 3,700 Basoga porters who were to accompany Grant to railhead with the regimental food and baggage. Kipture was asked to supply only 67 of the total requirements of over 5,000 loads that would be needed between Mumias and Fort Smith. No purchases were made from the Nandi, so Hobley was forced to hire Bienenfeld's caravan to transport 20,000 lb. of food from Kavirondo to Kipture. The Commissioner instructed chiefs in the vicinity of the road to stack grass and firewood at camps in their districts but these orders were not issued to chiefs in Nandi. Grant could hope for little assistance from Johnson's transport section based at Kipture. Although pleuro-pneumonia had died out in Nandi, it persisted in Kavirondo, so that waggons could not be employed west of Kipture, and female stock for exchange purposes could not be introduced into Nandi from Mumias. Owing to the breakdown of waggon transport because of disease and the condition of Sclater's Road, government mules and donkeys suffered heavily from the extra demands made upon them and were unable to cope with routine commitments. In order to meet the deficiency, the bulk of the loads for Uganda were transported by contractors' pack animals and by porters from Busoga, Kavirondo, and the famine stricken areas of the EAP.[10]

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* Weatherby, *UJ*, 26 (1962), p. 207; see p. 329.

Problems connected with the repair of the cart road were discussed by the railway and Protectorate authorities in January 1899, when it was decided that the section from Ravine to Port Victoria would be worked by porters and pack animals, and that major road repairs would be deferred until the *William Mackinnon* was launched. The sum of £12,000, which had been sanctioned for repairing Sclater's Road, was switched to the construction of a cart road near the new railway route from Nakuru to the Kavirondo Gulf. While this work was being carried out, porters and pack animals were to be used to transport the steamer loads on the rough survey track over Mau and through the Nyando Valley. Providing there were no unforeseen troubles among the "Kavirondo", the Chief Engineer hoped to get the *William Mackinnon* through to the Lake by this means. In the meantime Blackett, after crossing Mau, was almost halted by a breakdown in his arrangements to supply the survey camps through Ravine. In order to cope with this emergency regular convoys were organised from the stores at Molo and Mbaruk, and an assistant storekeeper with a large reserve of food was sent to Kitoto's to establish a station and to purchase supplies from the Luo.[11] Thus Cooper, the railway representative, became the first European to be stationed at Kitoto's, although Hobley had repeatedly made requests for a sub-station there in order to honour the Company's 1889 treaty, and to open up South Kavirondo and tap the food granary of the Kano Plains. While these requests had been turned down ostensibly because of lack of staff and resources, it is probable that Berkeley's decisions were also influenced by the danger of embroilment with the Nandi and Lumbwa if protection were accorded to the long suffering Kitoto.[12]

Although Whitehouse's decision to develop the Nyando Valley route meant the eventual abandonment of Sclater's Road, Hobley had to use the old cart track in order to meet the heavy demands for food and transport that were made on his district resources. During January 1899, Kavirondo supplied food to Kipture and Ravine, as well as for Macdonald's expedition, Grant's caravan, the Indian regiment, Uganda Transport, railway survey parties and passing caravans. Grain was purchased at Mumias, Port Victoria, Kakamega, Kitoto's, Samia and Elgon, and requisitions were made on tribes as far apart as the Kitosh and Luo. For Grant's caravan alone Hobley produced more than 4,000 loads or over a hundred tons of food. Most of these huge quantities were supplied through the chiefs, who also provided a number of men for porterage and other duties.

Apart from disquieting rumours of a devastating German raid on the country between Shirati and Kach, Hobley's district was fortunately peaceful after the Kakamega expedition and his negotiations with the tribes to the south and east of Mumias.[13] When six soldiers were returning from Mumias after escorting Bagge on the first stage of his journey to Toro, an incident occurred which might have had serious repercussions. But Hobley compensated the family of a Kakamega who was murdered by a Uganda Rifleman, and thus prevented any disruption of the peaceful relations which had been established in the previous month. Hobley remarked in his report on this outrage that the "natives are very ignorant and unsophisticated and at times are apt to identify hasty, individual actions with those of the Administration".* The fact that he no longer regarded it imperative for retribution to be exacted for the wound inflicted by the murdered man on the corporal in charge of Bagge's escort demonstrated that Hobley's position was sufficiently established to enable him to deal with incidents on their merits, without feeling bound to institute reprisals for every injury done to a government servant. He did not apparently appreciate, however, that the aptness which he ascribed to the Kavirondo was equally applicable to district officers. The government's relations with the Nandi provided several examples of hasty actions by individual tribesmen, which had been regarded as the premeditated acts of sections, or as proof of the truculence and indiscipline of the entire tribe.

Hobley's long-standing commitment to the Macdonald expedition was fulfilled on 7 January 1899, when Austin marched out of Mumias with 450 men to return to the coast. Macdonald had hoped to establish a chain of posts between Elgon, Lake Rudolf and the Nile which would be visited by a military patrol based on Mumias. But the Foreign Office decreed that "it will for the present be impossible to undertake any further responsibilities on the Uganda frontier of a costly character".[14] Lieut. C. E. Pereira, with the seventy Sudanese and twenty-six Swahilis who had been selected by Macdonald to patrol the northern territories, was posted temporarily to Mumias to strengthen Hobley's garrison company. The day after Austin's caravan left the Kakamega food store, his camp was visited by Nandi, "decently clad in skins and the primitive nudity of Kavirondo was now left behind us". A number of Kavirondo who wished to travel to the coast asked if they could join the caravan. This request, and the number of private contractors moving freely along the Uganda Road, prompted Austin to comment on the change that had taken place since his first visit to Kavirondo in 1892. He also remarked on the station vegetable garden and excellent grazing at Kipture, as well as on the small amount of land cultivated by the Nandi. Although he managed to buy a few baskets of flour from local producers, this transaction was considered extraordinary as most of the Nandi near the fort were accustomed to buy flour from the garrison. Austin's observations on the country between Kipture and Lessos, "no cultivation, and habitations and natives were conspicuous by their absence", coincided with Broome's opinion that the station had been built on the fringe of Nandi occupation. Austin was enthusiastic about the climate and potentialities of the country, but admitted that "there would be difficulties in connection with the Labour Question and others, before the country can conscientiously be recommended to intending colonizers as likely to repay initial outlay".*

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* Hobley-Com, 19 January, 1899, ESA, A/4/15. In August 1896 Hobley compensated a Kakamega who had been wounded by a Smith, Mackenzie and Co. man. See p. 207.

Bagge drew up a schedule of trade goods which were acceptable in Nandi for Macdonald's report on the Juba expedition. Some of these, he claimed, were current throughout the district: iron chain, wire and thread; brass wire and thread; small white beads and cowries. Bombay cloth was accepted by the Koilegei near the station (but presumably nowhere else). Most cattle purchases were carried out with sheep as the medium (twenty to twenty-five sheep for females and ten to fifteen for males), but a few transactions were made with brass wire, iron chain, ukuta beads and other trade goods. Female cattle were generally unobtainable, but the Nandi would accept a cow or heifer in exchange for two of their bulls or bullocks. A few small pieces of ivory were traded at various rates: a 36 lb. piece for ten sheep, 54 lb. for a cow and so on *pro rata.*[15]

This price list demonstrated the narrow scope of the trading transactions carried on with the Nandi, who exhibited little desire for the trade goods current in Kavirondo and other districts. Their wants were few and their chief concern was the enlargement of their flocks and herds by the acquisition of breeding stock. Although the demand for cloth and blankets was increasing in most of the administered parts of the Protectorate, there was only a negligible, localised market for these commodities in Nandi. Bagge's catalogue indicated that all forms of trading were largely confined to the sections near Kipture and Sclater's Road. This was not surprising as none of the coastal firms had tried to develop the Nandi market, and only Jumbe Kimameta had operated in districts away from the Uganda Road. The remark about the Koilegei near the station is the first reference made by a Kipture official to a *pororiet* by name, although the district had been administered for nearly three years.*

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* Austin, *op. cit.*, pp. 252-56; see p. 356. Chapter 3. Austin's Diary.

During his two periods of service at Kipture Bagge had done little to improve relations with the Nandi. It was unlikely that a new man to the district would succeed where Bagge had failed, unless J. P. Wilson had the will and resources to introduce more positive policies than his predecessor.† Wilson bought 23,800 lb. of food for the BLI caravan in February 1899, but as no presents were made to Nandi chiefs the purchases were probably made at Kakamega or Kitoto's; the Nandi contribution to this major undertaking was apparently limited to the sale of forty goats valued at Rs. 245. Berkeley reached Kipture on 21 February 1899 on his way to Ravine to recuperate from prolonged spells of sickness. After his arrival a large number of important messages were carried along Sclater's Road between Nandi and the temporary telegraph station at Naivasha. Some of these were entrusted to Nandi runners, but there were no other signs that the tribe was ready to co-operate with the government. Johnson's ox carts were back in service in the middle of February, but no cattle exchange transactions were negotiated with the Nandi to replenish the department's herd.[16]

Although the district had been free from incidents for several months, there was apparently little confidence that this state of affairs would be maintained. Whitehouse hoped to get the *William Mackinnon* to the Lake by the end of the year, "provided there was no trouble with the Nandi", and to supply the survey parties from Kitoto's "if the country is in a reasonably quiet state". At that time none of the railway parties had been attacked on the western slopes of Mau, and Blackett's survey caravan of six Indians and 185 Africans had reported friendly relations with the tribesmen they encountered.[17] Johnson supported Major Smith's recommendation that strong guards would be needed for the night stables in the Eastern Province. The original estimate had been for a hundred soldiers to be shared equally among the twenty projected posts. However, since Smith thought that tribesmen (presumably Masai) would undertake guard duties from Naivasha to Ravine, Johnson proposed that nine men should be stationed at Lessos and twelve at Darajani, the latter camp being near the place where the Nandi-Lumbwa track crossed the cart road. Hardinge, in far away Zanzibar, tried to comply with the Foreign Office's urgent demand for reductions in the transport estimates: he suggested that stable guards were unnecessary, as their functions could be carried out by local administrative patrols. Johnson contended that if troops could not be supplied from the Mau garrisons, soldiers should be specially enlisted at Rs. 20 a month, because it was essential to attract reliable men for this unattractive job. He realised it would not be easy to staff isolated posts between Ravine and Kakamega, where the presence of cattle would incite the cupidity of Nandi warriors. Hardinge's recommendations were rejected and Johnson's views prevailed. Neither Kipture nor Ravine could spare men for administrative patrols, there was little likelihood of the Nandi or Kamasia volunteering for this work, and the regular troops at stations east of Mumias were barely sufficient to cope with routine garrison and escort duties.*

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* Hobley identified the Kapchepkendi, Kapsile and Kaptalam on the south escarpment in September 1896; see pp. 213-218.

† J. P. Wilson joined IBEA Co. 1890; storekeeper on arrival at Kampala December 1891; 2nd class assistant, Uganda Government 1893; Toro 1894; Naivasha January 1897.

Hardinge's intervention in the night stables controversy was only one item in the protracted wrangle between the Protectorate, the Foreign Office and the Treasury over the Uganda estimates for 1899-1900. The operations against Mwanga, Kabarega and the mutineers, the despatch of the 27 BLI, the engagement of Evatt's Indian contingent and the cost of Ternan's military reorganisation scheme had resulted in an over-expenditure of £197,000 on the 1898-99 estimates. This alarming rise, in addition to the special funds allocated for Macdonald's expedition and the Uganda Railway, had provoked unfavourable criticism in Parliament and the press, and had enabled publicists to attack the government on the "Uganda muddle". Adverse comment was directed against the high cost of maintaining law and order by the employment of Indian contingents, and improving a transport system which was still in the experimental stage.[18] After lengthy negotiations the Treasury sanctioned a grant-in-aid of £250,000 for 1899-1900. Of this huge sum £50,000 were allocated to the newly reorganised transport system, but the Treasury was warned that this amount might prove inadequate.

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* Johnson-Mackinnon, 3 March, 1899, FOCP, 7401/44. The stables, which were estimated to cost £1,500, were 80 feet by 18 feet and accommodated 100 donkeys, 60 mules or 50 oxen. One Somali company garrisoned Kipture, Kakamega and Kitoto's; Ravine and Naivasha had half a company each.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer's budget surplus for 1898-99 was only £186,000, so a firm line had to be taken over East African expenditure. The Foreign Office refused to undertake fresh commitments against the Abyssinians and turned down Macdonald's scheme for occupying territory in Northern Uganda. Items in the EAP estimates for a political officer for Masailand and for additional posts elsewhere in the Protectorate were deleted on the grounds of expense, the possibility of their leading to punitive expeditions, and because of "severe pressure in other parts of the Empire".[19] Berkeley was told that all unnecessary troop movements and expeditions in Uganda should be avoided, and that the 27 BLI should be sent back to India without delay.

Sir Clement Hill went further and advocated the discontinuance of punitive expeditions and the use of levies: "I think the time has come for making an effort to put an end to the "punitive measures", which have for so long been harassing the Uganda Protectorate—I fear that the practice of using friendly natives to punish their hostile neighbours really tends to the devastation of the country to almost as great an extent as was the case before our Protectorate—the levies live on the country and probably sweep it like locusts". Salisbury rejected this argument on the grounds that Uganda was too unsettled for such a policy to be successful. The Foreign Secretary considered there were insufficient regulars to maintain law and order without the help of levies, and that the cost of providing extra troops would embarrass the government.[20]

The War Office also had misgivings about the ability of the East African forces to maintain security in an emergency without outside help, and urged that 61 officers and 2,830 men were needed to police an area nearly twice the size of France and Germany combined. The Foreign Office was criticised for its "hand to mouth" policy in security matters, and the commissioners were censured for consistently understating military necessities in their anxiety to avoid reproofs. The departure of the 27 BLI was deprecated until two new companies of local troops had been recruited, "as the Protectorate proper is by no means yet settled, and the detachment of Col. Martyr's column down the Nile adds seriously to the military responsibilities of the Commandant". These recommendations were scarcely likely to recommend themselves to the Treasury, however, and the Foreign Office ordered both commissioners to avoid punitive operations and extensions to the area under effective administration, so that all the local forces could concentrate on maintaining the *status quo*.[21]

The views of the War Office were accordingly brushed aside, and in March 1899 the Nandi watched as a huge caravan consisting of the 27 BLI sepoys and Grant's Basoga porters passed down the Uganda Road. Food purchases valued at Rs. 1,405 were made by Kipture during the month, and some of these may have come from the local people as Berkeley noted that the Nandi were bringing small quantities to the fort. Apparently no special help was given to Broome or Grant since no presents were made to Nandi chiefs. Firewood was purchased for the caravan at Kakamega, but at Kipture and other Nandi camps supplies were presumably cut and stacked by station staff or collected by the caravan's porters. The appearance of so large a body of troops must have caused the Nandi some anxiety and bewilderment; while a caravan of 126 sick Basoga who were sent back from Ravine must have been viewed with dismay; and the plight of the stricken porters could have done nothing to change the tribe's aversion to this form of employment.[22] Before Grant's caravan passed through, Cooper's company had been depleted by the departure of half of the Kipture garrison to relieve the troops who had been drafted from Luba's for Evatt's campaign against Mwanga and Kabarega in Bukedi. Cooper protested strongly against this order, which left him with only thirty rifles at Kipture and fifteen to man the Kakamega food post. This number was quite insufficient even for the safety of Kipture, where sentries were reduced to a dangerous level. When he warned Major Smith that road escorts would have to be provided by other troops, the latter minuted laconically "there are no other troops". Since Cooper would obviously be unable to spare ten riflemen for Johnson's stable guards, Mackinnon asked that the posts should be staffed with troops from the Protectorate reserve.[23]

Berkeley, who left Kipture for Ravine on 9 March 1899, did not share Cooper's alarm. Indeed, when the Commissioner was at Kipture there seemed no cause for anxiety: runners travelled safely between the station and Ravine; the houses in the neighbourhood of Kipture had been reoccupied by Nandi families; food was being brought into the fort; and Johnson was convinced that cattle exchange transactions could be resumed. Commenting unfavourably on the proposal to abandon Kipture in favour of a new headquarters station at Kakamega, Berkeley observed that the Nandi were "shy and somewhat nomadic" and that the country near Kipture was "either deserted or fairly well frequented according to the local frame of mind". When staff changes in Mau had to be made because of Major Smith's impending departure on leave, the Commissioner decided that as J. P. Wilson's presence was necessary at Kipture, it would be advisable for him to establish his headquarters there, "where matters appear to be progressing very satisfactorily". There were only three district officers in Mau at the time (Martin and Malek at Ravine and Wilson at Kipture), compared with seven in the 1899-1900 estimates, so Capt. Gorges was given civil and military charge at Naivasha and Kipture replaced Ravine as the district headquarters.*

Berkeley doubted whether Kipture was, in fact, on the extreme outskirts of Nandi in an uninhabited, foodless district, a doubt which he claimed was shared by Smith and other local officers. Apart from the fact that it was bad policy to abandon country which had been occupied for some time, the Commissioner thought that such a course would render the road insecure except for very strong parties. Many of the benefits that had been gained by shortening the Uganda Road would be lost if Kipture were abandoned, as small caravans would be forced to travel by the old track in order to avoid Nandi. Berkeley conceded that a new station would be needed at the terminus, if the railway went to the Kavirondo Gulf, but this would not detract from Kipture's usefulness as the district station for Nandi. The Commissioner realised when this despatch was written that he was not sufficiently recovered to return to Entebbe. He reminded Ternan, who would take over during his absence, that "you will remember that various difficulties have arisen in the Nandi District", and made it quite clear that Kipture must be retained as an essential link in the chain of communications.[24]

Along the railway where Blackett's preliminary lines had reached twenty-three miles from Mau Summit, work began on improving the survey track so that it could be used by pack animals. Whitehouse decided not to wait until a cart road had been made through the Nyando Valley before despatching loads of the *William Mackinnon* to the Kavirondo Gulf, but proposed using pack animals. This proceeding seemed to be free from risk in view of the friendly relations which Blackett had maintained with the Nandi and Lumbwa during the survey operations. So many of the steamer loads (including those looted or scattered by Nandi raids on the original caravans) were found to be missing, however, that the assembly of the vessel had to be suspended, while replacements were made in the railway workshops or sent out from England.* The railway engineers were concerned at this time about events taking place east of Mau, where raiders had more opportunities to profit from attacks on camps, parties and materials than those presented to the Nandi by Blackett's survey operations. The Kamba and Kikuyu, who had hitherto shown little opposition to the advance of the railway, were driven by famine and the misconduct of the coolies to raid camps in search of food, and to attack small parties sent out in search of supplies. These attacks were an embarrassment, but never became as serious a threat to the progress of the line as that posed by the Nandi when the construction camps reached their country.[25] Telegraphic communication in the Rift Valley was interrupted by marauding bands, who frequently cut the wire at night between Naivasha and Mbaruk. In order to discourage the marauders, Gorges was authorised to employ Naivasha Masai patrols, an expedient which was successfully imitated later by Johnston in Busoga but was only given cursory consideration when the telegraph was interrupted for long periods by Nandi depredations.[26]

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* Malek died at Ravine on 2 April, 1899; Bathurst was transferred to Luba's. Owing to a shortage of administrative staff, medical and military officers and even clerks were given charge of districts.

More menacing than these temporary harassments was the unsettled state of Masailand. This was caused by attacks against the Laitokitok and other sections by the Germans and Sendeyu, and by Kikuyu encroachments into the forested Masai grazing reserves. Lenana had been persuaded to countermand a raid which Terere's Naivasha Masai had planned against Sendeyu in January 1899, but there was no certainty that his representations would continue to meet with the same response from the restless warriors.

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* CEUR-URC, 24 March, 1899, CO, 537/59; CO, 614/6. See p. 101.

If operations to restore settled conditions became necessary, these would have a prolonged adverse effect on the progress of the line and would have vindicated the Little Englanders' warnings about the dangers of building a railway in the face of Masai opposition. The situation was carefully watched during the succeeding months but the Masai never attacked the railway parties, so that punitive action was not needed against them (as it was later against the Nandi), and the line progressed almost without incident. Much of the credit for this happy state of affairs was due to the efforts which Hall and Ainsworth had made to gain the confidence of the Masai.[27]

Berkeley remained at Ravine until 22 April 1899, when he left for Naivasha and the coast as his stay in Mau had not restored him to health, and Ternan became Acting Commissioner for the second time.[28] Nandi remained quiet during the change-over period. Pairs of Masai runners continued to carry important despatches between Kipture and Ravine, and two Nandi warriors were employed on two occasions to take telegrams to the railway food depot at Kitoto's. Several large Kavirondo caravans passed through Nandi with food in preparation for the return journey of William Grant's porters, and small parties of contractors' men and sick Basoga travelled to Mumias without incident. Among the caravans was a pioneer trading venture sponsored by the Baganda chiefs who were striving to compete with European and Indian transporters on the Uganda Road. Blackett laid down stake lines thirty miles to the west of Mau Summit, and Richard Grant passed safely through Nandi to begin preliminary work for the construction of the *William Mackinnon*. Despite these comings and goings, the Nandi maintained their passive role: no presents were made to any of the chiefs, and no food was purchased for station needs or Grant's Basoga caravan. Owing to a recurrence of pleuro-pneumonia in Kavirondo, the movement of cattle into Nandi was prohibited, so Johnson's plans for building up the Transport Department's herd with Nandi stock were left in abeyance. Moreover, routine waggon convoys were suspended towards the end of April 1899, when Johnson's carts were sent to Fort Smith to bring up the scores of porters from Grant's caravan who were too ill to walk.[29]

The temporary telegraph reached Ravine on 6 April 1899. Berkeley urged that the wire should be continued to Kipture, even if the main line was to follow the railway route through the Nyando Valley, "as it would be undesirable to leave Nandi without telegraphic communication with headquarters". Plans were also made to extend the fortnightly Kampala-Mumias mail service throughout the Eastern Province, so that communications between the Mau stations and Buganda could be speeded up. The Nandi garrison was not strong enough to provide escorts for the extra mail parties, nor to protect the telegraph working gangs and the completed line, but the prospects of obtaining reinforcements were improved after Evatt captured Mwanga and Kabarega at Kangai on 9 April 1899. A considerable number of troops would be required if Kipture became a telegraph station, and if guards for the stables on Sclater's Road were to be furnished by local garrisons. Ternan was instructed that the stables were to be guarded by regular soldiers unless the chiefs could be persuaded to detail men for the purpose. In order to meet these extra commitments, Ternan would be forced to carry out the recommendations which he had made in November 1898, but which Berkeley had been unable to implement, for a resident force of three and a half companies in the Road Military District.[30]

By the end of April 1899 operations against the rebel kings and the mutineers were almost completed. The uneasy peace in the Eastern Province had enabled the Commandant to concentrate his forces to achieve this end, without being called upon to divert men to pacify the Nandi and to secure the safety of the Uganda Road. A great deal of the credit for this must be given to Berkeley, who consistently refused to sanction measures that were likely to antagonise the Nandi and to provoke them into taking retaliatory action against the government. Although he realised that the subjugation of the tribe would have to be undertaken at some time, he was unwilling to precipitate the issue by hasty or ill-prepared action. So long as the lines of communication with the coast were not jeopardised, Berkeley was content to let the Kipture officials hold a watching brief over the district, until the Protectorate forces had defeated the mutineers and restored law and order in Buganda and Bunyoro. In taking this view of the situation, the Commissioner probably anticipated that Nandi would eventually become an isolated enclave of resistance surrounded by settled districts; and that once this consummation had been achieved, the Nandi would come to acknowledge the futility of continued opposition and non-co-operation. If they failed to do so, operations to bring them finally to their bearings could be undertaken at the Government's convenience, and without risk of a repetition of the partial failure that had attended Cunningham's and Ternan's attempts to achieve this object. As the months passed without the government's authority being openly challenged by the Nandi, Berkeley's policy appeared to be justified by events. Furthermore, a breathing space had been won which had allowed improvements to be made in the political, military and transport resources of the Protectorate. Rebellion had been put down in Buganda and Bunyoro, Hobley and Grant had strengthened their hold over Kavirondo and Busoga, and Lenana had persuaded the Masai warriors to refrain from hostile acts near the Uganda Road which would have brought them into conflict with the government. In the military field, the army had been strengthened by the additional local companies recruited under Ternan's reorganisation scheme, and the arrival of a resident Indian contingent. All these encouraging developments convinced Berkeley that a turning point had been reached at last in Uganda affairs. He pleaded for more help in "strengthening the hands of the Administration and fitting it to cope with wider duties and interests than heretofore".[31]

Although the transport system consistently failed to match up to the increasing demands that were made upon it, some progress had been achieved: animal transport had succeeded if only intermittently; private contractors were moving loads along Sclater's Road; business firms were building stores at several district stations; speedier means of inter-district communication had been introduced; specie was beginning to replace trade goods as the medium of currency; and better facilities existed for the conveyance of men and goods across the Lake. Moreover, the Treasury had reluctantly agreed to increase expenditure on transport, as a result of Foreign Office representations that the situation in Uganda and the Nile Valley made it essential for the government to be able to forward supplies readily to Uganda "and otherwise be in a position to act promptly from the east coast". Above all the railway was slowly approaching the Protectorate, and plans had been made to expedite the construction of the *William Mackinnon*.[32]

Despite these advances the transport system remained the weak link, so that the security of Sclater's Road continued to be more important than the administrative progress of the districts through which it ran. The initiation of administrative measures in the road districts necessarily entailed some degree of interference with tribal authorities and practices, which might lead to embroilment and the disruption of the transport service. Berkeley saw the danger. He recognised that the furtherance of imperial interests depended on the avoidance of provocative measures and the deferment of punitive expeditions against the Nandi and Masai, which would close the road for the duration of the military operations. Even if such operations proved successful, Berkeley knew that large numbers of troops would be needed, after the field force had been withdrawn, to ensure obedience to the government's will, and that provision would have to be made to keep them fed and supplied. He recognised moreover that the Foreign Office would support him in military operations when these were unavoidable, but would not look kindly on punitive measures which would not only weaken the Protectorate unnecessarily and make additional demands on the overtaxed transport system but also endanger Salisbury's Nile Valley policy. Foreign Office thinking on this subject had changed very little since July 1896, when it was considered unwise to increase the Uganda army to any great extent until troops and supplies could be sent up speedily and economically from the EAP or India by the railway. The employment of Indian troops after the mutiny had proved a difficult and costly expedient, which had caused the Treasury to ask for the discontinuance of military expeditions into the interior, and the Indian Government to consider placing an embargo on the use of sepoys in the protectorates. The War Office had expressed concern over the security situation in East Africa and Martyr's Nile expedition, and Berkeley had been directed to reduce military operations to the minimum.[33] It was unlikely in these circumstances that the Commissioner would sanction a campaign against the Nandi, unless some major imperial interest was demonstrably threatened by the warriors' actions.

Berkeley stood his ground despite the recommendations of senior administrative officers, like Jackson and Smith, and the military commanders in Mau. Because of their personal involvement with the tribe, district officers were less inclined to treat Nandi opposition, non-co-operation and rumoured threats with the same objective detachment as the Commissioner at Entebbe. They were also insufficiently briefed to assess the seriousness and urgency of the "Nandi question" in relation to general policy, and the other commitments which Berkeley had to consider or the contingencies he had to fear. To Jackson and his colleagues, the Nandi represented the only people on the Uganda Road who had emerged unrepentant from punitive operations, and had obstinately rejected all efforts to persuade them to co-operate with their district officer, or even to acknowledge his existence. Few hostile acts had been committed by Nandi warriors since Cunningham's expedition in 1895, but the Mau officials were convinced that outrages on a tribal scale were possible at any time, and that the Laibon might organise a combination of all the Kalenjin tribes, with the object of sacking the district stations, closing the Uganda Road and forcing the government to quit the country. In order to prevent such a situation arising, Jackson and his sympathisers advocated tighter control over the tribe. But this could only be done by the provision of sufficient forces to exact retribution for incidents as they occurred, and to compel the Nandi to abandon all hopes of a successful combination against the government. Unless this were done, Jackson considered it was futile to expect co-operation from the Nandi and to envisage them settling down under British rule as the Kavirondo had been persuaded to do.

The personal characters of the protagonists also had a significant bearing on the debate. Berkeley was averse to military action by temperament, training and policy, whereas Jackson and Smith's experiences had brought them to believe in the efficacy (and humanity) of rapid and thorough punitive measures.[34] The Commissioner had nothing to gain professionally from grappling with the Nandi problem, unless the subjugation of the tribe could be effected quickly, cheaply and without placing other Protectorate interests at risk. Moreover, the gamble of Martyr's expedition made Berkeley unduly sensitive to the dangers of embroilment elsewhere. The district officers for their part naturally felt the invidiousness of their position, and recognised the contrast between the meagreness of their achievements in Nandi, compared with the progress which Hobley had made among the neighbouring Kavirondo.

In 1898 and the beginning of 1899 Berkeley won his point as he had done in 1897. He held in his hands the key to the situation —control of the armed forces and the resources for their supply and maintenance. Hobley was able to act in Kavirondo on his own initiative and independently of outside help; but the Kipture garrison was never strong enough to tempt the district officer to proceed in a similar manner against the Nandi, although the forces at his command were comparable in size to those under Hobley's control. When Berkeley left East Africa in May 1899, to resume his consular career in Tunis, he had contributed little towards the solution of the "Nandi question". But his consistent advocacy of an expectant policy had done much to postpone the issue until the Protectorate was better placed to resolve it.

References

1. RSD; NCB; CO, 614/4. Bagge-Com, 3 November, 1898, ESA, A/4/14. Berkeley-FO, 1 November, 1898, FOCP, 7400/85.
2. Hobley-Com, 21 December, 1898, ESA, A/4/14, in which he describes his administrative methods. Foaker and Radcliffe took similar action on Ugana Island in December 1898 for the murder of a soldier in July; Foaker-Hobley, 23 December, 1898, ESA, A/4/15.
3. Hobley-Com, 21 December, 1898, ESA, A/4/14; Coles minuted "No information from Nandi". A fine was imposed but the murderers eluded capture; Hobley-Com, 24 January, 1900, FOCP, 7405/6.
4. RSD; NCB. Broome-Com, 24 December, 1898, ESA, A/4/14.
5. CEUR-FO, 1 December, 1898, FO2/172, 14 December, 1898, WP III; CEUR was lukewarm about diverting men to the Ravine-Mumias section which was useless to the railway.
6. Rev. S. R. Skeens, *Reminiscences of Busoga,* etc. (MS Uganda Society).
7. RSD; NCB. Mackinnon-FO, 30 December, 1898, FOCP, 7400/93. Smith-Com, 8 December, 1898; Bagge-Com, 18 December, 1898, ESA, A/4/14.
8. Burton, *op. cit.,* p. 360.
9. Hardinge-FO, 16 December, 1898, FOCP, 7400/48. Since neither the Masai nor the Nandi had surrendered their sovereign rights to the Crown by "treaty or grant", "power and jurisdiction" were claimed over both tribes through the East Africa Order-in-Council 1889 (Foreign Jurisdiction Act) on the grounds of "usage and sufferance"; *London Gazette,* 22 October, 1889, p. 5557.
10. RSD; NCB. Grant-Com, 4 January, 1899, Hobley-Com, 17 January, 1899, ESA, A/4/15; Berkeley-Hobley and Grant 8 and 9 January, 1899, ESA, A/5/5. Mackinnon-FO, 23 February, 1899, FOCP, 7400/207. Four types of tape and intestinal worms were isolated from donkeys in Nandi. Porters were chiefly Kamba, Giriama and Taita, but some Masai carried loads to Kampala. Matson, "Famine in the Nineties", *KWN*, 18 August, 1961.
11. CEUR-FO, 17 January, 1899, CO, 537/59, 2 January, 1899, FO2/280. Only volunteers could be used for road repairs because of the coolies' contracts. For the effect of the *Bhundara* plague ship on the CEUR's decision see WP IV, CO, 614/6, FOCP, 7400, 7401.
12. See Lonsdale, *op. cit.,* Chapter 3.

13. Hobley-Com, 2 January, 1899, 6 January, 1899, 17 January, 1899, ESA, A/4/15; 1 June, 1899, FO2/202. Luo informants reported that a military expedition from Shirati station had captured a large number of cattle in the Kach raid. Foaker complained that the Germans were taking an unfair advantage of the absence of a determined boundary. Baganda were raiding in the Port Victoria area; BRA, 14 January, 1899.
14. FO-Craufurd, 19 January, 1899, FOCP, 7400/77. Macdonald's plan was estimated to cost £18,000. Cf. FOCP, 6964/108 (Afmadu expedition); FO, 107/74, FO-Hardinge (Ogaden); FOCP, 7401/39/91; 7402/21/48/89 (Abyssinian raids) for similar restrictions on the EAP Northern Frontier.
15. Africa 9 (1899), p. 71, Cmd. 9503.
16. NCB; RSD.
17. CEUR-URC, February 1899, CO, 537/71; CO, 614/6. FOCP, 7422/15/27.
18. The original grant-in-aid was £142,000, so the total for 1898-99 was £339,000. 27 BLI cost £107,000 p.a. The cost of moving Evatt's troops to Uganda was £12,000 and of returning 27 BLI to Bombay £25,000. Speeches on the Supplementary Vote calling for an enquiry and a more experienced administration; Hansard LXVII, 700-735, 27 February, 1899; *The Times,* 23 and 24 January, 1899 and 27 January, 1899 (Weekly).
19. FO-Hardinge (tele) 11 and 15 February, 1899, FOCP, 7400/140/144. Hardinge-FO, 16 December, 1898, FO, 107/98; Salisbury's instructions were to mark time. Sudan, China, the Philippines, Samoa, Muscat, Transvaal and Nigeria were engaging the FO's attention outside Europe.
20. Hill's minute 16 December, 1898, FO2/164; he suggested enquiring "to what extent the natives can be disarmed".
21. WO-FO, 12 January, 1899, 14 February, 1899, FOCP, 7400/143. FO-Treas. 17 February, 1899, FOCP, 7400/150; Ternan-Com. 23 November, 1898, FOCP, 7400/132.
22. NCB; RSD.
23. Cooper-Com, 12 March, 1899, ESA, A/4/16; the Somalis of XIV Coy. withdrew from Kitoto's when the URy took over the food post. 340 men took part in the Bukedi campaign. Mackinnon-FO, 25 March, 1899, FOCP, 7401/44.
24. Berkeley-Ternan, 29 March, 1899, Berkeley-J. P. Wilson, 20 March, 1899, ESA, A/4/16, A/5/5; Berkeley-FO, 4 March, 1899, FO2/201.
25. CO, 614/6; FOCP, 7422/39/57/66/etc. 22 February, 1904, FO2/845.
26. Berkeley-Gorges, 1 April, 1899, ESA, A/5/5.
27. Hardinge-FO, 22 February, 1899, FOCP, 7401/11. Hall negotiated the land transactions with the Kikuyu, a procedure that was not followed in Nandi; Hall's Letters. Masai hostility, which had been feared more than anything else, proved to be minimal, and incomparably less than that shown by the Nandi and even the Kikuyu, Mungeam, *op. cit.*, p. 62. Ainsworth and Hall had served continuously at Machakos and Fort Smith respectively since 1892. From 1895 to June 1899, nine officers were in charge of Nandi.
28. Berkeley arrived at Zanzibar, 24 May, 1899.
29. RSD; NCB. CO, 614/6. Mackinnon-FO, 20 May, 1899, FOCP, 7401/129. Mika Sematimba took an exploratory party to Mombasa in December 1898; Matson, "Baganda Merchant Venturers", *UJ*, 32 (1968), 1-16; RSD; NCB; CO, 614/6; Mackinnon-FO, 20 May, 1899, FOCP, 7401/129.
30. CO, 614/6, 20 April, 1899; ESA, A/4/15, 7 April, 1899. FO-Ternan, 21 April, 1899, FOCP, 7401/52. Ternan-Com. 23 November, 1898, FOCP, 7400/132, FOCP, 7422/36, FO2/205.
31. Berkeley-FO, 28 November, 1898, FOCP, 7400/132. Hill 14 May, 1901, FOCP, 7514.

32. Jackson was able to use specie instead of cloth for payments in Buganda; Smith-OC, Entebbe, 14 August, 1899, BRA. The railway and increased competition were slowly reducing the price of goods; Berkeley-FO, 30 March, 1899, FOCP, 7401/90. FO-Treas, 25 November, 1898, FOCP, 7159/94. On 31 March, 1899, the railway was open to Kiu (mile 265); the line was workable much farther ahead and work was in progress on approaches to the Rift Valley and the Uganda Protectorate. Hill, 1 February, 1899, FOCP, 7075.
33. FO-WO, 30 July, 1896, FOCP, 6861/84; Treas-FO, 31 January, 1899, FOCP, 7400/108; WOID-FO, 14 February, 1899, FOCP, 7400/143; IO-FO, 31 January, 1899, FOCP, 7400/113; the Indian Government had made similar representations in 1893 and 1896.
34. Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 297.

APPENDIX I NANDI STATION COMMANDERS

Name and Appointment	*O.C. Nandi Station*	*Remarks*
1. GUASA MASA		
Sitwell, Capt. C. G. H. (1858-1900); appointed 1st Class Assistant 8-5-1895	23-9-1895—10-11-1895	To Toro after 1st Nandi expedition.
SUDANESE OFFICER.	10-11-1895—20-12-1895	During 1st Nandi expedition.
Foaker, F. G. (-1912); appointed 2nd Class Assistant 31-8-1894; joined I.B.E.A. Coy. 10-10-1889.	20-12-1895—27-5-1896	
2. KIPTURE		
Foaker, F. G.	28-5-1896—2-8-1896	Left on home leave.
Bagge, S. S. (1859—1900); appointed 2nd Class Assistant 8-10-1894; joined IBEA Coy. 9-5-1890.	2-8-1896—10-3-1897	Left on home leave.
Bagnall, Capt. C. E. (1861-1923); appointed 2nd Class Assistant 7-7-1896	10-3-1897—17-5-1897	On Kamasia and 2nd Nandi expeditions.
Tomkins, S. C. (-1946); appointed 3rd Class Assistant 11-3-1896	17-5-1897—22-6-1897	During above expeditions.
Bagnall, Capt. C. E.	22-6-1897—19-11-1897	To Uganda for mutiny operations.
Bushiri, Headman (?Swahili)	19-11-1897—11-12-1897	Committed suicide.
Unnamed **Headman** or **Askari** (? Swahili)	11-12-1897—11-12-1898	
Tomkins, S. C.	11-2-1898—13-4-1898	Reopened station.
Bagge, S. S.	13-4-1898—8-1-1899	To Toro.
Wilson, J.P. (—1911); Appointed 2nd Class Assistant 30-8-1894; joined IBEA Coy. 20-12-1890.	8-1-1899—12-6-1899	O.C. Mau District to Entebbe.

Appendix 2 Glossary of Nandi and other vernacular words

Askari	Soldier, armed attendant. (*Kiswahili*)
Babaka	Messengers, hence orders from the Kabaka. (*Luganda*)
Barngetuny	Nandi personal name meaning 'lion killer'; from *bar* (Kill') and *ngetuny* ('lion').
Boriti	Mangrove poles used as roof beams. (*Kiswahili*)
Chumba	Person wearing clothes, hence 'strangers' and especially Arabs and Europeans. (Nandi, *Chumbin-det*, pl. *Chumbek*)
Hongo	Toll levied on caravans in return for a safe passage through a (chief's) territory. (Kiswahili)
Kamanaganik	Nandi custom of loaning cattle to friends.
Keliot	*Acokanthera Schimperi* tree, a decoction from the leaves and twigs of which is used as arrow-poison.
Kesumei	Nandi custom of loaning food on the understanding that the loan will soon be repaid.
Kaptich	Grazing grounds in distant, uninhabited areas; lit. 'place' (*Kap*) of 'cattle' (*tich*).
Kiboko	Strip of raw hippopotamus hide used as a whip for administering punishment. (Kiswahili).
Kiptaiyat	pl. *Kiptainik;* leader of a *siritiet*, or raiding band.
Kiruogindet	pl. *Kiruogik;* elder renowned for wisdom in settling disputes; counsellor; judge.
Kokwet	pl. *Kokwotinwek;* council which governs the *koret* and adjudicates on disputes.
Koret	pl. *Korotinwek;* the smallest geographical area, the inhabitants of which the basic Nandi governing unit.
Laibon	Anglicized word for the Masai *L-oibonok* (ritual experts) and the Nandi *orkoik*.
Manyatta	Warriors' Kraal. (Masai).
Maotiot	pl. *Maotik; pororiet* representative who consulted the *Laibon* and communicated his wishes to the *pororiet* council.
Mtama	Millet (sorghum), having larger seeds than *wimbi*. (Kiswahili)
Orkoiyot	pl. *Orkoik;* medicine-man; name given by the Nandi to the Uasin Gishu Masai *laibons*.
Otuaget	pl. *Otuagik;* servant; slave; caravan porter.
Pororiet	pl. *Pororosiek;* the largest territorial, military and governing unit in Nandi section .
Saget-ap-Eito	Ceremony marking the 'retirement' of a 'warrior' age-set; lit. 'slaughter of the bullock'.
Saza	For *Owesaza*, a Baganda county chief. (Luganda)
Setanik	War medicine given by the *Laibon* to a raid commander.
Sigiroinet	pl. *Sigiroinok;* house for young unmarried men; barrack-room of the junior warriors.
Sime	Large knife or short two-edged sword, the blade of which broadens near the distal end. (Kiswahili)
Siritiet	pl. *Siritaiik;* smallest Nandi military unit; platoon or company.
Washenzi	Savages; used contemptuously by coastal dwellers for people in the interior. (Kiswahili)
Wimbi	Bulrush or finger millet. (Kiswahili)

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
MAP OF THE NANDI COUNTRY based on the maps compiled by Lieut. C.F.S. Vandeleur

34° 30'
40
50
35°
10
20
30
40
50
36°
Elegai
Guaso Masa
Lulburgo
Surangai
Bwanga
G. Masa Fort
Katape
Kapkoimur
Kirug
Kepdong
Kestra
Sergoit Rock
Kubkong or Kepdong
Nao (Londo) or Wei Wei (Kaulo)
to Njemps
Saingiro
R. Nzoia
Jubguia
Maiben
Yaridria
Kabras
Elsoruru
Eldalat
Nollosegeli
Kakeptui
Elburgolot
Uasin Gishu
Sosiani
Sukai
Ikinandi
Elgeyo Escarpment
Kamasia Escarpment
Kelosh
Kimong
Alagabiet
Elgorini camp
Walorie
Leosos
to R. Sio & Uganda Ferry
MUMIAS 4421'
to Port Victoria
Food post
Kobasor
Kambbir
West's camp
Tabolwa
Narogare
Kikelelwa's
Martini's
Food post (Isukha)
Anoldomie
Kotumbu
Samwiti (Kipsomoetei)
Kombe
Kipsirwo
Kimonde
NANDI
Ichuko
Sclater's Road
Asiory
Olmasidi
Umaramo
Kania's
Siyonso
Chavyika
Ketbui
Ueroya
Kakobis
Kingwal
Ngonyek swamp
Lessos
Martean
Walegeyon Camp
Neteredesi
Lembus
Eldoma Ravine
Eldjoro
Kaimosi
Kiptuiya
Amoi
Kapsobet
Kiture
Lolmiiningai
Siwo
Subugo
Masongo
Chesumei (Koiparak)
Mogong
Kisaigo
Kaptumo
Kosorgwa
Teito
Subugai line of hills
Timboroa
Ya Mwiba Ngore
Lekonge
Eldoma Ravine Station
Wakisa
Chubuguno
Korakor
Ruaye
Kaveren
Garak
Kwakimunu
Kobuljoi
Chibonyai
Uzun
Engorobobi Range
Narasha
Elerobi
Ngare Nyuk
Wakami
Tirfki
Nyangori
Mitete
Tinderet Range
Kesokon
to Nakuro
Yala
Onyara
Gem
SOUTH
Kiboswa
Maraba
Yemseria (Chepsiria)
Kapkolei
Koyo
Kipsabai
Chemase
Kundos
Kaborer or Kamwentwe
Maragolia
Marugwa
Soiga
Kevillat (Chebilat)
Maseno
Karanbo
Kajulu
Maragolia hills
Kosagam
Kabos
Chemursoi
Orobo
Chemelil
Sagene
Kibbitalet
Mau Escarpment
Eldalat
Kano Plain
Pangwa
Kibain salt lick
Kamilli
Longal Hills
Londiani
Elgwarigon
KISUMU
Kibigori
Enalgotwe
Emboga
Sagoria
Endubo
Molo
Uganda Railway to NAKURO
Kavirondo Gulf
Hardbo
KAVIRONDO
Nyamalo
Kitoto's
Sendeges
Ugowe Bay
Mtoma
Nyando
Nandi houses end
Mt. Blackett
Guaso Masai
Molo R.
Kedowa (Nyando)
Masai track to Lake Nakuro
Fort Ternan
Elburgon Range
LAKE VICTORIA
Sondu
Burgani
Belgut
Kosovo
Kach
Lumbwa
LAKE NAKURO
BS
TW
W
B
Scale 1"=4" Geographical miles
Small hills
Steeps
Rocks
Routes and camps in 1895 expedition
Open grass and scattered trees
Forests
Ranges
Bush wood
Villages and undulating
Surveyed line for Uganda Railway
Swamps
Thorn forest
Escarpment
Thick wood
Thickly populated
Sitwell's probable route in 1895 expedition
Cultivations
Lakes
Mountains
Bush and scrub
Stations
Caravan routes

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